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Abstract 
This research aims to enrich the existing literature on public administration, 
public accountability and public sector auditing. The research was undertaken 
through a comprehensive examination of the quality of information in the audit 
reports of the Indonesian State Audit Institution (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or BPK) 
with comparisons made between pre audit reform (1945-2000) and post audit 
reform (2001-2009). The study also evaluates the factors influencing the 
effectiveness and ineffectiveness of BPK audit information. To achieve these 
purposes, two main research questions were the focus of the study: How is the 
quality of information in BPK audit reports before and after audit reform? What are 
the key factors influencing the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of information in 
BPK audit reports? 
Data were collected through triangulation of observations, documentation, 
questionnaires and personal interviews. Purposive sampling and snowball 
techniques were applied in this study. The respondents and key informants engaged 
in this study were:(i) BPK auditors, Board members and managers;(ii) members of 
both central and regional Parliaments;(iii) public sector officials (auditees) at both 
the central and local level; and (iv)academics, researchers, and non government 
organisations (NGO). 
The study revealed that the Indonesia’s Executive (the President, Governors, 
Regents and Mayors)has historically neglected the roles and functions of BPK. Since 
the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 2001, the Indonesian government 
has reformed laws and regulations related to public sector auditing, including setting 
new rules for strengthening and improving BPK’s roles and functions. In situation 
where the Indonesian government needs immediate reform, BPK has been 
attempting to improve its professionalism and independence to provide better 
quality audit reports.  
Independence, professionalism and integrity are among the most important 
factors that influence public sector audits. However, in the past, BPK auditors lacked 
independence as the Executive influenced its administration and finances.Auditors 
also lackedopportunities to increase their professionalism by undertaking additional 
education and training. Since there was little incentive for auditors not to accept 
audit fees from auditees, the objectivity and integrity of auditors were reduced 
significantly.  
Fortunately, in response to the audit reform in 2001, the roles and functions 
of BPK have been strengthened. BPK has been able to give much more attention to 
education, training and the development of other skills and knowledge. BPK has also 
implemented improved remuneration and applied a rewards and sanctions system 
to strengthen auditor professionalism and integrity. This study revealed a significant 
improvement in the quantity and quality of BPK’s audit resources, including 
increases in the number of qualified auditors, representative offices, modern 
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equipment, and in the use of Information Technology (IT). However, the 
improvement inaudit resources have not quite matched with the increasing number 
of auditees and the authority given to the BPK. In terms of the quality of auditors, 
BPK has many new auditors, but they lack experience. To execute performance 
audits, BPK requires more auditors with diverse educational backgrounds in addition 
to accounting and finance.  
The research also showed that many factors have impeded the ‘followup’on 
information and recommendations in BPK audit reports.For example, Parliament’s 
lack of willingness to politically oversee the Executive, insufficient serious ‘buy-in’ by 
government to implement audit recommendations, and an unintegrated approach 
by authorised investigators to follow up on audit findings that indicate criminality 
and corruption. To what degree these factors influence the ineffectiveness of public 
sector auditsremains an open question and an areafor further research. 
It is clear from the research that there is further space for improvement of 
BPK’s functions to enhance the quality of public administration and accountability. 
Towards this, the study suggests recommendations to the BPK relating to four 
different aspects, namely: legal basis, institutional and resources, effectiveness of 
audit reports, human resources development. 
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Chapter 1  
Statement and Rationale for the Research on  
the Indonesian Public Sector Auditing 
This study examinesthe quality of information in audit reports produced by the 
Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia and the reasons behind theirineffectiveness or 
effectiveness. Moreover, itaddresses comparisons between pre and post audit reform in 
Indonesia. The research scope is limited to external, rather than internal, public sector 
auditing, due to concern over the performance and accountability of the Indonesian public 
sector. 
This chapter begins by describing the definitions of different types of auditing, the 
development of auditing, and the importance of public sector auditing in public 
administration. Then it describes the research problems and the significance and 
objectives of the study before exploring the research design and methodology, and 
limitations of the study. Finally, the chapter gives a brief overview on the thesis structure. 
1.1 Defining Public Sector Audit 
Before proceeding further, working definitions and the purposes of two distinctive 
types of audit in the public sector, namely, financial (including compliance) and 
performance audits will be provided. 
1.1.1 Financial (and Compliance) Auditing 
Several definitions of ‗financial auditing‘ (include compliance auditing) in public 
sector have been given by some academics as follows: 
 Reviewing whether auditees‘ financial statements, accounts, operations and 
other related financial information comply with laws and regulations and 
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present true and fair information (Gong 2009: 37; Hatherly and Skuse 1991 
quoted in Sherer and Turkey 1997: 182-3; Nosworthy 1999: 4; Ramos 
2006: 88-99). Russell (c2000: 25) added that financial audits include 
examining specifications of products andservices to see whether or not 
auditees comply with the specified requirements or standards.  
 Examining the financial reports of the public sector to seek information, 
obtain explanation, and provide justification from auditees in performing 
their transparency and accountability in managing public finance and 
resources (Mulgan 2003: 9). Moreover, in the context of public sector, 
Houghton and Jubb (2003: 299-300) added that the output of financial 
auditing is opinion of transparency and accountability of audited 
institutions from auditors. The auditors‘ opinion is valuable information to 
reflect the financial and economic condition of a country in reducing 
riskfor the public and market. 
 Examining auditees‘ financial reports and their compliance with laws and 
regulations, including audit standards, to support country‘s anticorruption 
programs(Nicoll 2005: 146-7). For instance, the anticorruption program 
conducted by the Auditor General of the State Audit of Vietnam, the 
Brazilian Court of Accounts, and the Audit Board of the Republic of 
Indonesia (BPK). 
 Verifying financial statements by referring and checking to a variety of 
evidence such as invoices, board minutes, contract notes, costing records 
and market values (Sikka 2009: 147). 
Besides the above definitions, Gauthier (2005: 20-32) pointed out two purposes of 
financial auditing relating to accountability of the public sector. The first purpose is 
related to fiscal accountability, which requires the government to be accountable when 
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making decisions regardingthe spending of public income and spending over a certain 
period (usually one fiscal year). The second purpose is related to operational 
accountability, which requires government agencies to meet their budget with operational 
objectives, and to provide financial statements based on audit standards. 
The abovementioneddefinitions and purposes indicate three main points about 
financial audits related to the public sector. Firstly, financial auditsare concerned with 
assessing and verifying whether the auditees‘ financial transactions, evidence, records and 
reports have been presented with adequate transparencyin accordance with audit 
standards. Secondly, financial audits—also called regulatory/compliance audits or process 
audits—verify financial processes to ensure and assure that financial transactions have 
complied with laws and regulations, including the audit standards. Thirdly, financial 
audits provides the auditor‘s opinion to the public on the transparency and accountability 
of the public sector in managing state finances; and prevents or reduces corruption, fraud,  
and othermisuses of state funds.  
1.1.2 Performance Auditing 
The second type of auditing is performance auditing (value-for-money auditing), 
which can be defined as follows:  
 Evaluating the management performance of the public sector to provide 
better services and to reduce public costs and resource use (Funnell 1997: 
89) or examining the effectiveness of programs or projects with concern on 
efficiency and the value of money (Broadbent 1992: 13).  
 Providing recommendations for the better performance of public sector 
administration and stimulating the government to providebetter goods and 
services and to use public resources effectively and efficiently (Houghton 
1998: 30-35, Wheat 1991: 387-388).  
4 
 Assessing the management and operational performance of programs, 
considering the 3Es (economy, efficiency and effectiveness) to achieve the 
administrative objective of the New Public Management (Politt, et. al 
1999).  
 Examining the economy and efficiency of operations, the correctness of 
policies, and the extent to which the organisational objectives can be 
achieved (Andy 2002: 109-118).  
 Improving the value of public sector administration by providing 
constructive criticismand recommendations from auditors (Barrett 2003: 
13). Due tothe complexity and narrowness of contemporary policy issues 
and the changing of political culture, Wheat (1991: 387-388) believed that 
auditors are strategically positionedto provide recommendations for public 
agencies with a wider perspective, including onpolicy performance.  
 Examining the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability in the pre-
contracting stage for public-private partnershipsin line with the changes 
demanded from public organisations in administrating contracts with a 
variety of private agencies (English 2007: 331).  
The above definitions present three common points that performance audits 
examinepublic sector institutions through: (1) their efficiency in using public money or 
other public resources; (2) their effectiveness in conducting programs and projects; and (3) 
their ability to develop the economy by using its resources in the most productive manner 
and by following up constructive audit recommendations for increasing performance and 
service delivery of the public sector. These three points clearly describe that performance 
audits go beyond financial audits by evaluating the costs, benefits and achievements of 
programs and policies. Besides, performance audits have a dramatic impact on recent 
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public administration by providing recommendations to improve the performance of 
public sector agencies and eliminating the ineffectiveness of public policies. 
1.1.3 Difference between Financial and Performance Audits 
Some literature explains the differencesbetweenfinancial and performance audits 
fromdifferent perspectives. In terms of ‗audit results‘, Brown and Copeland (1985:3-8) 
pointed out that financial audit reports provideopinions on auditedfinancial statements, 
while performance audit reports provide audit recommendations for obtaining better 
organisation performance. In terms of ‗audit standards‘ and period of time, Politt et.al. 
(1999: 9-16) argued that financial auditing is conducted yearly and is based on financial 
audit standards and procedures. In contrast, performance auditing is carried out more 
occasionally and is based on evaluation of performance criteria. Indicators to measure 
performance vary in terms of scope, length, focusand design in every public agency.  
In terms of ‗auditor‘s competencies,‘ Sheldon (1996: 52) pointed out that 
performance auditing in the public sector requires a wide range of auditors‘ competencies, 
ability, and educational background to design performance targeting in auditing. In 
contrast, financial auditors require specific competencies in financial and accounting 
backgrounds, and additional knowledge in public administration. In terms of ‗orientation‘, 
Kitindi (1992: 8-11) believed that financial auditing is more related to examining financial 
reports whether the reports accord with the truth and facts, including compliance with the 
existing regulations. Whereas performance auditing has a broader future, long term and 
strategic orientationthat makes it relevant to examine not only the outputs and results of 
programs, but also their expected impacts and benefits. In addition, Lindeberg (2007: 337-
350) compared financial and performance auditing and non-audit evaluative practices. He 
argued that performance auditing has great differences with financial auditing, but greater 
similarity with program evaluation. Therefore, the recommendations from performance 
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auditing can be used for evaluating and monitoring the programs and policies 
implemented in the public sector. 
Outside financial and performance audits, there are specific purpose audits that can 
be based on a request from the President, Members of Parliament, or government agencies 
that need immediate audits for certain purposes. Some examples of this type of auditing 
are related forensic, information technology (IT), environment, and financial reports (such 
as auditing for expenditure, tax income, non-tax income, subsidies, foreign loans, donors 
and foreign aid) for certain programs or projects.  
Table 1.1 presents a summary of comparisons between financial and performance 
audits.  
Table 1-1 Comparison between Financial and Performance Audits 
  Financial (Compliance) Audit Performance Audit 
 
Source: Compiled from the following: 
1. Brown, R.E. and Copeland, R.M., 1985, Current issues and developments in governmental accounting 
and auditing: impact on public policy, Public Budgeting and Finance, 5(2), pp. 3-8. 
2. Politt, C., Girre, X., Londsdale, J., Mul, R., Summa, H., and Waerness, M., 1999. Performance or 
Compliance? Performance audit and public management in five countries, Oxford University Press, New 
York, p. 16. 
3. Sheldon, D.R., 1996. Achieving Accountability in Business and Government, Quorum Books, Westport, 
Conn, p. 52. 
4. Kitindi, E.G., 1992. Performance auditing in Tanzanian parastatals, International Journal of 
Government Auditing, 19 (2), p. 8. 
5. Gong, T., 2009. Institutional learning and adaptation: developing state audit capacity in China, Public 
Administration and Development, 29 (1), p. 37. 
 
Objective/ 
Focus 
Examining financial statements 
regularity and compliance 
Assessing management and operational  
(inputs) for optimal 
performance(outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts) 
Results Audit opinions on compliance and 
financial statements  
Constructive recommendations for 
improving performance 
Auditor’s 
competency 
Strong background in finance,  
accounting, public administration and 
laws  
Education background from wide range 
of educational backgrounds 
Time Period Yearly/fiscal year Variesdepending on scope and focus 
Audit standard 
and norms 
Based on accounting standards, 
legitimacy, legality and completeness  
Based on performance audit standards, 
which applynorms of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness (3Es)  
Orientation Retrospective  Perspective or toward the future 
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1.2 Development of Public Sector Auditing and Accountability 
Academic authors have clearly described the development of public sector auditing 
in developed countries in line with the demand for more effective public accountability. 
Accountability is an essential process to ensure the elected politicians or public offices 
appointed to act responsibly and transparently (Schultz 2004: 2). This section describes 
the development of public sector auditing and accountability in the 1980s, 1990s and early 
21
st
 century. 
In the 1980s, public administrators and auditing theorists and practitioners 
acknowledged the contestable and changing practice of public auditing. Staats (1981: 1-
11) believed that the changing practice of public sector auditing was characterised by: (i) 
changing auditing practices to meet growing expectations from the public, (ii) growing 
auditing models as the number of complex problems increased, (iii) increasing number of 
evaluations onthe performance of government programs, (iv) increasing scope of audits to 
evaluate issues of social accounting that concern society, (v) developing audit techniques 
for paperless transaction systems, (vi) establishing fraud prevention instead of fraud 
detection,and (viii) continuing education for auditors in information system technology.  
In addition, Brown (1980: 259) highlighted the development and considerable 
growth of post audit and evaluation activities at the Legislative level. He found that public 
administration education and training circle paid little attention to issues of accountability 
and auditing.Guthrie (1989) also found a tremendous change in Australian public sector 
auditing as well as overseas on performance auditing for greater public accountability, 
rather than only administrative efficiency.  
In the 1990s, the focus of public sector auditing changed from financial and 
traditional auditing to performance auditing with afocus on efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy, and providing recommendations regardingmanagement. English and Guthrie 
(1991: 347-360) indicated several contestable and contentious issues in public sector 
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auditing, however, little attention was given by academics and professionals to research 
public sector auditing based on empirical data in specific areas. Guthrie (1992: 27-28) 
observed the development and changes in Australian public sector auditing that hada 
significant impact on the nature, scope, funding, organisation,staffing, and professional 
arrangements for public sector accountability. He also argued that public auditing has a 
significant function in maintaining the trust of public and Members of Legislative to the 
government‘s administration. Moreover, due to greater concern for social justice and 
equity and for developing public administration, public sector auditing has expanded its 
role with the development of performance auditing. This was examined by Guthrie and 
Parker (1999) in the Australian federal public sectorand by Jacobs (1998) and Guthrie and 
Parker (1999) in the New Zealand public sector.  
In the early 21
st
 century, the development of performance auditing in response to 
increasing demands for public accountability has continued. English and Guthrie (2000: 
98-114) emphasised the greater role of audit institutions in conducting performance 
auditing. According to Peter (Durrant 2000: 80), audit can hold agencies accountable 
through transparency. Besides, he believes that audit can support governance reforms. 
Moreover, Power (2003b: 188-191) found a potential development of auditing in line with 
increasing demand on program monitoring in public sector agencies. In addition, he 
emphasised improving of the role of auditing as a result of the development of accounting 
standards and higher demand from the public on accountability and performance of public 
sector.  
Therefore, the development and the role of the public sector auditing are 
increasingly important in the public sector. Audit institutions in the public sector are 
required to provide a broader role, not only for conducting financial audits, but also aimed 
more at performance audits. The relevant academic literature accurately portrays what 
public sector auditing has been facing in the late 1980s and more recently. However, most 
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of the studies and literature of public administration emphasised improving the role of 
public sector auditing in developed countries, instead of in developing countries such as 
Indonesia.Developing countries can learnfrom the experience of developed countries 
which hadexperienced to develop public sector auditing. 
1.3 The Importance of Public Sector Auditing 
The following sections describe the importance of auditing, especially for 
providing public accountability, effective and efficient administration, and good 
governance in the public sector.  
1.3.1 The Role of Auditing in Public Accountability 
Some scholars have argued that auditing has contributed topromoting the 
implementation of accountability in the public sector. Brooks and Parisher (1995: 72-83) 
claimed that public sector auditing is the key element in examining and evaluating 
government accountability in using public money and providing services to the public. 
Predengast (2003: 951) believed that the ability of bureaucracies to allocate public goods 
leads to a high level of inefficiency in the public sector. Public sector auditing can be an 
essential element in ensuring efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the 
government to the public (Barrett 2000: 67).  
In addition, Guthrie and English (1997:12) emphasised that the role of the 
AuditorGeneral is a vital part of the Westminster accountability mechanism to ensure the 
accountability of the Executive Government (the President, Governors, Regents and 
Mayors)to public needs and interests. Similarly, Nosworthy (1999: 4) believed that an 
independent audit institution has the function to examine government agencies in order to 
hold the Executive to be accountable to the public in using public funds and resources.  
According to Bovens (2005: 196-199), supreme audit institutions as external 
auditors of public sector have roles and functions inexternal administrative and financial 
10 
supervision that are closely related to administrative accountability. He (2007: 100) also 
underlined that most of administrative accountability dealswith a form of diagonal 
accountability which  helps parliament control but  not as a part of the direct chain of 
Parliament and government as principal and agent. Audit institutions report their findings 
on financial accountability and performance of auditees to their stakeholders. 
Accountability of government agenciesto the public and Parliament is called ‗horizontal 
accountability.‘ Moreover, Day and Klein (1987: 10-12) underlined political 
accountability as the function of Parliament in reviewing the governmentagenciesto hold 
them to account for their actions.  
Coy and Dixon (2004: 81) also argued that there are three discerning report 
paradigms, namely stewardship, decision usefulness and public accountability. 
Stewardship ―entails accountability between agent and principal‖; decision usefulness 
considers ―the information needs of existing and potential investors, lenders and similar 
suppliers of capital‖; and public accountability ―takes a broader perspective that 
encompasses social, political and wider economic interest‖.  
Gray et.al. (1993: 3) also underlined that most government concern over the last 
three decades has been about how to control public expenditure and how to strengthen 
public accountability with auditing and evaluation instruments. Auditors have been aware 
that the understanding of accountability and openness in the public sectorallowsthe public 
to criticize. The criticism can force the government to change and reform (Funnell 2003: 
114). Uhr (1999: 100) underlined that an audit body is an accountability agency 
thatholdsauditees to be accountable in managing public funds and providing better public 
services.  
Therefore, there is no doubt that auditing in the public sector has significantly 
affected assurance of government‘s accountability in managing and using public funds and 
other public resources for providing better benefits and services for the public. 
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1.3.2 Audit for Effectiveness and Efficiencyin Public Administration 
In line with the political demands for greater accountability in providing better 
services to the public and efficiency in managing public resources, public sector auditing 
became a necessity for the public sector in recent decades (Power 2003b: 191). Members 
of Parliament as representative of the public have greater concern about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the quality of public sector goods and services. Durrant (2000: 80) 
highlighted that public sector auditing is aprominent aspect for encouraging public sector 
agencies to improve their effectiveness and efficiency in public administration.  
Efficiency in using public funds and resources reduces the resources needed to 
provide public goods and services, while effectiveness provides a certain result (outputs, 
outcomes, impacts and benefits) on the quality of goods and services provided by the 
government. By preventing the waste of public money, fraud and misappropriation 
expenditure, the government can allocate funds for a greater numberand quality of public 
goods and services. As argued by Devas (1989: 271), external auditing can ensure all 
government‘s income is ―collected, accounted for and properly‖ used. Moreover, 
efficiency can provide lower costs of goods and services that influences tariff setting by 
the government, which is important for a country to be able to compete internationally 
(McIntosh 1997: 123-129). Funnel and Cooper (1998: 283) argued that effective public 
sector auditing cansignificantly improve public sector performance. 
One of the big problems in managing public sector funds and resources is the 
possibility of misuse, fraud and corruption. Bertsk (2000: 61) argued that the role of 
auditing for uncovering and investigating fraud and corruption has been recognised in 
many countries. Oiken (2007: 200-248) provided evidence of a substantive reduction in 
missing expenditure in over 600 Indonesian village road projects, from 27.7 percentto 19.2 
percent, after being audited by the external audit agency from a baseline 4 percent to 100 
percent. Raman and Wilson (1994:517-38) added that auditing can contribute specifically 
12 
tocontrolling and ensuring compliance with laws and regulations that prevent threats to 
society, including the practices of money laundering, fraud and corruption.  
Therefore, effective public sector auditing can provide greater efficiency and 
effectiveness in public administration by examining the public sector agencies in 
preventing and reducing waste, abuse, fraud and corruption. This can improve the 
performance of public administrationand public goods and services for the benefit of the 
public. 
1.3.3 Auditing for Good Governance 
Public auditing that holds for a transparency, accountability, efficiency, 
effectiveness, openness, preventing of corruption and excess expenditure, can promise 
good governance (Shimomura 2003: 167). This is also supported by Curtin and Dekker 
(2005: 36-37) who emphasised the principles of accountability, transparency, 
effectiveness and participation in public administration. They agreed that providing 
government accounting systemand public sector auditing can provide accountability of 
public sector agencies which lead to good governance. Moreover, Barret (1996:137-146) 
argued that the audit institution is a part of the governance framework that influences the 
economic and social development.  
An effective auditing practice is an essential precondition for good governance 
(Doig 1995:151). Similarly, Mulgan (2007: 24) found that the Auditor-Generalmakes a 
significant contribution to the public accountability and public sector reform in Australia 
by standing up for values of transparency, probity and good governance. Innes et.al. 
(1997: 706) believed that audit reports enhancethe credibility of the financial statements 
that are useful for investors in, and management of, the public sector.  
Therefore, public sector auditing is an important tool for resulting in good 
governance in the long term. Auditing provides assurance of an appropriate use of 
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resources and prevents misuse, fraud, abuse and corruption of public funds and resources. 
It can maintain and improve public trust, including that of local and foreign investors and 
also tax payers. 
1.4 Statement of Research Problem 
Since 1946 (from the establishment of the Audit Board of the Republic of 
Indonesia, or BPK), public sector auditing in Indonesia has not significantly evolved in 
promoting transparency and accountability of government. The BPK was not as functional 
as it should have beenand resultedin an ineffective public sector system and public 
administration, and lack of public accountability. 
Since 1998, Indonesia has achieved a critical transition from a centralised 
authoritarian government in the New Order Era
1
 to a decentralised democratic government 
during the Reformation Era. As a result of fiscal decentralisation policy in 1999, the 
allocation for the regional expenditure budget has increased annually. For instance, the 
budget allocation in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 reached Rp.150.5 trillion, Rp.226.2 
trillion, Rp.252.5 trillion and Rp.271.8 trillion respectively
2
. The regional budget 
expansion requires greater public accountability and standard of governance in managing 
public finance (Booth 1999:14). Dwiyanto et.al (2003: 108-109) pointed out that 
decentralisation has worsened the practice of corruption, collusion and nepotism at the 
regional level, both Executive and Legislative. As a result, corruption skyrocketed and 
spread not only in the central government, but also in the regional governments and 
Legislatures. This condition requires BPK to work hard toperform its roles and functions 
                                                             
 
 
1
 The New Order Era was under the leadership of President Soeharto (1968-1998); this replaced the Old Order 
Era (1945-1967) under the first leader of the Republic of Indonesia, President Soekarno.  
2
 Available from: 
http://www.indonesia.go.id/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1247&Itemid=701 (accessed 
02/12/2007) 
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to examine public sector accountability in managing and spending public resources, and to 
prevent misuse or abuse of public funds and resources. 
From 2001, as mandated by the third amendment of 1945 Constitution, BPK 
wasconfirmed as the only external audit institution in Indonesia. BPK has worked very 
hard to provide better performance in auditing and to gain trust from the public. However, 
some analysts have still identified poor implementation of the Indonesian public sector 
auditing in performing its roles. As stated by Booth (2005: 216), the bad performance of 
public sector auditing was an indication of bad governance in Indonesia. Moreover, 
studies fromthe Asian Development Bank (ADB 2003; ADB 2004b; ADB 2004c) of 
Indonesian public sector auditing indicated problems of legal obstacles, absence of public 
accountability, unsettled audit institutional arrangements, insufficient numbers of qualified 
auditors and low public awareness of audit functions. Combined, these have influence 
ineffectiveness of public sector auditing in Indonesia. Therefore, in 2007, BPK was one of 
the most priorities of public sector institution that had to reform its organisation. This was 
due to the importance of the audit functions ofBPK to improve the accountability and 
performance of the public sector. 
Under the leadership of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Bambang 
Yudhoyono, the government attempted to prioritisereducing corruption and creating good 
governance by reforming bureaucracy and public administration. This is his statement: 
Success of development depends on the quality of the administrative order as well as 
the effectiveness and performance of the bureaucracy. Therefore, to improve the 
performance of the bureaucracy and to create good governance; gradual and planned 
bureaucracy reform is carried out by the government. Such reform embraces the 
balanced improvement of the work system, performance measurement, and 
implementation of discipline as well as remuneration. On this level, the reform 
process has started to be carried out by the Ministry of Finance, the Supreme Court, 
and the Audit Board. (Yudhoyono 2007: 3) 
This statement indicates seriousness of President Yudhoyono to improve Indonesian 
performance in public administration and bureaucracy. The first step in achieving this 
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purpose is by reforming institutions thatare closely related to state finance, administration 
of justice and public sector auditing. 
The reform started with a significant change in Indonesian public sector financial 
management and auditing that influence the reform on institutional, organizational 
arrangements and policies.The significant audit reformswerecovered by the national media 
such asRepublika(3
rd 
October 2004), which stated that the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia had made strong efforts since the third amendment of the Constitution in 2001. 
The legislation and policies from 2003-2007related topublic sector auditing and 
accounting showed the seriousness of the government‘s attempts to enhance 
accountability and transparency of state finances through the improvement of the roles and 
functions of public sector auditing. As stated by a senior official, in order to rebuild the 
Indonesian economy, it is been necessary to redevelop the accounting and auditing legal 
system (Rakyat Merdeka 2
nd 
December 2006b).  
Regrettably, the considerable growth and change of external public sector auditing 
in Indonesia has gone largely unnoticed. Research on the issue of audit reporting for 
accountability and performance and the factors influencing itsineffectiveness on 
Indonesian public sector auditing has had little attention from academics and 
professionals. Moreover, there has so far been a lack of detailed studies related to the 
comparative effectiveness of external public sector auditing in Indonesia before and after 
the reforms of the early 2000s. There is also lack of research into the reasons behind the 
continuing failure (impediments) of audit effectiveness in Indonesia comparing the two 
periods (before and after audit reform in 2001). 
Thus, there are two major problems thatmotivate a study on the topic on external 
public sector auditing in Indonesia. The first problem is the limited interest by public 
administration scholars on the research of external public sector auditing reports, in 
particular, the lack of detailed case studies on the struggles of BPK after the reform in 
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improving public accountability of the Executive. The second problem is that although 
there have been some reforms and regulations to improve the roles and functions of the 
external public sector audits, there are still some factors that have significantly impeded 
the public sector audit effectivenessand theserequire deeper research. In addition, it is 
hoped that this study will be able to contribute to the general understanding of external 
public sector auditing in Indonesia. Particularly, the factors influencing the quality of audit 
reports for improving the transparency, performance and accountability of the public 
sector in public administration academic literature. 
1.5 Significance and Objectives of the Study 
This thesis is about assessing Indonesian external public sector auditing, preceding 
and following audit reform in 2001. First of all, the study rigorously examines the quality 
of information in the Indonesian external public sector auditing reports, which are issued 
by BPK. Secondly, this thesis evaluates some key factors influencing the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness regardingthe quality of audit reports. Through comprehensive analysis on 
the performance of the Indonesian external public sector auditing reports and its impacts 
to the transparency and development of public administration, the research will 
significantly contribute to gaps in the existing literature about auditing in Indonesia. Itwill 
also contribute to the general comparative and growing development of literature on 
different aspects of public sector auditing and administration.  
Solomon and Trotman (2003: 409) highlighted an urgent need for auditing 
research ―to pose and test theories that are well suited to the changing environment and 
task demands faced by auditors‖. They found that since the first 25 years that Accounting, 
Organisations and Society journals were published, there is less of response from the 
academic than professional in responding to changes and development of public sector 
auditing. Moreover, Durrant (2008: 291) suggested studying variations in the adoption of 
administrative reforms across agencies, and examining their ability to reform for 
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achieving policy goals and identifying factors affecting the adoption of administrative 
reforms.  
This study has two preliminary objectives in examining public sector auditing in 
Indonesia. The first main objective is to assess the quality of information and the extent of 
follow-up action on information in BPK audit reports, preceding and following audit 
reform in 2001. The second main research objective is to examine the key factors 
influencing reporting and follow-up action regardingthe information in BPK audit reports 
before and after audit reform. It is hoped that this research will improve understanding of 
Indonesian public sector auditing for other researchers, professionals, and relevant 
regulatory and oversight bodies.  
1.6 Research Questions 
Early in this chapter it was pointed that this study aims to assess the Indonesian 
external public sector auditing both preceding and following audit reform. Within the 
study objectives identified earlier in section1.5, this thesis will be guided by the following 
research questions:  
1. How is the quality of information in reportsof BPK both preceding and following audit 
reform in 2001? 
2. What are the key factors influencing the quality of information in BPK reports and the 
extent of follow-up action preceding and following audit reform in 2001? 
1.7 Research Design and Method 
In providing more comprehension of the emerging field of Indonesian external 
public sector auditing issues, the study utilised an exploratory research design. The 
research process included a theoretical conceptual stage and the field research stage. The 
theoretical conceptual stage included a literature review that provided background for 
study and disclosed the room for improvement in public sector auditing in Indonesia. 
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Moreover, a historical analysis of Indonesia public sector auditing includingthe crucial 
time period of Dutch colonisation (before 1945) until the Reformation Era (1998-present) 
was described in this study. This provides insights into the process of development and 
change regarding public sector auditingin Indonesia. The field research explored primary 
and secondary data. The primary data was collected from questionnaires (see Appendix A) 
to the respondents, observations at BPK, and unstructured in-depth interviews ranging 
from half an hour to two hours with the informants.  
The informants for primary data collection came from different group of 
respondents and informants, namely: public sector agencies (auditees), BPK auditors and 
management, Parliament and regional Parliaments Members, General Secretariat of 
Parliament, and others (such as researcher, auditors from ANAO, ex-auditor of BPK, team 
leader of ADB, and secondment participants), to provide greater insight into the changing 
nature of external public sector audits in Indonesia. The list position of interviewees and 
the date of the interview can be found in Appendix B. The secondary data was collected 
from government documents (regulations, reports, statistical data, audit results and 
photos), printed media (newspapers, magazines), academic papers presented in local and 
international conferences, and relevant national/international seminars. 
Analysis of the data was mainly qualitative descriptive withan applied 
triangulation method for verification. For ensuring the validity of data and information, 
data was collected from multiple resources including in-depth interviews, observations 
and document analysis (Creswell 2009: 199). As cited by Becker and Bryman (2004: 408), 
thetriangulation method was used to enrich and check the validity and reliability of 
collected data and information. Solomon and Trotman (2003: 408) strongly believed that 
the triangulation method plays a valuable role in advancing audit studies. The various 
responses from questionnaires and information during the interviews, observations in BPK 
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offices, and several secondary data sets were used in this study to check the validity and 
objectivity of data and information.  
Non-probability with specific purposive sampling was the chosen technique, 
considering the complexity and specific characteristics of informants (Blaikie 2000: 212-
213; May 1997: 87; Sproull 1988: 117). In order to provide reliable and valid data and 
information,key informants were selected through screening criteria related to 
theircompetencies or experience with public sector auditing. The study also applied the 
snowball sampling method whereby the number of respondents was determined based on 
the needs of information and suggestions from previous informants. 
The primary collection of data proceeded through the following stages: (i) 
consulting with the thesis supervisors on the questionnaires based on the development of 
concepts and theories related to the quality of public sector auditing, (ii) getting approval 
from the Secretary General of BPK, audited entities, and Secretary General of 
Parliamentto distribute the questionnaires and to interview the key informants (BPK 
auditors, auditees and Members of Parliament), (iii) collecting data from questionnaires to 
get preliminary information, (iv)  doing further interviews from 5
th
November 2006 to 
25
th
March 2007 during the first fieldwork phase, (v) classifying data and information 
based on the criteria to answer the research questions (vi) analysing data in Canberra 
fromMay to July 2007, (vii) collecting more data and information during the second 
fieldwork phase from 4
th
-9
th
August 2007, (viii) analysing data and writing up the research 
results, (ix) conductingfurther interviews and dialogue with key informants on 2
nd 
September to 23
rd 
December 2009 to get more data and information to uncover several 
sensitive cases and fast developments relatingto public sector auditing in Indonesia. 
Sixty-one key informants were interviewed. From the questionnaires, there were 
totaled140 responded over 180 distributed. Those who came from BPK consisted of (i) 
BPK Board Members as leaders who decideon strategic reform and policies for BPK, (ii) 
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top and middle managers from different bureaus under the GeneralSecretariat of BPK that 
manages resources and support for audit roles and functions, (iv) different groups of 
auditors of state finances (AKN) and representative offices that examine the financial 
reports and performance of public sector auditees, (iv) trainees (auditors who took part in 
some trainings), and (v) project managers who manage audit reform projects.  
Respondents from the BPK auditors can be divided into five AKNs, namely AKN 
I (auditors for the Ministry of Defence, the Air Force, the Navy, the Police, and the 
Ministry of Transportation), AKN II (auditors for the Central Bank of Indonesia
3
 and the 
Ministry of Finance
4
), AKN III (auditors for the Ministry of National Education, the 
Ministry of Health, and non-departmental agencies), AKN IV (auditors for all the regional 
governments), and AKN V (auditors for state-owned  enterprises and banks). BPK‘s 
regional  offices of West Java Province in Bandung can be selected as representative of 
other  regional offices in this research as following reasons: (i) the same characteristics as 
most representatives‘ offices of BPK in terms of organisational structure, quality of new 
auditors, and under chief of state finance auditors (AKN) IV for local governments, (ii) 
the most densely populated province in Indonesia with about 40.918 million people (BPS 
2008) and Bandung is the most dense city in West Java with 686,400 households (BPS 
West Java Province 2007), (iii) the second largest number of audited entities of BPK after 
                                                             
 
 
3. The Central Bank of Indonesia was chosen because this institution was a new audited entity for BPK 
starting from the Reformation Era and an important entity in terms of the case of BLBI (Liquidity Aid from 
the Central Bank of Indonesia to the state owned bank). 
4. The Ministry of Finance was chosenbecause of the state financial management reform that has been 
conducted in this department since the Reformation Era. 
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East Java Province
5
, and (iv) the reasonable distance between the central government in 
Jakarta and West Java Province toreduce the risk of difficulties during data collection
6
.  
Respondents and informants from the Executive as auditees are divided into seven 
categories. The first categorywas from central government (departments), namely the 
Ministry of Health (MOH), the Ministry of National Education (MONE), and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). MOH and MONE are selected because they (i) received large 
amounts of the government‘s national policy subsidies to their budgets,(ii) accommodated 
the increasing demands for accountability in managing funds from international 
organisations and donors in Indonesia, and (iii) were priority institutions to be audited by 
BPK on the expenditure side. MOFA was chosen because of Indonesia‘s recent policy on 
strengthening international relations, and the Ministry of Home Affairs because of the 
decentralisation policy. The second categorywas from central government (non-
departments), namely the manager of the State Audit Reform-Sectors Development 
Project (STAR SDP) from the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) and the 
Financial and Development Supervisory Board (BPKP) who provide information related 
to program reforms of the Indonesian public sector audit. The third category was from the 
Central Bank of Indonesia as one of the new and important auditees for BPK since audit 
reform. The fourth category was from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), namely the 
National Electricity Company (PLN) and the National Oil Company (Pertamina), due to 
the important issue of electricity and fuel subsidies. The fifth category was from regional-
owned enterprises, namely the Water Drinking Regional Enterprise (PDAM) in Bogor and 
                                                             
 
 
5. This is based on summary data for audit results in Semester I of Year 2007, published on BPK‘s website:  
http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007i/disc1/pdf_ikhtisar/lampiran_I.pdf(entities of the central government) 
http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007i/disc1/pdf_ikhtisar/lampiran_II.pdf (entities of the regional 
governments) 
http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007i/disc1/pdf_ikhtisar/lampiran_III.pdf (entities of SOEs) 
6. Due to the major flood disaster and Vivian Influenza epidemic in Jakarta and other regions in Indonesia, 
from January-March 2007, during the fieldwork study, the researcher decided to concentrate on two places in 
the province to reduce risks. 
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Sukabumi, which provide clean drinking water and sanitation for people in regional areas. 
The sixth categorywas from state-owned bank, namely the Mandiri Bank that had the case 
of non-performance loans (NPL). The seventh category was from auditees from local 
governments, namely the West Java Provincial Government, Local Secretariat of West 
Java Province, and Bogor City local government. The eighth category was from Members 
of Parliament at both the central (DPR) and regional levels (DPRD), as primary 
stakeholders of BPK. The DPRD Members are from five different commissions 
7
 and 
three different factions, namely Golkar Party (PG), National Mandate Party (PAN), and 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Informants from DPRDs are Members of West Java 
Province and Kuningan District.  
Other respondents and informants included:(i) researchers and academics, (ii) a 
manager from the Asian Development Bank (as an international organisation that has 
transferred the largest amount of money to reform Indonesia‘s public sector external 
auditing), (iii) B-Trust, a Non Government Organisation, and (iv) auditors from ANAO 
for getting information related to a secondment program in financial and performance 
audits and other collaboration with BPK.  
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited to before the audit reform of the period (1945-2001) and after 
the audit reform of the period (2001-2008), but not after these periods. During the 
fieldwork in 2007, Jakarta suffered a bad flood disaster that resulted in changes of 
informants from the original plans. Moreover, the informants were very busy and had very 
limited time for interviews. The greatest difficulty with this study was to make 
appointments with managers of public sector bodies and the Members of Legislative at 
central and local levels.  The second limitation was that this study found over-optimism 
                                                             
 
 
7
 Commissions are units within the legislative body in charge of certain affairs or tasks. 
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and a lack of honesty from respondents who filled out the questionnaires. Sensitive issues 
about inefficiency, corruption and fraud make it difficult for informants to speak honestly. 
Moreover, this study did not attempt to examine the integrity of BPK because it is difficult 
to find out the level of moral integrity, which is highly subjective and difficult to measure. 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises eight chapters, as follows: 
Chapter One introduces and presents the background of the study. This chapter 
presents definitions of different types of public sector audits, the development and 
importance of public sector auditing, and the statement of the research problem. It then 
describes the significance and objectives of the study, the research questions, the research 
method and design, the limitations of the study, and the structure of the thesis.Chapter 
Two, reviews the literature related to the quality of information in public sector audit 
reports and the factors influencing the effectiveness of audit reports. Chapter Three 
discusses the historical development of auditing practices in Indonesia before and after the 
audit reform in 2001 from different aspects, including culture, regulations, politics and 
institutional arrangements. This chapter provides better understanding of the comparison 
of the quality of the BPK reports pre and post audit reform. It also elaborateson the 
reasons behind the ineffectiveness of auditing in Indonesia by describing the historical 
development of Indonesian public sector auditing since the Dutch colonial period.Chapters 
Four and Five analyse data and information from different resources to establish the 
quality level of information provided in Indonesian public sector audit reports. Chapters 
Six and Seven apply the key factors influencing information that significantly contribute 
to effectiveness or ineffectiveness in Indonesian public sector audit reports.Chapter Eight 
provides a summary of findings related to the strengths and opportunities of the quality of 
BPK reportinformationand the weaknesses of and threatsto the quality of BPK report 
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information. Moreover, this chapter provides recommendations for BPK and suggestions 
for further research.  
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review on Criteria and Factors  
for Quality of Information in Public Sector Audit Reports 
This chapter reviews different sources of literature to assess the quality of audit 
reportinformation in public sector auditing and to identify factors influencing reporting and 
acting on audit information. The quality of audit reportinformation is divided into three 
parts, namely: (1) the content of, (2) communication of, and (3) acting on, information in 
audit reports. The review of the factors influencing the criteria is divided into two parts: (1) 
the factors influencing the quality of information; and (2) the factors influencing acting on 
information, in public sector auditing reports.  
Table 2-1 Summary of Criteria for the Quality of Audit Information and Factors 
Influencing the Effectiveness of Information 
No Quality of Audit Information/Factors 
Influencing 
Criteria 
 
Source: Dwiputrianti, S., 2007. 'Fiscal Policy in the Pacific Rim: the fiscal policy of effective government 
auditing for enhancing transparency and public accountability in Indonesia', 8thAssociation of Pacific 
Rim Universities (APRU) Doctoral Students Conference Keio University, Tokyo. Available from: 
http://www.ic.keio.ac.jp/apru/dsc/Panel8.html (accessed 17/08/2007). 
 
1. The quality of information in audit reports   
a. Content of information in the audit reports 1) Scope and objectives of auditing 
  2) Access for reliable audit evidence  
  3) Objectivity of information 
  4) Credibility of information 
b. Communication of information in the audit 
reports 
1) Clear and understandable audit 
information with precise and informative 
formatting 
  2) Timely reporting of audit information  
2. Acting on information in the audit reports 1) Publication of audit reports  
  2) Realistic audit recommendations 
  3) Follow-up audit findings and 
recommendations  
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The following sections review academic literature related to the quality of 
information in public sector audit reports and the factors influencing effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of information in public sector auditing reports. Table 2.1(above) provides 
a summary of criteria for the quality of information and the factors influencing the 
effectiveness of information that will be described in the following sections. 
2.1 The Quality of Information in Public Sector Audit Reports 
The following sections review academic literature related to the quality of 
information in public sector auditing reports. 
2.1.1 The Content of Information in the Audit Reports 
The quality of information in the audit reports can be examined from the content of 
information; including the scope, objectives, objectivity and credibility of information in 
audit reports. 
Scope and Objectives of Auditing 
Wilkins (1995: 423-425) argued that there are differencesin the auditing scope for 
financial and performance auditing. He argued that the scope in financial auditing can be 
measured from the number of agencies audited and the proportion of opinions qualified, 
while the scope in performance auditing can be evaluated from the number and value of 
audit recommendations for improvement in the public sector. He also emphasised that the 
purpose of an audit office is to fulfill the mandate for the audit office to improve the 
performance of public sector agencies.  
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The recent growth of the auditing scope in the public sector has changed from 
financial auditing to performance auditing to examine the achievements and outputs of 
public sector agencies as demanded by the public. Guthrie (1992: 27) also underlined that 
auditing for only financial statements may reduce the scope of audits. Moreover, Mikesell 
(2003: 216) underlined that audits can no longer just focus on financial detail concerned 
with how money was spent, but must go further andgive attention on performance audits. 
Glynn et.al (1992: 66) argued that effective auditing occurs when it is done through 
evaluation of the purpose, impact and accountability of programs undertaken by the 
government, which also commonly called ‗value for money‘ auditing.  
According to Brown and Pethtel (quoted by Wheat 1991: 386), the scope of 
performance audits includes examining and analysing the auditees‘ structure, planning, 
decision making, personnel, compliance with statutes, quality of goods and services, 
efficiency, output and purposes of programs and projects, performance standards, and 
policy alternatives and strategies. This is much broader than that of a traditional financial 
audit. Furthermore, Funnell (2003: 115) believed that performance audits havemore 
strategic consequences of the public accountability of government that protect the right of 
citizens to get better public goods and services. This means that the scope of performance 
auditing is broader than for financial audits in terms of assessing the results, outputs, 
benefits and impacts of public sector organisations in the short, medium and long term. 
In Sri Lanka since 1971, the Auditor General has been allowed to conduct more 
than financial audits and has the authority to conduct performance audits of public sector 
operations(Hemaratne 2005:23-25). In Australia, under various public sector reforms to 
improve the accountability of government, the auditing scope of the Australian National 
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Audit Office (ANAO) has moved from financial auditing to performance and 
environmental audits (Barrett 1999:48). Guthrie (1990: 280-282) indicated a positive 
relationship and impact of various scopes of auditing to levels of accountability, which are 
called the ‗ladder of accountability‘. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1 Different Levels of Accountability and Scope of Auditing 
 
Source: Adapted from Guthrie, J., 1990, ’The contested nature of performance auditing in Australia’ in J., 
Guthrie, L., Parker and D., Shand, D. (ed.), The Public Sector: contemporary readings in accounting and 
auditing, HBJ Publisher, Sydney, pp. 273-284. 
Figure 2.1 shows five levels of accountabilityeach with a different scope of 
auditing. The lowest level of accountability is related to the ‗accountability for probity and 
legality‘ within the scope of financial auditing, which is applied to avoid misuse and to 
ensure that public funds and other resources are used properly. The second level is 
‗process accountability,where internal and external auditors apply the scope beyond 
financial auditing to ensure the internal system and procedures are recorded and acted on 
adequately. In this second level, auditors provide performance indicators and standards to 
measure the achievements of organisations or individuals. For example, to check methods 
for assets safeguarding and the accuracy of information systems, to promote operational 
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efficiency and to provide quality control standards. The thirdlevel of impact is 
‗performance accountability,‘ within the scope of performance auditing and which focuses 
on the standard of performance against a set of criteria. In this level, auditors focus on the 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy of public resources. The fourth level is ‗program 
accountability,‘ within the scope of performance auditing, to determine whether the 
objective of each program in the public sector is found to promote effectiveness in public 
administration. This scope of auditing is also called ‗effectiveness‘, ‗results‘ or ‗program‘ 
auditing. The highest level impact of auditing is ‗policy accountability‘, which focuses on 
performance auditing that is concerned with outcomes and opinions on economy and 
effectiveness. In policy accountability, public sector auditing focuseson examining and 
evaluating public sector policies. In this level, auditing has an important role and function 
to evaluate and assess public policies so that they are relevant and based on public needs 
and interest.  
As all public funds need to be audited by the Auditor General  as an external 
auditing institution, Mulgan (1997: 113-114) argued that private companies that provide 
public services using state finances also need to be audited by the Auditor General. 
However, he believedthat as private firms, they have a right to have their own private 
sensitive data and information. In this case, he suggested that if the public thinks that 
private firms could not provide accountability in providing their services, the government 
should not allow the service to be contracted out. 
30 
 
Access for Reliable Audit Evidence 
According to Tandon et al. (2007: 77-78), audit reporting can be effective if the 
report is supported by sufficient, appropriate, accurate and reliable evidence. He defines 
sufficient evidence as the quantum of audit evidence that is obtained (quantity of 
evidence), and appropriate evidence as relevant and reliable evidence (the quality of the 
evidence). Moreover, he defined accurate evidence as the capability of providing correct 
information that conforms exactly to fact and is performed with care and precision, while 
reliable evidence is the degree of the auditors‘ confidence in checking the originality of 
audit evidence. Wilkins (1995: 424) argued that the reliability of documents provided by 
auditees is considered for reporting on the performance and quality of agencies‘ services. 
In addition, valid and reliable data can be defined as information and methods that are well 
grounded, based on truth, acceptable and assured for effective government auditing 
(Larson 1983).  
Effectiveness of audit can be measured by ability and power to access the data and 
information as evidence in auditing. ―Full access to all records and documents containing 
information‖ relating to the accounts and operation of government is essential for 
government auditing (Barrett 1996:137-146). Sufficient, competent and relevant evidence 
can provide a reasonable basis for auditors to make effective judgments, conclusions and 
recommendations in auditing; in contrast, inadequate evidence and information can lead to 
ineffective auditing (Larson 1983: 280; Thai 1992: 349).  
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Objectivity and Credibility of Information 
Objectivity of information is a fundamental criterion for the quality of audit report 
information. Objective information refers to reporting information by auditors thatis 
constructed by ―using appropriate auditing techniques and having a good set of working 
papers to demonstrate professional judgment‖ (Sikka 2009: 145). As a result, the audit 
report users can be confident in the facts, analysis and findings presented. Without such 
objectivity, auditors will not provide objective criticism and will not be able to produce 
objective recommendations (Al-Nofaie 2003:22-24; Seno 2004b:4-7). Thus, objectivity of 
information can be defined as information reported by auditors using appropriate audit 
techniques and professional judgment to produce objective audit opinions and 
recommendations. 
By providing unbiased and objective information in audit reports about whether 
state finances and other state resources are responsibly and effectively managed to achieve 
certain results, auditors help government agencies to achieve accountability and integrity 
to improve their programs, and to encourage trust from their stakeholders. It has been 
argued by some scholars (Russell and Regel 2000: 211; Tandon et. al 2007) that 
objectivity of information will be achieved if auditors are free from any bias and 
influences. These influences can be from internal pressures such as personal beliefs or 
interest, or external pressures such as pressure from auditees (Ferguson and Rafuse 
2004:10-15; Mukhamediyeva 2004:7). In addition, presenting objective audit reports can 
reduce the possibility of misusing the reports for political purposes (Yoedono 2002b:6-7). 
However, Palmer (2008: 281-283) found the possibility of bias in audit reports can be 
caused by audit manuals that are not based on the research and literature to control the 
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level of bias. He suggested joining the research with practical application in auditing 
guidelines for reducing bias in audit reports. 
Credibility is significant in presenting unbiased evidence in audit reports to 
convince stakeholders. According to Power (1994: 47) objectivity of information in 
auditing is a very important as one of measurement to see the quality of audit reports. In 
addition, Schwartz and Mayne (2005: 175) and Santiso (2008:67-84) argued that the 
performance of audit reports and effectiveness of audits depends on the credibility of audit 
findings, which are crucial for holding up the reputation of the Supreme Audit Institutions 
(SAIs).  
Therefore, objectivity of information can be defined as information presented in 
audit reports based on honesty, high integrity and fair professional views and examination 
without any personal and external influences intruding on judgment. Credible information 
is related to the quality of information in audit reports that can be trusted by stakeholders, 
auditees or users of the reports. 
2.1.2 Communication of Information in Audit Reports 
How auditors communicate information in audit reports tothe stakeholders is also a 
part of assessing the quality of information. It is necessary that the audit reports of an audit 
institution meet three criteria, namely: (1) they are communicated clearly and 
understandably, (2) they have precise and informative formatting, and (3) they are timely. 
The following sections discuss further each indicator in communicating audit information.  
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Understandable Information with Precise and Informative Formatting 
It is essential to report audit findings in a meaningful way that is widely 
understood. Brown (1980: 264) indicated thatschool of public administration can provide 
learning about the development of public sector audit that can help students and the 
community to understand the role of public sector auditing in examining government 
performance. In addition, Soedibyo (2003: 22-24) believed that the inadequacy of auditors 
to communicate their findings orally or in writing has had a strong influence on the 
effectiveness of government auditing, because if an audit report does not communicate its 
results effectively, then most likely it will not achieve its aims. 
Skaerbaek (2005: 387-388) believed that reportscan be a means of presenting 
information to others. He argued that innovative reports with an elegant layout on glossy 
paper, a multitude of pictures, fancy pie charts, and complete with short appealingly 
written stories of the most essential content, can impressParliament. Besides, he underlines 
that reports producing numbers without much meaning for practical purposes are not 
considering the needs of different users from internal and external organisations. 
Good quality communication and interaction orally or in writing between auditors 
and the audit committee will prevent misunderstanding between auditors and auditees 
(Krishnamoorthy et al. 2002:3-13). Bakti (2000a: 21) argued that in Indonesian, it is 
important to consider the culture of community in communication. He suggested using 
more sound communication concepts to encourage individual community Members to 
promote democracy and understanding. Thus, if the auditors do not communicate well, this 
may cause a lack of commitment by the auditees to the findings and recommendations of 
the audit report. 
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Russell and Regel (2000: 14-16) believed that ―the audit reports should be ‗user-
friendly‘, so readers can easily understand what is being reported.‖ They provide tips for 
auditors to provide more user-friendly audit reports: use terminology that the user will 
understand, avoid acronyms when possible, be direct and to the point, use a standard 
format that may improve communication with auditees, and define unfamiliar or technical 
terms used in the audit report. The basic requirement for a clear and user-friendly audit 
report is that the users will understand the report. This is indicated by not having too many 
questions on the reports. 
Timely Reporting of Information 
A timely report of external public sector auditors to Members of Parliament and 
Ministers is essential in communicating audit findings. Scanlan (1998: 54-55) argued that 
the timely nature of reports to Parliament is the most real and concrete result of audit work 
as an early warning for stakeholders to put further attention and scrutiny on unnoticed 
issues in accountability and performance of the public sector. Similarly, Schwartz and 
Mayne (2005: 173) and Santiso (2008:67-84) believed that timeliness of the audit report‘s 
distribution to the users is one indicator by which to assess the effectiveness of audits. 
Firth et.al. (2009: 118-132) revealed that timeliness in disseminating sanction and 
enforcement information leads to higher transparency and provides up to date information 
for regulatory agencies in other parts of the world. This is also applied in the case of the 
timeliness of audit findings and results. If auditors do not publicly announce the report to 
stakeholders on time, the audit reports may not be used effectively (Soedibyo 2003:22-24). 
For instance, the Netherlands Court of Audit in 1999 obtained an expression of 
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dissatisfaction from Parliament due to a very late accounts publication (Dees and Linders 
1999:11-12).  
The recent development of communication and IT may make it possible to deliver 
audit findings and reports more quickly and on time. Russell and Regel (2000: 171) argued 
the development of communication technology helps auditors to distribute audit reports in 
a timelier manner.  
2.1.3 Acting on Information in Audit Reports 
The following sections discuss indicators of acting on information to examine the 
quality of information in audit reports, namely, (i) publication of the audit reports, (ii) 
realistic audit recommendations, and (iii) followup of audit findings and recommendations. 
Publication of Audit Reports 
To embed the accountability of government, the publication of audit reports opens 
opportunities for the public and media to get information on the government‘s performance 
and policies. Guthrie (1992: 27) believed that increasing interest in public sector auditing 
influences the awareness of, and helps to explore, critical issues in public sector auditing. 
In addition, Widodo (2004:19-24 pointed out that publication of audit findings and 
recommendations enhance the quality of auditing information beyond the scope of ―being 
obscure‖ from the public who also participate in assessing the information being reported. 
Mikesell (2003: 156) also argued that publication of the audit reports of government 
institutions would relatively important to reduce the possibility of the same findings and 
problems happening.  
36 
 
In democratic countries, there is a direct relationship between the mass media and 
the concept of publicity. Santiso (2008:67-84) argued that the media is an effective actor in 
publishing audit findings. He also believed that the publication of audit reports has a role 
in indirect enforcement to implement audit recommendations for auditees. Arter (2003: 97) 
suggested that to improve the effect of audits, after they are finished, a summary that 
highlights any positive and negative conclusions should be published promptly.  
A limited exemption for unreported audit results may be allowed in certain 
circumstances, for instance, security interests. Nonetheless, these exceptions should not be 
too many in addressing government spending efficiency and effectiveness and maintaining 
public trust in an auditing institution. Kaltenback (1993:9-12) pointed out the case of the 
German government audit system under its democracy, which has fewer audits and reports 
withclassified security interests than would be the case under a monarchy, had led to better 
efficiency. Moreover, he stated that in the case of security interests, there are limited 
numbers of auditors involved; they protect classified information to safeguard government 
spending which leads to greater efficiency. Moreover, Hope (2008: 271) found that 
management and national culture affect the quality of financial reporting because auditors 
would be more willing to disclose findings in audit reports. 
Publications for corporate organisations that belong to the public sector, such as 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may have different characteristics. According to Mulgan 
(2008b: 23),SOEs may resist if the audit results are reported to the Legislative and 
published to the public. This is due to the data and information relating to commercial 
sensitivity, as SOE has a private sector background and largely commercial orientation. 
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As independent auditors of SAIs, they are required to report their findings after 
examining the financial and performance of the public sector agencies to the public 
(Chaturverdi 1987: 32; Guthrie and English 1997: 13). In addition, current communication 
technology development provides the opportunity to publish audit reports electronically by 
presenting them on a website (Debreceny and Gray 1999:335-50). Based on their case 
studies, Debreceny and Gray indicated that some public companies in France
8
, Germany
9
 
and the UK
10
 also provided a printed annual audit report version on their website. For the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 
externalaudit reports are published routinely (Bertsk 2000: 314). 
Therefore, publication of audit reports through printed or electronic media is one 
indicator of the quality of information relating to acting on audit reports that provide 
information about the performance of the public service. 
Realistic Audit Recommendations 
One of the measurements for the quality of effective information in audit reports is 
theprovision of realistic audit recommendations. Wilkins (1995: 429) pointed out that the 
improvement in public sector accountability can be achieved through audit results and 
recommendations. This means that public sector audits can be effective if auditees put into 
action audit recommendations for better government performance and resource 
management, which will improve economy, efficiency and effectiveness.  
                                                             
 
 
8
www.ccomptes.fr (accessed on 26/03/2007). 
9
www.bundesrechnungshow.de (accessed on 15/03/2007). 
10
www.nao.org.uk. (accessed on 15/03/2007). 
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For this purpose, auditors have to provide realistic and practicable audit 
recommendations for auditees to implement in order to improve their performance and 
public administration in general (Taylor 1996:147-56). Gendron et.al. (2007: 110) 
underlined the essential nature of auditor‘s expertise in issuing recommendations and 
constructing performance guidance measurements to improve the management of 
government.  
Followup of Audit Report Findings and Recommendations 
The quality of information is also indicated by the followup to the audit report 
findings and recommendations. The advantages of auditing can only be realised when 
findings and recommendations have been followed up. Following up of auditing can be in 
the form of discussion in Parliament and corrective action in government-auditedentities 
(Marsidi 2002:12-16; Thai 1992: 350). Without any followup from Parliament, the 
Executive, orinvestigators, audit reports are useless and public accountability cannot be 
enforced. This means that an audit office provides audit report information to raise 
political interest among Members of Parliament to follow up by presenting political 
oversight and control that offers further action. Moreover, Chowdhurry (2005: 905) 
suggested that effective monitoring and controlling is needed for the implementation of the 
audit follow-up recommendations. 
The internal auditor of a government agency has an important role in taking 
corrective action based on audit recommendations. Triadji (2004:9-12) described a 
situation where there was an absence of internal control to prevent corrupt government 
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management, and a lack of followup of an external audit reportthatcaused difficulty in 
addressing accountability, and achieving transparency and good governance. 
2.1.4 Summary 
Table 2.2 (below) presents the definition of each criterionfor the quality of 
information in public sector audit reports. 
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Table 2-2 
 Definition of Criteria for the Quality of Information in Public Sector Audit Reports 
No Quality of Audit 
Information 
Criteria Definition 
1. Content and 
communication of 
information in audit 
reports 
 The quality of content and communication of information to measure the 
quality of effectiveinformation in public sector audit reports. 
a. Content of information.  Information that iscontained in public sector audit reports. 
  (1) Scope and objectives of 
auditing 
Numbers and values of auditing, and the objectives of the audit office to 
improve the public sector.  
  (2) Compliance with audit 
standards 
Compliance of auditors with existing audit standards in conducting and 
reporting audit information. 
  (3) Access for reliable audit 
evidence  
Information in audit reports is supported by reliable data and documents. 
  (4) Objectivity and credibility 
of information 
Information in audit reports is presented correctly, is intellectually honest, 
and free from all bias and influence, andleads to ensuring trust from 
stakeholders.  
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Table 2.2 continued 
No Quality of Audit 
Information 
Criteria Definition 
2. Communication of 
information  
 The quality of written communication in audit reports to measure 
effectiveness of information in reporting audit results to stakeholders. 
  Clear and understandable 
information 
Information that is easy to follow and understand to avoid misunderstanding 
by readers or stakeholders.  
  Precise and informative 
formatting 
Information that is presented with interesting formatting, is brief, but is 
complete. 
  Timely reporting of 
information  
Information fromaudit reports received by stakeholders on time. 
b. Acting on information   Acting on audit results and recommendations to measure the quality of 
effectiveness of information in public sector audit reports. 
  Publication of the audit 
reports  
Information of audit findings and recommendations in audit reports is 
published in a printed or electronic format for the public.  
  Realistic government audit 
recommendations  
Providing audit recommendations that are applicable and realistic for 
auditees to improve their organisation’s performance.  
  Followup of findings and 
recommendations  
Followed up by stakeholders, including Members of Parliament at both 
central and local levels, auditees and authorised investigators (the police, KPK 
and judiciary (Attorney General). 
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2.2 Factors Influencing the Quality of Information in Audit Reports 
Having established indicators regarding the quality of effective information in 
public sector audit reports, it is also necessary to identify the factors thatsignificantly 
influence the success and failure of providing effective information in public sector audit 
reports. This study divides these factors into two parts: (1) content and communication of 
information, and (2) acting on audit information.  
Table 2-3 Definition of Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Information in Audit 
Reports 
No The Quality of 
Information 
Factors Definition 
1. Content and 
communication  
 Factors influencing the quality of information in audit 
reports. 
a.   Independence of auditors 
and audit institutions 
Free from bias, controls, interests, influence and 
pressurefrom any parties.  
b.   Integrity and 
professionalism of 
auditors 
Moral of auditors and audit competency, knowledge, 
experience, skills, and personality in performing audits.  
c  Internal and external 
quality assurance 
Assessing the quality of audit performance via  internal and 
external reviewers.  
d.   Resources of the audit 
institution 
Audit resources, including budget, personnel, offices, 
computers, internet, office equipment, regulationsand IT 
(installation, implementation of computer systems and 
applications). 
2.  Acting on 
information 
 Factors influencing acting on the information in audit 
reports. 
a.   Support from the 
Executive 
Commitment of the Executive (auditees) to implement audit 
recommendations.  
b.   Support from the 
Legislature 
Oversight from the Legislature on audit reports as a means 
to support their function in controlling the budget of the 
Executive. 
c.   Support from law 
enforcers 
Investigation and taking action from law enforcers for audit 
findings indicating criminality and corruption. 
d.  Cooperation with public 
and media 
Publishing reports and controlling government to act 
accountably in managing public resources. 
Table 2.3(above) presents the definition of factors influencing the quality of 
information to explain how each factor is defined in this study. 
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2.2.1 Factors Influencing Content and Communication of Information 
The following sections review literature onthree key factors influencing the quality 
of information in terms of the content and communication of audit reports: (1) 
independence of the audit institution and auditors, (2) professionalism and integrity of the 
auditors, and (3) audit resources.  
Independence of Audit Institution and Auditors 
The independence of auditors and the audit office is an essential factor influencing 
the quality of audit reports. Guthrie and English (1997: 12) believed that this is 
fundamental to maintain public and Parliamentary confidence inthe integrity and 
impartiality of audit opinions, recommendations and findings. He also emphasised that with 
independence, auditors are free of any direction from the Executive, bureaucracy and its 
auditees‘. Power (2003b: 198) defined that an auditor‘s independence as ―the extent to 
which the auditor is dependent on the auditee for knowledge or can develop an independent 
knowledge base‖. Moreover, Chowdhury (2005: 896) argued that the ―auditor‘s 
independence refers to auditors being independent of management in conducting audits and 
in the subsequent reporting process‖. Andy (2002: 112) also believed that independence in 
the public sector is stronger than in the private sector. In the public sector, the extent of the 
auditor‘s independence is related to thebroader culture of different perspective groups (such 
as the public and politicians), not only to auditees.  
The following sections focus on the independence of public sector audits, including 
anexplanation of whom the audit institution is independent from, the rationale of 
independence, and aspects influencing independence in public sector auditing. 
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The Importance of an Audit Institution and Auditor’s Independence 
It is widely accepted that being independent for auditees or government entities is 
crucial for public sector audit institutions to protect auditors from external pressure and to 
prevent actions that might limit the scope of its audit work. This is highlighted by: 
 Guthrie (1992: 29) who argued that independence of audit functions is one 
of several important issues in public sector auditing; 
 Funnell (1994: 179) who argued that state auditors should be independent of 
the Executive to ensure the confidence ofParliament in the impartiality and 
objectivity of the auditor‘s findings. 
 Politt and Sukma (1997: 313), White and Hollingsworth (1999: 92), who 
emphasised the importance of a high level of independence for Supreme 
Audit Institutions (SAIs) to enable auditors to perform their function in the 
accountability process. 
 Houghton and Jubb (1998: 33) and Torres (2004: 447-456) who claimed that 
independence is the heart of the auditors‘ profession and that they perform 
impartially, with intellectually honesty and are free from conflicts of interest 
both in fact and appearance. 
 Miller (1992: 74-84), Barret (1996:137-46), Gendron and Cooper (2001: 
278), Healy and Palepu (2001:405-40), Houghton and Jubb (2003: 310), and 
Windsor and Rasmussen (2009: 268) believed that independence of auditors 
is crucial to obtain credibility in audit reports. According to Barrett, 
credibility can only be gained if the Audit Board Members are independent 
and competent. 
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 Chen et.al. (2005: 167) found that ―independent auditing plays an important 
role in maintaining and improving the integrity of financial reporting, which 
is crucial to the development of an active and efficient capital market‖. 
 Tandon et al. (2007: 24) believed that auditors‘ independence can provide 
reliable information as the foundation for building the credibility of audit 
reports. 
 Santiso (2008:31-34) argued that an independent audit institution contributes 
positively to improved financial management and negatively to prevent 
corruption and mismanagement. 
This body of literature emphasises that independence is essential in public sector auditing 
because it influences the reliability and credibility of audit data and information. 
Additionally, it reduces outside pressure and influence, especially from within the 
Executive or auditees in reporting their performance and accountability to the public 
through Parliament. If auditors are not independent, then the value, credibility and integrity 
of the audit process is reduced and the trust in, and reputation of, the audit institution is 
threatened.  
The need for independence in audit opinions, recommendations and reports is 
undisputed in maintaining trust from the public and Parliament (Guthrie and English 1997: 
12). White and Hollingsworth (1999: 92) pointed out the importance of an independent 
audit institution in presenting impartial findings and assessing the government‘s accounts 
and performance. In addition, Barzelay (2000:52-88) argued that independence in 
performance audits is essential for building confidence in the performance indicator 
concept.  
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The most common source that threatens the independence of audit institutions is the 
Executive. Houghton and Jubb (2003: 301) mentioned examples of these threats, such as 
intimidation and interpersonal associations. They (1998:30-35) also suggested protection 
for auditors from external pressure to maintain their audit independence. Bertsk (2000: 63) 
provided Japan and Finland as examples of OECD countries that have a growing concern 
for ensuring the independence of SAIs from the Executive in their daily operations.  
Nicoll (2005: 105) argued that the work of SAIs can be influenced not only by the 
government, but also by the Legislature. He (2005: 176) provided an example of the 
possibility that auditors may be influenced by the Legislature, due to a very close 
relationship between the SAI and the Legislature, with the latter having the right to allocate 
budget for the SAI and to review its reports. Santiso (2008: 73-74) found the 
ineffectiveness of the National Audit Office of Argentina (Auditoria General de la Nacon, 
AGN) was due to political interference from the Legislaturein the auditing process at 
several stages, from the audit plan to the followup of audit reports. Therefore, the risk of 
the SAI being controlled by the Legislature is high, because the Members of Legislature are 
the first and main stakeholders who receive and usethe audit reports. 
Debates about independence emphasises a different angle with higher-level 
expectations, particularly in relation to compliance with codes of ethics and audit standards 
(Barrett 2003: 8). As audit institution‘s and auditor‘s independence, both in mind and in 
appearance, have been included in most audit professional standards, compliance with 
professional audit standards is necessary to maintain the independence and performance of 
SAIs (Ackerman 2004:447-63). Moreover, independence is threatened if auditors are 
economically dependent on the auditees (Windsor and Rasmussen 2009: 268). This 
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argument indicates that providing audit services forand accepting compensation from 
auditees reducesthe auditor‘s independence. 
The implementation of risk management in public sector bodies is also necessary to 
reflect the potential impact of risks  that occur on audit organisations as also stated by 
Power (2003b: 199). Moreover, risk management covers the identification and mitigation 
of risks that may prevent an organisation from achieving its objectives (Crawford and Stein 
2002: 122). 
Aspects of Audit Independence 
White and Hollingsworth (1999: 95) explored independent assessments of public 
institutions. Considering its complexity, they promote at least three dimensions to assess 
the independence of public institutions. Firstis establishing the organisational independence 
of the audit body as a state institution by examining certain questions, such as how the 
national audit office (NAO) is organised, how it is financed, and how it is related to other 
public institutions. Second is the independence of personnel in audit institutions. This is 
concerned with the extent to which personnel of an audit office or body are protected from 
external influences, in particular from auditees. Third is establishing the operational 
independence of the audit body by asking how the body operates or performs its functions 
on a daily basis or whether the audit body operates or performs its audit function without 
being dependent on any interested parties. Moreover, Funnell (1996: 113-114) argued that 
sometimes public sector auditshave only ever enjoyed a form of conditional independence, 
instead of substantive independence. Substantive independence encompasses legal, political 
and financial independence, which means that the audit office is independent from the 
Executive in organising its institution, human resources, regulationsand finance. 
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According to Gendron and Cooper (2001: 279), independence is a social 
construction from a variety of resources, including audit and organisation laws, 
professional regulations, audit practices, education about civics and the operation of 
democracies. Moreover, Guthrie and English (1997: 13) argued that the value of a public 
sector audit is in its independence that is bolstered by legislative, mandate and appropriate 
budget.  
From this literature, the following sections explain some aspects that bolster the 
independence of audit institutions, namely: statutory, financial, and audit board and 
auditor‘s independence. Related with the issues of negotiation between auditors and their 
client, Wang and Tuttle (2009: 222-243) suggested mandatory rotation which imposes 
auditors become not too close to their auditees and maintains independency in auditing.  
Statutory Independence 
White and Hollingsworth (1999: 92-93) explained that the independence of public 
external auditors can be established by legal means through a constitution or laws, and also 
through professional requirements such as those covered by audit standards for auditors. 
This indicates that audit independence is established by constitutions, charters or other 
basic legal documents that address the procedures and requirements for audit reporting and 
the obligations of auditees and auditors. For instance, the independence of the Japanese 
Board of Audit is established under the Constitution, which is free from the influences from 
the Cabinet
11
. Likewise, the State Audit Office of Finland, which is under the Constitution, 
is free of subordination to the Ministry of Finance
12
.  
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http://www.jbaudit.go.jp/engl/index.htm (accessed 23/09/2006)  
12
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/state_audit/Finland.pdf (accessed 08/06/2006) 
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Houghton and Jubb (2003: 304) argued that the most effective method for taking 
action in order to solve problems affecting independence inauditing is to apply forcefulness 
and strict obedience to rules in order to control auditing from any improper influences. 
Windsor and Rasmussen (2009: 283-284) also argued that depending only on rules and 
professional code of ethics will only frustrate efforts to achieve actual and perceived 
auditor independence, as ethical conduct is complex and requires more than the moral 
situation of the professional code. They also argued that auditors were more willing to be 
independent when auditees are in apoor financial condition instead of a good one. Shah 
(2007: 355) believed that in countries where democratic ‗trappings‘ are still new or 
superficial, and although legal and institutional frameworks are provided to ensure its 
independence, the role of the SAI in detecting fraud and corruption may be shaky as its 
independence is still unstable or insecure.  
For instance, in the case of the independence and autonomy of the Comptroller 
General of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CGR), this audit institution gradually 
attained its independence and autonomy. Only after the constitutional reform of 2000 did 
CGR gain its independence completely in regard to its auditing powers (Russián 2006:24-
26). In terms of the implementation of the State Audit Law, the Republic of China enacted 
a new audit law in 2006 (to replace the 1995 version), whichimproved the audit and 
supervision system, strengthened audit duties, enhanced audit powers, and standardised 
audit practices (INTOSAI 2007c10-14). Besides, the Office of the State Audit of Vietnam 
had its first state audit law in January 2006 (INTOSAI 2006b8-15). 
Financial Independence 
The activities of any audit institution inevitably depend on the audit resources 
available, including the budget. Priono (20028-11) believed that the independence of audit 
50 
institutions to allocate their budget directly from the Parliament and to manage their own 
audit budget is essential for conducting their audit functions. To be independent, funding 
for the audit office is taken out from the Executive or bureaucracy and approved or 
determined by Parliament (Guthrie and English 1997: 12). Control over an audit 
institution‘s budget in the process of negotiations with the Ministry of Finance or Treasury 
affects the independence issue (Barrett 1996137-146). According to Bowerman et.al. 
(2003b: 7), the budget of the National Audit Office (NAO) in England and Wales is outside 
of government and Treasury control. The Treasury only has an indirect influence through 
its approval in specifying NAO‘s resources and policy accounting. 
White and Hollingsworth (1999: 98-100) argued that in maintaining audit 
independence, the budget of an audit institution should not be exclusively controlled by the 
Executive in terms of audit activities, the number and skills of staff and auditors that canbe 
employed, and the investment bythe audit institution in the development of training and 
technology.  
Figure 2.2 Independent Budget Process of the Audit Institution Office in Germany 
 
 
Source: Adapted from White, F., and Hollingworth, K., 1999. Audit, Accountability and Government, 
Clarendon Press, New York, p. 98. 
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They described the independent budget setting process that is implemented by the 
audit institution of Germany (the Bundesrechnungshof). This is presented in Figure 2.2 as a 
circle diagram to show the continuing linkages process. The Parliament has the 
responsibility to ensure a sufficient budget for the audit institution. The proposal of the 
national audit office (NAO) budget is not approved by the Executive, but by the Parliament 
after discussions with the Ministry of Finance. NAO conducts audit work through funding 
from an annual Parliamentary vote, while the Public Accounts Commission (PAC) controls 
the estimated budget for NAO. Therefore, the audit office providing an independent budget 
for audit institutions is also important to maintain its independence. As argued by Windsor 
and Rasmussen (2009: 268) the independence of auditors decreasesif they are economically 
dependent on, or accept compensation from, auditees.  
In the case of the Ghana Audit Service (GAS), although its audit independence was 
stipulated inthe 1992 Constitution, its financial independence from the Treasury 
Department was only gained since January 2004 (Winful 2007:25-27). In relation to 
funding, the 1997 Australian Auditor General Act stipulated that a separate allocation of 
funds by the Parliament for the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), and the 
involvement of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) in estimating ANAO‘s 
budget (English and Guthrie 2000: 110).Audit Board and Auditors Independence 
Power (1994: 16) argued that the public issue of auditor independence becomes 
more critical than their competency. Independence of the leadership of audit institution and 
auditors in terms of appointment and dismissal of audit institutionMembers protects them 
from being influenced by auditees and prevents limitation of their scope of duties (Priono 
2002:8-11).  
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In the case of the Board of Audit and Inspection of the Republic of Korea, to ensure 
its independence, like the Chief of Justice and the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the 
Board is appointed by the President with the consent of the national assembly (INTOSAI 
2001:12-14). The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) acts independently in auditing 
the financial statements and administration of Commonwealth public sector entities and 
reports to the Parliament, the Executive, Boards, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and the 
public (Barrett 2003: 8).  
Russell and Regel (2000: 211) posed two questions for ensuring auditor 
independence. The first was: ―Are the auditors free from all the bias and influences 
affecting objectivity?‖ The second: ―Do persons and the organisations involved with the 
audit respect and support the independence and integrity of the auditors?‖ 
Houghton and Jubb (2003: 305-308) underlined threats in controlling auditor 
independence. Firstis the threat of efficiency, where most external oversight of audit 
institution occurs aftereconomical damage and does not put attention toward prevention. 
Secondis the threat of effectiveness, where potentially exists in cases when auditors provide 
non-audit services to auditees, such as reviewing auditees‘ works that develops into fee-
dependency. Fearnley and Beattie (2004: 117-138) also believed that ―the provision of non-
audit services undermines independence in appearance and threatens the credibility of 
audits‖. These arguments indicate that providing audit services for auditees reduces auditor 
independence. 
Jasmadi (2002:18-21) also pointed out personal constraints for BPK Members and 
auditors in performing independently in auditing. These personal constraints include a 
special relationship with the auditees officially, both personally and financially; prejudice 
against the auditees that may have severe consequences for the audit; and difficulty 
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defending independence if auditors do auditing at the same organisation repeatedly for long 
time/period; and coming from the same political party with the auditees.Rakgailwane 
(2004:30-34) argued that a personal relationship with auditees ―could jeopardise‖ auditors‘ 
independence and stop them from maintaining their ―actual and perceived political 
neutrality‖. 
Independence can significantly influence the power of auditors and the audit 
institution in accessing information from auditees (Guthrie and English 1997: 13). 
Similarly, White and Hollingsworth (1999) argued―objectivity can be maintained by setting 
up ‗Chinese Walls‘ within an audit institution‖. Montondon (1995:59-69)believed that to 
provide an objective report, auditors should be sufficiently removed from political 
pressures and conduct their audits without fear of political repercussions. Similarly, Brown 
(1979: 14-15) and Power (1994) believed that independent auditors who are free from any 
influenceand conflicts of interest are necessary for objectivity in public sector audit work.  
Shah (2007: 355) saw three dimensions in addressing the independence of auditors. 
The first is the structural independence dimension, which come from the independence of 
the Board Members in doing auditing process and to report its audit results. The second is 
independence in the audit environment, which ensures auditor independence while 
conducting the auditing work without any influence, limits and pressure from the auditees, 
such as limiting access to data and information from officials, and modifying the audit 
report. The last dimension is personal independence, where auditors are free from personal 
conflicts of interest or bias that may affect their impartiality in auditing or providing audit 
report results. Moreover, Gietzmann (2002: 186) believed that ―the desire of auditors to 
maintain their independence is also determined by economic forces, such as present and 
future fee income‖.  These statements indicate that the independence of auditors needs 
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substantial support from audit institutions, the audit environment (including auditees) and 
the audit system in appreciating auditor performance.  
Integrity and Professionalism of Auditors 
According to Funnell (1996: 114-115), integrity and professionalism is the ability of 
auditors to carry out their workin an unbiased and honest manner. He defined integrity as 
―the staunch observance of accepted standards of honesty which must underlie all 
professional decisions and actions.‖ Public sector auditing practice requires the highest 
standards of integrity, professionalism, openness, and transparency in increasing efficiency 
in using public resource allocations (Bartel and van Rietschoten 1993: 34, Doig 1995:151-
152). Soedibyo (2006:25-28) defined auditor professionalism as ―a professional capability 
for auditors in maintaining a consistent quality of service and independence in public sector 
audit‖. Thus, integrity and professionalism, which requires auditors to adhere to a strict 
moral or ethical code, and professionalism, are important to perform independentlyas 
auditors.  
The auditor‘s professionalism and integrity significantly influences the objectivity 
of reports. In addition, this factor is closely related to independence. Some references 
indicate the importance for auditors to maintain their independence and integrity to act 
professionally, in particular in cases where auditors encounter pressures and conflicts from 
management of audited entities (Barkess et.al. 2002:14; Culvenor et.al. 2002:12-23; 
Ferguson and Rafuse 2004:10-15; Krishnamoorthy et.al. 2002:3-13; Moore 1993:39-50). In 
addition, Barrett (1996:137-146) stated that conflicts of interest have a bad influence on 
auditors and audit teams in performing professionally and objectively.  
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Professionalism and Audit Standards 
In the public sector, auditor competency in non-financial performance measures, 
which are more output-oriented, is recommended for performance audits (Chowdhury 
2005: 896). Gendron et.al (2007: 101-102) found that the professionalism and expertise of 
auditors of the Auditor General in the Canadian province of Alberta are essential in 
controlling the government‘s accountability and supporting performance audits to assess 
the performance measures of the New Public Management (NPM) process. Furthermore, 
Wheat (1991: 388) emphasised the necessary qualifications of performance auditors are to 
be proactive and independent auditors , to initiate audits and to adhere to the accepted 
government audit standards, and to see the public or its representatives as their clients 
rather than as auditees. However, an auditor‘s integrity is fragileas audit standards can be 
violated bythe auditors (Houghton and Jubb 2003: 301).  
Abbott (1983, 1988) examined the development of professionalism and professional 
ethics mechanisms. He argued that although professional codes of ethics and other 
enforcement mechanism are universally used in the professions, in practice, professional 
ethics are still questionable. In fact, informal enforcement among those of a higher 
professional status, daily norms enforced by group compliance, the mechanism of informal 
norms, situational values and similar means of social control are all more important to 
fulfill the professional obligations (corporate and individual) than formal codes (Abbott 
1988: 2-7). He also underlined two levels of professional obligations, namely corporate and 
individual, that are governed by both formal and informal rules (1988: 2). His statements 
indicate that the values of the auditors‘ profession are reflected in the way auditors carry 
out audits and ethical audit standards, not from the presence or absence of codes of ethics.  
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Healy and Palepu (2001:405-40) believed that the differences in audit standards, the 
legal framework that governs the audit profession, enforcement of standards and rules, and 
professional training requirements influence the credibility of audit reports and financial 
statements. They also argued standards and a legal basis for audits, and also their 
enforcementare necessary for the credibility of the audit report. 
Auditors’ Proficiency and Experience 
Auditing work requiresqualified staff and auditors that collectively have the 
necessary qualifications and competencies to support the full range of auditing. Lee (1998: 
223) argued―the lack of competence due to the lack of expertise and experience forces the 
auditors to rely on client management in terms of asking questions and assessing 
responses‖. Frantz (1999:59)argued that level of auditor skill influences the quality of 
auditing as required by audit standards. This means that lower audit feesand a limited 
number of qualified auditors in the public sector can influence the capability of an audit 
institution in conducting its auditing scope, both in number and quality of audits. 
Gendron et.al (2007: 101-129) developed a better understanding about the 
professions of public sector accountants and auditors and the production of professional 
expertise in implementing new public management reforms in the Canadian province of 
Alberta. They also analysed and observed how auditors construct their expertise in audit 
performance measures (both financial and non-financial) through the production of 
guidance documents and the issuance of recommendations. Auditor expertise is judged 
through an examination of the audit office and auditees‘ responses.  
According to Mulgan (2003: 87), traditionally, audit offices have mostly been 
professional accountants. However with the expansion of the role of government auditing 
from financial auditing to performance auditing, a wider variety of skills are required in 
57 
auditors. In terms of performance audits, it is crucial for auditors to be familiar with other 
disciplines (that is, to be multidisciplinary), besides accounting and management. Other 
disciplines may include computer science, economics, research methodology, social 
science, public policy analysis, law, engineering, agriculture and pharmacology (Al-Nofaie 
2003:22-24).  
The expansive and dynamic growth in IT in delivering government services has 
affected the nature of auditing. Coe and Borthich (1984: 67-74) suggested auditors for 
having skills in implementing computer‘s application and IT. The Australian National 
Audit Office (ANAO 2001: 28) had problems in implementing an IT system for financial 
auditing due to a lack of staff expertise in management systems and reporting thatrequired 
development of its personnel in special skills to conduct IT auditing. By undertaking an IT 
audit, there is a greater chance of success in ensuring availability, security and integrity of 
information processing to support government sector objectives.  
Some authors emphasise the importance of competencies and skills of auditors, 
including knowledge, experience, skill or other operational competencies to promote the 
quality of performance and to maximise the effectiveness of audit activities (Al-Nofaie 
2003:22-24; Ferguson and Rafuse 2004:10-15; Flint 1988). Another example regards the 
skills required for auditors to test non-compliance with laws and regulations, such as 
‗internal revenue code regulations‘ concerning income tax expenses (Ramos 2006: 89). 
Howieson (2003: 100) suggested developing competency in ―technologies, abstraction, 
system thinking, experimentation and the capacity for communication and collaboration‖, 
Skaerbaek (2009: 2) found the need for auditors‘ capacity in performance measurement, 
indicators and methodology in examining the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of 
public agencies. Hoadley (2006: 192) suggested upgrading administrative skills for audit 
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personnel, while Crawford and Stein (2002: 122) found highauditorcompetency in risk 
management important. 
In constructing expertise, the Auditor General can apply two strategies to reduce 
self-doubt (Gendron et.al. 2007: 104-105). The office developed two strategies to overcome 
these obstacles. The first strategy requested by auditors to have expertise when they need 
specific qualifications in performance auditing to provide rational recommendations for 
auditees. The second strategy required auditors to develop their expertise through 
individual programs and the work of specific departments. Building networks with a variety 
of national and international organisations, such as public accounting offices, professional 
bodiesand public policy groups, can also develop auditor and accountant expertise in 
measuring organisational performance. The strategy led auditors to defer considerations on 
whether specific measures are ‗relevant‘ and help to check auditors‘findings.  
Building competency and skills among auditors requires training, technical 
assistance and other development activities (Kefi 2005:1-3; Rakgailwane 2004:30-34). 
Similarly, Flint (1988: 48) emphasised that the first requirement of qualifications 
forauditorsregards their competency in both knowledge and skills as the result of education, 
training and experience. However, according to Lee (1998: 223-224), training is 
insufficient if the nature of the audit subjectmatter requires skills not held by financial 
experts. The presence of personnel who have full knowledge and the highest relevant 
competency supporting their performance in auditing isone of the success factors for 
effective government auditing (Torres 2004:447-56). Professional training improves auditor 
competency, expertise and skills, and significantly contributes tothe production of credible 
reports (Healy and Palepu 2001:405-40).  
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There are four types of training identified for auditors and staff of SAIs: (1) 
introductory training for new auditors to provide information about the roles and functions 
of SAIs, (2) technical training to improve auditor skills in performing auditing tasks, (3) 
managerial training for employees to obtain skills for working in auditing units, and (4) 
continuing training to enhance or maintain auditor or staff capability (Mazur et.al. 2005:10-
14). One aspect of professional development is developing an e-learning strategy through 
information and communication technologies, including the internet, to enhance the future 
learning environment in audit institutions (Callaghan 2004:16-19). 
According to Moyes et.al (1999: 157-235), certified public accountant or auditors, 
the level of education, and auditing experience all have a positive affect on auditor income. 
They argued that compensation from audit offices is influenced by auditor proficiency and 
experience. Proficiency is measured by the level of education and auditors who obtained 
certification auditor professionwith a minimum bachelor degree in accounting. Moreover, 
longer experience and greater professional maturity improve the ability of auditors to detect 
fraud and material irregularities. This means that the compensation for auditors is 
influenced by their ability, proficiency and professionalism. 
To summarise, professionalism and integrity are values for auditors that are 
important forperforming independently and objectively in auditing and reporting. The 
formal rules, including audit standards, code of profession ethics and its enforcement 
mechanism are universally used. However, in practice there are still possible deficiencies. 
In line with the expanding role of auditing toperformance auditing and the dynamic growth 
in IT in government, auditors need skills from a multidisciplinary background, besides 
accounting and finance. Building auditorcompetencies and skills are required through 
training and education, technical assistance, and other individual program such as e-
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learning strategies or building networks with a variety of national and international 
organisations such aspublic accounting offices, professional bodies and public policy 
groups. 
Internal and External Quality Assurance 
Wilkins underlined (1995: 421-429) the importance of internal and external quality 
assurance for assessing the quality of audit office performance. For internal quality 
assurance, there are regular reviews of audit reports, including communication with 
auditees agencies to find out the quality of audit results. External assessment of an audit 
office‘s quality performance is conducted by external, independent peer reviewers. From 
three national audit offices in the United Kingdom (National Audit Office-NAO), Sweden 
(Riksrevisionsverket-RRV) and Australia (Australian National Audit Office-ANAO), 
Wilkins explained that NAO received comments from academic reviewers, the media and 
Parliament, while RRV obtained feedback from auditees, Members of Parliament, the 
Ministry of Finance and the research community as their external reviewer to assess the 
quality of audit. Wilkins (1995: 421-429) argued that the review of audits has a significant 
influence on the performance and progress of audit offices.  
Internal auditing has a responsibility to examine the financial management and 
performance of its own organisation and review the results with internal management 
(Burke et.al. 2006: 104). In addition, Felix et.al.(2001:513)argued that there are positive 
influence of the work from internal auditorsto the workload of external auditors. This 
means that the good performance of internal auditors in conducting financial and 
performance auditing can help external auditors in conducting further examinations. 
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Wilkins (1995: 427) emphasised the importance of peer reviewsat least once every 
three years to assess the performance of an audit office. In addition, Nicoll (2005: 105) 
pointed out that the audit work and management of SAIs are reviewed as they act as a 
rolemodel for government entities. Aldons (2001:34-42) also believed that the quality of an 
audit report improves when the auditors know that their work will be reviewed and that 
sanctions for poor quality work will be applied. 
Fargher et.al. (2005) investigated the factors determining the extent of the audit 
review process. Their study found that time pressure and the attitude of the reviewer toward 
detail are significant factors, while client risk was not a significant factor. They claim that 
these factors are similar in both the private and public sector due to professional audit 
standards, which provide guidance in implementing and providing a framework to promote 
the quality of audit work. Standards in the public sector are adopted from private sector 
audit standards. 
The above statements indicate that external and internal reviews of audit work 
influence the independence, professionalism and quality of the audit.   
Resources of the Audit Institution 
The power of an audit institution in controlling the government has to be supported 
by sufficient resources for their auditing work. These resources include funding for auditors 
and staff, computers, comfortable and conducive offices and other equipment. Gendron 
et.al (2007: 101-108) described the need for greater attention by Auditor Generalsforthe 
necessary resources for audit work, especially in conducting research and developing 
experience and networks for establishing expertise in measuring government performance. 
The lack of resources in audit offices that occurs in some developing countries can affect 
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the effectiveness of audit work (Rakgailwane 2004:30-34). For instance, public auditing in 
Sri Lanka was found to be weak in contributing to financial accountability and good 
governance due to insufficient human resources, information technology, audit 
methodology and infrastructure (Hemaratne 2005:23-25).  
Budget and Human Resources 
The audit work must have sufficient budget to support the objectives. The audit 
budget is an ―important element that should not be left under the control of the organisation 
under audit, because the budget impacts on the audit activity‘s capacity to carry out its 
duties‖ (Thorne et.al 2001). Houghton (1998: 79) argued that there are consequenceswhen 
public sector auditor salaries and other conditions of employment are uncompetitive 
compared with the private sector. These include making it difficult to recruit both newly 
qualified graduates and experienced personnel, andaffecting the morale of auditors in 
maintaining their credibility and objectivity. 
For maintaining the independence of auditors, an audit office needs enough budgets 
to cover the appropriate incentives for a professional auditor. Craswell (1997: 19) believed 
in the importance of auditor independence from the auditees. In this regard, he (1997: 19) 
argued that providing remuneration is a strategy to reduce the risk of losing the 
independence of auditors by prohibiting auditors to supply any services and accept money 
from auditees. However, the strategies increase the audit costs that should be spent by the 
audit agencies. 
Offices and Information Technology (IT) Resources 
In line with the expanding scope of audit institutions in controlling public sector 
activities, technology and the growing size of offices has developed significantly (Scott 
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2003: 210). Besides, with the complexity of computer systems and growing computer use 
in government institutions, to ensure effective and efficient audits, auditors also need access 
to computer resources (Coe and Borthick 1984:67-74).Lapsley (2009: 1-20) also argued 
that audit technology has important implications for policy makers, managers and citizens 
to deploy auditing. 
Skaerbaek (2009: 4) argued ―employees of audited entities may change in various 
ways when auditors and others initiate changes in accounting and auditing technologies‖. 
The Auditor General‘s Office of Thailand, which concentrates on the accuracy of 
documents and compliance with the law for audit procedures, needs computer processing of 
accounting information to provide timely reports and to reduce reliance on paper in 
assessing the documents and accounting records (Henry and Attavitkamtorn 1999: 447). 
These statements indicate that IT resources, which include computers, communication 
technology, IT applications and systems, have significant advantages in processing 
accounting and auditing reports. 
The greater use of computers provides more productivity, lower audit costs and 
better audit methodology (Nicoll 2005: 16). In addition, the development of communication 
technology can save time, allowing auditors to communicate with people involved prior to 
and after audits, and to send timely audit reports (Russell and Regel 2000: 171). The 
current situation provides challenges for auditors to access data and information, 
particularly from websites and theinternet. A website that contains information relating to 
the activities of the audit office, relevant regulationsand documents (such as state or 
government audit standards, Code of Ethics for government auditors) is useful for sharing 
information between SAIs, clients and other interested groups. This is because they are able 
to see the audit reports on various ministriesand new publications related to the audit office. 
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Examples of new SAI websites in 2002 are the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General (C&AG) of Bangladesh
13
 and the Indonesian State Audit Board (BPK)
14
.  
In a simple system, auditors may be able to audit without computers. However, this 
may become more difficult when auditing entities that use complex data processing. Coe 
and Borthick (1984:67-74) found an increase in unresolved audit findings on misuse and 
abuse of public finances as a result of the lack of computer technology and of auditors 
knowledgeable in computer auditing. Moreover, they suggested that auditors can use 
computersto improve audit tools and methods in verifying and validating the account 
balances of financial statements based on government accounting standards. Deck 
(1985:52-62) argued that computers and IT resources are beneficial tools that can increase 
auditor capability in detecting fraud by examining record keeping and processing 
transactions electronically for audited entities.  
Audit institutions have to cope with successive developments in management 
methods for large masses of information and new technologies (Kefi 2005:1-3). For 
instance, a geographical information system or GIS (computer hardware, software and 
geographic data to analyse geographically referenced information) can be used for audit 
purposes such as auditing housing subsidies and to audit disaster response and management 
(Rentenaar and Williams-Bridgers 2006:17-21). 
2.2.2 Factors Influencing Acting on Information 
In a democratic political process, the accountability of government is reviewed and 
scrutinised by an external audit institution to facilitate the checks and balances system 
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www.cagbd.org (accessed 23/03/2005). 
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www.bpk.go.id (accessed 23/03/2005). 
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(legislative, judicial and Executive) in public governance (Grace 2005: 576). Moreover, 
Grace (2010: 581-582) argued that to provide a synergy and coherence to the checks and 
balances mechanism, the audit office, through its audit reports information, acts as a 
catalyst to help public bodies improve their performance and accountability. The following 
sections provide a literature reviewon the factors that influence the quality of information in 
audit reports in relation to the capacity of audit office and auditees to act on that 
information. 
Political Support from the Legislative 
Parliamentary Members have a significant role and function in improving public 
administration and holding the Executive to account. Moreover, the role of the Legislature 
in controlling and enforcing the accountability of the bureaucracy is the key element in the 
relationship between politics and administration.Aldons (2001: 34-42) believed that 
Members of Parliament have the political power to hold the Executive accountable to the 
public.  
The Legislature has a significant role in ensuring public satisfaction about the 
performance of government bureaucracy. Uhr (1982: 31-32) stated that ―although 
Parliaments cannot and should not be governed, they should call the governors to account, 
demanding an explanation of how current measures are consistent with general policy 
guidelines authorised by Parliamentary vote‖. Uhr‘s statement clearly indicatedthat 
Parliament has the function of reviewing the processes of government administration. This 
is also supported by Day and Rudolf (1987: 10-12) who argued that political accountability 
is employed by Parliament to hold government to account for their actions after reviewing 
audit reports.  
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Gendron and Cooper (2001: 306) emphasised the close relationship between state 
auditors and the Legislature. Funnel (1994: 178) argued that the audit office has the role of 
examining information on the Executive‘s spending and taxation income and to report the 
results toParliament. Moreover, he argued that the Parliament must have the will to 
admonish and call the government to account to the public. Moreover, Simms (1999: 34) 
argued that to ensure the accountability of government, an audit institution examines the 
accountability of public sector bodies and reports the audit results toParliament. The reports 
are reviewed by Parliament to hold the government to account to the public for managing 
and using public resources, and in order to uncover poor administration and corruption 
(Evans 1999: 87; Simms 1999: 34).  
The function of Parliament to hold government accountable in using public 
resources and improving public administration has been applied by most of the national 
audit institution in OECD countries (such as: the Supreme Audit Office in the Czech 
Republic; the National Audit Offices in Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom; the 
Federal and Lander Courts of Auditors in Germany; the State Audit Office in Hungary; the 
Board of Audit and Inspection in Korea; the Prime Ministry High Auditing Board in 
Turkey and the Australian National Audit Office in Australia), which assist the Congress or 
Legislature in scrutinising the public administration (Bertsk 2000: 63 and Houghton and 
Jubb 1998: 30).  
Eckardt (2008:1-17) studied the interaction between political institutions andpublic 
sector performance in Indonesian local governance. From a randomised sample of 177 
districts, he found that the political power of regional Legislatures in controlling 
government is through the implementation of sanctions for non-compliance by officials, 
which has forced them to reduce opportunistic behavior and improve their performance. 
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The reports from state auditors support the essential roles and functions of Parliament in 
forcing the government or Executive to provide possible action to improve its 
accountability. 
In reviewing audit reports, a separate committee can assist Parliament to conduct its 
function by sending a complete audit report to be commented on by both the Parliament 
and Executive (Brown 1980: 260). The comments from the Executive are published as part 
of the audit reports. For example, in Britain, there is a Public Accounts Committee that 
receives audit reports of SAI to support the Parliament in questioning the Executive on its 
performance and accountability (Yoedono 2002b:6-7). Besides, in Australia, there is the 
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) which works closely with the 
Auditor General and ANAO and has the power to hold government officials accountable to 
the public. Audit institutions can monitor the progress of audit reports followed up by the 
Legislative (Brown 1980: 260).  
Support from the Executive 
One of the measurements for effective auditing is the improvement of public sector 
accountability through audit results and recommendations (Wilkins 1995: 429). The 
Executive has a responsibility to followup audit results that contain findings and 
recommendations for better government performance (Taylor 1996:147-56). This means 
that an external audit agency examines the accountability of the Executive‘s state finances 
and performance, and reports the finding to the public agencies that have responsibility to 
follow them up. 
Scott (2003: 205) stated that ―auditors might be effective as meta-regulators‖ on the 
bases of control than hierarchy, which means that although auditors have no authority to 
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put on sanctions for auditees, but they can report and publish their findings in respect of 
regularity or qualification of the accounts that shaming their auditees. According to 
Humphrey (2002: 60 quoted in Scott 2003: 213), ―meta regulation highlights the potential 
in using governance power to steer the internal governance rather than securing direct 
control‖. This means audit institutions can evaluate the policies of public agencies to 
determine whether the regulation of government has met its objectives. Recommendations 
and findings from audit institutionsshould then be followed up by enforcement from the 
Executive itself or Parliament. 
Brooks and Pariser (1995:72-83) suggested that audit recommendations have to be 
followed up by officials and managers of audited entities. This means that the following up 
of audit reports greatly depends on the commitment of government. They also suggested 
someaspects to provide effective follow-up audit reports to increase accountability. The 
first is to create a climate for an effective audit follow-up system, such as (i) requiring 
followup by administrative regulation; (ii) providing audit laws with the requirement of 
prompt corrective action by audited entities with a commitment demonstrated to implement 
the audit recommendations; (iii) enforcing penalties on agencies thatignore audit 
recommendations. The second aspect is to set up procedures to ensure effective solutions to 
audit recommendations, such as evaluating audit recommendations to see their impact on 
the financial and operationalaccountability in using public resources of agencies. This 
includes providing corrective action plans to monitor and assess implementation and the 
reviewing of recommendations, and highlighting key recommendations that require special 
attention due to a potential negative impact in the future. The last recommendation is to 
utilise the followup of audit recommendations for accountability, for example, monitoring 
the status of audit recommendations to explain why corrective action is not necessary, 
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approving a government agency‘s budget request after audit recommendations have been 
implemented, and designing follow-up audit recommendations to bring audited entities into 
compliance with laws and regulations.  
The accountability of the Executive ―presumed that the political Executive is 
responsible to the Parliament‖ (Simms 1999: 34). This means that the Executive has a 
strong significant influence in developing independent auditing and following up the audit 
results in response to Parliament.  
Law Enforcement Support 
There is interaction between the international development in New Public 
Management (NPM) to administrative law on auditing and audit standards. Guthrie (1990) 
argued that there is a significant relationship between restructuring the accounting and 
auditing system, and standards in public sector administration and policy. Moreover, Nicoll 
(2005: 35-44) underlined the critical role of administrative law to require agencies to 
develop audit standards to perform efficient and effective audits of government entities. 
This is argued by Rahman and Goddard (1998: 198) who said that administrative law can 
require agencies to hold their performance and comply with accounting and auditing 
standards to verify the financial and management information that is provided. Moreover, 
according to Quick and Rasmussen (2002: 147-148), for auditors who do not obey the rules 
and auditing standards, sanctions and punishment are not only in the form of money , but 
can  also be in the form of influence on their reputation by publishing the names of auditors 
who have been punished.  
In addition, financial management and reporting of the public sector and accrual-
based accounting system practices in government institutions have significantly influenced 
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the audit process and the standards with which auditors must comply (English and Guthrie 
1991). China is an example of a country in Asia that has achieved remarkable development 
progress in economic reform since its government regulationsreestablished accounting and 
auditing standards based on international best practices (Chen et.al. 2005).  
In the public sector, financial audit standards adopted from private sector 
management and reporting practices, while performance audit standards are determined by 
the mandate of legislation to auditors in determining the objectives of the audit (Nicoll 
2005: 36-38).As Gendron et.al (2007: 116) explained, audit standards are the result of good 
practices developed through continuous study, consultation and shared information between 
auditors and peers about the principlesof providing audit services.  
Compliance with audit standards can maintain auditors confidence in reporting and 
providing audit opinions and recommendations (Nicoll 2005: 35). Abdolmohammadi 
(2009: 27-42) argued that there are personal and organisational variables that contribute to 
the use of, and compliance with, audit standards. He believed that the length of professional 
Memberships, certification, continuing professional education, academic degree and years 
of experience are important factors to improve the usage of, and compliance with, the 
standards. Hodgdon et.al. (2009: 33-55) revealed that compliance is positively related to the 
auditor‘s choice, thus they reinforce the importance of developing institutional mechanisms 
(such as enforcement) to encourage compliance with the standards. This means, regulations 
and enforcement may supersede the use of or compliance with standards. 
All audit findings that indicate criminal activity or corruption should be followed up 
by law enforcers or investigators. Fraud findings from auditors can be considered as the 
beginning stage in the process of further deep examination (Dempsey 1985:39-51). Reports 
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from internal and external auditors that indicate criminal activity can be used for initial or 
preliminary evidence for further investigation.  
Audit institutions have no power to apply formal sanctionson auditees (Scott 2003: 
211). This means that although auditors have spent time and effort on different types of 
auditing (compliance, fraud and performance audits), audit institutions have no capacity to 
impose any sanction for any finding of irregularities, fraud and other criminal actions of 
public agencies. 
Law enforcement can be a tool to ensure that audit findings that indicate 
criminalitywill be preliminary evidence at court and will reduce fraud and thus the 
possibility of auditees repeating their crimes (Soedibyo 2004:12-14). Audit institutions can 
establish auditing functions properly and effectivelyif the auditors are sure that there will be 
followup from law enforcers on their findings that indicate corruption and fraud.  
Public and Media Support 
Through the principle of transparency, the public and media have the rightto access 
all information in the public sector. Miyakawa (1999: 91-92) argued that publicconcern 
about how their money is used by the government has become inevitable in a modern 
society. Moreover, with the development of democracy, public exposure can affect public 
perception of government (Evans 1999: 88). As the Executive is responsible to the people, 
poor performance in government programs can be directly criticised by the community 
through interest groups and the media (Simms 1999: 34).  
Civil society can also be involved in persuading government to change from being 
supplieroriented and ignoring performance in public services, to being consumeroriented 
and responsive to public demands; and they can also be involved in assessing SAIs in 
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carrying out their audit roles and functions (Pyun 2006: 20-23). The satisfaction of the 
public and auditees as the secondary clients of an audit institution is one factor that 
influences the performance of an audit office (Wilkins 1995: 429). This means that the 
awareness of civil society about government performance and about the functions and role 
of public sector auditing is essential to improving accountability. 
The media can help audit institutions inform the public about the performance of 
government and public sector agencies. Gonzalez et.al (2008: 439) emphasised the role of 
the media to convey information on audit reports that can inform public opinion on the 
performance of public sector agencies. He (2008.435) also found that the awareness of 
SAIs about the important role of media as a communication strategyfor providing the 
public with an overview of what their activities are and what they do relating to public 
sector auditing.  
With support from the media, the public can get information transparently about 
government accountability in operating and handling public funds and public 
services.Mulgan (2008a: 345) found the role of the media enables the public to find out 
information about government activities. Aldons (2001:34-42) believes that the media, in 
particular press and radio, are major instruments for the checks and balances needed in a 
representative democracy. To maximise the effectiveness of information about audit report 
findings being transmitted to the public, SAI should cooperate with the media (Mazur et.al. 
2005:10-14). The media have no formal authority or power to review, but they can bring 
considerable informal pressure to hold the government, particularly Ministers and public 
servants, to be accountable to the public (Mulgan 2000: 89).  
Some lessons can be drawn from the experience of six developing countries (India, 
South Africa, Mexico, South Korea, and Argentina) that involve the public in auditing 
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(Ramkumar 2007:15-19). In India and Mexico, the public uncovered misappropriation of 
funds thatwas not reported by government auditors. South Africa and Argentina publish 
government audit reportsand then the public demands that government agencies take action 
and the Legislature reviews the government‘s audit reports. In the Philippines and South 
Korea, citizens ask for special audits on government projects in the case of financial and 
procurement irregularities. Finally, South Korea, the Philippines and India have a‗citizen 
audit request‘ system to support citizen participation in government auditing. This means 
that the critique from the public and media encourages the government and Parliament to 
respond on the information in audit reports. 
2.3 Analytical Framework of Reporting Information in Public Sector Auditing 
The effectiveness of reporting and acting on audit information in the public sector 
(measured by content and quality of audit report information, dissemination of audit report 
information and action taken on such information) depends on a number of factors such as 
the degree of independence, integrity, professionalism, independent peer review, and audit 
resources. Also, the level of support from the Executive, Legislature and law enforcers in 
following up audit results and the level of cooperation between audit institutions with the 
public and media. The analytical framework of this study is summarised in Figure 2.3.   
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Figure 2.3 Analytical Framework for Reporting Information in Public Sector Audits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next chapter describes the development of the external public sector auditing 
environment in Indonesiato provide important background for the analysis presented from 
Chapter Four to Chapter Seven.  
A. Influencing Reporting 
Audit Information 
 
1. Independence 
 Audit institution 
 Auditors 
 
2. Integrity and 
professionalism 
 
3. Internal and external 
quality assurance 
 
4. Resources 
  Budget  
 Human 
 Communication  and IT  
 
B. Influencing Acting on 
Audit Information 
 
1. Support from 
 Legislature 
 Executive 
 Law Enforcers 
 
2. Cooperation with the 
public and media 
A. Criteria Information in 
Audit Reports 
 
1. Content information 
 Scope, objectives and 
methodology 
 Compliance with Laws and 
Regulations 
 
2. Quality of information 
 Reliable evidence 
 Objectivity and credibility of 
information  
 
3. Communication of 
Information 
 Understandable information 
  Timely reporting 
 
B. Criteria for Acting on 
Information in Audit Reports 
 
1. Publication of audit reports 
 
2. Realistic audit 
recommendations 
 
3. Follow-up audit report 
findings and recommendations 
Output 
 
Enhancement of 
public sector 
accountability and 
transparency  
Factors 
Outcomes 
 
Improvement of 
performance 
(quality of public 
sector services) 
Impact 
 
Social and 
economic 
development 
(Wilkins 1995:429) 
 
 
Audit Process Effective Audit 
75 
Chapter 3  
The Historical Development of Indonesian Public Sector  
Auditing (from the Dutch Colonial Period to the Reformation 
Era) 
This chapter reviews the historical development of public sector auditing practices 
in Indonesia as the background to the research. External auditing in the Indonesian public 
sector has a long history, which can be divided into three crucial periods, namely: (1) prior 
Independence until during the Old Order (1945-1965), (2) during the New Order Era (1966-
1998), and (3) during the Reformation Era (1999-present).  
3.1 Public Sector Auditing from the Dutch Colonial period to the Old Order (1945-
1965) 
Prior to the independence of Indonesia, the colonial bureaucracy and the Dutch 
administration dominated public administration and auditing in Indonesia. Javanese culture 
was also strongly influenced by the bureaucracy culture with patrimonial practices and 
power concentrated in the sovereignty. Prior to Indonesian independence in 1945, audit 
functions were conducted by the Algemene Rekenkamer (the Dutch‘s Audit Institution). 
Forms of administration were governed based on the formative period of Dutch 
colonialism, exemplified by the administrative institutions in Yogjakarta and prevailing 
until the end of the 18
th
 century. According to Hoadley (2006: 9), ―Javanese politics were 
dominated by diadic ties forged between sovereign and vassal (gusti-kawula) resulting in a 
highly centralised, if brittle, state with little delegation of authority or intermediate 
organisations‖. Boediono (2005: 322) noted that independence in Indonesia had to start 
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with weak civil service traditions andincompetent civil servants. This condition burdened 
the state budget and provided continuing problems in reforming the performance of the 
public sector.  
In addition, public sector auditing was carried out by ARK (Algemene Rekenkamer), 
which was the official name of the SAI during the Dutch occupation period in Indonesia. 
On-site auditing was formally conducted by BPK due to the absence of adequate available 
documents, data and information for auditing. Although on-site auditing necessities 
required large travel costs, this was still applied instead of desk audits (with no visits to the 
auditee).  
Since Independence Day on 17
th
 August 1945, the founders of the Republic of 
Indonesia realised the importance of auditingfor examining state finances. The first Head of 
Supreme Audit was the first President of the Republic Indonesia, Soekarno. The Board 
Members of BPK were Ministers. BPK began officially performing its constitutional 
assignment on 1
st
 January 1947 in Magelang
15
. To perform its duty, BPK used Indische 
Comptabiliteitswet or ICW (laws for financial accountability for the East Indies) and 
Instructie en verdere bepalingen voor de AlgemeeneRekenkamer or IAR (instructions and 
further provisions for the office of the state audit) as the basic regulations used bythe 
Algemene Rekenkamer (Auditor Magazine 2003:20-21). This meant that since BPK was 
formally formed in 1947, the head and Board Members of BPKwere under the power of the 
Executive and were still using the East Indies laws. 
The Parliamentary system under the original 1945 Constitution (before the 
amendment), applied unikameral, which meant the People‘s Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
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 This is based on information from a Board Member IV of BPK in the press conference on 5
th
 January 2007 in 
the auditorium of BPK, Jakarta. 
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held the highest institutional authority as the representative power of Indonesian people. 
MPR determined the Constitution, and elected both the President and vice-President. As a 
result, the position of President was under MPR. More than half of MPR Members were 
also Members of Parliament (DPR). 
The formation of state institutions in Indonesia was adopted from the Netherlands. 
For instance, the position of MPR had a similar function to that of the King or Queen in 
Netherlands. The position of BPK (Algemere Rekenkamer) under the original 1945 
Constitution was similar to the institution referred to in the constitution of the Netherlands 
as one of the ‗highinstitutions of state‘ (in Dutch ‗hoge colleges van staat’) along with the 
Supreme Court (MA or Hogeraad/Landraad), Parliament (DPR or Volksraad), Supreme 
Advisory Council (DPA or Raad van Nederlandshe Indie), and the President (equal with 
General Governor) (Asshiddiqie 2005: 204). Consequently, BPK gave its reports to MPR. 
Asshiddiqie (2005: 7) noted that under the 1945 Constitution, there was a lack of a checks 
and balances mechanism between the Executive, Legislative and Judicative. Figure 3.1 
presents the position of BPK under the 1945 Constitution and the People's Assembly 
(MPR), which was adopted from the colonial (Netherlands) structures and practices.  
Therefore, basically, the position of BPK under the 1945 Constitution was more 
firmly under the MPR, within the state structure. As stated by Board Member IV of 
BPK
16the establishment of BPK is stipulated in the Constitution as a ‗social contract‘ with 
the people of the Republic of Indonesia: 
The establishment of BPK started from the Independence Day in this country. BPK 
was founded based on the Constitution. In the theory of the state formation, the 
establishment of this state started from the same hopes, the same desires and the same 
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The speech and presentation of a Member IV of BPK at Sosialisasi of BPK on 6
th
 December 2006 in the 
auditorium of BPK, Jakarta. 
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goals, as stipulated in the Constitution as a ‗social contract‘ between all the people in 
this state. 
Figure 3.1 BPK under 1945 Constitution and People’s Assembly (MPR) 
 
Source: The presentation of a Board Member of BPK in Sosialisasi of BPK, on 6thDecember 2006 in the 
auditorium of BPK, Jakarta. 
 
This statement indicates that the purpose of BPK‘s establishment should not be separated 
from the Indonesian peoples‘ desires, which is stated in the 1945 Constitution, Paragraph 5, 
Article 23 (GOI 2006c: 57) as follows: 
In order to audit the accountability of the state finances, an Audit Body shall be 
established, the regulations shall be prescribed by statute. The results of the audit 
shall be made known to Parliament. 
However, the term ‗an Audit Body‘ with the authority to conduct external auditing in this 
paragraph was not clear. Since the power of the President in the 1945 Constitution was 
strong, BPK had no independence from the influence and power of the Executive. An audit 
body in this statement could be interpreted to mean that the roles and functions of BPK 
were the same as those of other central and local government internal audit institutions, 
namely the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (BPKP), General Inspectorates 
(for the Ministry level), Primary Inspectorates (for the non-ministerial institution -at central 
level), and Regional Inspectorates (province and district/municipal Inspectorates), and other 
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Internal Control Units (SPI) in the public sector. As a result of this proliferation of auditing 
bodies, the cost of auditing was high; public sector audits were poorly structured with 
overlapping functions, and were ineffective. Moreover, the auditees took too much time 
and energy to serve all the auditors from the different supervisory institutions 
From the 1950s until 1958, Indonesia applied a Parliamentary system, based on the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Indonesia and the Provisional Constitution of the 
new Republic of Indonesia. BPK operated under the title of Finance Control Council 
(Dewan Pengawas Keuangan). The office of the Board was located in Bogor
17
, where it 
was known as the seat of Algemene Rekenkamer, the Court of Audit of the former 
Netherlands East Indies‘ Government (BPK RI 200320-21).  
The 1945 Constitution was re-imposed by Presidential Decree on the 5
th
July1959 
(BPK RI 2003:20-21). From 1959 until 1965, Indonesia applied ‗Guided Democracy‘ 
(demokrasi terpimpin), whichcentralised power in three aspects: political elite over society, 
the Jakarta centre over the provinces, and the charisma of President Soekarno as the leader 
of central government level (Lev 2000: 12-13). Moreover, the army simultaneously had 
dual functions (dwifungsi) in defense and security (military affairs) and also in society and 
politics (civilian affairs) (Hoadley 2006: 112-113). The dual functions allowed domination 
of bureaucratic and Executive positions (in both central and regional governments) by 
retired military personnel. This affected the lack of autonomy of the bureaucracy, including 
BPK. Although the first Law on BPK was enacted in 1965, the law did not fully comply 
with the terms of the 1945 Constitution, since the President dominated the Board. Over the 
years, BPK lacked authority and resources, which affected the quality of public sector 
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 Bogor is located 60 km south of Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. 
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administration and services. Boediono (2005: 322) noted the low quality and performance 
of the Indonesian public sector and that it needed serious attention. The influence of politics 
and the government on the BPK led to declining performance and capacity of public sector 
agencies to achieve the Constitution‘s message to be accountable in using public finances. 
3.2 BPK under the New Order Era (1966-1998) 
During the New Order Era, the centralisation of power was solely controlled by 
President. Moreover, the Guided Democracy system still continued. In terms of fiscal 
revenues, about 90 per cent of total revenues were handled by the central government, 
although the government functions were decentralised to the regions (Ferrazzi 2000: 108). 
In addition, the army became more powerful in the New Order Era. Lev (2000: 15) stated 
―the army became the primary beneficiary group of the most powerful government in the 
history of modern Indonesia‖. This means that in the New Order Era, Indonesia was led by 
a highly centralised authoritarian regime with a military base. Therefore, the political elite 
did not worry much about potential disruption from the public.  
McLeod (2005: 369) argued that during the Soeharto Era (1966-1998), the reward 
for good performance in the public sector institution was strongly aligned with meeting the 
President‘s objectives rather than corresponding with society‘s objectives. He (2005: 369-
370)also coined the concept of Soeharto‘s franchise system of government which included 
the Legislature, the judiciary, the legal bureaucracy, the military/police, the bureaucracy, 
SOEs, and the state banks. Rosyadi and Kurniasih (2009: 20) argued that although the 
neutrality of the government was legally stipulated, in practice, all bureaucracy was 
controlled by the power of President as the head of the Executive or government. 
Therefore, all public institutions, including courts, police, audit boards and most 
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bureaucratic offices lost their autonomous status and the bureaucracy was forced to comply 
with the power of the political party, instead of working in the public interest.  
During the New Order Era, corruption became systemic under the power of the 
President (Soeharto) and his cronies. One of the reasons was the weakness of the 
Indonesian legal system and the redistribution of income occurred on the basis of 
kekeluargaan (family) or kemitraan (partnership). McLeod (1993: 35) argued the 
ambiguity of the written laws that had only minor modifications since the Dutch Era, 
meaning they were not suitable to the needs of Indonesian economic and social 
development. He emphasized the very low salary of public sector employees. The officials 
had additional income from their clients (public) and as a result they sank further into 
corruption which was widespread and profound. This was supported by Houben (2000: 
55)who argued that under the New Order Era, ―possibilities of internal drain (or economic 
distortions) grew to unhealthy connections between those who seek personal economic 
benefits and political power holders who offer exclusive opportunity‖. Therefore, the long-
term unreliability of the legal system, which was not applicable to Indonesia‘s vastly 
changed economic and social development, led to an inherently poor bureaucratic culture. 
The Law on BPK (1965) was replaced by Law Number 15of the Year 1973. Article 
1 of the Law on BPK (GOI 1973) stated:  
The Audit Board is a High State Institution, which in the implementation of its tasks 
shall be independent from the influence and power of the Government, but shall not 
be superior to the Government. 
This article clearly states that BPK as an audit board has to be independent. However, BPK 
was influenced or controlled by the governmentand suffered many limitations in 
conducting audits. President Soeharto as the head of state was answerable to the MPR, 
BPK, and DPA, whose chairmen were directly appointed by the President. During the New 
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Order Era, O‘Rourke (2002: 287) argued that BPK ―had never been much more than a 
showcase agency‖ as it had never conducted its roles and functions effectively due to the 
Executive controlling its organisation and resources.  
The limitation of BPK‘s roles and functions were indicated with the following facts 
(Yoedono 2002a:7-9). Firstly, BPK had the authority to audit only the central government 
and not regional governments, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and regional-owned 
enterprises (ROEs). During the New Order, BPKP (internal audit institution under the 
Executive) had the greater authority in public sector auditing. Secondly, BPK could not 
audit local government because of its limited number of regional offices and no budget for 
larger auditingin local level government. Finally, BPK audit reports were only for 
Parliament Members and BPK Members had no jurisdiction to report its audits to regional 
Parliaments. As a result, BPK audit reports could not be an information resource related to 
the condition of public finances for legislators and decision makers in the public sector. 
Also, the practice of collusion between private companies and the government grew 
uncontrollably. Therefore, the BPK‘s roles and functions were reduced by the New Order 
government and its performance was unsatisfactory with limitations in its authority, audit 
objectives and resources. 
Moreover, the development of financial management in the public sector was also 
stagnant. As a result, financial audit reports could not explain economic conditions as the 
foundation for anticipating the future actions and strategies for state administrators. 
Ramcharan (2000: 64) emphasized the weaknesses of public financial management since 
the economic crisis in 1997 that had severe implications for all sectors in Indonesia, 
including the banking sector and for Indonesia‘s crony capitalism. The weaknesses of 
Indonesia‘s public sector accounting and auditing system, combined with decentralisation, 
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resulted in higher rates of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) at both the Executive 
and legislative, which led Indonesia ranked the 5
th
 most corrupt country out of 102 most 
corrupt countries in 2002 (Dwiyanto et.al. 2003: 106). Indonesia has been struggling to 
reduce the corruption through financial and auditing reforms. The Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI)
18
 of Indonesia increased from 1.9 in 2002 to 2.8 (rank 111 over 180 countries) 
in 2009 (Choi 2011: 27). 
3.3 Audit Reform under the Reformation Era (1999-Present) 
Due to the bureaucratic culture present during the New Order Era, reform of the 
bureaucracy, seen as a prerequisite of good governance, has provided a big challenge as 
power was dispersed horizontally and vertically, which has had implications for the 
dispersion of corruption (Lele 2009: 84). Indonesian people‘s demand for ‗good 
governance‘ as necessary for the country‘s development (Bakti 2000a: 3) has forced the 
Constitution to be amended.  
Audit reform started in 2001 when the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution  
(Seno 2002: 4-6) declared BPK‘s status and function to be the only state external audit 
institution and required improvements in its independence and professionalism. The 
amended Constitution builds up a ‗checks and balances‘ system that had been lost for 
nearly 55 years (1946-2001). In addition, the chairman of BPK is no longer appointed by 
the President to conduct its audit function without interference from the Executive. The 
function of BPK in examining the management and accountability of government and in 
assisting the legislative to conduct its role has been strengthened. The third amendment of 
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 The score were published annually by Transparency International (TI). A higher score means less (perceived) 
corruption.  
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the 1945 Constitution (2001) provides one special Chapter (VIIIA) on BPK, consisting of 
Articles 23E, 23F and 23G. These articles strengthen the position, roles and functions of 
BPK as an audit institution coherently and clearly. All BPK Members are high officials of 
the state, but not government officials; they are not subjectto criminal proceedings in 
conducting their duties and must have the prior consent of the Head of State.  
Figure 3.2 Position of BPK under the Third Amendment of the 1945 Constitution (2001) 
 
Source: ‘The Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK RI): enhancing transparency and 
accountability in state finance with independency, integrity and professionalism’, Jakarta, p. 14 (BPK RI 
January 2007). 
 
Figure 3.2 (above) presents the position of BPK under the third Amendment of 
the1945 Constitution (2001) as parallel with MPR, DPR, the President, Supreme Court, 
Constitutional Court (MK), the Senate (DPD) and the Judicial Commission (KY). The 
People‘s Consultative Assembly (MPR) has been curtailed.The power of the Executive has 
been transferred to the Legislative both at the central and regional level, as the standard 
practice of democracies. Moreover, after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, power 
between MPR and DPR was separated. The amended has provided a clear fundamental 
ruling directive to reform state governance with strong commitment and strategies. 
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3.3.1 Policies in Accountancy and Auditing for Transparency and Accountability 
In the Reformation Era, the Indonesian government has reformed laws on state 
finance and auditing (2003-2004). These laws reform the accounting system from using a 
single entry accounting system to a double entry system, and from cash-based accounting 
into a modified accruals-based accounting system
19
 that helps BPK in examining the 
financial and non-financial performance of public sector agencies. This is also noted by 
McCrae and Aiken (2000: 285), who said that public sector accounting in other developed 
countries has adopted an accruals-based accounting system from the private sector to focus 
on performance in government financial reports. Financial reports from public sector 
agencies are required to be based on the new government accounting standards (GOI 2005) 
where all public resources are recorded in integrated government reports that help the 
internal and external auditors to monitor the financial and liquidity conditions of both 
central and regional governments.  
The Law on State Finances (GOI 2003b)
20
 forces the government to apply the new 
government accounting system (SAP) to improve the transparency and accountability of 
public sector agencies in managing state finances. Articles 30 and 31 of this law stipulate 
the requirement for BPK to audit Executive agencies‘ financial statements includingbalance 
sheets, budget realisation, cash flow statements, and notes to financial statements, and to 
submit the audit results to Parliament no later than six months after the end of the budget 
year. This regulation was effectively implemented in 2006and BPK audits began adhering 
to the new system in 2007.  
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 According to Pallot (2003: 135-136), accruals-based accounting system ensure cost responsibility, encourage 
ongoing monitoring of assets and enable systemic costing and charging for services. 
20
 This was approved to replace the Netherlands‘ regulation of state finances during the colonial era, namely the 
Statute Book of 1933 No. 320 of IAR. 
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During the New Order Era, economic policies were influenced by 
developmentalism and crony capitalism. This resulted in significant government debt 
increases and economic growth and development becoming concentrated in a few groups or 
individuals (Bakti 2000b: 40). There was a lack of fairness and transparency relating to the 
use of public finances and resources. After the audit reform, all foreign aid projects or loan 
programs had to be audited by BPK.An economist and middle official of Bandung City 
local government (Interview A17) argued that the requirement of Parliament‘s approval in 
obtaining foreign aid received a lot of interference from legislators. Moreover, he thought 
that the Indonesian government is unable to be flexible in determining fiscal policies, which 
slows down the government‘s capacity to improve economic conditions. This statement is 
an example of an auditee who disagrees with the new regulations related to reporting 
state/local government loans as an indication of lack of transparency, accountability and 
competency at government level.  
Besides the Law on State Finance (2003), Article 56, Paragraph 3 of the Law on 
State Treasury (GOI 2004c) stipulates that government is required to submit financial 
statements to BPK within three months of the end of the financial year. BPK also has 
additional work in regulating state losses. These include the mechanism of officials to pay 
state losses based on audit findings and also the sanctions, and the responsibility of 
employers or the heads of units to report any state losses to the heads of departments or 
regional governments and BPK (BPK RI 2007a: 6). This law puts pressure on the BPK to 
follow technical procedures to implement the law. The Head of the Law Bureau stated:  
BPK is arranging the procedure of compensation for state losses for the treasurer and 
in consultation with government, in this case, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
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Law and Human Rights and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (for regional treasurer). 
We hope in two months it will be done
21
.  
Moreover, according to a key informant from the Law Bureau of BPK during the second 
fieldwork study
22
, in early 2007, BPK completed the regulations of compensation for the 
procedure for any kind of state loss. This indicates that BPK has a lot of work to complete 
the operational regulations for criminal activities leading to state or regional losses.  
Law of Audit (2004) and Law on BPK (2006) 
The Indonesian government did not change its Audit Law from the 
Netherlands/colonial erauntil the Audit Law was legalised on the 19
th
July 2004 to replace 
the IARStaadsblad 1933 Number 320. The Audit Law (GOI 2004b) regulates the following: 
(i) definition of auditing and auditors, (ii) scope of auditing and auditing standards, (iii) 
freedom and independence of audit work, (iv) access to information for auditors, (v) 
authority to evaluate internal controls,(vi) audit results and followup, (vii) imposition of 
compensation for state losses, and (viii) administration of criminal penalties for any person 
who does not comply with the responsibility to follow up the BPK‘s audit findings. 
Detailed explanations of the content and implementation of the Audit Law are provided in 
the following Chapters. 
After two years discussion, on 30
th
 October 2006, the Law on BPK replaced the 
former Law on BPK (GOI 1973)to provide a legal basis for public sector auditing that 
harmonised with the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 2001 and state finances 
law package of 2003-2004 (GOI 2006a). There are four important changes from the former 
Law on BPK, namely: (1) restating the mandate, function, position and responsibility, (2) 
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 This is based on an interview on 19
th
 February 2007 at BPK office, Jakarta. 
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 This is based on an interview during the second fieldwork from 4
th
 August to 11
th
 August 2007 in Jakarta. 
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enlarging the number of Board Members, (3) establishing regional offices in all provinces, 
and (4) confirming the only external audit institution in the Republic of Indonesia. This law 
was initiated by DPR instead of BPK itself
23
. To reform Indonesian public sector auditing 
and the organisation of BPK, the Law on BPK was based on international best practice for 
public sector auditing. On 8
th
January 2007, BPK celebrated its 60
th
anniversary (1947-
2007). This means that since the establishment of BPK, this was the first time that BPK is 
under the Law on BPK, which provides the legitimate power and authority to be a free and 
independent audit institution to achieve effective public sector auditing.  
Regulation on State Finances Audit Standards and Code of Conducts (2007) 
Paragraph 6, Article 6 of the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) requires BPK to regulate 
further for implementing its duties auditing state finance management and accountability. 
BPK provided new audit standards. The process of providing this new audit standards 
should be carried out precisely (due process) and based on benchmarks from international 
best practice as required by Article 5 of the Audit Law (GOI 2004b).  
The consultant team of BPK came from the economics faculty of the University of 
Indonesia and SAIs from the United States (GAO), Netherlands (ARK) and New Zealand 
(ANZ)
24
. Feedback was getting from public hearings, which come from professionals; 
researchers; academics; government officials; and the public. The new audit standards of 
BPK, namely Standard Pemeriksaan Keuangan Negara (SPKN), were launched in January 
2007. Table 3.1 (below) presents the differences between SAP and SPKN (BPK RI 2007g).  
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 This is based on presentation of the Tortama IV of BPK on 6
th
 December 2006 in the auditorium of BPK, 
Jakarta. 
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 This is based on information and documents from the Organisation Bureau of BPK collected on 9
th
 August 
2007. 
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Table 3-1Differences between Former (SAP 1995) and New (SPKN 2007) Audit Standards 
Description SAP 1995 SPKN 2007 
 
Source: Adapted from information from the Jakarta BPK office and was made available in the interview 
during the second field study on 9thAugust 2007. 
 
Table 3.1 suggests that SPKN regulates important issues including responses to 
recommendations, auditor requirements, internal audit weaknesses, users, and non-
compliance. Starting on 7
th
 March 2007, BPK auditors, public accountants on behalf of 
BPKand other internal auditors
25
 began using SPKNas guidelines for planning, 
implementing, evaluating and reviewing audit reports.  
In addition, on 22
nd
 August 2007, BPK introduced a Code of Ethic to regulate the 
integrity and professionalism of leaders of BPK Board Members and auditors in performing 
their duties and using their authority. As believed by Dalglish and Miller (2010: 16), 
integrity is one of the most significant abilities for a leader in emerging changes of 
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 This includes auditors from various institutions, experts who perform audits, or supervisory bodies that act as 
internal auditors of institutions, such asthe internal audit unit in the Central Bank of Indonesia and other state-
owned bank.  
Legal basis Law 5/1973 Law 15/2004 and Law 15/2006 
Number of paragraphs 27 (20 main paragraphs and 
seven additional paragraphs) 
46 (33 main paragraphs and 13 
additional paragraphs) 
Development concept Not clearly regulated A part of the professional standard of 
SPKN, formed a SPKN committee. 
Users BPK and other state internal 
audit institutions and public 
accountants based on contracts 
BPK, public accountants and other 
parties that work for and on behalf of 
BPK 
Requirement of staff 
capacities in conducting 
state audits 
Individuals had to be registered 
accountants 
Has expertise in the field of finance, 
collectively has certification, 
responsible person, should have a 
valid professional certificate. 
Uncover internal audit 
weaknesses  
General (narrative) Findings (condition, criteria, causes, 
effects) 
Responses to 
recommendations 
Not available Shall be conducted 
Non-compliance Not regulated Regulated separately 
Title of state finances audit 
report 
Auditor independence report Report of audit result on the financial 
statements. 
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globalisation. However, as long as BPK employees are public servants, they have to obey 
regulations from BKN (State Personnel Board). Hoadley (2006: 127) found that leaders and 
civil servants in Indonesia do everything according to the golden rule of ‗as long as the boss 
is satisfied‘ (asal Bapak senang) and rewards and performance were not based on merit 
system. The seniority and paternalistic system still strongly drives public administrators and 
auditors and if they do not satisfy their boss, it might be difficult for them to keep a good 
performancerecord.  
Table 3-2 Legal Changes since Audit Reform (2001) in Indonesia 
No. Legal 
Changes 
Before Audit Reform 
(1946-2000) 
After Audit Reform (2001-present) 
 
Source: Adapted from different legal sources related to government auditing before and after the audit 
reform of 2001 
 
Therefore, since audit reform, the authority and power of BPK has become stronger 
with the amendment of regulations. Table 3.2 (above) summarises the legal changes related 
to public sector auditing in Indonesia before (1946-2000) and after (2001-present) the 2001 
audit reform. This table shows that before audit reform, the legal basis of government 
auditing was ambiguous, which resulted in ineffectivegovernment auditing functions. After 
audit reform, some significant changes in the roles and functions of BPK and its standards 
1 Constitution Government auditing was 
stipulated in only one 
paragraph of the 1945 
Constitution 
BPK roles, functions and position are stipulated 
coherently and clearly in one chapter, three 
articles and seven paragraphs in the third 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution. 
2 Laws about 
BPK 
Laws about BPK from 1946-
1973 did not view BPK as an 
independent audit 
institution  
The new Law on BPK (2006) is based on 
international best practice and stipulates roles 
and functions of BPK to be an independent audit 
institution 
3 Government 
Audit 
Standards 
Some important items were 
not stipulated in former BPK 
audit standards (SAP 1995) 
In 2007, BPK’s SPKN is developed from 
international best practice with guidelines for 
three types of public sector auditing (financial, 
performance and specific purposes audits) 
4 Code of 
Conduct 
A Code of Conduct was not 
available, only auditors’ 
declaration without legal 
enforcement 
Code of Ethical Conduct and an Honorary Board 
of Code of Ethics were established in 2007 to 
maintain the performance and professionalism 
of BPK Board Members and auditors. 
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occurred. The legal changes were developed based oninternational best practice to provide 
effectivepublic sector auditing implementation and to maintain the integrity and 
professionalism of BPK Board Members and auditors.  
3.3.2 Reforming Audit Institutions in Indonesia 
Before the audit reform, the roles and functions of internal and external audit 
institutions lacked clarity and often overlapped. The duplication and unclear functions 
among audit institutions caused ineffectiveness, with high costs of auditing activities and 
increased pressureon auditees being reviewed. As a result, although Indonesia had 
experience with public sector auditing for more than five decades (1945-2001), the audit 
system still suffered from a lack of accountability and quality in examining public sector 
institutions. The following sections describe the audit institutions related to BPK functions 
before and after audit reform. 
Limited and Duplicated BPK Functions Pre Audit Reform (2001) 
During the New Order Era, before audit reform, Presidential Decree Number 31 in 
1983 mandated the government to establish an internal audit institution, namely the 
Financial and Development Supervisory Board (BPKP), which sat under the Coordinating 
Minister for Development Supervision and Administrative Reforms. BPKP was considered 
the right arm of the President and had responsibility for both internal inspections and 
external auditing. Nonetheless, this caused a duplication of audit functions between BPK 
and BPKP to conduct post audit function (BPK RI 2005a; BPKP 2004; BPKP 2005). 
However, BPK and BPK had huge differences in budgets and resources.  
Table 3.3 shows that BPKP had a much greater auditing resources. The amount of 
budget and representative offices of BPK were much higher compared with BPK. As a 
92 
result, BPKP had stronger power to conduct auditing with larger number of auditees in 
regional governments, while BPK could only audit a limited number of public sector 
agencies at the central and local levels. Moreover, BPKP had better quality and numbers of 
auditors. Thus, BPKP had more than double the number of auditors with much better 
qualifications to audit SOEs compared with BPK. In addition, BPKP also had a greater 
number of computers as a modern technology to support audit tasks compared to BPK. This 
resulted in reducing the BPK‘s power and operational capability and impeded its 
achievement of goals and purposes in auditing public sector agencies. 
Table 3-3 Resources of BPK and BPKP (2004) 
Source: Adapted from Nasution, A., 2006. ‘The role of BPK in promoting transparency and accountability 
of the state finance’, The Audit Forum, IX(2), pp. 6-11. 
 
The issue of duplicated functions of BPK and the internal audit institutions was 
argued by the BPK Chairman (Kontan 10
th
March 2007) as follows: 
The function of the internal controller is to build the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the state financial management accountability system. It will avoid duplication and 
conflict of authority, thus it will create work harmonisation. The government should 
organise these internal control institutions. 
This statement suggested that the functions and roles of internal audit institutions are 
crucial for effective public financial management and performance of public sector 
No Resources BPK BPKP 
1. Personnel 2,850 7,200 
 - Staff administration 418 2,200 
 - Auditors 2,382 5,000 
2. Level of education   
 -Senior high school and diploma 776 1478 
 -S1 (Bachelor Degree)) 1,754 5,110 
 -S2 and S3 (Master and Doctorate 
Degrees) 
320 612 
3. Representative offices 9 25 
4. Computers 1,202 2,400 
5. Four-wheel vehicles 136 210 
6. Budget Rp.273 billion Rp.421 billion 
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organisations. Effective internal auditing can help external auditors to better examine the 
financial accountability and performance of public sector agencies.  
After audit reform, the Presidential Decree on BPKP Number 103 of 2001(GOI 
2001) replaced the Presidential Decree on BPKP in 1983. The law stipulated the roles and 
functions of BPKP as professional government internal auditor in the area of financial and 
development supervision. Moreover, Article 114, Paragraph 4 of Presidential Decree 
Number 9 of 2004 (GOI 2004a) stated that BPKP does not have the responsibility to 
conduct audit functions for regional government agencies. Since then, BPKP has only 
helped government agencies in managing and reporting state finances based on the new 
government accounting standards. In addition, BPKP provides manuals of accountability 
for public sector agencies through government internal auditors or APIP (Aparat 
Pengawasan Internal Pemerintah).The manualsinclude guidance on operational audit 
planning, monitoring and evaluation of follow-up activities; technical sampling (random 
sampling) during the process of audits; and government loss indemnity and strategies 
against national corruption.  
Since the 1999 decentralisation policy, regional Inspectorates have the full authority 
to audit and control regional governments in managing public resources. However, most of 
regional Inspectorates still lack the necessary number of qualified internal auditors. As a 
result, BPKP also helps regional government in managing public finances.  
Therefore, since audit reform, the Indonesian government and legislative 
restructured the function of audit public sector institutions to obtain effective and well 
functioning audits for the accountability framework. The Constitution and existing laws 
confirm that BPK is the only external audit institution and the Central and Regional 
Inspectorates are internal audit institutions.  
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Table 3-4 Indonesian External and Internal Audit Institutions and their Report to Main 
Stakeholder(s) 
 
Table 3.4 (above) presents the structure of Indonesia‘s external and internal 
government audit institutions in terms of their functions and reporting. Internal audit 
institutions report to the head of Ministry/institution/local government, while BPK reports 
to the Parliament. Therefore, internal audit institutions are a part of the Executive, while 
BPK is a state audit institution that is independent from the influence of the Executive and 
other parties. This indicates the clear and separate roles and functions of external and 
internal audit institutions in Indonesia. BPK audits all public agencies and reports to DPR 
(Parliament) and DPRDs (regional Parliaments). Internal auditing in central government is 
conducted by general Inspectorates that report to the Minister or head of public sector 
agencies at the central level. The regional inspectorate conducts internal auditing for 
regional government and reports to the head of the regional government (governor, Regent, 
or Mayor). For state-owned enterprises/regional-owned enterprises, there is an internal 
controller unit (SPI). All of these internal audit institutions have the function of controlling 
and auditing the internal management of public sector agencies. 
Organisational Change of BPK 
Since BPK has a new mandate and greater authority to conduct all external auditing 
of public sector agencies, the Audit Board has committed to achieve its strategic purposes. 
 External Auditing Internal Auditing 
Central Level Regional Level Central Level Regional Level 
Audit 
Institutions 
BPK BPK General 
Inspectorates 
Regional Inspectorates 
Report to Main 
Stakeholders 
National 
Parliament or 
DPR(s) 
Regional 
Parliament(s) or 
DPRD(s) 
Minister/head of 
institution(s) 
Governor(s)/Regent(s)/ 
Mayor(s) 
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BPK has the vision ―To become a state finances audit institution, which is independent, 
professional and plays an active role in improving the accountability and transparency of 
state finances‖, and the mission ―To audit state finance management and accountability in 
order to improve the accountability and transparency of state finances and to play an active 
role in achieving good, clean and transparent governance‖. The mission is broken down 
into four strategic goals: (1) to establish BPK as an independent and professional state 
finance audit institution, (2) to meet the needs and expectations of stakeholders, (3) to 
establish BPK as the central regulator in the field of auditing state finance management and 
accountability in accordance with its legal and legislative mandates, and (4) to encourage 
the achievement of good governance of state finance management and accountability (BPK 
RI 2006a: 3-4). The strategic objectives indicate a new commitment and value of BPK to 
provide better performance for its stakeholders. 
To achieve its purposes, BPK has reformed its organisation to improve operational 
capabilities both internally and externally, including rightsizing organisation, improving 
staff competency, providing better information technology and so forth. Although the 
priority of BPK in the short and middle terms is still very much concerned with financial 
audits, it is also eager to help the functions of Parliament by conducting specific purpose 
auditing and to conduct performance auditing for examining public sector agencies‘ 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy.  
3.4 Conclusion 
Prior to Indonesian independence in 1945, public administration and auditing was 
dominated by the Dutch administration and Javanese culture, which strongly influenced the 
bureaucratic culture with patrimonial and patronisation practices. The President was a state 
leader who elected by the representative of Indonesian people and was powerful and 
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strongly influenced to the bureaucracy and government, including the BPK. Although the 
past position of BPK was under the 1945 Constitution and MPR, BPK had no independence 
from the government or was less powerful than the government. The audit reports from 
BPK were reported to Parliament which was majority dominated by the Golkar party, as the 
ruling party and single winner in the election. Hence, during the New Order Era, corruption 
became systemic under the power of the President (Soeharto) and his cronies. There were 
no external audit institutions independently examining public financial management and 
government accountability.  
The duplication of audit functions in the public sector occurred not only between 
BPK and internal audit institutions, but also among the internal audit institutions 
themselves. BPKP, an internal audit institution, had the same roles and functions as BPK in 
conducting post audits, instead of examining the planning and management of the internal 
public sector agencies‘ financial budgets and reports. However, BPKP had a much higher 
budget, and more qualified auditors, representative offices, and other audit resources from 
which to conduct public sector audits. As a result, BPKP had a greater auditing scope in 
regional governments, SOEs and ROEs, while BPK only audited central government. This 
meant the function and role of BPK to examine the public accountability of public sector 
agencies was diminished by the reduction in resources and audit scope. The duplication of 
audit functions burdened both state finances and auditees.  
Since the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution (2001), the roles and functions 
of BPK as the only external audit institution are stated clearly. BPK has gradually been 
givengreater power to examine the public accountability of public sector agencies under the 
Audit Law (GOI 2004b). Since then, BPK has reformed its organisation and strengthened 
its roles and functions.Table 3.5compares the functions; laws and types of auditing, 
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position, and standards before and after audit reform. The table illustrates the Reformation 
of the system and regulations of public sector auditing in Indonesia.  
Table 3-5 Comparison of Internal and External Public Sector Auditing before and after 
Audit Reform (2001) 
 
How effective are the new audit legislations in delivering promised outcomes for 
improving the Indonesian public administration remains a big question. This study 
examines the quality of, and the factors influencing, BPK reports to improve public 
accountability of government and public administration. Some Indonesian scholars have 
written academic publications on aspects of public sector auditing such as Bastian (2007) 
from Gajah Mada University, Harun (2007) from Tadulako University, Pujiono and Jati 
(2007) from Surabaya University and Udayana University, respectively. However, all the 
No Public Sector 
Auditing 
Before Reform After Reform 
1. External audit 
institution(s) 
BPKP, BPK Only BPK 
 - The function of BPK Limited auditing of central 
government 
Auditing all state finances of 
central and local governments, 
SOEs and ROEs 
 - The function of 
BPKP 
Auditised central government, 
SOEs,and ROEs 
Supporting internal auditing 
functions 
 -Reporting to The President and Parliament Direct to Parliament and regional 
Parliaments 
 - Basic laws ICW and IAR regulations 
Law on BPK (1965) 
Law on BPK (1973) 
The third amendment of the 1945 
Constitution, State Finances 
Package Laws (2003-2004) and 
Law on BPK (2006) 
 - Auditing standards SAP (1995) SPKN (2007)  
 - Types of Audit Financial and compliance audits Financial, performance and 
specific purpose audits 
 - Position of BPK A high institution (a limited 
power of state institution) 
A state institution (stronger 
position) 
2. Internal audit 
institution(s) 
Bawasda, IG, SPI, Main 
Inspectorate 
BPKP, Bawasda, IG, Main 
Inspectorate 
 -The function Post auditing Pre-auditing for management of 
state finances 
 -Basic laws Colonial era of the Netherlands, 
IAR (1933) 
Law on State Finances (2003), Law 
on Treasury, and Audit Law (GOI 
2004b). 
 -Accounting 
standards 
Not available  Based on Government Accounting 
standards(2005) 
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authors come from the accounting department of their universities and analysed Indonesian 
public sector auditing from accounting problems, policies and practices perspective. Harun 
(2007) and Bastian (2007) gave a little mention about Indonesia‘s public sector audit laws 
and institutions, but none gave an overall systemic account of the quality of audit reporting 
and the reasons for its effectiveness or ineffectiveness. This thesis intends to help remedy 
this research gap and to provide a reliable overview and analysis of BPK‘s current 
performance. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of government audit reports in Indonesia, 
Chapters Four and Five examine criteria related to the quality, content, communication of 
and action on the information in BPK audit reports. 
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Chapter 4  
Quality of BPK Reports: Content of Information 
Chapters Four and Five of this thesis assess the quality of information in public 
sector external audits in Indonesia. These chapters provide insights into the quality of 
information in public sector audit reports based on the theories and concepts described in 
Chapter Two. Here in Chapter Four, the quality of BPK reports is assessed against three 
criteria relating to the content of information: (1) scope of audits; (2) access to reliable 
evidence; and (3) objectivity and credibility of information. Each criterion outlines the 
laws, regulations and rules as ―the heart of both the theory and the practice of public 
administration‖ (Drewry 2003: 257) to understand the policies of Indonesian external 
public sector auditing. Following is an examination of survey results, comments and 
statements from the personal interviews conducted with key informants. The final section 
draws some conclusions about the quality of the information content in BPK audit reports. 
4.1 Scope of Audit 
The scope of auditing is an important criterion to assess the quality of audit 
information in terms of how deep and how broad the content is in providing opinions and 
recommendations on public sector agency performance. The following sections describe 
the legal basis and scope of the Audit Board of the Republic Indonesia (BPK) reports. 
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4.1.1 Legal Basis for Audit Scope of BPK 
Since audit reform in 2001, the BPK‘s auditing scope has been stipulated by the 
third amendment of the 1945 Constitution. After this, the government provided new 
policies related to the audit scope of BPK, namely: Article 2 the Law on State Finances 
(GOI 2003b)
26
, the Audit Law (GOI 2004b), and the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b). The scope 
includes all state finances, which are defined as all state rights and obligations that may be 
appraised against a monetary value
27
 , wherever the resources are and for whatever 
purposes they are used. State finance audits not only examine state and regional 
government revenues and expenditure budgets, but also a range of other entities. These 
includestate-owned  enterprises (SOEs); regional-owned enterprises (ROEs); foundations; 
pension funds and companies that provide official services; and private social institutions 
that receive government funds, foreign aid, and other government assistance. 
Moreover, the Audit Law (GOI 2004b) emphasises the role of BPK in auditing all 
state finances for three types of auditing: financial, performance and specific purpose 
audits. The Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) also stipulates the duty and authority of BPK to 
audit the management and accountability of public sector agencies, including government 
organisations, the Central Bank of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia –BI), SOEs, ROEs, public 
services agencies and other agencies that use state money. 
                                                             
 
 
26―State‘s right to collect tax, to expend and to distribute money, and to make loans‖; ―State‘s obligation to 
organise public service tasks of the state governance and to pay the third party‘s claim‖; ―State revenues‖; 
―State expenditure‖; ―Regional revenues‖; ―Regional expenditure‖; ―State properties/regional properties which 
are managed by themselves or other parties in the form of money, commercial papers, receivable, goods as well 
as other right, which may be appraised by money including property separated at the state-owned  enterprises 
(SOEs)
26
or regional-owned enterprises (ROEs)‖; ―Other parties‘ properties, which are possessed by the 
government in the frame of organising the government task and/or public interest.‖ 
27
As well as everything that is in the form of money and goods which may become state property in respect of 
the implementation of rights and obligations, including all state revenues and expenditure. 
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The Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) and audit standards (BPK RI 2007g: 13) stipulates 
the objectives and different audit scopes. For this purpose, auditors are required to consider 
the users‘ needs and apply their knowledge, skills and experience. Different 
methodologies, level of analysis and evaluation can be employed for determining the scope 
of an audit. BPK audit standards provideinformation about the purpose and scope of 
auditing that is stipulated in Paragraph 8 of the SPKN (BPK RI 2007g: 83). 
The responsibility of auditors to describe the scope and methodology of auditing in 
performance audit reports was stipulated in Paragraph 9 (BPK RI 2007g: 84). The auditors 
are required to explain any audit problems in the reports and to avoid misunderstanding by 
stating the audit objectives that are not covered in audit reports. These legal bases for audit 
objectives, scope and methodology legitimize BPK to conduct its functions in enhancing 
the reliability of reported financial and performance information in public sector 
organisations. In addition, since the Law on BPK (2006) was enacted, BPK can set its own 
priorities for its auditees, audit methods and procedures, and audit scope and policies, 
which enables BPK to be more independent in providing its audit opinions and 
recommendations. 
In addition, the responsibility of auditors to audit the compliance of auditees with 
the provisions of laws and regulations to measureaccountability of auditees to the public is 
stipulated in SPKN 2007. The focus of compliance auditing is actually to encourage the 
public sector to comply with regulations.  
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4.1.2 Comparing Different Audit Scopes of BPK before and after Reform 
BPK‘s auditing scope differed significantly before and after reform. The following 
sections describe these differences for each type of auditing. 
Scope of Audit before Audit Reform 
Before reform and especially during the New Order Era, BPK was under the 
control of the government, which resulted in BPK auditing having a very limited scope. In 
terms of audit objectives and entities, BPK only focused on financial and compliance 
auditing for central government and very small entities in regional governments. 
Performance auditing was not conducted based on international best practice and did not 
cover the 3Es (efficiency, effectiveness and economy) as defined in international audit 
standards (ISSAI 3000 2004).  
Under the New Order Era, the President was the solely most powerful of the 
Government of the Republic Indonesia. He had power in making both economic and 
politic decisions. The President limited the role of BPK. BPK could not audit all state 
revenues, cash deposits and finances expenditure. The government prohibited BPK from 
conducting audits on some state revenues, such as mining contracts (including oil and gas), 
non-tax revenue, state debt stock and tax revenue
28
. Moreover, none of the government‘s 
gold mining assetssuch as the Central Bank of Indonesia (the Bank of Indonesia), the 
National Airline Company (Garuda Indonesia Airways), the National Oil Company 
(Pertamina), stateowned banks (the Mandiri Bank, BNI, etc), and other SOEs, were 
                                                             
 
 
28
 Nevertheless, BPK still does not have access to audit tax revenues. 
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subject to BPK audits. Audits of state expenditure were limited to the central government 
and expenditure from the state budget (APBN) only. Most regional governments were 
audited by the government internal audit institution BPKP. The Chairman of BPK during a 
Seminar at Udayana University, Denpasar, Bali (Nasution 2005a) stated:  
During the New Order, there was no fiscal transparency. The audit of BPK was 
limited only in the expenditure side of the central government budget. During that 
time, the revenue side of central government budget, the non budgeter budget, SOEs 
and ROEs and other foundations that used state facilities were not audited by BPK. 
On the other hand, our experience on crises connection, started on: Pertamina crises 
on 1975; Duta Bank and Bukopin Bank crises during 80‘s until; the financial and 
economic crises during 1997-1998. These crises showed the loss of the entire non 
budgeter budget, SOEs and ROEs, and all the foundations that are related to the 
official services became ‗contingent liabilities‘ of the state finances that burdened all 
citizens or people. Government debt that rose very high this time, after the economic 
crises, was caused by the expropriation of debts outside the official central 
government budget.  
In this statement the BPK Chairman expressed his dissatisfaction with the limitations 
imposed on BPK‘s scope of auditing before audit reform that eventually led to the lack of 
fiscal transparency, accountability and bad governance in public sector. In addition, BPK 
could not provide audit opinions for the management and accountability of state finances 
because there was no authority for auditing. This situation shows that BPK could not 
conduct its roles and functions as it was supposed to do which then led to the lack of 
transparency and accountability in Indonesia‘s public sector financial management. 
Furthermore, most of SOEs and ROEs in Indonesia, including the State Oil Company 
(Pertamina), the National Electricity Company (PLN) and state banks suffered from the 
impact of a financial and economic crisis caused by their poor performance in finance and 
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services. The Central Bank of Indonesia
29
 and state-owned bank were never audited by 
BPK. According to Friend (2003: 365), in his book ‗Indonesian Destinies‘, BPK in 1999 
reported 48 banks had misused about 95 per cent of the Rp.144.5 trillion of funds from the 
Central Bank of Indonesia during1997-1998 allocated to support emergency credit 
liquidity to soften the impact of the economic crises. This case, called BLBI (Liquidity Aid 
of Indonesia Bank), burdened the government budget and all of the Indonesian people.  
Therefore, it was clearly apparent that BPK‘s limited auditing scope affected the 
lack of transparency, performance and accountability of public sector agencies. BPK had 
no authority and capacity to audit all state finances and was under government control. 
This condition led to financial and economic cases after the crises that burdened the 
‗contingent liabilities‘ of state finances. 
BPK Financial AuditingAfter Reform 
Since reform, BPK has focused on financial and compliance audits to provide audit 
opinions on public sector agencies‘ financial statements. Both central30 and local 
government (33 provinces, 370 cities, 95 regencies, 6131 districts, 73,405 villages
31
), 776 
SOEs and ROEs (including state-owned bank), and the Central Bank of Indonesia have to 
provide financial statements based on the new government accounting standards (2005). 
                                                             
 
 
29
 The responsibility to audit the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI) is mandated by Article 59 of Law on the 
Central Bank of Indonesia (GOI 1999). 
30
 Central government consists of more than 76 audited entities, namely, 20 departments (ministries), 3 
coordinator ministries, 10 state ministries, 5 institutions at the same level as ministry (State Secretariat, Cabinet 
Secretariat, the Attorney General, Indonesia National Army, and Police of Republic Indonesia), 25 non-
department institutions, 8 High State Institutions, 1 Central Bank of Indonesia, other institutions. 
31
Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik), Indonesia‘s Major Social Economic Indicators, 2008. 
(Beberapa Indikator Utama Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia 2008). 
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BPK has confirmed its first audit priorities are financial auditing for the central 
government (LKPP)
32
, financial statements of department (LKD), financial statements of 
institutes (LKL), financial statements of the Central Bank of Indonesia (LKBI) and 
financial statements of loan guaranteed institution (LPS). Additionally, the specific 
purposes audit has become another priority at the request ofParliament. For example, 
audits of the National Electricity Company (PLN), the Fertilizer Company and Pertamina 
and for saving state expenditure electricity, refined fuel oil and fertiliser subsidies. 
Table 4-1 Auditees and BPK Audit Opinion period 2006-08 
Year Audit Opinion from BPK Total 
Auditees Group of Entities WTP WDP TW TMP 
 
Sources: 
Data from 
1. BPK RI Statistics 2006, Secretariat General BPK RI, Jakarta, 2007. 
2. BPK RI Statistics 2007, Secretariat General BPK RI, Jakarta, 2008. 
3. BPK RI Statistics 2008, Secretariat General BPK RI, Jakarta, 2009. 
4. BPK website, www.bpk.go.id (last accessed on 20 January 2010) 
Notes: 
WTP = Unqualified Opinion 
WDP (Wajar Dengan Pengecualian) or Qualified Opinion 
TW (Tidak Wajar) or Adverse Opinion  
TMP (Tidak Memberikan Pendapat) or Disclaimer 
 
                                                             
 
 
32
 This audit will give an opinion on LKPP that has been compiled by the Ministry of Finance. The audit on 
LKPP is emphasised at certain posts that change every year according to the assessment of internal controls and 
the audit risks.  
Year 2006 9 365 28 139 541 
Central Gov. Entities 6 39 0 37 82 
Local Gov. Entities 3 326 28 102 459 
Year 2007 21 314 60 154 549 
Central Gov. Entities 17 31 1 34 83 
Local Gov. Entities 4 283 59 120 466 
Year 2008      
Central Gov. Entities 34 30 0 18 82 
Local Gov. Entities NA NA NA NA NA 
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Table 4.1 (above) presents the number of auditees and audit opinions given by BPK 
on central and local government financial statements during the period 2006-2008. The 
table shows a significant increase in the number of auditees for both central and local 
government as a positive indication of the development in the scope of financial audits. 
However, BPK audit opinion showed the poor performance of both central and local 
government with transparency and accountability on the information presented in their 
financial statements. Although a significant number of government entities received 
‗unqualified opinions‘ (WTP) and ‗qualified opinions‘ (WDP), there were still a significant 
number of ‗adverse opinions‘ (TW) and ‗disclaimer opinions‘ (TMP) for central and local 
government agencies. There are significant variation ofgovernment entities‘ operational 
ability to apply the new government financial system and accounting standards. 
Commitment of government leaders to provide transparent and accountable financial 
reports and the competency of staff to implement the new government accounting 
standardscan influence the performance of government financial statements. Besides, since 
government entities have been audited by BPK, auditors never again found state money in 
state officials‘ private accounts.  
Law (2001: 75) noted that in the New Public Management, financial annual reports 
have been used as a mechanism to evaluate the accountability of an organisation and 
suggested local policing plans to provide reports which contain the information necessary 
for accountability.BPK‘s disclaimer audit opinions on financial statements of government 
suggested poor financial performance and accountability mechanisms by the Indonesian 
government. This situation can stimulate distrust from the public, including taxpayers and 
investors, regarding government accountability in managing their money. This is also 
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supported by a statement from a senior economist of Econit (Koran Tempo 12
th
March 
2007) that, ―the impact of BPK‘s opinion on LKPP has had great impact on the macro 
economy of Indonesia. BPK‘s opinion gave a poor impression to the public of the 
government capability in managing public funds‖. Therefore, the value of transparency, 
accountability, fairness and trust in the Indonesian public servant environment was still 
low and influenced public dissatisfaction with government performance.  
Scope of Financial and Compliance Auditing 
After reform, in terms of the number of financially audited entities, BPK has 
improved its scope of audits for public financial transparency and accountability. 
However, this study revealed that BPK‘s financial auditing still does not cover all public 
sector bodies as mandated by the laws. Up until 2005, BPK only performed financial 
auditing for about 50 per cent of the total auditees (BPK RI 2005a), partly because the total 
number of regional government agencies increased substantially
33
. In 2005, BPK only 
audited 34 of 76 entities from central government agencies; 33 provinces; 214 of about 370 
cities and regencies; and only 28 ROEs and 22 SOEs from more than a hundred. In 2006, 
BPK audited less than 80 per cent of the total reports or about 296 of a total of 370 
regional government entities in regencies, provinces and cities (Bisnis Indonesia 9
th
March 
2006). One crucial problem was that not all government entities could provide and submit 
financial statements based on the new government accounting standard. For example, in 
                                                             
 
 
33
 In 2007, the total number of regional government entities increased to be 498, includes 370 regencies, 96 
cities and 33 provinces after expanding region policy. 
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2007, the East Nusa Tenggara, the Maluku, and the West Papua Provinces
34
 did not submit 
their financial statements to be audited by BPK. 
Another difficult task for BPK to fulfill the amended Constitution is its limited 
power to audit the tax office, especially the tax revenues
35
. The Chairman of BPK 
commented cynically as follows: 
The Tax Law issued by the New Order regime prevented BPK from auditing state 
tax revenues. Such control in the pastmade BPK a ‗rubber stamp‘ for the legitimising 
of the Government‘s actions. 
The above statement from the Chairman of BPK indicates how firmly BPK was under the 
control of the New Order government in the past. BPK could not audit tax revenues. The 
Law on Taxation (GOI 1983 and GOI 1994) impaired BPK‘s ability to audit tax revenues, 
which was one of the main sources of national income in the country (about 70 per cent of 
total income). This was opposed by the Chairman of BPK as a lack of accountability and 
transparency in the tax office (Jakarta Post 15
th 
January 2008). As the tax office revenues 
could not be audited, there was no significant evidence or evaluation of the transparency 
and accountability of the government in managing taxpayer money. 
The government predicted a target of tax revenues in 2006 to be only Rp.30 trillion 
(Rakyat Merdeka 2
nd 
December 2006a). Moreover, the government reported that tax 
revenues were only about 13.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Jakarta Post 
15
th 
January 2008). BPK could not access data to examine the accountability and 
                                                             
 
 
34
 This is based on the information from BPK‘s audited entities of regional governments and regional-owned 
enterprises (ROEs) semester I of 2007. Available from: 
http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007i/disc1/pdf_ikhtisar/lampiran_II.pdf. (Accessed 29/01/2008). 
35
The speech of the BPK Chairman in a one day seminar for the commemoration of the 60
th
 Anniversary of 
BPK, on 9
th
January 2007, 10 AM.  
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performance of the tax office in targeting tax revenues as the most important potential 
income in Indonesia. As a result, the tax revenues targets provided by the government were 
not reliable. The expenditure of taxpayer money could not be rigorously accounted for 
indicating a lack of accountability of public money.  
Article 34 of the second amendment of the Law on Taxation (GOI 2000) stipulated 
that an official of the tax office is not allowed to give out confidential information 
concerning taxpayers to outside parties. BPK could not examine tax revenues due to 
confidentiality of taxpayer‘s personal data. After the Law on Taxation (GOI 2007b) was 
amended for the third time, BPK‘s authority to get information and data for auditing 
remains limited. The law stipulates that BPK auditors can access tax revenue data and 
information only if they receive permission from the Minister of Finance (Hasan 14
th 
January 2006; Murdono 30
th 
September 2005; Pelita 6
th 
February 2008). The Ministry of 
Finance is under the President (government), and has a lower position in the state structure, 
than BPK. However, the law stipulates BPK must ask permission from the Minister of 
Finance for auditing tax revenues. The Ministry of Finance issues the list of documents 
that can be audited by BPK and these exclude tax revenues (GOI 1990). For getting clearer 
authority, BPK asked Parliament and the Constitutional Court (MK) to review the tax law. 
However, BPK has still not received a positive response. The Chairman of BPK said 
cynically (Rakyat Merdeka 2
nd 
December 2006b) as follows: ―Only the Directorate General 
of Taxation, and God, knows the tax information‖. He also argued:  
It is ridiculous to limit the access of BPK to audit the tax service accounts because of 
the fear that BPK auditors may disclose information to other parties. As stipulated by 
the law, BPK auditors are banned from distributing data and information during 
auditing. (Jakarta Post 15
th
January 2008) 
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This statement indicates that BPK has the mandate to audit all state finances, including the 
money that Indonesian taxpayers paid to the government. The Chairman of BPK found 
inappropriate if BPK has to get permission from the Ministry of Finance for auditing the 
tax, because the Law on Audit (2004) stipulates sanctions for any auditors who misuse 
data and information from auditees.  
Besides tax, BPK could not audit go public SOEs or the revenue of the Supreme 
Court. The law fatwa of Supreme Court 16
th
August 2006 (Sulistio 15
th
March 2007) 
prevents BPK auditing Supreme Court revenue. Moreover, the Investment Coordinating 
Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal or Bapepam) prohibited BPK to audit go 
public SOEs (Mangku 2006a). According to the Decrees of the State Minister for SOEs 
(Kementrian Negara BUMN)
36
, SOE financial statements
37
 can only be audited by the 
public accountant‘s office (GOI 2003a). These rules are contrary to the Law on State 
Finances (GOI 2003b) which stipulates SOEs as companies that are partly owned by the 
government (Triadji 2003:10-17), and therefore should be audited by BPK. 
Scope of Performance and Specific Purposes Audits after Audit Reform 
As mandated by the Law on Audit (2004), BPK conducts not only financial 
auditing, but also performance and specific purpose audits.  
                                                             
 
 
36
The Decree of State Minister for SOEs (Kementrian Negara BUMN) is regulated in Letter Number S-
19/MBU/2004 on 21
st
January 2004. 
37
Audit of financial statement for managing state finance and accountability is mandated in Article 30, 
Paragraph 2 of the Law on State Finances (GOI 2003b). 
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Specific purpose audits
38
in particular address the commitment of the President of 
the Republic of Indonesia, Bambang Yudhoyono, to fight against corruption as a national 
priority. He reiterated a zero tolerance for corruption as a part of the national 
anticorruption movement was declared in December 2004 (Pradana 2005). This movement 
affected the role of BPK as an important institution to achieve anticorruption objectives 
(Nasution 2005b; Joedono 2003: 8). In line with the objective, the government has 
increased income from tax revenues and non-tax revenues in both central and local 
governments, including regional charges (retribusi). As a result, BPK has given a higher 
priority to auditing the accountability of government in managing state revenues. 
However, the Law on Taxation has impeded the authority of BPK to audit tax. 
Performance audits that were planned for 2007 were postponed because BPK was 
still preparing its instruments and auditors
39
. According to the explanation from the BPK 
Chairman stated in a national newspaper (Bisnis Indonesia 18
th
January 2008), BPK will 
move its focus on auditing in 2009 to not onlyfinancial auditing but also to performance 
auditing. A BPKBoard Memberconfirmed this (Kompas 6
th
January 2007) in the following 
statement: 
If government financial statement reports have been provided based on government 
accounting standards (GOI 2005), auditors of BPK will find it easier to conduct 
financial auditing, then they will concentrate more on performance audits. All 
government agencies have to provide good public services and their performance 
will be audited by BPK. We plan to conduct performance auditing in the next two 
years. At the moment, we are still concentrating on auditing government financial 
reports. 
                                                             
 
 
38
This is stipulated by the Audit Law (GOI 2004b). Information on specific purposes auditing which were 
conducted by BPK from semester I of 2005 to semester I of 2007 is presented on BPK‘s website: 
http://www.bpk.go.id/ 
39
This information was based on the explanation from key informant from BPK in Jakarta on 10
th
August 2007.  
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This statement indicates BPK‘s optimism to conduct performance auditing effectively in 
2009. BPK still focuses on financial auditing in line with the implementation of new 
government accounting standards for transparency and accountability of public sector 
agencies in managing state finances. The broadening of BPK‘s auditing scope to include 
performance auditing is essential for promoting a culture of effectiveness and efficiency in 
the provision of public services for Indonesian society. The first priority of BPK 
performance auditing is the performance of state-owned bank for accelerating the 
restructuring of Non Performing Loans (NPL), and state academic institutions for better 
performance in tertiary level education. Indonesian government agencies are still preparing 
performance indicators as a part bureaucracy reform to help BPK in conducting 
performance auditing. Moreover, BPK has received assistance from the National 
Australian Audit Office (ANAO) to provide trainingfor auditors and consultations to 
conduct performance auditing. This is similar to the case of Argentina‘s SAI, which has 
strengthened its performance auditing tools and methodology with assistance from the 
National Audit Office of the United Kingdom (INTOSAI 2007a: 4). 
Table 4.2 (below) presents the number of BPK audited entities for performance and 
specific purpose audits at the central and local levels from 2005 to 2007. The table 
indicates that although BPK did not implement performance auditing widely, BPK did 
conduct this type of auditing during that period. In addition, BPK only conducted 
performance auditing for central and local government and ROEs, but not for SOEs. In 
2007, BPK only focused on performance auditing for certain programs at four agencies, 
namely: (1) the Ministry of Health, (2) the Ministry of Agriculture, related to the control of 
avian flu and the influenza epidemic, (3) the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board 
113 
 
 
(BRR) Nangroe Aceh Darussalam-Nias related to post-tsunami disaster development, and 
(4) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
40
. However, these performance audits examined 
financial accountability rather than evaluated the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of 
those programs. 
Table 4-2 Audited Entities and Value (in Billion Rupiahs) of Performance and Specific 
Purposes Audits 2005-2007 
Source:  Data from 
1. Summary of Audit Results of BPK semester II of 2007 
http://bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007ii/Pdf_IHPS/Lampiran%201.pdf (accessed 01/03/2008) 
http://bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007ii/Pdf_IHPS/Lampiran%202.pdf (accessed 01/03/2008) 
2. Summary of Audit Results of BPK Semester I of 2007 
http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007i/disc1/pdf_ikhtisar/lampiran_I.pdf (accessed 5/11/2007). 
3. Summary of Audit Result of BPK Semester II of 2006: 
http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2006ii/ikhtisar/Bagian_I/Lamp-2.pdf (accessed 17/08/2007). 
4. Summary of Audit Result of BPK Semester I of 2006: 
http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2006i/ikhtisar/Lampiran_2.pdf (accessed 3/11/2006). 
5. Summary Audit Result of BPK Semester II of 2005 http://www.bpk.go.id/  (accessed 23/09/2006). 
6. Summary Audit Result of BPK Semester I of 2005 http://www.bpk.go.id/ (accessed 13/03/2006). 
 
 
  
                                                             
 
 
40
 This is based on data of BPK reports on central government, semester I 2007 
(http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007i/disc1/pdf_ikhtisar/lampiran_I.pdf) (accessed 31/11/2007). 
No Year and Group of Entities 
Performance 
Entities 
Audit 
Value 
Specific 
Entities 
Purposes Audits 
Value 
I 2005 60  724  
 Central government 17 0.38 104 187,904 
 Regional gov. and ROEs 43 2.09 599 92,356 
 SOEs - - 22 450,389 
II 2006 26  667  
 Central government 11 2,290 229 271,421 
 Regional gov. and ROEs 15 871 384 352,600 
 SOEs - - 54 242,336 
III 2007 4  714  
 Central government 4 n.a. 64 n.a. 
 Regional gov. and ROEs - n.a. 643 n.a. 
  SOEs - n.a. 7 n.a. 
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In 2005, BPK audited the fuel and oil subsidy‘s reducing program (PKPS MMB), 
the subsidy on electricity and fertilisers, and also evaluating mining contracts. These were 
the selected audit priorities for BPK because the subsidy on fuel and oil, electricity, 
fertilisers and mining contracts are a high state expenditure  burdening state finances 
(Handayani 2006). Regarding this, the BPK Chairman said the following:  
The financial problems in SOEs and ROEs cannot be separated from problems in the 
state finances. Financial losses of these enterprises are the ‗contingent liabilities‘ of 
government that have burdened the state finances. Corporate governance in 
Indonesia is still bad, because of too much involvement from the government in 
appointing managers and deciding policies. In general, managers of SOEs and ROEs 
consist of government officials who only expect additional income of their salary 
from these enterprises. 
This excerpt indicates that BPK could not audit SOEs, which provided ‗gold income‘ for 
high officials in the Indonesian public sector. SOEs mainly manage natural resources and 
other important public services and products and these are usually managed badly and 
unaccountably with widespread corruption, collusion and nepotism. Although SOEs had 
good public resources and monopoly market, they operated inefficiently and ineffectively. 
This situation harmed public funds while benefiting only certain high officials who worked 
for the President, but not for the public. Since the global economic crisis in 1997, the 
impact of poor SOE management has burdened Indonesian state finances. 
In 2006, regional governments conducted specific purposes auditing for the 
election of local government leaders at provincial, city and district levels. For central 
government, BPK conducted specific purposes auditing on funding assistance to political 
factions; expenditure and non-tax income; the State Audit Reform Sector Development 
Project (STAR-SDP); and international aid and donors, such asADB, the World Bank and 
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AusAID
41
. Besides, specific purpose auditing focused on auditing income, expenditure and 
costs at both central and local levels
42
. For SOEs, BPK conducted specific purposes 
auditing, in relation to the accomplishment of social values and prosperity, such as the 
subsidy for fertilisers, fuel, and electricity. As the government planned to raise electricity 
rates in 2006, BPK audited PLN to examine its operational capacity and to evaluate the 
possibility of efficiency to reduce the need for these rate increases (Jakarta Post 11
th 
March 
2006). 
In 2007, besides auditing for the leaders of regional government‘s election, BPK 
also audited the balanced budgets, income, expenditure, inventory of assets, and political 
party funds. BPK also focused on auditing capital and goods expenditure, non-tax income 
and implementation of capital budget expenditure
43
. In addition, BPK audited the cost of 
the main electricity power supply in the period 2002-2006 to help the work committee of 
Commission VII of the Parliament with the policy and strategy of PLN for the public 
service obligation (PSO) and subsidy program (Rakyat Merdeka 17
th 
February 2007).  
Since audit reform, BPK has conducted specific purpose audits for environmental 
accountability of public sector policies to give recommendations to Parliament Members 
on government policy decisions. For example this occurred in cases including the mudflow 
disaster of Lapindo at Sidoardjo (East Java), the flood disaster at Jember, the landslide at 
Purbalingga, and the damaged forest in Java(Suara Pembaharuan 6
th 
January 2006). 
                                                             
 
 
41
 This is based on information from BPK‘s audited entities of regional governments and ROEs, semester I of 
2007, http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007i/disc1/pdf_ikhtisar/lampiran_II.pdf) (accessed 3/11/2007). 
42
 This is based on information from BPK‘s audited entities of regional governments and ROEs, semester II of 
2006, http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2006ii/ikhtisar/Bagian_I/Lamp-2.pdf (accessed 17/08/2007) 
43
 This is based on information from BPK‘s audited entities of central government, semester I of 2007, 
http://www.bpk.go.id/doc/hapsem/2007i/disc1/pdf_ikhtisar/lampiran_I.pdf (accessed 5/11/2007). 
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BPK cooperates with other SAIs for environmental audits. A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2007 with the SAIs of Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei 
Darussalam
44
 for cooperative auditing and to protect and conserve natural biodiversity. 
The MoU covers environmental issues  such as the haze from forest fires and slash and 
burn land clearance that seriously affects neighboring countries, the spread of avian 
influenza and the security of the Malacca Strait to ensure the secure shipping as well as 
potential pollution threats from shipping. The BPK Chairman explained to a Jakarta Post 
reporter (Hudiono 17
th 
May 2006) the following: 
The focus of this agreement would mainly be on the auditing of compliance with 
environmental regulations. This would include government policies and the activities 
of both public and private sectors. If there is an incidence of pollution for example, 
we will assess who is responsible, what actually happened and what‘s being done to 
handle it and how the regulations are enforced. Take Jakarta, for example, the 
province‘s regulations on the environment are there, but we can see for ourselves 
how bad the pollution here is right now. 
This statement reflects BPK‘s commitment to examine environmental matters and 
regulations and provide recommendations for central and regional governments to be 
concerned about sustainable planning and development for public accountability. The 
National Audit Department (NAD) of Malaysia is a good example of a developing country 
audit body that has developed performance-based assessments with indicators to 
investigate fraud and to conduct environment audits (Buang 2007). 
Besides environmental audits, BPK improves its capacity to perform investigative 
auditing. BPK audits international and local aid to uphold international and public trust in 
the government in managing development assistance. BPK has audited international and 
                                                             
 
 
44
 Researcher attended this joint commitment and signing of the memorandum of understanding of these four 
countries on Monday, 8
th
 January 2007 in the Pola Room of BPK Office, 2 -4 PM, Jakarta.  
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national aid for the Tsunami disaster in Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and Nias (North 
Sumatera). BPK has also recommended that the Indonesian government develops and 
builds up an administrative system for the delivery of humanitarian aid.  
BPK audited international aid for the Provincial Health Project II (PHP II) that was 
funded by IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) in the Health 
Department of the Ministry of Heath, (BPK RI 2007a: 24). BPK‘s audit of international aid 
from the World Health Organisation (WHO) for the maintenance of health for poor people 
resulted in positive comments from the World Bank‘s Mr. Andrew Steer (BPK RI 2007a: 
24), who said:  
The activity of the audit is an encouraging sign. We will continue to carry out the 
cooperation related to institutions in Indonesia in the effort to protect projects from 
abuse, especially projects funded by the World Bank. Good coordination will 
improve the surveillance. 
The statement indicates optimism and motivation from the World Bank for running health 
projects for poor people in Indonesia with the cooperation of BPK to auditaccountability of 
officials in managing the aid. In 2005, four BPK auditors reported that about 20 per cent of 
the World Bank‘s total expenditure (equivalent to US$420,000)on the development of a 
community health program in the Ministry of Health could not be accounted for (SAI 
Indonesia 2006: 10). The findings of BPK proved the lack of financial and performance 
accountability of officials and the Ministry of Health to manage the project and to respond 
the needs of poor people. 
To summarise, before audit reform the scope of BPK was very limited with its lack 
of authority and capacity to audit public sector agencies. BPK only audited central 
governmentwhile internal audit institutions such as BPKP audited most of the 
118 
 
 
substantialstate income from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and regional governments. 
Since reform, the scope of BPK has become broader and includes financial, performance 
and specific purposes audits. BPK has gradually conducted comprehensive financial and 
compliance audits for all public sector bodies. Although up until 2007, opinion from BPK 
on financial audit reports of the public sector indicated dissatisfaction with still many 
disclaimer opinions issued on both central and local governments‘ financial statements. 
This indicated a lack of transparency and accountability and also a lack of competency and 
ability from within government agencies to implement the new government accounting 
standard.  
Since reform, as mandated by law, BPK audits the performance of public sector 
agencies. However, this type of audit has not been implemented effectively as BPK 
alongside auditees are still preparing relevant performanceindicators. Additionally, BPK 
has to provide auditors for performance auditing both in number and quality. For specific 
purpose audits, BPK conducted environmental audits to protect further environmental 
damage and investigative audits related to elections for heads of regional governments, 
international/ national aid, and other anti-corruption programs. BPK also conducted audits 
to support Parliament Members and government in policymaking, such as policies for 
subsidies on electricity, fuel and fertiliser.  
4.1.3 Survey Results and Comments on Scope of BPK 
This section describes perceptions of respondents from this study on the 
information in the content of BPK reports in terms of the scope of auditing. Figure 4.1 
(below) indicates that in general, respondents significantly agreed that BPK reports 
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provide clear information on the auditing scope and objectives. This is pointed out by the 
interviewed auditors, of whom 29 per cent indicated that they ‗strongly agree‘ and 58 per 
cent ‗agree‘. From auditees, 9 per cent indicated that they ‗strongly agree‘ and 73 per cent 
‗agree‘. The optimism of respondents was encouraged by the contrast in BPK performance 
reports from before and after audit reform. However, most respondents focused only on the 
scope of financial and/or compliance audits in line with the application of new government 
accounting standard, rather than performance audits, which had not been implemented 
effectively. 
Figure 4.1 Survey Results of ‘BPK Reports Provide Clear Information for Audit Scope and 
Objectives’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey in Indonesia from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007. 
 
In the overall responses, this survey recorded 12 per cent of participants ‗as neutral‘ 
and 3 per cent whom ‗disagree‘. For the auditors‘ group, only 9 per cent of respondents 
indicated ‗neutral‘ and 4 per cent ‗disagree‘. On the other hand, about 15 per cent of the 
auditees‘ group responded ‗neutral‘ and 3 per cent ‗disagree.‘ Some of the negative views 
revealed comments and statements during interviews of BPK auditors included:  
 “BPK had limited the scope of auditing” (Interview B17, an auditor of AKN I). 
 “BPK only audited the huge or big budget items in state finances” (Interview B21, 
an auditor of AKN IV). 
 “BPK did not cover auditing for all SOEs” (Interview B23, an auditor of AKN V). 
29
58
9
4
9
73
15
3
20
65
12
3
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Perceptions
Pe
rc
en
tag
es
Auditors Auditees Overall responses
120 
 
 
 “BPK could not audit tax income” (Interview B13, an auditor of AKN I). 
 “Overlapping auditing among auditors with internal auditors at the same time 
and the same entities had reduced BPK’s scope of auditing” (Interview B11, an 
auditor of AKN III). 
 “Before audit reform, under the former of Law on BPK (1973), BPK only audited 
implementation of state budget for central government” (Interview B24, an 
auditor of AKN V). 
 “Limitation of BPK’s scope of auditing hindered this audit institution from 
carrying out its roles and functions in examining the accountability of state 
finances” (Interview B16, an auditor of AKN II). 
These excerpts indicate the auditors‘ disappointment on the limitation of the auditing 
scope, which demonstrated the incapacity of BPK to scrutinize the accountability of the 
Indonesian public sector. Moreover, auditors also indicated pessimism regarding the scope 
of BPK audits for tax revenues and SOEs. BPK could not examine the compliance of 
taxpayers and the accountability and transparency of the taxation office as stipulated by the 
tax law. Therefore, BPK never evaluated the performance of tax administrators. In 
addition, a Board Member of BPK commented on the issue of SOEs in a national 
magazine, as follows: 
The problem of SOE is the problem of ‗pie‘ auditing, like a struggle to obtain a 
fortune. SOEs manage the state finances, don‘t they? Is it right that each cent of the 
state finances has to be audited by BPK? There are no exceptions. In principle, all of 
the state finances have to be audited by an audit institution, called BPK (Forum 17
th 
December 2006:32). 
The above statement indicates problems facing BPK to audit SOEs. In 2008, BPK 
submitted files for proposing a judicial review of the tax and SOEs laws that impede its 
roles and functions. This means that the authority of BPK to cover the entire scope of state 
finances of Indonesian public sector agencies is still impeded. 
There are two examples of non-compliance cases were found by BPKthat was 
published in national newspapers. Under the funding of Banten Province budget of 2004-
2005, there were 19 projects were not comply with the government regulations. (Koran 
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Tempo 27
th 
June 2006). The auditee claimed that there was a miscarriage of justice by BPK 
which had audited the projects before 20
th
December 2005 and concluded that the projects 
were not finished by the scheduled date, thus making them seemingly in breach of the law. 
The vice head of the project argued, ―We still have 10 days to complete all these projects, 
but BPK had judged it an illegal act‖ (Koran Tempo 27thJune 2006). The statement 
indicated that auditee found unfairness on the BPK reports that the project was not 
completed on time, before the end of the financial year. In accordance with the 
requirement for auditors to report auditees‘ non-compliance with laws and regulations, this 
argument from the auditee seemed bias. To prepare a non-compliance report and to present 
findings with regard to fraud, violations of provisions of laws and regulations, the auditor 
had applied proper auditing procedures. The complaint by the auditee was subjective and 
indicated a lack of transparency and accountability. 
Furthermore, some auditors have pointed out common findings regarding non-
compliance with laws and regulations in auditees‘ financial statements:  
 “Some procedures of management state finances were not based on the 
provisions of laws and regulations and financial statements were not accordance 
to the new government accounting standard” (Interview B21, an auditor of AKN 
IV).  
 “Ineffective procedures of verification, income reconciliation, grants and 
purchases in managing state finances” (Interview B20, an auditor of AKN III).  
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These statements are examples of non-compliance with laws and regulations that were 
found by auditors. The Chairman of BPK also revealed in a national seminar
45
 other 
examples of non-compliance found by BPK: 
BPK found the irregularities in government‘s management of state finances. For 
example: the procedures of verification and income reconciliation of tax and non-tax, 
the management of government account statements at the Central Bank of Indonesia 
(BI) and state-owned  banks, account management of the investment budget and 
regional development, asset management in SOEs and state management assets from 
the incomplete BPPN re-structured program.  
This excerpt indicates that the government failed to demonstrate that they had managed 
public resources responsibly. This situation can reduce trust and confidence in government 
to govern transparently, efficiently and effectively. In addition, several articles about BPK 
findings of central and local governments‘ non-compliance were scrutinised and written by 
journalist of some national newspapers and magazines. For example, articles on 
irregularities in non-tax state revenue management, such as the payment of a traffic ticket 
at the high court (Riyadi and Barus 14
th 
June 2006), unreported non-tax revenue in 11 
ministries (Hudiono 17
th 
May 2006), and non-tax charges or tariff in local government 
(Bisnis Indonesia 3
rd 
June 2006).  
Additionally, a journalist was written about BPK findings on incorrect counting 
and reporting the actual value of aid fundsfor Tsunami victims in Aceh and Nias 
(Taufiqurrahman 2006). Another example is an article about ineffective procedures in 17 
departments regarding the purchase of goods and services, with state losses valued at 
Rp.137.63 billion (Bisnis Indonesia 17
th 
May 2006; Suara Pembaharuan 16
th 
May 2006). 
                                                             
 
 
45
Prof. Anwar Nasution in keynote speech at a National Seminar, titled ‗Accountability of State Finance 
Management as Effort to Combat Corruption‘, Brawijaya Accounting Fair 2006, Economic Faculty of 
Brawijaya University, Malang, 3
rd
 June 2006. 
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A final example is reports of the inefficiencies and losses in government investment funds 
managed by SOEs (Hudiono 17
th 
May 2006). All these cases revealed many irregularities, 
such as misuse and graft in public funds. All the irregularities occurred since the New 
Order Era, but still existed in the early Reformation Era.  
The duplication problem of roles and functions between BPK and BPKP 
wasgetting clear, since the audit reform of 2001 as BPK has mandated as the only external 
audit institution in Indonesia. The Chairman of BPKP, Didi Widiyadi, stated that ―BPK is 
an external audit institution based on the 1945 Constitution, while BPKP is an internal 
audit institution based on Presidential Decree. This is designed for checks and balances‖. 
(Suara Pembaharuan 5
th
December 2006 and Tagukawi 2006). Since then, BPK has 
significantly increased its scope of financial auditing in terms of quantity and it is also 
preparing for performance auditing in the near future.  
Six respondents expressed their opinions regarding performance and specific 
purpose audits as follows:  
 “BPK is not ready yet to conduct performance audits” (Interview B10). 
 “BPK is still looking for the techniques, procedures and shape of performance 
audits that are suitable and appropriate for this type of auditing” (Interview B5). 
 “Opinions and arguments are still developing to decide whether an audit can be 
labelled as performance auditing”(Interview B24, an auditor of AKN V). 
 “Audited entities are not ready to be audited for performance audits” (Interview 
A10). 
 “Audit’s objectives are mentioned in all audit reports to set the scope of the audit, 
in particular, on performance audit reports” (Interview B15, an auditor of AKN 
III). 
 “BPK conducted performance and specific purpose audits only for audited 
entities that had actual problematic issues and these were based on demands or 
orders from the Parliaments” (Interview B14). 
 “BPK conducts compliance audit as a part of performance audit” (Interview B17, 
an auditor of AKN I). 
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These excerpts imply that BPK is still looking for the right format for developing 
performance auditing in its internal organisation. On the other hand, public sector agencies 
are also preparing performance measurements and indicators for their organisations. This 
means that BPK is still undergoing a process to examine the accountability of government 
agencies for their efficiency, effectiveness and equitable conduct. 
In summary, as mandated by the Constitution, BPK‘s financial audit scope has 
expanded extensively for examining the transparency and accountability of all public 
sector bodies. The workload for BPK has increased in terms of the number of agencies and 
the audit scope, which includes financial, performance and special purpose audits. 
However, until 2009, BPK still could not audit tax revenues and some SOEs. Moreover, 
the lack of competency in government agencies to apply the new government accounting 
standards(2005) resulted in the late submission of their financial statements, which caused 
BPK to examine their financial accountability. Although BPK has made significant 
improvements in increasing the number of audited entities for financial auditing, including 
compliance audits, the audit scope of BPK is still limited in enhancing accountability as it 
has not yet focused on actual outcome and performance audits. BPK is still continuing to 
develop the instruments and measurements to examine the performance of public sector 
agencies. Specific purpose audits were demanded by Parliament, such as request for 
investigative audits for caseswith indications of corruption, environmental audits, financial 
auditsof financial report of head of regional government elections and international aid.  
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4.2 Reliability of Audit Evidence 
Quality audit reports require reliable evidence. Employing sufficient, relevant, 
valid, accurate and reliable data are important for a good quality audit report. The 
following sections describe about reliable data and information of BPK as one of 
measurement to examine the quality of audit reports. . 
4.2.1 Laws and Regulations as the Basis of Strong Audit Evidence 
As stipulated by the Audit Law (2004) and the Law on BPK (2006), any 
organisation that uses public/state finances must give BPK auditors access to any 
documents and/or data to be audited. The right of auditors to access all documents and data 
for auditing and to ask for the required documents from officials or other parties is 
stipulated in Articles 10 and 11 of the Audit Law (GOI 2004b). Auditors have the authority 
to access all auditees‘ documents includes access to all types of goods, documents and data 
under the authority or control of auditees. Moreover, they can seal cash boxes and lock up 
goods and documents relating to state finance arrangements; take pictures, records, and 
retrieve any sample as a tool for auditing; and ask for information from anybody. 
In order to avoid the misuse of BPK powers in accessing data and information, 
fraud provisions are regulated by Article 25 of the Audit Law (GOI 2004b). Sanctions and 
a penalty of at least three years jail or a fine of no more than Rp.1 billion are stipulated in 
this article to prevent officials, Board Members and auditors of BPK misusing documents 
provided by audited entities. In particular, it relates to dealing with information and data 
collected before and after auditing, and before reporting to the Parliaments or to the public. 
In addition, Article 24 of the Audit Law (GOI 2004b) stipulates punishment by 
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imprisonment for a maximum one and a half years and/or a penalty of no more than 
Rp.500 millionfor anybody who deliberately withholds any data and information from 
BPK auditors. This includes anybody who intentionally does not carry out their obligation 
to provide documents and/or refuses to give the information required for the smooth 
running of the auditing of state finance management
46
 and accountability
47
. It also includes 
those who intentionally avoid, obscure, and/or fail to implement auditing instructions 
(Article 10) and those who refuse a request from BPK without providing written reasons 
for refusal (Article 11).  
Moreover, anybody (auditors) who intentionally forges or falsifies documents 
submitted for auditing may be subject to imprisonment for a maximum of three years 
and/or a penalty of no more than Rp.1 billion. Article 24 of the Law on BPK requires the 
government institutions as auditees to cooperate with the auditors in terms of providing 
data and information (GOI 2006b). 
The BPK Regulation, Number 1 of the Year 2007, on audit standards provides 
guidelines for an accurate, valid and reliable audit report (BPK RI 2007g). Paragraph 42 
(BPK RI 2007g: 91-92) emphasises the importance of an accurate audit report and the 
impact of an inaccurate audit report. In addition, Paragraph 43 (BPK RI 2007g: 92) 
describes how auditors should provide information that is valid, accurate and reliable. 
Audit reports must contain information supported by competent and relevant evidence in 
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 According to the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b), state finance management is ―all activities carried out by the 
state finance management officer in accordance with their position and authorities, covering planning, 
implementation, supervision and accountability.‖ 
47
 According to the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b), state finance accountability is ―the government obligation to 
carry out state finance management in an orderly manner, in compliance with the law and legislation, 
efficiently, and economically, transparently, and accountably, with due observance of fairness and 
appropriateness.‖ 
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an audit worksheet. In case there are significant data with respect to audit findings, but 
auditors cannot examine the data as they need more evidence, then the auditors must 
clearly indicate in their audit reports that such data are not examined and that they do not 
have any findings or recommendations based on that data. 
How the evidence, audit standards and reference can help auditors to provide an 
accurate and reasonable audit report is stated in Paragraph 44:  
Evidence in audit reports must be reasonable and represent the accuracy of matters 
reported. Correct description means an accurate explanation on the audit scope and 
methodology, and the presentation of findings is consistent with the scope of audit. 
One of the ways of ensuring that audit reports have met audit standards is by 
exercising quality control, such as a reference of the process. The reference process 
is a process in which an auditor who is not involved in an audit process conducts an 
examination to find whether or not the facts, numbers, or dates have been reported 
accurately, the findings are supported by audit documents, and conclusions and 
recommendations are logically based on the supporting data. 
In summary, since the introduction of the Audit Law (GOI 2004b) and the Law on 
BPK (GOI 2006b), BPK auditors have gained a clear authority to access any data and 
information from auditees. These laws promote the openness and transparency in the 
government environment and power to BPK to scrutinise the performance and 
accountability of the public sector agencies. The sanctions are also stipulated for any 
person who deliberately does not providedata and information as required by the auditors 
and also for those whomisuse the audit data and information. 
4.2.2 Survey Results and Comments on Strong Audit Evidence 
Figure 4.2 (below) presents respondent‘s perceptions on strong audit evidence used 
in BPK reports. Out of the total129 respondents, 85 per cent ‗agreed‘ and ‗strongly agreed‘ 
that BPK auditors use ‗strong evidence‘ in auditing. Of 78 auditors, 88 per cent responded 
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positively, including 28 per cent who ‗strongly agreed‘ and 60 per cent who ‗agreed‘. 
From 51 auditees, 62 per cent ‗agreed‘ and 18 per cent ‗strongly agreed. ‘These responses 
indicate that auditors were the most convinced that they had strong data and information 
for auditing, especially after the power and authority granted through law to BPK to access 
data and information. 
Figure 4.2 Survey Results of ‘Information in Audit Reports is Supported by Strong Evidence’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007 in Indonesia 
 
Auditees provided a positive perception, since the new Law on BPK (GOI 
2006b)requires auditees to be more transparent and accountable in presenting their reports 
and providing all the data and information needed by BPK auditors. Three auditees pointed 
out the importance of strong evidence for auditors as follows  
 “The audit report is the result of objective auditing that was supported by valid 
and accurate information” (Interview A7). 
 “Valid, accurate and reliable information is the basic standard of the auditing 
work to provide an objective and accountable audit report” (Interview A5). 
 “As far as the audit findings are based on evidence, the audit findings are 
objective” (Interview A8). 
These comments implied that auditees understand the importance of evidence in auditing. 
Moreover, they also positively support the data collection required by auditors.  
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On the other hand, few respondents responded negatively. About 10 per cent were 
neutral and only 5 per cent disagreed that BPK used strong audit evidence in reporting 
audit information. A key informant from a non-government organisation (Interview F1) 
provided the following opinion about the lack of power auditors have to access data and 
information during auditing: 
BPK needs power and more authority to get any kind of data from any department. 
Any single cent of state finances shall be reached by BPK. When BPK conducted 
auditing at the Ministry of Finance or other ministries, every cent of the state money 
shall not be hampered by anyone. So, they could not hamper BPK auditors during 
auditing. Although as mandated by the Constitution, BPK is an independent audit 
institution and free from any influences of government, other parties, and other 
institutions, before the new Law on BPK (2006), BPK had no power to access valid 
and accurate data or information for auditing.  
This quotation points out that BPK cannot access reliable and accurate data or information 
from auditees because of the lack of transparency in the public sector. The key informant 
emphasised how powerless BPK is in accessing data and information from the Ministry of 
Finance and the weaknesses of BPK in accessing accurate data and information prior to the 
passing of the Law on BPK (2006). The Chairman of BPK, speaking in front of Parliament 
stated, ―BPK had no power to seal, search and seize documents and other related items 
necessary for auditing and inspection‖ (Nasution 2005b). This statement indicatesthe lack 
of power BPK has in accessing public sector agencies before the issuing of the Law on 
BPK (2006). 
Some criticisms from auditors about difficulties in accessing data and information 
from auditees are as follows:  
 “Auditors had difficulty in getting sufficient valid and accurate information from 
auditees”(Interview B17, an auditor of AKN I). 
 “Not all auditing work was supported by accurate and valid information” 
(Interview B19, an auditor of AKN II). 
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 “BPK had no access in computer systems of auditees and using electronic 
data”(Interview B18, an auditor of AKN I). 
These excerpts show dissatisfaction from auditors about the data and information made 
available for auditing. In addition, in line with the transformation of public administration 
from paper based to electronic data and information, auditors found that they had no free 
access to the electronic data.  
According to the Chairman of BPK, some regulations still impeded and limited the 
power of BPK auditors in accessing data and information for auditing, such as information 
related to tax revenues, official foundations and SOEs entering the stock market (Bisnis 
Indonesia 12
th
March 2007). In a statement to a national newspaper, the Director of 
Institute for Development of Economic and Finance (INDEF), Fadhil Hasan, also pointed 
out tax revenue that could not be audited by BPK (Kompas 13
th
March 2007): 
The public have been forced to believe the tax restitution information is uncovered 
by the directorate general of taxation office, because the directorate institution is 
very close and cannot provide data on taxpayers and revenues openly. Even BPK 
auditors found it was difficult to enter the database of tax office for auditing.  
Responses and statements from auditees and auditors indicated that although the power of 
BPK to access data and information for conducting auditing had improved under the laws 
that followed audit reform, unfortunately BPK still had difficulty in accessing data and 
information in some institutions that used state finances. This situation indicated the lack 
of transparency and openness in public administration, which boosted corruption, collusion 
and nepotism in the public sector working environment.  
To conclude, under the new law of BPK (2006), auditors have the power to access 
any data and information in every government agency for auditing purposes. The sanctions 
for auditees who do not provide the necessary data and information, and for auditors who 
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misuse the data and information, have been stipulated. The clear power and authority of 
BPK auditors to access data and information for auditing indicates a positive commitment 
from the government to act transparently and accountably and also generated positive 
perceptions from the respondents. However, based on the research evidence, although the 
power of BPK to access data and information has been strengthened, BPK is still impeded 
in accessing data and information from auditees, such as in the case of tax revenue data 
and the audit data for go public SOEs.  
4.3 Objectivity and Credibility of Audit Report Information 
This section analyses the objectivity and credibility of BPK reports based on 
research data and information from regulations, documents, reports, media, and key 
informant‘s perceptions and comments. Objective and credible information is one of the 
criteria to provide a quality audit report that can be trusted and useful for the main 
stakeholders, namely the Executive (audited entities), Legislative institutions (DPR, 
DPRDs, DPD) and the public.  
4.3.1 Regulations and Rules for Objectivity and Credibility of Information 
Since audit reform, state finance audit standards (SPKN 2007
48
) have stipulated the 
operational basis for requiring auditors to maintain their objectivity in performing audits 
consistent with the public interest. This means auditors must provide an objective audit 
report, respond objectively to officials responsible for following up audit reports, and 
disclose confidential information on audit reports objectively. The standards give clear 
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 The standard was issued in January 2007 and was implemented on 7
th
 March 2007. 
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guidelines for auditors to provide audit reports that are informative, professional and 
objective. The standards emphasise that auditors must not exaggerate in their reports the 
deficiencies of auditee performance. This regulation adopts from the United States of 
government auditing standards concerning objectivity (US GAO 2005).  
Guidelines for auditors to objectively evaluate and review officials‘ responses are 
also stipulated in the audit standards (BPK RI 2007g: 88-89). This means that auditors 
should not only present their findings and opinions clearly and directly, but also 
objectively in reviewing auditees to encourage further improvements. The audit standards 
also provide guidelines regarding disagreements between auditors and auditees on audit 
findings. Discussion and communication with audited entities or auditees shall not change 
to a ‗negotiated‘ mode of report that risks compromising the findings and 
recommendations that would normally part of an audit report.  
Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) refers to the norms in the 
Code of Ethics that must be complied to by the Board Members and auditorsof BPK in 
carrying out their duties to preserve their dignity, honor, image and credibility. Article 35 
of this law (GOI 2006b) also mandates that the quality control system of BPK shall be 
reviewed by the Audit Board of a Membercountry of the International Organisation of the 
Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). 
To ensure the general quality of audit reports, auditors present their results based 
on the guidance provided by the audit standards (BPK RI 2007g). The audit standards 
provide new guidelines for the credibility of audit reports. The basic rule of providing a 
credible report is based on Paragraph 48, of the standard (BPK RI 2007g: 93): 
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To be convincing, a report must be able to answer questions in regard to auditing, to 
present logical findings, conclusions and recommendations. The presented 
information must adequately convince report users to acknowledge the validity of the 
findings and the benefits of the recommendations. Reports prepared in such a manner 
may assist the officials in charge to stay focused on matters requiring attention and 
may assist in taking corrective measures in accordance with the recommendations in 
the audit report. 
Thus, to be credible, the report has to fulfill the audit objectives by presenting valid 
findings, and the summary and the recommendations logically. Moreover, the credibility of 
a report is also determined by the presentation of evidence, so that audit report users are 
confident of the facts and analysis presented. 
SPKN 2007 provides clear guidelines for presenting a credible audit report. 
Auditing that is conducted based on standards can provide credible information in the 
reports through the objective collection and testing of evidence from auditees (BPK RI 
2007g: 10). If an auditor carries out the assignment in this manner and reports the results in 
accordance with the auditing standards, then the report will be able to demonstrate the 
quality improvement in the management and accountability of state finances and 
government decisionmaking.  
Therefore, post ReformationEra, the regulations demonstrate the responsibility of 
auditors to provide objective and credible reports. The following section analyses the 
objectivity and credibility of BPK audit reports.  
4.3.2 Survey Results and Comments on the Objectivity and Credibility of Audit 
Reports 
The survey on the objectivity and credibility of BPK audit reports resulted in 
various perceptions that are described in the following sections. 
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Positive Results and Comments 
Figure 4.3 (below) presents respondentperceptions regarding the objectivity of 
information in BPK audit reports. There were significant positive responses from 
respondents regarding the objectivity of information provided by BPK in audit reports. 
Overall, sixty-two per cent of the respondents agreed the information was objective, while 
among the auditor group, 80 per cent of the 78 BPK auditors responded positively.  
Figure 4.3 Survey Results of ‘Information in BPK Audit Reports is Objective (Using 
Appropriate Audit Techniques and Professional Judgment)’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007 in Indonesia 
For Legislative Members, 64 per cent ‗agreed‘, while from the total of 55 auditees, 
70 per cent ‗agreed‘ and 12 per cent ‗strongly agreed‘. The responses from the Legislature 
Members are spread only between two categories, 64 per cent ‗agree‘ and 36 per cent had 
a ‗neutral‘ perception. These two variations of perception among the Members of the 
Legislature may be because they come from different commissions and have a different 
experience regarding the objectivity of BPK audit reports. The overall positive response 
from auditors reflects significant optimism that they can uphold their objectivity as they 
feel secure to uncover the audit findings and have protected by laws and regulations. This 
means that auditors can readily deal with sensitive issues faced in their findings and can 
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report the results in an unbiased manner and objectively. A senior auditor from BPK 
(Interview B 23) states as follows:  
From my own perspective and experience as an auditor, so far, the audit report of 
BPK is sufficiently objective. There is no problem in this matter. In the rare event 
that some matters could be said to be lack of objectivity, these would have been 
dropped only if the reasons were strong. Even if a matter has to be dropped we have 
strong reasons. For example, after a discussion with the audit team, we have decided 
that this situation just arose from a misunderstanding. But I have heard from another 
AKN (the group of state finances auditors) that its audit findings are no longer 
available following their arrival at the top of an institution. But this situation has 
been changed gradually, especially, since the fall of President Soeharto in 1998. 
This excerpt indicates optimism that auditors have been able to maintain their objectivity 
since the reform of BPK and the new commitment to uphold transparency and 
accountability to the public in this Reformation Era that is very different from the 
authoritarian government in the past. 
Moreover, a positive response also came from acentral government auditee who 
said: 
In the New Order Era, after BPK reported the audit findings, these reports became 
confidential documents. So, the public could not evaluate objectively the audit 
findings that were reported to DPR (Parliament). In contrast, since the audit reform, 
BPK is braver to uncovercorruption practice, mark-ups and misuse of state finances. 
We can read these reports every semester. These reports are also reported to DPR or 
we can read in the printed media or in BPK‘s website. 
This statement indicates significant optimism that the provision of objective information in 
audit reports is improving. After reform, media publications and public participation have 
supported BPK in its efforts to uncoverKKN (collusion, corruption and nepotism), which 
had long been rooted in the Indonesian bureaucracy.  
Figure 4.4 Survey Results of ‘Information in BPK Audit Reports is Credible (Trusted by 
Stakeholders)’ 
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Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007 in Indonesia. 
 
Figure 4.4 (above) presents responses regarding the question about the credibility 
of information in BPK audit reports. The respondents, consisting of auditors, auditees from 
central and local governments and Members of the Legislature, mostly responded 
positively.  
The LegislatureMembers from the different commissions responded in a narrower 
median range that the other groups as their perceptions were only in two categories, 
‗agree‘ and ‗neutral‘. Seventy per cent of them responded positively. Dr. Harry Azhar 
Aziz
49
, argued that the effective implementation of the Audit Law (GOI 2004b) and the 
Law on BPK (GOI 2006b), which stipulates the responsibilities of auditors and auditees in 
providing credible information, is important. He stated: 
Basic Reformation on the management and accountability of state finances system 
started from the arrangement and implementation of the law framework. Complete 
Laws consist of three laws on state finances plus the Law on BPK (2006) can 
provide transparency in management and accountability of state finances. However, 
experience proved that ‗the devil is in the implementation.‘ Consequently, it is 
relevant for us to ask: How far had we collectively implemented these laws for the 
same goals to provide good government and governance in Indonesia?  
                                                             
 
 
49
Dr. Aziz, a Member of Parliament from Commission XI (Finance, Banking and Development Planning) and 
his statement was made during a presentation at the One Day Seminar on Public Sector Auditing to 
commemorate the 60th Anniversary of BPK in Jakarta on 9
th
January 2007. 
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This excerpt sends a message about the importance of implementing the laws on state 
finance and the Law on BPK. Dr. Aziz argued the trustworthiness of the audit process and 
subsequent audit reports depends on how effectively the audit laws are implemented. 
Eighty-five per cent of auditors responded positively, agreeing that information in 
BPK audit reports is credible. BPK reforms in its regulations, institution, management, 
personnel, and audit quality standards provoked optimism from respondents about the 
credibility of audit reports. A high official of BPK argued as follows: 
We have new state finance auditing standards this year as tools for measuring the 
quality of BPK audit reports. Starting from 2007, BPK‘s quality of auditing will be 
reviewed by SAI from other countries; is audited by an independent KAP; is 
assessed by peer review; and is controlled by the Honorary Board of Code of Ethics 
to assure credibility of information in BPK audit reports. 
This quotation presents another view that other institutions and independent reviewers also 
evaluate BPK‘s credibility. For examining its financial accountability, BPK is audited by 
KAP. In terms of the quality of audit reports, they are peer reviewed by another SAI. In 
addition, a Member of Parliament believed that the new regulations and audit standard 
scan support BPK in providing credible information in its audit reports. 
Respondents from the auditees‘ group responded positively with 70 per cent 
‗agreeing‘ and 10 per cent ‗strongly agreeing‘ that BPK provided credible information in 
audit reports. A high official and internal auditor of a state-owned enterprise (Interview 
A1) supported this view as follows: 
BPK had a better performance after the audit reform, which gradually becomes more 
mature and experienced in auditing. BPK auditors know the problems better and 
deeper. As a result, the auditing systems and materials provide more focused and 
sharper findings. This condition helps us to provide corrections based on BPK audit 
reports. 
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This statement indicates optimism and confidence regarding the performance of BPK. The 
informant also found that BPK auditors were competent in identifying the problems of 
public sector agencies and in analysing the findings for providing opinions and 
recommendations for improved public administration.  
In addition, a Member of Parliament from Commission I (Interview C4) provided a 
positive response about the objectivity and credibility of BPK reports as follows:  
Since the audit reform in 2001, BPK has shown a lot of progress and more power to 
reform the government auditing system, including willingness to be an independent 
audit institution free from outside influences. Further, BPK has shown its power as 
an audit institution. If the performance of BPK was unsatisfactory, DPR warned 
BPK. Consequently, BPK had to maintain its performance in providing credible and 
objective audit reports. 
This statement implies that the Member of Parliament respects some of BPK‘s efforts to 
reform its institution in performing their audit roles and functions, including reforms in 
providing credible and objective audit reports. The Parliament Member s appreciated the 
desire of BPK to be objective and credible and to audit without political or other 
interference. 
Negative Results and Comments 
Besides the positive responses, this study also revealed a few negative responses on 
the objectivity of information in BPK reports. From the total respondents, 14 per cent were 
‗neutral‘, 6 per cent ‗disagreed‘ and 1 per cent ‗strongly disagreed. From the auditor group, 
13 per cent were ‗neutral‘ and 6 per cent ‗disagreed‘. Auditors who audited local 
government complained that they had problems in reporting objectively due to 
pressurefrom the Regent (the head of a district) or the Mayor (the head of a city) who may 
have been involved in KKN and fraud (Interview B21, an auditor of AKN IV). This 
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situation demonstrated a lack of accountability and transparency from elected leaders in 
local government. Elected leaders did not act responsibly for the community and showed 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the provision of public services and in managing public 
resources. In addition, two local government auditors criticised the objectivity of 
information in BPK reports as follows: 
 “The objectivity of BPK audit reports depended on the objectivity of the auditors 
themselves. In some cases, the auditors could not conduct the audit fully 
objectively” (Interview B 20). 
 “Institutionally, BPK was an independent institution, but not personally. The 
auditors did try hard to be objective. Yet, there were some limitations that 
affected them and consequently objectivity was limited” (Interview B16, an 
auditor of AKN II). 
The first statement indicates that the objectivity of reports can depend on the auditors 
personally, in other words it ismuch related to the professionalism and integrity of those 
conducting the audit. The second excerpt indicates that objectivity in reports not only 
depends on the auditors, but also the often strong influence presented by auditees and audit 
offices.  
In addition, during the interview, some auditors expressed their feelings of 
insecurity when they should disclose bad or poor findings from their auditees who come 
from the local governments in the audit reports (Interview B21, an auditor of AKN 
IV).This indicated a lack of clear guidance to protect auditors when they objectively 
uncovered bad practices and poor performance by the government. Besides, there is a lack 
of immunity and protection for auditors who uncover criminality, corruptionand fraud, and 
this has affected the objectivity of auditors in providing audit information.  
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Two auditors revealed impartial views by BPK auditors who audited the central 
government and which affected objective information being presented in their audit 
reports:  
 “The BPK audit reports were sometimes not objective, because auditors were 
neither independent nor objective.”(Interview B15, an auditor of AKN III)  
 “A few auditors had a political relationship with auditees.” (Interview B23, an 
auditor of AKN V) 
These two statements indicate that auditors cannot provide objective information in the 
reports because their independence was compromised by the influence of auditees and 
political parties.  
Moreover, an auditor of the Ministry of National Education raised the issue that 
audit reports have been altered and were not based on real facts: 
Some audit reports did not provide objective information, because they had been 
altered. The objectivity of the audit report depends on who are the auditors and the 
auditees, however, there were a few audit reports that were influenced by outsiders 
(Interview B14). 
Similarly, a BPK high official explained the practice of altering reports during the New 
Order Era
50
:  
BPK and other high state institutions, including Parliament, was only a ‗rubber 
stamp‘ for the government. Before being submitted to Parliament, BPK audit reports 
were sent to the government office, in this case the State Secretary‘s office, to be 
altered. If these reports could influence national stability, the issues raised could not 
be mentioned in BPK‘s reports. That was the practice in the New Order Era. 
These two excerpts explain that BPK audit reports were altered which indicates that the 
reports were not objective. In the past, audit findings from BPK that had potential 
influence on national stability were altered by the State Secretary office before they were 
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 This is presentation from one high official of BPK for visiting economic faculty students of Gajah Mada 
University to BPK in the Pola Room of BPK office, Jakarta. 
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submitted to Parliament. BPK was not free of influence from the Indonesian government. 
Although this practice is much reduced compared with the past, it seems that BPK still 
alters some reports. An auditor who audited the Ministry of the Defence of the Republic of 
Indonesia revealed this, describing a situation where audit findingsdisappeared after they 
arrived at the top management level of BPK and before they were published (Interview 
B13, an auditor of AKN I):  
I conducted an audit of the Ministry of the National Army. As an auditor, I did my 
best to provide an objective auditing report based on the real conditions. Then, I 
reported my audit findings and discussed them with my audit team. This audit report 
had to be signed and approved by a supervisor of the audit team, the Chief Auditor of 
State finances and a Board Member of BPK before it was published or was sent to 
the audited entity and Parliament. However, we found that some of these findings 
that were quite sensitive and may influence the performance of this Ministry for the 
public did not appear in the audit report. I think the Board Members of BPK were not 
brave enough to publish these findings. So, the objectivity of the audit report in my 
case also depends on the Board Members.  
This statement implies that after audit reform in 2001, some BPK audit reports were still 
being altered by the Board Members of BPK, for example, as in the case of audited entities 
strongly involved with aspects of security and national stability, such as at the Ministry of 
Defence, the Air Force, the Navy and the Police. The reason for altering these audit 
findings is likely due to concerns of public security and safety or other political reasons. 
However, a high official of BPK from AKN I (Interview B12) argued that the information 
was not publicly disclosed does not necessarily mean the reports lacked objectivity. He 
(Interview B12) explained that the unpublished findings in this case were due to the Board 
Members of BPK choosing not to make the poor performance of the Ministry open to the 
public. 
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From the auditees‘ group, 11 per centindicated ‗neutrality‘, 6 per cent 
‗disagreement‘ and 1 per cent ‗strong disagreement‘ regarding the objectivity of 
information in audit reports. The most frequently expressed concerns were about the lack 
of objectivity of information in the reports due to questions or doubts about auditor 
impartiality. There was skepticism among auditees as indicated by the following negative 
views
51
:  
 “The auditors are normal humans so they cannot be free from pressure” 
(Interview A14). 
 “Sometimes, BPK auditors were influenced by other parties or were not 
conducting auditing in an objective manner’ (Interview A13). 
 “There were self-interest factors influencing auditing” (Interview A16). 
 “The audit reports were not fully objective, because BPK was not a fully 
independent institution” (Interview A4). 
These comments indicate subjectivity in BPK reports due to a lack of auditor 
independence created by influence from auditees, political parties, or self interest and a 
lack of support from the audit office. Similarly, auditees at the local level also criticized 
the objectivity of information in BPK audit reports
52
:  
 “Not all the BPK audit reports contained the truth” (Interview A20, with an 
auditee from Local Government of Bandung City). 
 “The auditors were not independent or objective, I hope this will end and will not 
happen in the future” (Interview A25, with an auditee from Local Government of 
Jambi Province53).  
These statements indicate that local government auditees have found bias and a lack of 
objective information in BPK audit reports.. They expected more objective information in 
the report. 
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 This is based on short interviews with auditors during the fieldwork survey from 5
th
 November 2006 to 
26
th
March 2007 in Jakarta regional office of BPK and Bandung regional office of BPK, Indonesia. 
52
This is based on interviews and comments from respondents during the fieldwork survey 5
th
 November 2006 
to 26
th
March 2007 in Jakarta and Bandung. 
53
 As also a postgraduate student of STIA LAN Bandung.  
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Parliament Members come from different Commissions also flagged the lack of 
objectivity in BPK audit reports:  
 ‘The BPK audit reports were not objective, because they were not based on real 
facts or real conditions” (Interview C3, from Commission VI).  
 “Some audit reports were objective but some were still questionable, such as the 
audit reports of BPPN” (Interview C7, from Commission XI).  
 “Auditors and auditees of BPK had a principle of a ‘win-win’ solution” (Interview 
C2, with Commission VII). 
 “The objectivity of audit reports was only in terms of auditing procedures and 
the financial system, but not in terms of the report contents” (Interview C9, with 
a Member of Kuningan regional Parliament, Commission C). 
 “There were still some auditors who were not independent and objective, 
because they accepted bribes” (Interview C10, with a Member of West Java 
Province Regional Parliament). 
These statements indicate that auditees found BPK auditors do not perform objectively. 
There is also such a sense of pessimism from auditees toward objectivity of BPK report 
because there are easily bribed. Besides, practice of negotiation also common, that 
resulting in the audit reports of BPK do not show the actual audit findings. Although the 
negative and neutral responses from Members of the Legislature interviewed were not 
statistically significant, the negative views expressed by Parliament Members of the 
different commissions and groups of political parties were considered.  
In terms of the credibility of information in audit reports, from the survey results12 
per cent of auditors were ‗neutral‘ and 3 per cent ‗disagreed‘. Thirty-six per cent of the 
Members of the Legislature had a ‗neutral‘ response; and 11 per cent, 8 per cent and 1 per 
cent of the auditees surveyed responded with neutrality, disagreement and strong 
disagreement, respectively. Two BPK managers and a Member of Parliament made the 
following criticisms:  
 “Credibility of the BPK audit reports was about 65 per cent; but I had doubts 
about 35 per cent” (Interview B4). 
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 “The audit reports were not credible, because BPK auditors were not 
independent” (Interview B10). 
 “Some audit reports were not objective; as a result, they were also not credible” 
(Interview C1). 
The above negative statements indicate significant doubt about the credibility of audit 
reports, even when the statement comes from a BPK informant. The informants also found 
that the lack of credibility in audit reports is due to the BPK auditor‘s lack of independence 
and objectivity.  
In conclusion, this study revealed both positive and negative responses and 
comments on the objectivity and credibility of information in BPK audit reports. However, 
the survey revealed largely positive perceptions of the information in audit reports and 
optimism regarding the reforms designed to provide objective and credible audit reports. 
Survey supported by respondents from BPK, auditees and Members of Parliament. 
However, criticism and negative views have showed that these claims were overly 
optimistic. Some negative comments presented during the interviews provided more open 
and honest statements, which reduces the overall optimism to some degree. The key 
informants doubt the objectivity and credibility of audit reports due to BPK‘s lack of 
independence. The study revealed that BPK auditors faced considerable pressure fromhigh 
officials or elected people who were not acting responsibly to the public. For example, at 
the local level the pressure from the Regent or Mayor. In addition, audit reports on the 
Ministry of the National Army were altered. These negative views presented a more 
balanced viewpoint and showed that there is still room for BPK to improve the objectivity 
and credibility of its audit reports. 
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Chapter 5  
Quality of BPK Reports: 
Communication of and Acting on Information 
Chapter Five provides data and analysis of criteria related to the quality of BPK 
audit reports in terms of the communication of and acting on the information in those 
reports. As in the previous chapter, before presenting evidence and findings, each section 
examines the legal and regulatory basis relevant to each criterion. This is followed by an 
assessment of respondents‘ perceptions and comments and finally the chapter closes with 
conclusions. 
The following sections examine three criteria related to the communication of 
information in audit reports: understandable information, precise and informative 
formatting, and timely reporting. 
5.1 Understandable Information 
It is clear that an audit report should be easy to understand by all stakeholders. In 
the case of Indonesia, the stakeholders of BPK are Members of Parliament, audited entities 
and the public. Understandable information means that the information is simply presented 
and easily understood by readers so that misunderstandings between auditors and 
stakeholders are avoided.  
5.1.1 Basic Rules for Clear and Understandable Reports 
The responsibility of auditors to provide a clear and understandable report is 
stipulated in the BPK regulation on state finance auditing standards (BPK RI 2007g: 93). 
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The regulation requires that information in the reports is easily read and understood by: (i) 
using as clear language as possible; (2) using simple and non-technical language to simplify 
presentation; (iii) avoiding unfamiliar technical terms, abbreviations and acronyms that are 
not defined clearly; and (iv) not using acronyms too frequently. In addition, the audit 
standard stipulates that a report must answer questions with regard to auditing, present 
logical findings, provide conclusions and recommendations and present information that 
sufficiently convince readers that the findings and recommendations are valid. Auditors 
must try to avoid misunderstandings by the reader in respect to the work performed and not 
performed in the context of achieving the audit objectives, particularly if the auditing is 
limited by time or resource constraints. Therefore, the BPK audit standard has provided 
guidance for officials and auditors in charge of auditing to focus on matters requiring 
attention and in taking corrective measures to prepare audit report recommendations clearly 
and to avoid misunderstanding. 
For performance auditing, the tone of the report must encourage decision makers to 
take action based on the findings and recommendations. Auditors must keep in mind that 
their objective is to convince and should avoid language that may result in a defensive and 
opposing attitude from audited entities. This means that although criticism of performance 
is often needed, audit reports must also focus on improvements. 
5.1.2 Survey Results and Comments on Clear and Understandable Reports 
During the survey, respondents were asked whether information in BPK audit 
reports is clear and easy to understand. Figure 5.1 (below) shows significant varying 
perceptions between auditors, auditees and Members of Parliament. Comparing the 
respondents from Parliament Members and auditees groups, auditors group had higher 
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percentage of ‗agree‘ perception that information in BPK reports is clear and easy to 
understand. . However, negative and neutral responses from respondents were also found: 
17 per cent were ‗neutral‘, 7 per cent ‗disagreed‘ and 1 per cent ‗strongly disagreed‘. The 
highest percentage of negative responses ‗disagreeing‘ came from the Members of 
Parliament group, followed by the auditee group where10 per cent ‗disagreed‘ and 1 per 
cent ‗strongly disagreed‘.  
Figure 5.1 Survey Results of ‘Information in BPK Audit Reports is Clear and Easy to 
Understand’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007. 
Members of Parliament from both central and local levels had the following 
criticisms:  
 “Some financial and auditing terms in BPK audit reports were not clearly defined 
and difficult to understand for the Members of Parliament” (Interview C5, with a 
Memberof Parliament). 
 “We need information in audit reports which is easy to understand” (Interview 
C8, a Member of Parliament). 
 “Please correct audit reports’ language, so the Members and the public can easily 
understand” (Interview C10, a Member of regional Parliament). 
 “Some auditing or financial terms were not familiar for us. We could not 
understand the meaning of these terms”(Interview C9, a Member of Regional 
Parliament).  
These quotes implied that stakeholders found the information in BPK audit reports difficult 
to follow and understand. In addition, the reports provided too many auditing and financial 
terms that were not defined clearly. As a result, the Members and other stakeholders who 
had no knowledge or background in finance and accounting found it difficult to understand 
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the report. Less audit and finance terms (technical language) in the reports would have 
made it easier for them to understand.  
Auditees also expressed negative views on understanding BPK audit reports: 
 “Not all information in audit reports is easy to understand; sometimes, different 
perceptions and misunderstanding appeared” (Interview A24, an auditee from 
Cianjur District). 
 “Need further communication between the auditors and the auditees to provide 
better understanding of information in reports” (Interview A8, an auditee from 
the Ministry of Finance). 
 “We could not understand the accounting and auditing terms” (Interview A21, an 
auditee from Bandung City). 
 “We were sometimes confused by information provided in BPK audit reports” 
(Interview A13, an auditee from Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
 “We still could not understand why BPK provided ‘disclaimer’ to the central 
government’s financial statements” (Interview A3, an auditee from National 
Electricity Company-PLN). 
 “Some statements in audit reports were difficult to understand for auditees; we 
had to ask for further explanation from BPK” (Interview A18, an auditee from 
state-owned bank).  
These criticisms revealed that auditees experienced difficulty understanding audit reports 
and misinterpreted information. As a result, auditees had to ask for further explanations 
from BPK to obtain the same interpretation with auditors. Most of the public sector finance 
division had no personnel with accounting or finance backgrounds as auditing and financial 
accounting were never a priority during the Soeharto Era. The problem of understanding 
audit BPK reports, not only at local government level, but also at the central government 
level, even in state-owned bank. 
BPK managers and auditors realised that some terms in audit reports were not 
understood by the readers. They argued that the ability to read and to understand BPK audit 
reports depends on stakeholders‘ educational background and knowledge. Their comments 
were as follows: 
 “Understanding audit reports depended on the ability of the stakeholders to 
understand them, some of them were not well educated and sufficiently 
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knowledgeable to understand BPK audit reports” (Interview B23, an auditor of 
AKN V). 
 “Some auditing and financial terms could not be understood by the stakeholders. 
Educational backgrounds of stakeholders affected their ability to understand 
audit reports” (Interview B17 an auditor of AKN I). 
 “For some stakeholders, BPK audit reports were difficult to read and understand. 
For example, the Members of Parliament are highly dependent on assistance from 
expert staff rather than their own ability to review the BPK reports” (Interview 
B27, a manager of BPK from publication sub division). 
These statements implied that auditors noted the limited capacity of stakeholders in 
understanding reports. An auditee of good educational background supported these views, 
stating ―audit reports from BPK in general were easy to understand‖. Moreover, two 
Members of the Legislature with backgrounds in economics, accounting and management 
also commented positively on the BPK reports. As a new democratic country, voters in 
Indonesia selectedMembers of Parliament not based ontheir capacity to provide effective 
programs for the public, but more on their fame and popularity. Sudibjo (2009b: 165) 
confirms this, pointing out that many artists and other incompetent people were elected as 
Members of Parliament. Some 15 artists were elected as Members of Parliament (2009-
2014), such as Tantowi Yahya, Inggrid Maria Palupi, Venna Melinda, Jamal Mirdad, Nurul 
Arifin and so on, while Wanda Hamidah was elected as Member of Jakarta Province 
Parliament and resulted in a controversy. A Parliament researcher (Interview F6) 
mentioned, ―The lack of ability of the Members of Parliament at central and local levels 
should be considered by BPK auditors‖. This statement indicates that auditors should be 
consider educational background of their readers, when they write audit findings for their 
main stakeholders, in this case is the Members of Parliament.  
The survey results indicate various perceptions on whether or not BPK audit reports 
provided clear and understandable information. The study revealed that information in BPK 
reports was difficult for stakeholders to understand, especially when technical terms on 
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auditing and finance were used, but not well defined. Although auditors argued that the 
ability to understand audit reports depends on the competency of stakeholders, this study 
found that presenting clearer and simpler information in the report could avoid 
misinterpretation and help citizens to understand the reports.  
5.2 Precise and Informative Formatting 
A precise and informative audit report format is closely linked to clear and 
understandable information. This section analyses formatting in audit reports and how it 
supports or hinders the delivery of findings and recommendations. 
5.2.1 Basic Rules for Precise and Informative Audit Report Formatting 
State auditing standards (2007) provide guidance for auditors to provide precise and 
informative reports. The audit standard requires auditors to prepare a report summary to 
present important information to be acted on by users. This summary contains audit 
objectives and the most significant audit findings and recommendations in a logical, 
accurate and correct manner. Moreover, the standards provide guidance for an informative 
format summary, which (i) presents relevant facts to provide clarity and understanding for 
the users, (ii) uses headings, subheadings and topic sentences (main subject) to facilitate 
reading and comprehension, and (ii) provides visual aids (such as pictures, schemes, 
graphicsand maps) to explain complicated issues. 
Furthermore, Paragraph 52 of audit standards (BPK RI 2007g: 94) provides 
guidelines on how auditors can provide a precise or brief report that is no longer than 
necessary to convey and support the message. Reports with too many details can diminish 
their quality by concealing the important messages, creating confusion or reducing the 
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interest of the reader. Unnecessary repetition should also be avoided. Although there are 
many opportunities to consider the contents of a report, a comprehensive but brief report 
can attain a better result.  
Therefore, the state finance audit standard emphasises the requirement for a brief 
report that avoids too many details and repetition. Under this standard, BPK has direction 
for providing better quality audit reports that meet the needs of stakeholders.  
5.2.2 Survey Results on Precise and Informative BPK Audit Report Formatting 
During the survey, respondents were asked whether they agreed that BPK provided 
a precise and informative audit report format. The questionnaire results are shown in Figure 
5.2 (below)and reveal mainly optimistic responses, with 51 per cent of total respondents 
‗agreeing‘ and 21 per cent ‗strongly agreeing‘ The highest ‗strongly-agree‘ response was 
provided by the auditors‘ group, with over 40 per cent, while the highest ‗agree‘ response, 
66 per cent, was provided by auditees.  
Figure 5.2 Survey Results for ‘Format of BPK Audit Reports is Precise and Informative’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007  
 
BPK adopted a new format for its audit report summaries in 2007, meaning reports 
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43
34
19
4
0
8
66
18
7
1
15
38 38
9
0
21
51
20
7
1
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
Perceptions
Pe
rce
nta
ge
s
Auditors Auditees Members of Parliament Overall responses
152 
 
 
summary comment beside relevant paragraphs, (iii) explain the auditing and financial terms 
used in the report, (iv) use graphs, diagrams and tables to provide clearer illustration of 
facts, and (v) analyse findings 
54
. These summary audit reports were part of an effort from 
BPK to provide comprehensive but brief audit reports that would encourage Members of 
Parliament to review the reports. BPK‘s efforts to improve the format of audit reports 
encouraged positive responses, such as the following comments made by Members of 
Parliament: 
 “BPK audit reports are getting better and easier to read with the summaries of the 
reports” (Interview C2). 
 “With the summary of audit reports from the General Secretariat of Parliament, 
BPK audit reports became easier and more interesting to read”(Interview C5). 
These excerpts indicate that Members of Parliament, as primary stakeholders of BPK, have 
taken much interest in audit reportsdue to innovations in how the reports are presented. One 
example is created for a summary format of BPK audit reports. 
Besides the largely positive views, some neutral and negative responses were also 
recorded. The highest neutral response, 38 per cent, came from Members of Parliament. 
Furthermore, 9 per cent of the Members of Parliament, 7 per cent of auditees and 4 per cent 
of auditors disagreed that BPK provided precise and informative audit reportformatting. 
This is supported by the following negative opinions made by Members of Parliament: 
 “BPK audit reports were too complicated, too thick, and too long” (Interview C4). 
 “Think about being ‘user friendly’ for audit report formatting. Present audit 
findings with the highest priority cases, such as high amounts of money involved 
or high materiality findings, to be reviewed by the Members, with attractive 
formatting, such as causative format” (Interview C3). 
 “Audit reports were too thick” (Interview C6). 
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An example of anaudit report summary of Semester I of 2007is available from the BPK 
website:,www.bpk.go.id (23/01/08). 
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 “I was reluctant to read BPK audit reports, because of their old style formatting 
with long statements and their thickness. I had no time to read them” (Interview 
C1). 
These excerpts indicate evidence that BPK report formatting was not satisfactory, because 
the text written in audit reports was too long with too many pages and had lack clear tables, 
pictures and charts to help readers. The Vice President of Indonesia stated (Kompas 
4
th
December 2006) that BPK audit findings were too thick, like an encyclopedia, and 
because of this the President and Ministers could not read all of them. He said, ―We need 
just their summaries‖.  
In addition, an auditor from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)
55
 
(Interview F3) suggested adopting ANAO‘s report format with headings, subheadings, 
short summaries, tables and figures, a combination of font colours on a white background, 
and a moderate numbers of pages. Moreover, that reports should emphasise important 
information by using different font sizes and styles, to help ensure an interesting 
presentation and benefit reader understanding. The ANAO auditor emphasised that the way 
auditors present reports is important and significant as it affects the reader‘s willingness to 
read them. 
Therefore, audit reports from BPK were too thick, too long, too complicated and 
lacked interesting presentation. This situation created difficulties for stakeholders in 
reading, absorbing and understanding the information provided. Since 2007, BPK has 
provided a new summary audit report format and has continued to innovate, introducing 
more appealing lay out, pictures, pie charts, and even short stories. Moreover, BPK has 
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 This auditor visited BPK on March 2006 while the researcher was collecting data during the fieldwork. 
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attempted to obtain information from report producers and readers about expectations 
regarding audit reports, in particular, fromMembers of Parliament and government.  
5.3 Timely Reporting 
Timely reporting is the third criterion related to the communication of information 
in audit reports. Reporting audit findings and recommendations within a specific timeframe 
for stakeholders or users is essential for communicating the report effectively.  
5.3.1 Basic Laws and Rules on Timely Reporting of Information 
Before the issuance of the Audit Law (2004), there were no regulations on the 
timeframe for reporting BPK audit results. There was no required timeframe when BPK 
reported its findings to Parliament; the regulation only stated ―audit findings or reports 
must be issued to the Legislature‖ (Soedibyo 2003:22-24).  
Since the Audit Law (GOI 2004b) was issued, audit reports need to be submitted by 
BPK to Members of the Legislature no more than two months after BPK has accepted 
financial statements from the government entities. For performance and specific purpose 
audits, the timeframe depends on the agreement with the Legislature. The Audit Law also 
stipulated the latest timeframe to submit BPK semester audit report summaries to the 
Legislature, the President and the head of regional governments, as no later than three 
months after the semester ends. In addition, the new auditing standards (BPK RI 2007g) 
accommodate guidelines to provide timely audit reports. In order to maximise information, 
audit reports must be presented in a timely manner,as audit reports presented late will not 
be valued by the users.  
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Hence, the Audit Law (2004) stipulates that once BPK has received the financial 
statements from government bodies (both central and regional) they then have two months 
in which to submit the audit reports to Parliament and government heads. Moreover, 
summaries of semester audit reports
56
 are to be submitted not more than three months after 
the semester ends.  
5.3.2 Survey Results on Timely Reporting 
Figure 5.3 (below) shows respondent‘s perceptions regarding timely reporting of 
BPK reports. Of the BPKauditor group, 43 per cent ‗strongly agree‘ and 30 per cent 
‗agree‘. Largely positive responses from auditees were also indicated by 65 per cent 
responding to ‗agree‘ and 3 per cent responding to ‗strongly agree‘ on the punctuality of 
BPK audit reports. These positive responses indicate optimism of respondents about the 
timeliness of audit reports from BPK since the Audit Law (2004) stipulated the relevant 
timeframes. Since 2005, BPK has also submitted its audit report summaries every semester. 
Figure 5.3 Survey Results on ‘BPK Reports its Audit Results in a Timely Fashion’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007  
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The study also received negative responses. Thirty-nine per cent of Legislature 
Members interviewed ‗disagreed‘ and 15 per cent responded ‗neutral‘, while 29 per cent of 
auditees responded ‗neutral‘ and 3 per cent ‗disagreed‘ that BPK reporting was punctual. 
The negative responses were supported by arguments from auditors as follows: 
 “The audit reports were mainly submitted on time, however, a few audit reports 
were late due to the late submission of financial statements from audited entities” 
( Interview B22 an auditor of AKN IV). 
 “BPK audit reports were not issued on time, because we did not have enough 
auditors but a huge number of audited entities” (Interview B18, an auditor of 
AKN I). 
These excerpts indicate delays in auditees providing financial statements caused the late 
submission of BPK reports to stakeholders. Another constraint was the expanding number 
of BPK auditees, which did not balance with the number of available auditors. This 
situation also caused late audit reports. Moreover, auditees also provided negative views 
such as the following: 
 “BPK audit reports were sometimes late and were not done on time, which 
influenced follow-up and feedback from the management” (Interview A4). 
 “BPK audit reports from BPK were often late” (Interview A20). 
 “BPK audit reports from BPK were out of date and too slow, not on time 
whenever auditees or Parliament needed them” (Interview A15). 
 “Audit reports from BPK were too late and out of date; we need more truly useful 
audit reports” (Interview A18). 
These excerpts affirmed the statements from auditors that BPK reports were usually late. 
Therefore, BPK audit reports information had overdue data and information. This suggests 
that the BPK reports cannot be helpful to provide recommendations and input for public 
sector institutions to reform their performance. The reports seemed only as the output of the 
formality audit results and lacked of their functions to improve the performance and 
accountability of public sector institutions. Additionally, criticisms from the Members of 
Legislature are as followed:  
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 “The Members of Parliament need factual and up-to-date audit reports. We need 
the issuing of audit reports immediately. Auditing reports from BPK were too old 
and not interesting to the Members” (Interview C3, a Member of Parliament from 
Commission VI). 
 “If possible, we need audit results of BPK faster” (Interview C4, a Member of 
Parliament from Commission I). 
 “BPK audit reports were not timely” (Interview C11, a Member of Parliament 
from Commission IX).  
 “The timing for audit reports was not timely, in particular at the regional level. 
Lack of transparency and accountability from the Governor (Interview A1, Head 
of West Java Provincial Government) 
 “Political willingness of regional government was the central problem of regional 
level auditing” (Interview C9, a Member of Kuningan regional Parliament from 
Commission C). 
 “BPK audit reports have to be on time according to the schedule. This is important 
so it will not affect the budget plan of regional government” (Interview C10, a 
Member of West Java Province regional Parliament). 
These excerpts indicate that Members of Parliament as main stakeholders of BPK found 
that audit reports were not timely. This condition disappointed reports‘ readers as the 
information was provided outdated. They believed that timely audit reports were useful for 
following up on the information in the reports. They suggested faster and timelier audit 
results to be reported to ensure up-to-date information for the Members. A Member of a 
regional Parliament (Interview C9)argued that the late BPK reports were due to the heads 
of regional governments not submitting their financial statements on schedule. This in turn 
also caused delays in auditing financial statements and contributed to the late submission of 
audit reports to Members of Parliament.  
Since 2007, BPK has committed to submitting timely audit report summaries to 
Parliaments at both the central and local level. Although 105 regional governments did not 
submit their financial statements on time, BPK submitted its audit report summary
57
 to 
Parliament on time on 10 October 2007 (BPK RI 2007c). Thus, lateregional government 
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This is BPK audit results which had been summarised or provided only the importance information. Complete 
data and information can be seen in the BPK audit reports.  
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financial statements did not prevent BPK from submitting audit report summaries of central 
and local governments on time to Legislative institutions. 
To summarise, timely audit reporting is stipulated by the Audit Law (2004) and is 
included in audit standards. The survey results indicated more positive responses from 
auditors and auditees‘ groups than from Members of Parliament who doubted the timeliness 
of audit reports. Negative views were also revealed which suggested BPK did not 
successfully fulfill the requirements to provide up-to-date and timely audit reports for 
stakeholders, in particular Members of Legislative institutions. 
5.4 Acting on Information in BPK Reports 
The following sections discuss the criteria related to acting on information in audit 
reports, namely, the publication of audit reports, realistic audit recommendationsand follow 
up of audit findings and recommendations. 
5.4.1 Publication of Audit Reports 
Publication of information in audit reports for the public is the first criterion related 
to acting on information in audit reports. It is necessary for the public to be informed about 
the financial accountability and performance of public sector agencies through BPK 
reports. With this information, the public can then push the government to act more 
accountably in managing public resources.  
Laws and Regulations Related to the Publication of Audit reports 
After BPK audit reports are submitted to Members of Parliament, these reports must 
be published or immediately declared to the public as stipulated by Article 19, Paragraph 1 
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of the Audit Law (GOI 2004b) and Article 5, Paragraph 4 of the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b). 
However, the publication of confidential information is also governed by law and 
legislation (Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the Audit Law). The BPK audit standard (2007) 
stipulates that any confidential information should be regulated to provide a reasonable 
explanation of any unpublished information in the audit reports. Certain information 
isallowed to be disclosed and submitted to certain authorised parties, in accordance with 
laws and regulations. Furthermore, the audit standard (BPK RI 2007g: 53) provides 
guidelines for BPK auditors to assess specific non-publishable information and to take into 
account public interest and provide reasons for decisions regarding the non-disclosure of 
specific information in the report. 
In the case of performance audit reports, Paragraph 33 of audit standards reporting 
(BPK RI 2007g: 89) requires auditors to indicate the characteristics of information that is 
deleted, which must take into account the public interest and to evaluate the provisions that 
prohibit the disclosure of such information. If the auditors decide to delete particular 
information, they must state the nature of the deleted information and the reasons for such 
deletion. Moreover, the audit standards (BPK RI 2007g: 90) indicates that information may 
be excluded from the audit reports or not be publicly disclosed if this information affects 
public safety and security, for instance, detailed findings with respect to the security of 
assets. 
To conclude, the Audit Law (GOI 2004b) and the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) 
establishes the responsibility of BPK to publish audit results for transparency in state 
management. Besides, this is also indicates the willingness of government to provide the 
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public with the right information on public administration while considering the protection 
of private data and confidential state information.  
Publication of Audit Reports Pre and Post Audit Reform 
In the past, before the Law on Audit (2004) was issued, BPK had limited access to 
the public and the media and almost all audit reports were not published as they were 
considered to be state secrets and confidential documents. From 1945-2004, audit results 
were never published and BPK was very remote from the public. In this period, there was 
no information available about BPK audit findings in the media. If there was news about 
BPK, it was presented in a small column in the middle part of newspapers or magazines, 
which indicated it to be news of limited interest. 
In contrast, since BPK was mandated to publish its audit reports for the public every 
semester (after reporting to Parliament) print and internet media have published BPK 
findings on irregularities, corruption, and other criminal offences. This has supported 
transparency by providing public information on government officials‘ accountability. 
However, this study revealed that in the period 2001-2004 that BPK did not publish audit 
reports on its website, but begun doing so since 2005. To better support the publication of 
BPK audit reports and other information through the internet, the capacity of its local area 
network (LAN) and website has been expanded.  
With relation to mainstream media articles (print, radio and television) about BPK 
and its findings, Table 5.1 (below) presents the approximate number of special BPK news 
items in 2006.  
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Table 5-1 Examples of Approximate Numbers of News Articles of BPK’s Findings/Results 
in 2006 
Source: Adapted and processed from Clippings of BPK, the Public Relations Division of BPK, Jakarta, 
2007  
 
BPK audit reports have become an interesting and important topic for public 
attention and are often discussed among various public groups, in particular instances of 
irregularities, fraud and corruption in state finances. After being submitted to the 
Legislative institutions, audit results are announced in the newspapersand discussed in 
business, management, finance and economic magazines. News about BPK has made the 
headlines of print media and increasingly features on television and radio, which indicates 
the high level of publicinterest in audit findings and role of BPK in examining 
governmentaccountability.BPK findings can also be useful to complement formal 
punishments for officials who have not complied with laws and regulations. Criticism of 
governmentperformances helps the public to be more careful in making their electoral 
choices and to understand the role of BPK, the government and the Parliament in the 
democratic process. 
No Month Number of News Items 
1 January 61 
2 February 56 
3 March 92 
4 April  53 
5 May 68 
6 June 69 
7 July 157 
8 August 136 
9 September 59 
10 October 131 
11 November 108 
12 December 84 
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Publication in Corruption and Irregularity Cases 
BPK findings in corruption cases are an interesting subject for discussion in the 
media. Four examples of BPK corruption findings are: (1) corruption over the procurement 
of an army helicopter (M1-17) in the Department of Defense, which was bought from Swift 
Air Company in Russia, which had been closed since 1999 (Indo Pos 8
th
June 2007; Loppies 
2007; Republika 8
th
June 2007; Setyawan 2007; Wilmar 2007); (2) state finances lost 
Rp.28.7 billion 
58
 (US$3,24 million)
59
; (3) the BULOG (Logistic Agency) case where the 
agency accepted illegal funds from commodity procurements with the loss of millions of 
Rupiah; and (4) the case of BLBI (Liquidity Aid of Indonesia Bank), which involved about 
Rp.144 trillion(US$15,8 billion)
60
 for recapitulated banks during the Bank Rush
61
 as a 
result of the economic crises in 1997 (Republika 13
th
 January 2006), and in which 90 per 
cent of the money was accounted for (Kwik Kian Gie 2008). The publications of BPK 
reports and media about corruption provided hard evidence that the Indonesian public 
service used public money for its own purposes rather than carefully and accountably. 
Moreover, at the local level, BPK findings on irregularities of government agencies 
and Parliaments were also published in national and local media. One example was an 
irregularity to a value of Rp.13 billion (US$1.45 million)
62
 in the DKI Province 
government budget of 2004 due to excessive payments made to Members of Parliament and 
                                                             
 
 
58
 In 8
th
 June 2007 US$1=Rp. 9102. 
59
 This was implicated to four public prosecutors, namely, the former Director of Budget Implementation, 
Directorate General of Planning System Defense, Department of Defense; the former Head of the Financial 
Centre, Department of Defense; the former Head of the Treasury Office and State Cash Jakarta VI; and the 
Swift Air and Industrial Supply company in Jakarta; 
60
 In 8
th
 June 2007 US$1=Rp. 9102.  
61
As a result of lack of trust from the customer of bank. 
62
 In 27
th
 June 2004, US$1=Rp. 9416. 
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government projects, and irregularities in expenditure (such as expenditure without proof) 
(Ihsan et al. 2006c; Koran Tempo 4 January 2006; Rakyat Merdeka 6
th
 January 2006; Suara 
Pembaharuan 16
th
 May 2006). In 2004, an irregularity amounting to Rp.3.2 billion 
(US$384,826)
63
 was found regarding the budget of Tangerang City Government and 
Parliament for welfare and health, housing, maintenance and operational costs, and other 
activities to support the head and Members of Parliament (Ihsan and Johansyah 2006b; 
Johansyah 2006a).That same year, the Tangerang Regency Government budget also 
showed irregularities, in this case to the value of Rp.6,1 billion (US$657,327)
64
(Ihsan and 
Cipta 2006a; Johansyah 2006b). Another example was an irregularity of Rp.3.3 billion 
(US$355,603)
65
 in the 2004 budget of Bekasi City government and Parliament budget for 
2004 (Wahyuni 2006b) and indicating irregularities and corruption valued at Rp.7.6 billion 
(US$818,655)
66
 in the 2004 budget of West Java Province (Indo Pos 14
th
 March 2006). A 
final example was regards the2004 budget of Kupang City where a loss in state finances 
valued at Rp.2.55 billion (US$284,784)
67
 occurred when the money was wrongly used by 
Members of the regional Parliament (Pukan 2006).  
BPK audit findings of SOEs were also published in the media. For example, 
findings regarding the National Electricity Company (PLN) were published. One was an 
indication of corruption in the funding bonus (tantiem
68
) valued at Rp.4.34 billion 
(US$457,034)
69
, which can only be distributed if the company has made a profit and in this 
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 In 16
th
 December 2004, US$1=Rp. 9280. 
64
 In 16
th
 December 2004, US$1=Rp. 9280. 
65
 In 16
th
 December 2004, US$1=Rp. 9280. 
66
 In 16
th
 December 2004, US$1=Rp. 9280. 
67
 In 16
th
 December 2004, US$1=Rp. 9280. 
68
Bonus that is given by profit companies at the end of the year to their executives and employees. 
69
 The following exchange rates as of 13
th
 June 2006, US$1=Rp. 9496. 
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case PLN made a loss (Din 2006; Rakyat Merdeka 16
th
 January 2006; Republika 
14
th
January 2006). The other case regarded procurement for a truck at Borang gas power 
electricity station in South Sumatera that was bought for Rp.122.43 billion(US$12.9 
million), far above the normal price (Yasin 2006).Another audit related to a proposal from 
PLN to increase electricity rates and reduce subsidies (Supriyanto 2006a; Jakarta Post 
10
th
March 2006; Jakarta Post 11
th
March 2006).  
In addition, Mangku (2006b) published BPK findings regarding corruption and 
irregularities involving some SOEs, as follows: 
(1)The National Telecommunication Company (PT. Telkom) case with indications 
of trillions of Rupiahs corruption (Rakyat Merdeka 2
nd
 December 2006a);  
(2) irregularities in using the investment fund account or RDI
70
 outside their proper 
business with a total value of Rp.6,2 trillion (US$ 652.9 million), such as PT Rajawali 
Nusantara Indonesia (RNI) valued at Rp.1,6 trillion (US$ 168.5 million), PT. Dirgantara 
Indonesia valued at Rp.7,3 billion ( US$ 768,745) plus the sub loan agreement with the 
government valued at Rp.1,06 trillion (US$ 111.6 million), and PT. Djakarta Lloyd valued 
at Rp.122,6 billion (US$12.9 million);  
(3) a finding that involved opinions from BPK on SOE financial statements
71
 with 
53 per cent (81 SOEs) judged as very healthy or healthy, 34 per cent (53 SOEs) as not 
healthy; and 13 per cent (20 SOEs) which were unable to be judged (disclaimer), because 
                                                             
 
 
70
 Investment Funding Account or Rekening Dana Investasi (RDI) refers to state loans that were given for state 
owned enterprises. State loans for RDI came from foreign debts with low interest. 
71
There are 154 SOEs in Indonesia. 
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they did not submit financial statements to BPK and the auditors doubted the truth of the 
information and data presented in their financial statements.  
(4) Irregularities and Non-Performing Loans (NPL) of state-owned bank: (a) 97 
irregularities were found and 4.6 per cent of NPL to a value of Rp.2,628 trillion 
(US$276,758 million) state loss at BNI‘46 (Evy 2006; Indo Pos 12thJanuary 2006; 
Republika 13
th
January 2006; Jakarta Post 12
th
January 2006; Wahyuni 2006a; Wahyuni 
2006b); (b) 23.4 per cent NPL of Mandiri Bank which was much higher than normal NPL 
(maximum 5 per cent) (Republika 13
th
January 2006). 
All this evidence reveals the serious determination of BPK to publish various audit 
findings to the public. BPK‘s openness has raised the level of public trust in its 
performance of to safeguard state finances. Media seemed to be more interested in 
reporting information related to irregularities or corruption scandals, rather than public 
sector efforts to improve efficiency, effectiveness and overall performance. The publication 
of audit reports enables the public to be aware of how state finances have been used and to 
evaluate the performance of public sector entities in upholding their public accountability.  
Survey Results and Comments on the Publication of Audit Reports 
During the survey, auditors and auditees were asked whether they agreed that BPK 
had published its audit reports. Figure 5.4 (below) shows that positive responses dominated, 
with 44 per cent ‗agreeing‘ and 30 per cent ‗strongly agreeing‘. An auditor from BPK 
stated that, ―Publication of BPK reports is to enhance the state finance system in Indonesia 
which has been lacking in transparency‖. Moreover, the Chairman of BPK stated in a 
national magazine (Bisnis Indonesia 12
th
March 2007):  
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The lack of transparency in the state finances system caused the public to be reluctant 
to pay tax and to buy state debt letters (SUN). The lack of transparency of the state 
financial system can also drive suspicion and conflict between the regional, ethnic, 
and religious groups in this heterogeneous country. 
This statement implied that the financial system in government was not managed 
professionally. As argued by Perkasa (2009: 107), much of the regional state budgets were 
irresponsibly used for personal interests. He also provides evidence of traditional financial 
management by the Papua government in spending public money without bills or signatures 
from the receiver. The head of BPK emphasised that transparency of public funds can 
provide information for the public, including: taxpayers and domestic/foreign investors. 
Moreover, regional governments, whichcontribute significantly their natural resources for 
national budget revenues, ensure all revenues were managed in accountable manner by the 
central government. Transparency builds public and regional government trust that their 
resources are managed accountably.  
The positive response from auditors and auditees about the publication of BPK 
reports and findings indicates transparency in the public sector and are shown in Figure 5.4 
(below). 
Figure 5.4 Survey Results of ‘BPK Published Its Audit Reports’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007. 
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However, 32 per cent of auditees responded ‗neutral‘ and 18 per cent ‗disagreed‘ 
that BPK had published audit reports. An auditee observed, ―BPK audit reports were not 
published transparently.‖ This criticism was disputed by a BPK who said, ―Some 
information about audit findings were not published on the orders of the Parliament in 
consideration of its bad impact on the public‖. Another auditor also referred to the practice 
of not publishing all findings in the reports at the request of auditees. This means that even 
though BPK has published its findings, there was still a degree of dissatisfaction with audit 
publications due to unreported findings, meaning there was a failure to uncover the real 
condition of auditee performance in order to protect them from public pressure. A draftLaw 
on State Confidential Information is currently being discussed in Parliament
72
 and aims to 
stipulate what information can be made public. 
In addition, a Member of Parliament from Commission VI stated that ―BPK printed 
reports were not widely available and were difficult to find‖. BPK submits its audit reports 
to Parliament, after which the secretariat of each commission sends the reports to individual 
Members according to their tasks and functions. Currently, BPK is improving its capacity 
to publish audit reports on its website. However, a BPK auditor argued that some Members 
of Parliament, in particular at the regional level, were not familiar with accessing 
information from the internet and were not favoring this approach. Sudibjo (2009a: 20) 
argued about the lack of quality and integrity of Members of Parliament at the central level 
during 2004-2009, with indications of many absencein meetings and hearings. He also 
stated that he found about 60 per cent of the Members of Parliament lack of qualification as 
state officials, based on educational backgrounds, ability to operate computer, 
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 This is based on information received from a BPK auditor on 19
th
 November 2007.  
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communications with email and using internet. The worse condition was for the 
qualification of Members of regional Parliaments, as the lack of information system 
resources and infrastructure in some regional areas, than at the central level. 
This study also recorded comments from auditees that indicated their unwillingness 
for BPK to publish audit findings in particular circumstances:  
 “I prefer audit findings not to be published when the followup has not been 
finished. But audit findings which have been followed up can be reported to the 
public and presented on the official website”(Interview A12). 
 “To some extent, auditees mind if BPK’s audit findings are published and made 
available to the public. I hope BPK auditors will consider this matter”(Interview 
A2). 
These comments could be interpreted as implying that some auditees lack transparency and 
accountability to the public in their requests for audit findings and the results for their 
organisation to not be published. This was similar to past practicewhen audit findings were 
never published. As the Chairman of BPK stated in a national newspaper, Suara Karya, 
―BPK audit reports during the situation in the New Order Era could not be described as the 
real condition of state finances which were in a serious condition, with KKN (corruption, 
collusion and nepotism)‖ (Handayani 12thJanuary 2006). Backman (2008: 207-216) 
forecasted the economic condition in Indonesia as having no future if the Indonesian 
government does not reduce KKN in the public sector. These statements indicate that 
transparency is based on the freedom to get information related to the public interest.  
A Member of BPK (Interview B1) with extensive experience of interacting with 
high government officials stated that, ―The accountability culture of government officials in 
Indonesia is very low. High officials think that they know everything, so they are reluctant 
to be criticised and reveal their mistakes‖. These comments reflect the lack of transparency 
and accountability of leaders or managers in the public sector. The paternalistic culture of 
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the Indonesian political apparatus was still strong. Many officials in the public sector could 
not criticise their leaders. This is still happening in Jayawijaya District, where a strong 
practice of client-patron relations between staff and their leaders caused blood relationship 
and brotherhood (Mutiarin, 2009: 130). As a result, when the leader resigned, all staff under 
the former leader was replaced with the new leader‘s people. This situation has worsened 
the performance of bureaucracy in Indonesia. BPK found it difficult to change auditees‘ 
mind-set to being more transparent and accountable in managing public finances and 
providing better performance and services.  
Another auditee commented on the possible misuse of BPK audit reports. He said 
that publishing BPK audit results sometimes had a negative effect on auditees, because it 
can lead to negative perceptions from Indonesian community. In addition, a writer from a 
local newspaper provided an article about the publication of some audit reports that were 
misused for political interests (LM Sinaga 11
th 
March 2006). Both media and non 
government organisations have sometimes used BPK audit findings and reports on sensitive 
cases (such as corruption and other criminal cases) as political tools. For example, cases of 
corruption or misuse of state funds by certain political high officials can be used by 
political opponents to bring down of the officials. This situation indicates that 
democratisation in Indonesia is less than ideal. Most Members of Parliament were 
motivated by money instead of working as representatives of the Indonesian people 
(Sudibjo 2009a: 19). 
There has also been disagreement about publishing BPK audit reports or audit 
findings by auditees in state-owned bank. BPK‘s Chairman stated to a reporter of a national 
newspaper (Riza 2006), ―There is a campaign by politicians, authorities or certain 
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employees to stop BPK reporting its audit results to the public‖. In the case of non-
performing loans and irregularities of the Indonesia State Bank (BNI‘46), BPK published 
the relevant audit results on its website, including findings about debts and bad creditors of 
some state-owned bank. These publications have been criticised by bankers who feel afraid 
that the BPK publications can cause a lack of trust from their customers. Djunaedi in Suara 
Karya newspaper (27
th 
April 2006) commented that the publication of audit findings in 
relation to these national banks caused a low credit expansion of some national banks, a 
slower economic recovery and a reduction in the general rate of fiscal expansion. This 
means that BPK publications on non-performing national banks potentially impact the 
behavior of bank customers. 
The Chairman of BPK argued strongly with bankers‘ views as follows (Nasution 
2007):  
BPK has to provide its audit results to the public, because public finances are used by 
the government to recover the national banking conditions that are known to have 
been misused and abused. As a consequence, the banking risks would be returned to 
the public.  
This statement implies that transparency through BPK publications on public sector 
performance is important for transparency of public funds, although there might be some 
complaints about BPK findings regarding the poor performance of national banks.  
Some confidential information is related to state defense (such as guns, technology 
inventions, supplies), international relations (such as results of analysis by diplomats in 
bilateral issues, policy in politics, economics, and accreditation materials), law enforcement 
process (such as investigations by police or other law enforcers), national economic 
survival (in the field of monetary, fiscal, industrial and trade economics), the state coding 
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system, the state intelligence system, and state vital assets (such as military installations, 
training areas, and arms manufacturers)
73
.  
To summarise, BPK audit reports are now published to provide the public with 
information on the performance of government and how government funds are spent. A 
public awareness program has been conducted to raise public understanding of BPK‘s roles 
and functions in promoting participation in effective public sector auditing. The survey of 
this research found that respondents agreed that BPK audit reports have been published. 
However, some respondents, including politicians and auditees, were unhappy with the 
publication of BPK audit findings. Auditees covered up their casesand tried to stop BPK 
from publishing information about them. They argued that information in BPK reports 
could provide a bad impact on their organisations, for example, information on non-
performing loans (NPL) and irregularities in national banks that made customers distrustful 
and encouraged them to move to foreign banks.  
5.4.2 Realistic Audit Recommendations 
A realistic audit recommendation is related to acting on information in audit reports. 
Realistic recommendation can be defined as recommendations from auditors that are 
concrete and applicable to improve performance in the management and administration of 
auditees. Audit recommendations are provided in performance audits to improve economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness in managing audited entities‘ resources.  
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 This is based on Article 4 of the draft Law on State Confidential (GOI 2007a). 
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Regulations and Rules for Realistic Audit Recommendations 
The new auditing state finances standard (BPK RI 2007g: 88) requires auditors to 
convey recommendations on corrective measures to improve performance in problem areas 
of public sector agencies (Paragraph 24). Based on this standard, audit recommendations 
are to provide potential corrections, to improve compliance with laws and regulations, and 
to encourage follow up of previous recommendations that were not done. In providing 
constructive and realistic recommendations, the BPK standard provides guidelines that are: 
(i) aimed at problem solving, (ii) oriented to real and specific actions, (iii) aimed at 
authorities to take action, (iii) focused on concrete solutions, and (iv)aimed at reasonable 
expenses/costs. 
Therefore, the new audit standard (2007) provides direction for recommendations 
topromote continuous improvement and performance accountability of the public sector 
focused on efficiency, quality and results. 
Survey Results on Realistic Audit Recommendations 
This section discusses respondents‘ perceptions about whether or not BPK auditors 
provided realistic recommendations. Figure 5.5 (below) shows the survey results indicated 
mainly positive responses. Sixty per cent of BPK auditors ‗agreed‘ and 3 per cent ‗strongly 
agreed‘, while for auditees 52 per cent ‗agreed‘ and 4 per cent ‗strongly agreed‘. However, 
the results also revealed ‗neutral‘ responses with this category selected by 54 percent of 
Members of Parliament, 36 per cent of auditors and 33 per cent of auditees. Moreover, 
‗disagree‘ was selected by 19 per cent of the Members of Parliament, 1 per cent of auditors 
and 11 per cent of auditees.  
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Figure 5.5 Survey Results of ‘BPK Auditors Provide Realistic Recommendations’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007. 
 
Some of the negative views of the auditees from government entities were 
expressed as follows:  
 “The audit findings and recommendations of BPK were the same every time” 
(19/3/2007). 
 “Not all the audit recommendations were possible for implementation” 
(19/12/2006). 
 “Not all the auditors’ recommendations could be implemented; we need 
recommendations to solve our organisation’s problems” (10/01/2007). 
 “Not all BPK’s recommendations were easy to implement” (4/2/2007). 
 “Some recommendations from BPK were not easy to implement or were not clear. 
We needed more explanations from BPK” (14/2/2007). 
 “Not all the audit reports of BPK could be followed up soon, because we need a 
long process in the case of corruption” (28/02/2007). 
 “Auditors only provided their findings as the problems, without explained what 
causes, how the effect and how to solve the problems” (20/08/2009). 
These excerpts indicate three points. Firstly, audit recommendations were not followed up 
by auditeesas the same recommendations were again suggested in subsequent reports. 
Secondly, auditor recommendations were not applicable. Thirdly, audit recommendations 
were not oriented to realistic actions. These criticisms imply that auditors were unable to 
provide constructive and realistic recommendations. This indicates a lack of expertise and 
professionalism in providing recommendations as required by the audit standard.  
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A high official from BPK argued that a lack of honesty and accountability in 
providing public services and public performance made audit recommendations more 
difficult to implement (Interview B2). Moreover, a senior BPK auditor with more than 10-
years of auditing experience argued the following (Interview B3): 
BPK‘s findings were informed to auditees without potential recommendations. They 
contain only facts, criteria, causes and effects. After we get comments from auditees 
on these findings, the audit team provides a draft of audit reports including 
recommendations to be discussed with their supervisor and Board of Members. After 
that, the final audit reports and recommendations are published.  
This excerpt indicates that auditors analyse the phenomenon and problems with auditees 
before providing audit reports in order to provide constructive and realistic 
recommendations. In addition, an auditor from ‗a BPK regional office‘ (Interview B21) 
explained as follows:  
Before providing audit recommendations, there was no communication between 
auditors and auditees. BPK‘s audit recommendations were made after auditors 
completed auditing and came back to BPK‘s office. Audit results were discussed with 
team Members, supervisors and BPK‘s high officials. After that, final audit reports 
were submitted to Parliament and auditees. Audit recommendations were made only 
to reduce the ‗causes‘ of the organisation‘s problems but not to address the real 
causes of problems. Lack of auditors‘ ability to provide realistic recommendations 
affected the difficulty of auditees in implementing them.  
This statement confirmed the process of providing recommendations as stated by the prior 
informant. Besides, the auditor acknowledged the incompetence of BPK auditors in 
providing constructive recommendations that are easily and practical for auditees to carry 
out. 
To summarise, realistic and constructive audit recommendations to improve public 
administration and performance are essential for effective audit reports. The research 
revealed that auditees found difficulties in following up audit reports and recommendations. 
Moreover, there was lack of responsiveness of auditees to make changes for improvement 
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based on auditors‘ recommendations. Auditees found that auditors could not provide 
realistic recommendations that could be implemented in the short or medium termby 
auditees. As a result, BPK recommendations do not change from year to year. 
5.4.3 Following up Audit Findings and Recommendations 
Following up audit reports is the third criterion related to acting on information in 
audit reports. Audit reports become largely worthless without any follow-up from Members 
of Parliament, auditeesand authorised investigators.  
Laws and Regulations for Following up Audit Reports 
Requirements for Members of Legislative institutions to follow up on BPK reports 
is stipulated by Article 23E of the third amendment of the Constitution (GOI 2006c: 62), 
the Audit Law (GOI 2004b) and the BPK Law (GOI 2006b) and are part of Parliament‘s 
functions for budgeting and controlling public sector accountability. These Members are 
expected to follow up BPK reports by reviewing the reports and acting within theirauthority 
to force the government in following up BPK recommendations. Members have the right to 
ask for government accountability in the use of resources and in performing public services. 
The responsibility of auditees in responding to audit reports is stipulated in Article 
20 of the Audit Law (GOI 2004b). Responses and clarification from auditees are required 
to be submitted not more than 60 days after the reports are accepted. Followup by 
government shall be notified in writing to BPK by the President (for central 
government),by Governors (for provincial governments), by Mayors (for city 
governments)and by Regents (for district governments).  
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In regard to enforcing officials to carry out their responsibilities in following up 
audit findings and recommendations, Article 20, Paragraph 5 of the Audit Law (GOI 
2004b) stipulates administrative sanctions for any officials who do not comply with this 
law in accordance with employment regulations. Furthermore, Article 26 of this law (GOI 
2004b) stipulates a criminal sanction of imprisonment for at least 1.5 years and/or a 
maximum fine of Rp.500 million(US$55,194
74
) for infringements. 
The mandate to follow up findings of criminal activities in audit reports is stipulated 
in Article 8, Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Law on BPK (2006). All evidence of crime found in 
audit reports should be reported to the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions 
of laws and regulations no later than a month after its acknowledgement. The audit reports 
are to be used as the basis of investigation by the authorised investigator in accordance with 
laws and regulations. Authorised investigators include the police, the Attorney General‘s 
Office and the Commission of Corruption Eradication (KPK). BPK has a responsibility to 
monitor follow-up actions from audited entities and to provide written reportsmonitoring 
the results of this to Parliament and the government. On the other hand, the Executive 
should report their follow up results to BPK in writing.  
These regulations can be used to bring pressure on Parliament, the government and 
on the authorised investigators to follow up audit reports and findings. Moreover, legal 
accountability applies in these regulations to ensure compliance with the law. 
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Followup on BPK Reports before and after Audit Reform 
Before audit reform (pre 2001), the follow-up procedure for audit reports was 
divided into three stages (Marsidi 2002: 14). Firstly, one month after receiving audit 
reports, the Ministers had to respond to audit findings, conclusions and recommendations 
from BPK. Secondly, if government agencies did not respond to audit reports, BPK would 
report them to the President. Finally, if this did not work, the case was sent to Parliament 
for a final decision. Nonetheless, the application of these procedures was unsuccessful 
because the government controlled the Parliament and political parties and ensured they 
supported the President‘s purposes. There were no external controls and government 
accountability was lacking.  
After audit reform (2002-2006), data indicates that government faced serious 
problems in following up BPK reports. National daily newspapers (Sam 2006, Susapto 
2006 and Suara Pembaharuan 16 May 2006) revealed that the level of followup of BPK 
audit reports was very low. From 2003 to 2005, 16,433 cases regarding he misuse of state 
finances to a value of Rp.132.49 trillion (US$146.69 million), were found by BPK. 
However, only 6,920 cases (42 per cent) were followed up, while the rest, valued at 
Rp.34.22 trillion (US$ 61.11 million), were not addressed by government.  
In addition, significant BPK findings for various government procurement 
projectsincluded inefficiencies and losses of state finances up to a value of Rp.253.75 
billion were not followed up. Another Rp.1.5 trillion in questionable debt reductions and 
bad loans involving a number of dissolved bankswere also not followed up (Hudiono 
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17
th
May 2006). Moreover, in semester 1 of 2006, followup of BPK audit reports was only 
36.15 per cent
75
.  
Table 5-2 Followup of Cases and their Value (in Billion Rupiahs) of State Losses during 2005-
2006. 
Entities State Losses  FollowedUp Not Followed Up 
 
Source: Adapted from: Kompas, 6thJanuary 2007. ‘Tata Pemerintahan: BPK segera terbitkan standar 
pemeriksaan’ (State administration: BPK will launch auditing standards soon), Jakarta. 
 
Table 5.2(above) summarises the number of cases and the value of state losses 
revealed by BPK audit findings in 2005 and semester I of 2006 and indicates a very low 
follow-up rate (only 10.8 per cent of cases in 2005 and 1.51 per cent in 2006). Although 
few in number, the followup of state losses contributed about Rp.2.597 billion in 2005 and 
Rp.199.5 billion in 2006 to the state treasury.  
BPK auditors complained that there was a lack of attention by auditees to follow up 
audit reports:  
 “We need auditees to pay more attention to following up BPK audit reports” (an 
auditor of regional government, 15/3/2007). 
 “Many audit reports and recommendations from BPK had not been followed up 
by auditees” (several auditors, March-August 2007).  
 “Most government entities still lack willingness to change the bureaucracy” 
(several auditors, March-August 2007). 
                                                             
 
 
75This information was presented by Tortama IV of BPK in the auditorium of BPK, Jakarta, on 
6thDecember 2006. 
 Cases Value Cases Value Cases Value 
Central Government 701 7,713 104 2,507 597 5,205 
Regional Government 2,330 1,352 226 89 2,104 1,263 
SOEs 23 4,762 - - 23 4,762 
Total Year 2005 3,054 13,827  330 2,597 2,724 11,230 
Central Government 165 16,056 18 143 147 15,913 
Regional Government 1,530 1,869 3 0.3 1,527 1,868 
SOEs 26l 1,321 5 56.2 21 1,265 
Total Sem. I 2006 1,721 19,246 26 199.5 1,695 19,046 
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These quotations are in line with statements made by the Chairman of BPK, who was 
strongly critical about audit findings and recommendations that had not been followed up. 
He also emphasised monitoring results which indicated a low responsefrom government to 
follow up audit findings
76
. Moreover, he made the following complaint about the lack of 
follow up of BPK findings in front of Lampung local government officials, representing 32 
entities (one province, 11 districts and cities, three SOEs and 18 ROEs)
77
: 
About 173 audit findings with a value of Rp.1.5 trillion (44.94 per cent) were 
followed up, however, there were still 212 findings with a value of Rp.1.76 trillion 
(55.06 per cent) which had not been followed up. The low rate of accomplishment of 
follow-up audit reports in Lampung has to be improved. I hope the heads of regional 
government, regional Parliaments, and law enforcers will pay more attention to the 
follow up of audit reports (Lampung Post 9
th
March 2007). 
This statement indicates a low levelof follow up of audit reports (less than 50 per cent) in 
Lampung Province, which was caused by lack of responsiveness of its leaders and senior 
staff (heads of departments, bureaus and agencies within the civil service) to provide 
substantial changes in the era of public sector reform. Nevertheless, BPK has no authority 
to punish auditees who do not follow up audit reports. In this case, the Governor of 
Lampung claimed that he had followedup all BPK‘s audit findings (Lampung Post 
10
th
March 2007) and stated, ―We are determined to bring to reality Lampung as a model of 
good government management of state finances‖. His statement adduced his commitment 
to follow up BPK findings in order to be an institution that is accountable in managing 
public finances and complying with laws and regulations.  
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 The researcher attended this event at the Parliament Nusantara Building I, Jakarta, on 15
th
 May 2006.  
77
 This was stated during the submission of the summary of BPK‘s audit findings, semester I of 2006 for 
Lampung Province on 8
th
 March 2007.  
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The Head of Auditama IV (Tortama IV) 
78
 emphasised the importance of following 
up audit reports and the responsibility of BPK to monitor this:  
No matter how many audit findings and how actively BPK audits state finances, 
without significant follow-up from audited entities, it will be difficult to provide 
better government performance. As mandated by the law, government officials are 
required to follow up audit reports. BPK examines government‘s financial statements 
and performance, and then writes this down in audit reports. BPK has the 
responsibility to monitor followup of its audit reports then report the results to 
Parliament. BPK cannot prosecute for any committed crime. 
This statement emphasises how important it is that audit reports are followed up. The Law 
requires auditees to follow up BPK.  
However, based on monitoring data, Table 5.3 (below) shows the significant 
numbers of audit finding cases which finished or still under process or had not been 
followed-up 2008. Data indicates significant BPK findings on the inefficiency of state 
expenditure in the public sector. 
Table 5-3 Follow up of BPK Audit Findings (numbers and value of cases) at the Central 
and Local Government and SOEs in 2008 
Source: Processed from website BPK RI (www.bpk.go.id accessed on 13thMarch 2009). 
 
                                                             
 
 
78
This was presented by a BPK senior official on Sosialisasion 6
th
 December 2006 in the BPK auditorium, 
Jakarta. 
Institution Total  Status Completed  
Finished Under Process No Follow up 
Central 
Government 
13,794 cases 7,062 cases 
(23.3%) 
Rp. 52 trillion 
3,130 cases 
(48.52%) 
Rp. 108.31 trillion 
3,602 cases 
(28.18%) 
Rp. 62.91 trillion 
Local 
Government 
76,733 cases 29,399 cases 
(24.16%) 
Rp.100.3 trillion 
13,588 cases 
(44.03%) 
Rp. 182.75 trillion 
33,746 cases 
(31.81%) 
Rp. 132.04 trillion 
SOEs 2,954 cases 1,000 cases 
(50.75%) 
Rp. 63.82 trillion 
1,292 cases 
(41.28%) 
Rp. 51.92 trillion 
662 cases 
(7.97%) 
Rp. 10.02 trillion 
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Table 5.3 shows a significant number of cases with huge valued of money (totally 
Rp. 204.97 trillion), were not followed by auditees, at both the central and regional 
government, and SOEs. It seems that the process of following up audit findings and 
recommendations were very slow. For instance, of about 2954 cases relating to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), follow up of findings for 662 were not completed. Almost 25 per cent 
of BPK reports were followed up by central and local governments and more than 50 per 
cent by SOEs. This contributed more than Rp. 216 trillion to the state treasury.The most 
inefficiency was in local government, central government and SOEs respectively.  
An official of BPK (Interview B9) argued that BPK only has the responsibility to 
monitor the follow-up of audit reports to auditees and investigators. This is his 
argumentation:  
BPK auditors and officials monitor followup of audit reports. The monitoring 
includes audited entities and law enforcers (such as police and the Attorney General). 
Monitoring results are reported to Parliament and authorised investigators for 
indications of crime and corruption.  
This excerpt indicates that BPK monitors the follow up of audit reports from public sector 
agencies and from investigators for audit findings that indicate criminal activity. The 
monitoring results are sent to Members of Parliament to be reviewed and followed up. 
Survey Results and Comments on the Following up of BPK Reports 
Respondents from government, ROEs, SOEs, and Members of Parliament were 
asked their perceptions on the follow up of BPK audit reports. Figure 5.6 (below) shows the 
survey results. The positive responses obtained from auditors included 38 per cent who 
responded ‗agree‘ and 23 per cent who responded ‗strongly agree‘, while from Members of 
the Legislature, only 18 per cent responded ‗agreed‘. From auditees, 53 per cent responded 
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‗agree‘ and 20 per cent responded ‗strongly agree‘.  The highest percentage of positive 
responses came from auditees followed by auditors while the smallest percentage of 
positive responses came from Legislative respondents.  
Figure 5.6 Survey Results of ‘BPK Audit Reports are Followed up’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007. 
 
The positive response of the survey results is supported by comments from auditees 
and Members of Parliament as follows:  
 “An audit report of BPK was followed up by auditees gradually” (Interview A6, an 
auditee from the Ministry of Education). 
 “All audit findings were necessary to be followed up and must be followed up” 
(Interview A4, an auditee from the national oil company Pertamina). 
 “At the Ministry of National Education, follow-up of BPK audit reports is the 
priority” (Interview A7, an auditee from the Ministry of National Education). 
 “Follow-up of BPK audit reports is the real output. We also concentrated on the 
benefit of these audit reports. However, we found it’s hard to complete all the 
requirements from auditors” (Interview A17, an auditee from Centre of Education 
and Training for Apparatus).  
 “Parliament has followed up BPK audit reports by calling the officials and asking 
for their followup on BPK’s audit findings. They argued that it was only 
administrative problems and it will take time to follow up the problems” 
(Interview C8, a Member of Parliament from Commission V of PKB fraction). 
 “We always follow up the BPK audit reports” (Interview C11, a Member of 
Parliament from Commission I of Golkar faction). 
These excerpts indicate a good level of responsiveness from auditees and Members of 
Parliament in following up BPK audit reports. Their comments also imply the moral 
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accountability of individuals and organisations to followup BPK reports for providing 
better performance and services to the public. 
There were also negative and neutral responses in the survey results. For the 
auditors‘ group, 29 per cent gave a ‗neutral‘ response and 10 per cent ‗disagreed‘. Among 
the Legislature Members, 73 per cent gave a ‗neutral‘ response and 9 per cent ‗disagreed‘, 
while for the auditees‘ group, 17 per cent responded ‗neutral‘ and 10 per cent ‗disagreed‘. 
This indicated that almost three-quarters of the Legislature group responded that they did 
not believe or were doubtful about the follow up of BPK audit reports. This is supported by 
comments fromMembers of Parliament and an auditee: 
 “Some BPK audit reports were followed up (such as the cases of SOEs, state-
owned  bank and the Central Bank of Indonesia). However, some have not been 
followed up yet, such as the case of the Ministry of Finance” (Interview C6, a 
Member of Parliament from Commission IX of PAN faction). 
 “To overcome the problems, follow-up of audit findings and recommendations 
needs Reformation in the bureaucracy” (Interview C8, a Member of Parliament 
from Commission XI of PKB faction). 
 “Only a few of the BPK audit reports were followed up. Some entities said it was 
only an administrative problem and it needs Reformation of the bureaucracy”. 
(Interview C4, a Member of Parliament from Commission I of Golkar faction). 
 “BPK audit reports could not be followed up. These audit reports and data 
findings from BPK were not enough evidence and further processing was needed” 
(Interview C1, a Member of Parliament from Commission II of PAN faction). 
 “None of BPK audit reports were followed up completely at Commission VI. It was 
because information from BPK was still biased, such as the case of SOEs (the 
National Oil Company or Pertamina and Jamsostek). Further auditing is needed” 
(Interview C3, a Member of Parliament from Commission VI of PAN faction). 
 “Not all BPK’s audit results could be followed up at once, because we need a long 
process in the case of corruption” (Interview A7, an auditee from Ministry of 
National Education). 
All these statements indicate three problems faced by Members and auditees in following 
up BPK reports, namely (1) the lack of capacity, capability and commitment of public 
sector agencies in reforming their institutions, (2) BPK reports were still too recent to be 
followed up, and (3) the practice of corruption is rooted in the Indonesian public sector and 
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is difficult to eradicate in the short term. These problems also indicate the auditor‘s lack of 
capability to provide realistic and constructive recommendations.  
Hence, auditees argued that following up BPK audit reports was not easy and may 
require a long-term process. A Member of Parliament provided an anecdote to explain that 
if BPK conducted audits, those were only a ‗yellow light‘, but if the Commission of 
Corruption Eradication (KPK) conducted audits that was a ‗red light‘ (Suara Pembaharuan 
16
th
May 2006). This statement illustrates the difference responses of auditees to BPK and 
KPK findings. KPK results that indicate corruption cases received more attention than 
BPK‘s, which only uncovered cases related to public administration including public 
financial losses. For instance, BPK audit findings for cases related findings ‗mark-up‘or 
raise prices of public goods and services from the market price
79
, were not followed up for 
several years. Auditees could not return because they said this money has gone. However, 
there were no sanctions from auditees‘ internal management for such non-compliance 
(Interview A5, an auditee from Ministry of Home Affair). This example indicates that the 
Executive in the Ministry Home Affair did not follow up audit reports of BPK seriously. 
In the case of regional government, two Members from regional Parliaments argued 
as follows: 
 “Regional Parliament could not follow up the audit report, only the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, which has the power to push the regional government officials to 
follow up BPK audit findings” (Interview C10, a Member of Regional Parliament 
from West Java Province). 
 “Based on the Law Number 32 and Law Number 33 of Year 2004, the authority of 
regional Parliament is only to give strategic notes about performance to the 
Governor. It is the Minister of Internal Affairs who should follow up BPK reports 
and push the regional government to follow up the audit findings” (Interview C9, 
a Member of Regional Parliament from Kuningan City). 
                                                             
 
 
79
 Auditees have to return the difference in the price is raised and market price. 
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These excerpts indicate the inability of Members of regional Parliament to push the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs to improve the performance of regional government personnel 
and institutions in following up audit reports. This might be due to the ‗political 
psychology‘ of the relationship between the Executive and Legislature. He/she also stated 
as follows: 
The followup of BPK audit findings depends on the bravery of the Parliament as the 
institution that has the right to control the Executive and the Law Enforcers to follow 
up these findings. The relationship of the Executive and the Legislature cannot work 
in the condition of tight control. In some cases, some of the Executive were protected 
by the Legislature. For instance, the Members came from the PDIP party and the 
cases of audit findings were connected with Ministries led by the PDIP. In this case, 
the Members were difficult reviewing BPK reports. There was ‗political psychology‘ 
between the Executive and the Legislature.  
This statement implies that since Indonesia has become a democratic state, there are 
increasing issues about the relationship between politics and administration. The principle 
of independence for the Members of Parliament seems difficult to implement as conflicts of 
interest become more dominant.  
To summarise, although the mandate for public sector agencies to follow up BPK 
audit reports has been provided in audit regulations, the evidence shows that the rate of 
follow up of BPK findings and reports is still very low. This study revealed that Members 
of Parliament found it difficult to encourage public sector agencies to follow up on BPK 
reports. Public sector agencies were aware of the importance of following up on BPK audit 
findings, but auditees, in the short term, found it hard to follow up and to meet all the data, 
information and recommendations as requested by BPK auditors. 
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5.4.4 Conclusion on the Quality of Information in BPK Reports 
Regarding information in public sector audit reports in Indonesia, this study 
revealed that since audit reform in 2001, the roles and functions of public sector auditing 
have been strengthened. Laws and regulations related to public sector auditing have been 
reformed based on international based practices. Moreover, BPK has improved its internal 
quality processes in reporting audit information. 
The survey results comprised overwhelmingly positive responses on the criteria 
concerned with public sector audit report information, although respondents also expressed 
their dissatisfaction about the information in BPK reports, which undermined the positive 
responses. There are three reasons to explain these varying results. The first reason is in the 
Indonesian bureaucratic culture, there is excessive loyalty to colleagues and seniors with 
the same work organisation /corps (Hoadley 2006:121). As a result, opinion of bad or poor 
conditions of their own organisation or colleagues is difficult.The second reason is that the 
questionnaires may lead to different perceptions for respondents. Further explanations for 
respondents during interviews enabled a better understanding of, and answer to, the 
questionsraised by the researcher. The respondents also felt more comfortable with 
providing further explanation of what they really felt during interviews rather than in 
formal questionnaires. A personal approach to the respondents can help them to express 
their pessimism or disappointment more clearly and openly. Another explanation is that 
respondents who filled in the questionnaires were mostly low and middle managers, and 
auditors. They may have had difficulty in being frank on the negatives or weaknesses of an 
audit report, feeling that it may impact adversely on their position. Personal interviews 
encourage respondents to be more frank than impersonal surveys (Cohen et al. 2000: 276, 
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Patton 2002: 567). Face-to-face interviews provided more open and honest explanations 
from respondents in this study than those from the survey questionnaires. The statements 
from respondents and the media also add further balance to this study. Therefore, although 
negative responses or even neutral responses to the survey only constitute a small 
percentage of those surveyed and interviewed, they cannot be ignored. More reliable 
findings can be drawn from the comments made during the interviews.  
This study revealed that BPK has made significant improvements to the content of 
information in audit reports during the implementation of its new mandate for examining 
financial reports, including compliance audits and conducting specific purpose audits. The 
content of BPK reports provides information that is open to the public regarding the public 
sector‘s accountability in managing public resources and complying with the rules. 
However, there was significant evidence that BPK still lacks audit scope. BPK still cannot 
audit tax revenues as it is not allowed to access data and information from the Directorate 
General of Taxation Office. For performance audits, BPK is still not fully implementing 
effectively as BPK and auditees are still preparing performance standards, measurement 
and methodology of public sector bodies.  
Although the survey on the quality of information in BPK reports showed 80 per 
cent positive perceptions, the study found dissatisfaction from respondents on the lack of 
strong audit evidence, objectivity and credibility in BPK reports, which potentially reduced 
optimism about the quality of the information in BPK reports. The empirical evidence 
showed that BPK auditors were still afraid to objectively and credibly uncover audit 
findings of public sector agencies, because they did not feel safe. Moreover, auditees and 
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Members of Parliament found that BPK auditors could be bribed. Moreover, BPK auditors 
also found have had bad behaviors that reducing their integrity and independence.  
Communication of information in audit reports mainly had positive comments, with 
more than 73 per cent of respondents indicating that the reports had understandable 
information, were precise and were in an informative format. Forty-six per cent responded 
positive regarding timely reporting of BPK reports. A degree of optimism was seen as a 
result of better formatting with the introduction of summaries in audit reports for the 
Members of Parliament and auditees, and a timeframe for auditing and submission of the 
reports. Since 2005, BPK has reported audit results to the Legislative institutions every 
semester in a timely manner. However, this study revealed a degree of disappointment 
about the lack of clarity with the use of some technical auditing and financial terms in the 
reports. Moreover, in terms of formatting and timely reporting, respondents found that BPK 
audit reports were too thick, too long, too complicated, out of date, and late, all of which 
made stakeholders reluctant to read all the reports. Moreover, the lack of capacity of 
agencies to provide timely financial reporting based on accounting standards caused BPK 
to be unable to submit audit results in a timely manner to the public. Now, BPK does not 
wait for agencies that are late in submitting their financial reports.  
In terms of acting on the information in audit reports, this study revealed significant 
changes in BPK‘s publication of reports through the media and on the BPK website. This 
prompted positive responses in the survey results of 74 per cent. Transparency builds public 
trust that resources are managing accountably. Dissatisfied responses regarding publication 
indicated a lack of auditees‘ accountability and transparency and evidence. Moreover, 
unreported BPK audit findings with security and confidential reasons, and missing audit 
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reports after arriving at high levels of officials at BPK are unacceptable to auditors and the 
public.  
In relation to the realistic nature of BPK audit recommendations, this study found 
that ‗auditors have made an effort to convey constructive and realistic recommendations 
based on audit standards, which was viewed positively by the respondents and informants. 
However, negative views were revealed as well, that BPK recommendations are not 
realistic to the existing conditions of public sector institutions, which resulting in 
difficulties of auditees to follow up BPK reports. Because not followed up, BPK 
recommendations were the same annually. The criticisms imply a lack of capacity of BPK 
auditors to provide constructive and realistic recommendations as required by the audit 
standards. On the other side, a lack of public sector honesty and accountability in providing 
excellent public services and performance made audit recommendations more difficult to 
implement. 
On the following up of audit reports, 73 per cent responded positively that this had 
happened for BPK audit reports. However, in evaluating documentation and media 
publications, the study revealed evidence that there was a low rate of followup. This means 
that the government has failed to follow up BPK audit findings and recommendations due 
to the following reasons: (i) the lack of capacity, capability and commitment within public 
sector agencies to reform their institutions, (ii) BPK reports were still premature to be 
followed up, and (iii) the practice of corruption is rooted in the Indonesian public sector. 
These factors meant that audit reports were not easy to follow up and may require a longer-
term process. 
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Table 5.4(below) summarises the improvements that have been achieved so far in 
public sector auditing in Indonesia. It also contains suggestions for further improvements 
based on the criteria related to quality and content of information, and communication of 
and acting on information in audit reports. The table shows that since the Indonesian public 
sector audit was reformed, BPK has had more power to examine the management and 
accountability of public agencies. Although the roles and functions of BPK are obviously 
much better now than before audit reform, this study reveals that BPK reports still did not 
fully take into account user information needs. 
Chapters Six and Seven evaluate the factors influencing the effectiveness of 
information in BPK audit reports. 
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Table 5-4 Summary of Improvements and Areas for Further Improvementfor Public Sector Audit Reports since Audit Reform 
(2001) 
Criteria Sub criteria Improvements Impediments/Room for improvement 
Quality of 
Information 
Strong audit 
evidence 
information 
 Strengthening power of BPK to access data and information 
from auditees. 
 Sanctions for auditors who misuse data and information from 
auditees. 
 Access taxpayer data and information on tax revenues from tax 
office, and data of SOEs involved in stock markets. 
 Objectivity and 
credibility of 
information 
 
 Strengthening BPK auditor independence and professionalism, 
and review of BPK audits from SAIs from another country. 
 Security, welfare, education and training, rewards and 
punishment for auditors to improve their independence, integrity 
and professionalism in providing objective and credible 
information. 
Content in 
audit reports 
Compliance with 
laws and 
regulations 
 New system of regulations and standards based on best 
practice to be complied. 
 Partly implementing rewards and punishment.  
 Auditors and auditee compliance with laws and regulations. 
 Law enforcement and implementing rewards and punishment 
effectively. 
 Audit scope and 
methodology 
 Requirements to conduct financial, performance and specific 
purpose audits. 
 Auditing of all public bodies. 
 Broader and deeper scope of auditing in line with the complex 
problems in providing public services and improving public 
administration. 
 Public agency ability to provide financial statements based on 
government accounting standards to support BPK in auditing 
financial accountability. 
 Performance measurements, indicators and auditors for 
performance auditing.  
 Audit the taxation revenues and public sector corporate (SOEs 
involved in the stock market). 
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Table 5.4 (Cont) 
Criteria  Sub criteria Improvements  Room for Improvements 
Communication of 
information 
Clear and understandable 
information with informative 
formatting 
 New format for audit reports; emphasising important 
findings with simple and short statements; supported 
with data, figures, various font, colours, good quality 
paper and an interesting cover. 
 A user friendlyreport based on stakeholder needs. 
  
 Provide innovation and creativity in qualified audit 
reports, both performance and content.  
 Publication of audit reports to 
the public 
 All public agencies and Members of Parliament 
receive printed reports. 
 BPK website provides electronic audit reports every 
semester. 
 Unreported confidential information in audit reports. 
 Transparency and public accountability in some public 
bodies. 
Acting on 
information 
Realistic audit 
recommendations 
 Significant effort from auditors to provide 
constructive and realistic audit recommendations.  
 Increasing public accountability of public sector bodies to 
implementing BPK audit recommendations. 
 Auditorcompetency to provide realistic audit 
recommendations. 
 Followup of audit findings 
and recommendations 
 BPK monitors followup of audit findings and 
recommendations by public agencies. 
 Reporting the results of monitoring to the Legislative 
for further actions. 
 Signed joint agreement with the Legislative and 
auditees to encourage followup of the reports. 
 Sanctions for public agencies that do not followup audit 
findings and recommendations.  
 Oversight from Parliament. 
 Seriousness of audited entities to follow up BPK reports. 
 Followup findings that 
indicate criminality and 
corruption 
 Signed joint agreements with authorised investigators 
and PPATK 
 Increased commitment and law enforcement from 
authorised investigators to follow up criminal indications 
in audit reports. 
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Chapter 6  
Factors Influencing the Content and Communication of 
Information in BPK Reports 
After Chapters Four and Five examined the quality of information in Indonesian 
State Audit Board (BPK) reports, Chapters Six and Seven examine the factors influencing 
the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the quality of information that were explained in 
Chapters Four and Five. This chapter evaluates the factors influencing the quality of 
information in terms of its content and communication in BPK audit reports, while Chapter 
Seven focuses on the factors influencing the quality of information in terms of acting on 
BPK audit reports.  
There are three key factors influencing the content and communication of 
information in BPK reports, namely: (1) independence and autonomy, (2) professionalism 
and integrity, and (3) audit resources.  
6.1 Independence and Autonomy of an Audit Institution 
The independence of the audit office from the direction of the Executive 
government, bureaucracy and auditees is the key factor influencing the effectiveness of the 
quality information in public sector audit reports. Without independence, BPK and its 
auditors are unable to provide credible and objective information in audit reports. The 
following section analyses the independence of BPK, including its auditors, budget and 
resources.  
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6.1.1 The Independence of BPK 
This section compares the independence of BPK before audit reform, under the 
original 1945 Constitution, and BPK after audit reform, under the third amendment of the 
1945 Constitution. Moreover, it evaluates the implementation of new policies on audit 
independence that are influencing the content and communication of information in BPK 
audit reports.  
The Independence of the BPK before the Reform 
Before audit reform, Article 23, Paragraph 5 of the ‗sacred‘ (sakti) 1945 
Constitution stipulated the independence of BPK. The desire for BPK to be an independent 
and free audit institution was developed by the ‗founding fathers‘ of the Republic of 
Indonesia at the time of Independence, Soekarno and Hatta. The Member IV of BPK 
(Interview B2) explained that the historical establishment of BPK occurred at the same time 
as the legalisation of the 1945 Constitution on 18
th
August 1945. He emphasised that the 
existence of BPK under the Constitution is a social contract between the Indonesian people 
and the government made at the time the state was formed. This means the existence of 
BPK was mandated by people of the Republic of Indonesia.  
However, despite the government understanding this message of the Constitution it 
did not carry out the mandate as the public expected. The power of the President to 
influence most bureaucratic offices, including BPK, removed the genuine autonomy 
mandated by the Constitution. BPK had no power to be free from the Executive 
government‘s direction and BPK audit reports were tailored to suit the government‘s 
interests. An official of BPK (8
th
December 2006) underlined the government‘s control of 
BPK, because during the authoritarian regime of the New Order, all BPK reports had to be 
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checked with the government, (in this case was the State Secretary Office). The reason was 
for national stability reasons. He said that BPK was only a ―rubber stamp‖ for the 
government. His opinion implies that BPK was firmly under the control of government and 
could not perform independently. The government was not transparent, altering the content 
of audit reports that could damage the government‘s reputation and make the public 
uncomfortable with the government‘s performance. 
During the New Order Era, Indonesia applied guided democracy. In this situation, 
all personnel in the bureaucracy had to be loyal to the President and his interests. The 
Soeharto regime ignored people who gave opposing opinions or open criticism. BPK could 
not scrutinise the accountability of the government, because it had insufficient freedom to 
access all relevant information in public sector agencies. For example, BPK could not 
examine the accountability of government in managing public resources, including natural 
resources (such as coal, crude oil, gold, forest, lead, copper, and natural gas), national 
banks, electricity, telecommunications, transportation and logistics. The monopoly market 
of public goods and services under government authority without control from BPK and the 
Legislature resulted in the absence of ‗checks and balances‘ in state finances. The 
Chairman of BPK explained why BPK lacked independence in the past to a business 
magazine (Eksekutif January 2007:18-23), as follows: 
The Suharto era in the past was an authoritarian regime. No one was brave enough to 
say ‗No‘ at that time or you would be ‗dipetrus‘ (shot mysteriously). In the past, BPK 
was under the control of the government. What was happening had to be permitted by 
the Ministry of Empowerment Apparatus (MENPAN). Control also extended to the 
employees and all the personnel of BPK, because all were public servants. In the past 
there was also control over the budget of BPK. Then all the audit results had to be 
discussed first with the government to prevent the national instability. In the case of 
the objects of the audits, none of the material assets at that time could be audited or 
touched by BPK, including the National Oil Company (Pertamina),the Central Bank 
(theBank of Indonesia), state banking and also BULOG (Logistic Agency). Thus, 
BPK did not disturb national stability. 
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This statement implies that during the authoritarian regime, BPK and its resources were 
under government direction. The government interfered with the independence of auditors, 
including selecting the auditees and sample objects of BPK audits. Soeharto‘s leadership 
was authoritarian and compelled all the bureaucracy to abide with his rules. All state 
companies that provided enough income and strategic benefit for the nation were audited 
by BPKP (as a part of the Executive), instead of by BPK.  
The Independence of BPK after Audit Reform 
Since audit reform, the independence of BPK has been bolstered by the 
Constitutional mandate. BPK is confirmed to be the only independent external body to 
audit state finances in the Republic of Indonesia. The amended Constitution has legally 
embedded BPK as an independent SAI and to have a major function in improving the 
transparency and accountability of the public sector. Furthermore, the Audit Law (2004) 
and the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) stipulate the independence of BPK in terms of its 
budgeting, personnel and other aspects of auditing. Besides, after the audit reform, the 
appointment, tenure, and reappointment ofBoard Members of BPK are also stipulated under 
the Audit Law (2004) and Law on BPK (2006), to maintain BPK‘s independence. 
After gaining independence, BPK has carried out its audit roles and functions to 
help Members of Parliament, as the most prominent client, to improve the accountability 
and transparency of government. The public expects their resources to be managed 
accountably by the government for the prosperity of the people. BPK is improving its 
capability to conduct performance audits in accordance with the Lima Declaration
80
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Congress of INTOSAI in Peru and attended by more than 100 countries. Although the declaration was made 30 
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other international audit standards
81
 to provide advice for public policy. Under the new 
audit legal system, BPK is strengthening its independence to improve government 
transparency and accountability (Aritonang 2005: 4).  
The Head of Parliament
82
argued about the strong willingness of the Indonesian 
people for BPK to be strong and independence audit institution. He believes that if BPK 
conducts its audit functions properly and correctly, government efforts to eliminate 
corruption and reduce poverty. The purpose of the state to achieve the welfare of the 
Indonesian community, according to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, will be 
achieved faster. For this purpose, BPK continues to reform its internal organisation from 
conditional independence to substantial independence. 
Figure 6-1 Perceptions of ‘BPK is an Independent Audit Institution’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007 
 
To further analyse the independence of BPK, this study collected data and 
information from key informants and respondents, including BPK auditors, auditees, and 
Members of Parliament. Figure 6.1 (below) shows the survey results indicated positive 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
years ago, the spirit and the meaning of this declaration are still very important to the system of administration 
and government. 
81INTOSAI, AFROSAI, ASOSAI and BPK‘s audit standards and guidelines. 
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 Keynote spokesman, H.R. Agung Laksono, at the One Day Seminar on Public Sector Audit, on 9
th
 January 
2007, at Jakarta Convention Centre.  
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responses on the independence of BPK. Of the auditees‘ group, 65 per cent ‗agreed‘ and 8 
per cent ‗strongly agreed‘, while from the auditors‘ group, 49 per cent ‗agreed‘ and 35 per 
cent ‗strongly agreed‘. 
Most BPK auditors were aware that the full independence of BPK is essential 
(Interviews B13-B24). They also show optimistic that under the new Law on BPK, BPK 
can be independent from the government.The opinions imply on determining the position 
of BPK as an external audit institution which should behave and act independence as stated 
in the amended constitution and new laws. However, the most important question is how 
successful BPK is in performing the independently according to the new laws. An auditee 
from central government (Interview A10) also expressed this, arguing that how BPK 
manages its independence and authority is crucial. 
This study obtained negative views on the independence of BPK from respondents. 
In the survey, 20 per cent of auditees responded ‗neutral‘, 5 per cent ‗disagreed‘, and 2 per 
cent ‗stronglydisagreed‘. Of the auditors surveyed, 9 per cent responded ‗neutral‘, 6 per 
cent ‗disagreed‘ and 1 per cent stronglydisagreed. They also criticised the lack of BPK‘s 
substantive independence as follows:  
 “BPK is not a fully independent institution” (Interview B23, an auditor of AKN V). 
 “I am not sure that politically BPK is an independent institution” (Interview A23, 
an auditee from Water Drinking Regional Enterprise Sukabumi). 
 “It is only hope, the fact is not” (Interview B17, an auditor of AKN I). 
 “BPK is still not independent, as far as BPK still under the same unit of 
government” (Interview B6, a manager of BPK). 
 “BPK has not been an audit institution that is independent” (Interview A20, an 
auditee from Bandung City local government). 
 “Auditors of BPK can still be bribed” (Interview A11, an auditee from Cianjur 
District local government). 
These comments from different groups of informants, directly argue that BPK lacks 
substantive independence. This indicates that BPK has not been fully independent from any 
parties as expected and mandated by the Constitution and laws. The statements imply there 
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was still influence from political parties and the government (auditees) on the BPK and its 
auditors. Moreover, the last comment about bribe practices is the most interesting statement 
in helping to explain the reason why BPK auditors were not performing independently. 
Bribing auditors usually carried out in public sector audit, and have been done decades. As 
a result, pessimism shows from auditors, auditees and Members of Parliament who know 
bribing practices really happen.  
The following sections provide further detailed analysis about BPK‘s independence 
in terms of budgeting, board Members and auditors.  
6.1.2 Independence in Budgeting 
This section analyses the independence of the BPK in managing its budget as an 
essential resource for auditing the Indonesian public sector. Budgeting independence is 
crucial to maintain the independence of an external audit institution from the influence of 
other parties. The following sections describe the new legal basis of BPK budgeting, 
compares independence in budgeting pre and post audit reform, and analyses data and 
information from respondents and key informants about the independence of BPK in 
budgeting. 
Independence in Budgeting Pre Audit Reform 
Before reform, BPK‘s budget was funded from the State Annual Budget (APBN) 
and determined by the government (the Ministry of Finance). Government reduced the 
functions of BPK by providing a very limited budget to support its roles and functions as a 
state audit institution. This situation resulted in a limited budget for BPK to improve its 
auditor numbers and quality, to increase the welfare and professionalism of its personnel, 
and to acquire modern office stationery and information technology. The government in the 
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past aimed strongly to restrict the capacity of BPK to examine governmentaccountability in 
ways that could disturb national political stability. 
Independence in Budgeting Post Audit Reform 
Since audit reform, Chapter VIII on Budget, Article 35 of the Law on BPK provides 
for the jurisdiction of the BPK‘s budget to be funded separately from the state budget, to be 
proposed by BPK to Parliament (DPR), to be discussed in the introductory discussion of the 
state budget plan, and to be conveyed to the Minister of Finance in determining BPK‘s 
budget estimates. In addition, Article 32 of the Law on BPK stipulates that BPK has to be 
audited by a public accountant annually to examine its accountability in managing budget. 
The public accountant must be appointed by Parliament (DPR) based on the proposal of 
BPK and the Minister of Finance, with each of them having to propose three names. 
Additionally, the selected accountant must not have performed any duty for or on behalf of 
BPK or provided any service to BPK during the last two years. The audits coming from the 
public accounting office should be presented to Parliament and be sent to the government.  
The above provisions regulate the budget resources of BPK to maintain its 
independence from the government and to provide its budget according to state audit needs. 
Since the application of the BPK Law (2006), the budget of BPK is no longer under the 
direct control of the Executive, because the BPK budget is directly determined by 
Parliament after reporting to the Minister of Finance. Moreover, the BPK Law (2006) 
stipulates the process for examining BPK accountability in managing its budget
83
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December 2006 in the auditorium of BPK, Jakarta. 
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Since reform, the budget resources of BPK have been separated from the annual 
state budget of government. The budget is approved by Parliament after a discussion with 
BPK and the Ministry of Finance, based on the budget proposal from BPK. Besides, for 
specific purpose audits, such as the Bank of Indonesia and IBRA (the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency), BPK obtains a special budget allocation through the Ministry of 
Finance after getting approval by Parliament.  
Figure 6.2 BPK Budgeting Resources 
 
Source: Adapted from Article 35 of the Law Number 15 of 2006 (GOI 2006b). 
 
The increasing budget independence of BPK is due to good coordination with the 
Ministry of Finance and Parliament (DPR). Figure 6.2 (above) illustrates the process of 
getting budget resources and the auditing accountability of BPK‘s budget. Three main state 
institutions are involved in this process, Parliament, the Ministry of Finance and BPK. To 
maintain independence in budgeting, four steps are followed. First, BPK‘s planned budget 
is separated from the state budget plan and the proposed budget plan is submitted for 
approval from the Parliament after a discussion about the need for state audit activities. 
Second, after the budget is approved, Parliament informs the Ministry of Finance of BPK‘s 
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audit needs so the budget can be inserted in the annual state budget plan. Third, to examine 
the accountability of BPK to the public, Parliament appoints an independent Public 
Accountant Office (KAP) of three auditors proposed by BPK. The final step is the 
publishing of theaudit results of KAP on BPK accountability. 
An example of the budget process for BPK was the case of auditing the basic costs 
for the supply of electricity and an increased electricity tariff proposed by the National 
Electricity Company (PLN) in 2006. BPK accepted an official letter about requesting 
aBoard Memberof BPK to lead audit work at PLN with the assistance of 30 auditors, from 
Parliament and the Chairman of BPK After Parliamentary approval was sent to BPK and 
the Ministry of Finance, the Director General of Treasury provided an audit budget for this 
specific audit (Koran Tempo 3
rd
February 2006).  
During the fieldwork, this study found different points of view from the respondents 
and key informants about the independence of the BPK in budgeting. Before the 
independence of BPK in budgeting was clearly defined by the Law on BPK (2006), its 
budgeting was determined by the Ministry of Finance, which affected BPK‘s independence. 
Two BPK auditors (17
th
October 2006) argued that although judicially independent, BPK 
was still not entirely financially independent as its budget was still included in the central 
government budget from the Ministry of Finance. They complained about limitations in 
resources, including salaries, remuneration and training for auditors. Because of these 
conditions, they admitted receiving money from auditees to support their work, including 
for transportation, accommodation and meal costs during auditing. Auditees used the 
financial weaknessof BPK auditors to influence the objectivity of audit results. The 
statements from informants about practice of bribery and lack of BPK auditors‘ 
independence are indications lack objectivity of findings. This practice had been running 
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for so long that it caused auditees to doubt that BPK was an honest and independent audit 
institution. However, since audit reform in 2001, the BPK budget is much higher.  
Moreover, a Member of Parliament worried that the authority of BPK meant the 
audit institution became a ‗super body‘, because no other institution examines BPK‘s 
budget accountability (Koran Tempo 6
th
February 2006). However, this concern cannot be 
acceptedbecausean independent KAP now audits BPK‘s transparency and accountability. 
This is also controlled by the Parliament and the public after the KAP audit results are 
publishedand are reviewed by SAIs from other countries as mandated by the Law on BPK 
(2006).  
6.1.3 Independence of Board Members and Auditors 
This section evaluates the independence of the Board Members of BPK
84
 and 
auditors pre and post audit reform. The legal basis and data and information from 
documents, comments and statements from key informants are provided as supporting 
evidence. 
Independence of the Board Members Pre and Post Audit Reform 
Pre Audit Reform 
In the past, there was no legal basis to establish the independence of the Board 
Members and auditors of BPK. BPK had no independence in the election, appointment and 
dismissal of its Board Members, including the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Parliament 
only proposed three candidates for Board Membership, while the government proposed 
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four Members. During the New Order regime, the Chairman of BPK was appointed and 
dismissed by the President, based on the proposal of Parliament (Article 10 GOI 1973). 
This means that the election process for Board Members of BPK in the past could not 
uphold the independence of this audit institution. 
The President had the final decision over who were to be chosen as Chairman, Vice 
Chairman and also ordinary Board Members. This practice prevented the leaders of BPK 
from being independent from the President and thus the government and the Executive. The 
Chairmen of BPK had no power to manage their own organisational structure (Kompas 
11
th
August 2005). A conflict of interest was highly visible as the President appointed the 
Chairman and the Vice Chairman positions and as a result the appointees were deeply 
indebted to the President. A key informant from Public Relations Division of BPK 
(Interview B5), affirmed this, describing the close relationships between former BPK 
leaders and the President as follows:  
In the past, the Chairman of BPK was proposed by the Members of Parliament, but he 
was appointed by the President, as a result, anyone who was the Chairman of BPK in 
the past had a close relationship with the President, for instance, Sri Sultan 
Hamengkubowono (1964-1966), Dadang Suprayogi (1966-1973), Umar 
Wirahadikusumah (1973-1983), M. Jusuf (1983-1993) and JB Sumarlin (1993-1998). 
All these Chairmen of BPK had a close relationship with President Soeharto during 
the New Order. Satrio Budihardjo Joedono was the Chairman of BPK from 1998-
2004 and had a close relationship with President BJ Habibie at that time. 
This situation became a serious factor causing the ineffectiveness of BPK in examining the 
transparency and accountability of public sector. Seno (2004b:4-7) also agreed that the 
Chairmen and the Vice Chairmen of BPK were influenced by the Executive.  
The Board Members of BPK in the past were former high officials from 
government offices, such as from the Central Bank of Indonesia, the National Army and the 
Ministry of Finance. However, even though they worked for BPK, they still had working 
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relationships with their former organisations as BPK auditees. Moreover, they also 
provided consultation services. Indeed, these practice significantly influencedthe 
independence of BPK Members. 
Moreover, BPK‗s independence was also reduced by its roles and functions not 
being supported by the public and Parliament nor by internal legal regulations or a code of 
ethics. The New Order Era government conditioned BPK like thisin order to prevent the 
audit institution from working properly and impeding the power of government. As a result, 
the government managed public resources for its political purposes without control from 
other institutions, including the Parliament and BPK. This meant that public resources were 
managed unprofessionally, with unsatisfactory public services and without concern for 
public need and accountability. 
Post Audit Reform 
To strengthen the independence of BPK since audit reform, Article 23F, Paragraphs 
1 and 2 of the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution (2001) and Articles 16 and 17 of 
the Law on BPK (2006) stipulated the appointment and dismissal of BPK Board Members, 
including the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Since the new appointment system was 
implemented, leaders of BPK have significantly more autonomy and independence. The 
Board Members of BPK are in a public professional position that is appointed by 
Parliament to strengthen BPK‘s independence. 
The appointment process of the Board Members of BPK is depicted in Figure 6.3 
(below). DPR proposes all candidates for BPK Board Membership to be considered by 
DPD (processes 1 and 2). After that, all candidates are announced to the public (process 3). 
Parliament (DPR) then makes the final decision on appointment and selection after 
consideration by DPD and input from the public (processes 4, 5 and 6).  
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Figure 6.3 Appointment Process for Members, Chairman and Vice Chairman of BPK 
 
Source: Adapted from the amended 1945 Constitution (2001) and Article 14 of the Law Number 15 of 
2006 on BPK (GOI 2006b). 
 
Before assuming their position, selected Members of BPK read an oath in 
accordance with their respective religions under the guidance of the Head of the Supreme 
Court of Justice (process 7). The President attends this ceremony. After the ‗swearingin‘, 
elected Members may meet in a special session to select among themselves who is to 
become Chairman, the Vice Chairman and ordinary Members of the Board (processes 8 and 
9). The process of electing Board Members has extended the impersonal and neutral 
position of BPK in relation to the Executive and the Legislature. 
In 2004 and 2009, BPK conducted an election process for its Members by applying 
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BPK Chairman, Professor Anwar Nasution
85
, was different from the previous Chairman pre 
reform. Mr. Anwar had a strong commitment to reform BPK as an independent audit 
institution to better enable it examine the management and accountability of public sector 
toward providing a clean and good government; free from corruption, collusionand 
nepotism (KKN). In addition, he was brave enough to criticise weaknesses regarding 
transparency and accountability of Indonesia‘s public sector (Masirom and Widyatmoko 
2007). This was not the case under the former Chairmen of BPK before reform. 
The requirement of Board Members to maintain their independence, to perform 
their duties, and to exercise their authority is stipulated by Article 3 of the Law on BPK 
(2006). Board Members are required to observe their professional oath and pledge, act 
neutrally and impartially, avoid any conflict of interest, and avoid situations that may affect 
the objectivity of an audit. Besides, the Members are prohibited from holding a concurrent 
position in other state institutions, other agencies managing state finances, or domestic or 
foreign private companies. They cannot participate as Members of any political party or 
demonstrate attitudes and behavior that may cause their independence to be questioned. 
Independence of Auditors Pre and Post Audit Reform 
Pre Audit Reform 
Before audit reform, since the BPK leaders were appointed by the President, the 
personnel of BPK were also influenced by the government (that was the Ministry of 
Empowerment Apparatus (MENPAN). The Chairman of BPK stated to media (Eksekutif 
January 2007: 18) that all BPK personnel were public servants. This means that the rules 
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for and salary of BPK personnel, including its auditors, were the same as for other civil 
servants. The personnel management of civil servants was under the regulations of the State 
Personnel Board (BKN), including policies for recruitment, career development and 
compensation.  
A BPK official (15/03/2007) expressed his disappointment and dissatisfaction 
withthe inflexibility of the audit institution in developing the quality and quantity of its 
auditors. He argued that BPK auditors and staff had little incentive to perform. Even if they 
performed better than their peers, promotion was based on seniority rather than 
performance, and auditors had little opportunity to increase their productivity by 
undertaking additional training and education. This practice was the same as the salary 
system employed for the Indonesian civil service.With few incentives such as promotions; 
BPK auditors augmented their earnings from auditees. As a result, BPK auditor morale was 
low and continued to significantly reduce their independence in auditing. BPK audits were 
never effectively implemented in the Indonesian public sector.  
Post Audit Reform 
The Law on BPK regulates how BPK auditors can maintain their independence. In 
this law, it is clearly stated that auditors shall not (i) have an immediate family relationship 
or a relationship by marriage with anyone who has the responsibility towards the audit 
itself, (ii) have any financial interest either directly or indirectly in the auditee, (iii) have 
worked or provided services to the auditees within the last two years, (iv) have a private 
relationship with the auditees, or (v) be involved either directly or indirectly in the activities 
of the auditees, such as providing assistance, consultation services, a development system, 
or preparing and reviewing the auditees‘ financial statements. These regulations have 
guided auditors to be independent from personal, external and organisational disruptions 
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that can affect their independence in providing audit opinions, conclusions, considerations 
and recommendations.  
Moreover, audit standards (BPK RI 2007g: 17) have stipulated the responsibility of 
auditors to maintain independence in mental attitude (independence in fact) and 
independence in appearance. Being independent constitutes being impartial and 
intellectually honest as well as thinking in a way that is free from conflict of interest. 
Taking an independent stance means avoiding relationships that can affect the behavior  
and objective appearance of auditors in performing an audit. A continuous assessment of 
the relationship between auditors and audited entities is needed to maintain objectivity and 
independence. This means that auditors must avoid situations thatcould cause third parties 
who know relevant facts and conditions to conclude that the auditors concerned are unable 
to maintain their independence, thus causing them to be unable to provide an objective and 
impartial evaluation of all matters related to the implementation and reporting of audit 
results. 
Furthermore, auditors need to take into consideration two kinds of disruption to 
independence, namely, personal, and external or organisational (BPK RI 2007g: 40). If one 
or more of the aforementioned disruptions to independence affect the ability of individual 
auditors in performing their auditing tasks, the auditors concerned must reject the audit 
assignment. In the event that the auditors, due to certain reasons, are unable to reject the 
audit assignment, the aforementioned disruptions must be indicated in the audit scope 
section of the audit report. The following paragraphs explain in detail these two types of 
disruption.  
Paragraph 24 of audit standards (BPK RI 2007g: 45) ‗external disruption‘ section, 
states the requirement for auditors to be free from political pressure. How BPK auditors 
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ensure their independence in performing their duties and exercising their authority is 
reinforced in Article 6 of the Regulation on the Code of Ethics of BPK (BPK RI 2007h). In 
addition, other examples of behavior that is inappropriate for auditors include submitting to 
other parties‘ intimidation or pressure; leaking information obtained from audited parties; 
and being affected by any particular prejudice, interpretation, or interest, including the 
personal interest of the auditors or of other parties regarding the audit findings.  
To avoid personal disruptions, according to the audit standards of BPK (SPKN 
2007), Paragraph 19 (BPK RI 2007g: 25-27), audit organisations must have an internal 
quality control system to help them determine whether their auditors‘ independence is 
exposed to personal disruptions. This includes prejudice against individuals, groups, 
organisations or program objectives that may result in impartial implementation of the 
audit. It also includes having past responsibilities in decision making or management of an 
entity affecting the implementation of the entity‘s activities or programs currently 
underway or being audited. 
However, this study revealed criticisms about the lack of independence of BPK 
auditors from Members of Parliament and auditees, as follows: 
 “Auditors of BPK are not fully independent, because I still hear of the negotiation 
system with the auditees” (Interview C5, a Member of Parliament Commission I, 
PAN fraction). 
 “A few of the BPK auditors are still weak in terms of independence” (Interview C9, 
a Member of Kuniangan Regional Parliament). 
 “Auditors were not independent or objective, I hope this is the last and will not 
happen in the future” (Interview A13, an auditee from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affair). 
 “BPK auditors could not be independent, because they are always willing to 
accept the money that we give, but they only want to receive in cash and not 
transfer to their account” (Interview A19, an auditee from Ministry of Public 
Works). 
These criticisms raised serious issues about the lack of BPK auditors‘ independence. The 
practice of negotiation and receiving money from auditees resulted in reducing the 
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independence of auditors in performing objective and credible reports. The statement from 
a Member of Parliament (Interview C5) supported by a key informant (Interview A19, an 
auditee from the Ministry of Public Works) admitted that auditees are able to obtain 
information about BPK auditors to find out about their characters and behavior, so that the 
negotiation process can run smoothly. 
To provide further information about bribery practices for BPK auditors from 
auditees, an informant who worked for more than 5-years in the finance section of a 
regional government explained her experience (Interview F4, an ex-auditor of BPK) as 
follows: 
As long as I was dealing with BPK auditors, they all could be bribed. We tried to 
spend a lot of money to serve them during auditing. They asked for us to pay their 
hotel and food bill; entertainment, like karaoke and cinema; shopping; and gifts on 
the day they returned to their hometown. I think this practice still occurs in all 
regional government agencies. 
This excerpt provides evidence of how BPK auditors do not act independently in audits, 
because they can be bribed or have accepted bribes. This statement supports statements that 
already stated before from auditees of central and local government who had similar 
experiences when BPK auditors visited and audited their offices. 
On the other side, BPK auditors defend themselves by expressing the difficulties 
they face in avoiding influence and pressure from auditees, as follows:  
 “The Law on BPK could not protect us if we experienced pressure from the 
auditee; for instance, after the audit, the auditees refused to sign the audit 
findings and said, ‘Change this audit report or you will die’. We need protection, 
don’t leave us to take on all the risk ourselves, BPK has to take further action” 
(Interview B21, an auditor from AKN IV). 
 “I audited a plane. After I took some photographs and obtained evidence, I found 
irregularities to do with this plane. Yet, the auditee said, ‘you can choose to 
uncover these findings or you can choose to get off this plane safely” (Interview 
B13, an auditor of AKN I). 
 “If an auditee refuses to be audited, what can we do after that? We need basic 
rules on audit standards and audit management guidelines as soon as possible as 
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a followup to the Law on BPK , so we can show them the basic rules” (Interview 
B24, an auditor of  AKN V). 
The auditor from AKN IV had difficulties in facing auditees from regional government 
who had no responsibility to be transparent and accountable in managing public finances 
and resources. Besides, these auditees threatened to kill and harm BPK auditors if they 
revealed the real situation in the audit reports. BPK auditors felt that the risk to be borne 
was very high and that BPK did not support them fully. A similar experience was had by 
the auditor from AKN I (Interview B17) who audited the Ministry of Defense and was 
threatened with not getting off the plane safely if s/he reported the findings as they were. 
Another experience was from an auditor from AKN V (Interview B24) who has to audit 
SOEs, but the SOEs rejected the BPK auditorsbecause they had already been audited by 
KAP. This refusal indicates that BPK auditors were not appreciated as the only external 
auditors examining the transparency and accountability of the public sector. These 
experiences prove that although BPK has legally embedded independence, there are still 
extensive opportunities to improve its independence, such as providing a new draft of the 
Audit Management Guidelines (PMP) that was issued on 19
th
February 2008. Besides, BPK 
provided audit guidelines of 100 financial audits on 19
th
May 2008, 200 performance audits 
on 5
th
June 2008and 300 special purposes audits on 27
th
February 2009 that can help auditors 
during auditing.  
Since audit reform, BPK has the authority to organise its human resources. 
According to BPK‘s human resource division (Interview B8), BPK has the authorisation to 
independently manage its own employees in any aspect related to audit quality, such as to 
establish the Code of Ethics; recruiting, deploying, developing, and organising its own 
personnel; and determining the qualifications, positions and provision of BPK auditors. 
Although BPK personnel are civil servants or PNS(Pegawai Negeri Sipil), since audit 
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reform, BPK has had more flexibility in organising its human resource management and is 
no longer subject to the strict rules administered by MENPAN. The reform of BPK 
personnel is intended to enable BPK become an independent and autonomous audit 
institution.  
Since audit reform, the majorInspectorate (ITAMA) of BPK has made some efforts 
to review the performance of personnel and audit reports. According to a middle officer and 
an official of the ITAMA unit (Interview B4), they realised that their unit has a significant 
role in examining and supervising the performance of BPK auditors and staff. Since audit 
reform, the unit has worked hard to provide the operational and procedural standards for 
evaluating the work performance of its personnel. The internal controller or 
Inspectorateunit of BPK keeps improving its capacity to evaluate and monitor the integrity 
and independence of auditors to fulfill the mandate of the Constitution by strengthening the 
roles and functions of BPK internal controlling system. The Code of Ethics employs with 
reward and punishment to BPK auditors. Moreover, the public services unit (Interview B7)  
collected data and information about BPK from stakeholders (Members of Parliament, 
auditees and public) in 2007.An officer from the unit argued that BPK still has a lot of work 
to do to meet stakeholder expectations and the mandate of the Constitution. 
For assuring the independence and quality of BPK audits as mandated by the Law 
on Audit (2004) and the Law on BPK (2006), BPK has been assessed by external peer 
reviewers from other countries. The peer review is appointed by BPK after obtaining 
Parliamentary approval. Following the passing of the laws, BPK was reviewed by the 
Auditor General of New Zealand in 2004. In 2009, the Netherlands Court of Audit 
reviewed BPK and assessed the follow up of the previous peer review recommendations. 
The results and recommendations from the Netherlands Court of Audit were published 
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onthe BPK website and identified both positive achievements and areas for improvement. 
The reviews have significantly influenced improvements in BPK audit quality and 
performance. 
6.1.4 Conclusion on BPK Independence 
To conclude, before audit reform, BPK was not independent as mandated to be by 
the sacred (sakti) 1945 Constitution. The President was a powerful influence on all of the 
bureaucracy, including BPK. As a result, BPK could not provide objective and credible 
information in its reports because the reports were sorted and checked by the government 
for national stability reasons. Moreover, BPK had a limited budget with which to maintain 
its independence.  
Since audit reform, the independence of BPK has been secured and strengthened by 
the amendment of the 1945 Constitution (2001), the Law on BPK (2006) and the state 
finance audit standards (SPKN 2007). Some significant reforms have been made to enable 
BPK to become an independent audit institution. In terms of budgeting, approval of BPK 
budgeting does not come from the government, but from the Parliament based on the needs 
of BPK. In terms of leadership, the new appointment process for Board Members of BPK, 
including the Chairman and Vice Chairman, has resulted in the independence of BPK 
leaders from the government. In terms of human resources, BPK has more flexibility in 
recruiting, developing, terminating, rewarding and punishing Board Members, auditorsand 
staff, without being subjected to the strict rules of MENPAN and BPK. 
Besides these positive indications of improving BPK independence, this study 
reveals that BPK has not been successful in becoming an independent audit institution. 
Evidence shows the deficiencies of BPK auditors in achieving substantial independence, 
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especially due to the fact that they are still inappropriately accepting money from auditees 
and are still open to negotiation or cooperation to uncover the audit findings between 
auditors and auditees. These practices significantly reduce the independence of auditors.  
Since 2004, a SAI has been involved as an external peer reviewer has assessed the 
independence and performance of BPK. The roles of peer reviewer and internal inspector 
have significantly influenced BPK efforts to keep improving the quality of its audit reports 
through maintaining its independence. 
6.2 Integrity and Professionalism of BPK Members and Auditors 
Professionalism and integrity are significant in providing objectivity and credibility 
of information, selecting audit methodology, providing clear and understandable 
information, a precise and informative format and realistic audit recommendations in audit 
reports. This section describes the legal basis for BPK‘s professionalism and integrity and 
analyses its professionalism and integrity pre and post audit reform.  
6.2.1 Legal Basis for BPK’s Integrity and Professionalism 
Article 29 of the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) stipulates the responsibility of BPK to 
provide a Code of Ethics containing the norms to be complied with by every Member and 
auditor to maintain their dignity, honor, image and credibility. To enforce the 
implementation of the Code of Ethics, Article 30 of the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) 
stipulates the formation of an Honorary Members of the Code of Ethics Board. In 2007, 
BPK carried out this mandateby providing the Code forming the Honorary Members Board 
consisting of BPK Board Members, professional practitioners and academics. 
Article 7 of the BPK regulation on the Code of Ethics (BPK RI 2007h) stipulates 
that BPK auditors are not allowed to receive gifts of any kind, directly or indirectly. 
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Moreover, Article 8 requires BPK auditors to (i) employ prudent, accurate, and careful 
principles, (ii) keep state or professional confidentiality, audited parties‘ confidentiality and 
only disclose information to authorised officials, (iii) avoid performing actions beyond the 
scope of their duty and authority, (iv) demonstrate a high commitment to their work in 
accordance with the SPKN, (v) update, develop and improve their professional abilities in 
performing their auditing duties, (vi) respect and trust as well as mutually assist each other 
to enable good cooperation in performing their duties, (vii) maintain good communication 
and discussion about issues occurring in the performance of their audit task, and (viii) use 
public resources efficiently, effectively and economically.  
To motivate improvements regarding auditor professionalism, BPK requires 
auditors to develop their respective functional positions in implementing their duties as 
mandated by Article 9(h) of the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b). Moreover, the Law on BPK 
requires BPK to ensure Board Members‘ integrity, professionalism, and to protect their 
immunity and security. Second, in implementing their duty and authority; Members, 
auditors and other parties that work for and on behalf of BPK shall be granted legal 
protection and security assurance by the competent authority. Finally, in the event of claims 
by other parties in relation to its duties and authorities, BPK shall be entitled to legal aid on 
the state‘s account in accordance with laws and regulations. 
6.2.2 Professionalism and Integrity of BPK Pre Audit Reform 
Before audit reform, BPK auditors lacked professionalism and integrity. BPK 
recruited auditors with different educational backgrounds (from accounting, economics, 
law, sport and literature) that were not based on the goals and needs of the organisation. In 
addition, BPK personnel had very limited opportunities to improve their professionalism 
through education and training both inside and outside Indonesia.  
217 
The Centre of Training and Development of BPK was not managed effectively and 
professionally. One example is that with training and education courses, auditors‘ 
qualifications were never tested before or after the course (Soedibyo 2004:12-14). This 
meant that there was no evaluation after training delivery and the results of a training and 
education program were never reviewed for further action, such as: for the benefit and 
impact on audit quality, and for rewarding the outstanding trainers  for better position in 
his/her career and development. As a result, BPK‘s auditors and other personnel had little 
motivation to take up training courses (Seno 2004a:4-6) and as a result the quality of BPK 
auditors and staff grew very slowly (Priyono 2004:8-11). BPK auditors (13-15 March 
2007) support this, arguing that trainers from the centre of training and education were very 
unqualified and that the trainers and materials offered little help to auditors in improving 
their competencies. 
In terms the backgrounds of BPK auditors, they were divided into two groups 
(Yoedono 2003:16-17). The first group was auditors who audited state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and regional-owned enterprises (ROEs) was, in general, called an ‗accountant‘. All 
auditors with a background in accountancy are under the professional organisation of the 
Indonesian Accountant Association (IAI), which was developed alongside the 
implementation of the Code of Ethics and accountancy professional standards. The second 
group is auditors without a background as accountants also have an ‗umbrella‘ organisation 
of their own, a professional association called the Indonesian Auditors‘ Association (IAuI). 
This association did not develop as well as IAI and lacked both an auditors‘ code of ethics 
and audit standards. 
The above situation means that in the past, BPK had no formal rules in the form of a 
code of ethics for its own BPK personnel, though auditors who were Members of IAIwere 
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under its professional Code of Ethics. However, being a Member of an Auditor‘s 
association did not mean that auditors acted in the public interest. Social control from 
community for public sector auditing was very weak. BPK Members and auditors also had 
no formal regulations for immunity, legal protection and security assurance. These 
shortcomings significantly harmed the integrity of BPK Members and auditors in auditing 
the public sector.  
A key informant from BPK (Interview B25, a trainee in Centre of Education and 
Training of BPK) described the problems faced by BPK in relation to its professionalism 
and integrity. He emphasised that in the past BPK provided low salaries, lacked a clear 
audit manuals and technicalaudit guidelines for different types of audits, and did not have 
enough budgetto improve the quality and professionalism of its auditors. On the other hand, 
the risks faced by auditors were high as they need to: deal with not properly behavior of 
auditees, conduct auditing in a very remote location (such as auditing in the middle of the 
Kalimantan forests).  
This interviewee found that the integrity of BPK auditors were significantly reduced 
by highrisk audits, low salaries, a strong bureaucratic culture with promotion based on 
seniority instead of performance, and a lack of opportunities and budget for developing 
auditor‘s professional development. This argument was supported by LP3ES (Economic 
and Social Research, Education and Information Agency) (2003:22-27), which argued that 
BPK could not provide professional and competent auditors as expectedif their income was 
too low. Moreover, BPK could not recruit newly qualified auditors if salaries were too low.  
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6.2.3 Professionalism and Integrity of BPK Post Audit Reform 
As mandated by Article 9 of the Law on BPK (2006), auditors are required to 
develop competence for their functional position through continual professional education 
to enhance their audit skills. Since audit reform, BPK has increased trainings, education, 
workshops, seminars and other programs, both inside and outside of Indonesia, to develop 
the professionalism and competence of its personnel. A BPK trainer (Interview B28) 
explained that every BPK auditor must complete at least 20 hours of a total 80 hours 
education and training package within a one to two year period
86
. This professional 
education includes audit topics such as: knowledge of audit standards, general knowledge 
of the auditee environment, skills to communicate effectively both verbally and in writing, 
statistics, finance and accounting, management, information systems, state administration, 
government structure and policies, industrial techniques, economic science, social science 
and information technology (BPK RI 2007g: 22-23).  
After reform, BPK also developed two functional positions for auditors, namely, 
skilled auditors and expert auditors. The development of these positions is relevant to the 
needs of auditors for undertaken performance audits in the future. For financial and 
compliance auditing, BPK requires accountants, while for performance audits, it requires 
other disciplines such as civil engineering, public policy, economics, management and the 
environmental management and engineering.  
To provide good quality auditors and maintain their integrity and professionalism, 
BPK increased its budget to provide better compensation for its personnel (staff, managers, 
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 This means all professional auditors of BPK shall carry out a total of 80 hours of training and education. This 
training and education can be done in stages, at least 20 hours in 1-2 year(s).   
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Members and auditors). Moreover, if an audit requires a very specific audit method, the 
audit team may involve experts (BPK RI 2007g: 24). The Chairman of BPK)
87
 underlined 
four reasons for increasing auditor income and incentives, namely: (1) there are high risks 
for auditors in uncovering corruption, fraud and other criminal findings, (2) the 
remuneration for auditors must be balanced with the value contribution they make to state 
income/state cash revenue through the audit findings, (3) the income of auditors is 
obviously relevant to the new recruitment of qualified auditors and their participation in 
training, education, workshops, seminars and other professional development activities, and 
(4) the professional performance of auditors is obviously relevant to the quality of audit 
results and recommendations for restructuring the public sector entities for the wider public 
interest.  
Table 6.1 (below) illustrates improvements made regarding the salaries and 
allowances of BPK personnel since the implementation of audit reform and the 
remuneration system on 2006. The remuneration system is linking performance with 
payment to motivate personnel to perform better. The data indicates a significant increase 
in the total income of BPK managers and staff compared with other public servants or 
apparatus in government institutions. For instance, the audit fee for BPK auditors was 
formerly only Rp.50,000 per day, which meant inadequate travel expenses and shortages in 
essential supplies like fuel. Since 2006, the audit fee has increased to Rp.200, 000 per day, 
four times higher than before.  
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Table 6-1Remuneration Income of BPK Managers and Staff in 2004 and 2006(in Rupiah) 
Personnel Groups Income in 2004 Income in 2006 
 
Source: Adapted from the speech and presentation of Chairman of BPK during the International 
Conference on Public Sector Audit, the Jakarta Convention Centre, 8thJanuary 2007.  
 
A consequence of this system is that auditors have not been allowed to receive any 
fees from auditees in order to maintain their professionalism in providing credible and 
objective reports, as mandated by Article 7 of the Law on BPK. This effort is to reduce the 
possibility of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) between auditors and auditees.A 
Member of BPK commented in a national newspaper about the effect of the higher 
remuneration for auditors: ―This is to avoid BPK auditors accepting any auditing fees from 
auditees‖ (Handayani 12 January 2006). As a result of better remuneration, BPK acts 
strongly and firmly with any of its auditors who accept fees or other compensation from the 
audited entities. A MemberIV of BPK (Interview B2) emphasised that if an auditor or any 
BPK personnel does not perform their audits specifically as regulated, this should be 
immediately reported to BPK. He also promised to take serious action or punishment to 
BPK auditors if they did mistakesthat reflecting their lack of integrity and professionalism. 
This comment confirmed the eagerness of BPK to apply sanctions on auditors who accept 
any fees and compensation from auditees after the remuneration system applied. 
Level of Manager   
Echelon IA 8,528,505 11,772,852 
Echelon IB 8,076,105 11,007,848 
Echelon IIA 5,536,712 8,055,740 
Echelon IIIA 3,078,387 4,797,594 
Echelon IVA 2,290,875 3,701,930 
Level of Staff   
Group IV 1,812,906 2,918,892 
Group III 1,192,686 2,555,326 
Group II 1,200,751 2,324,816 
Group I 993,138 1,976,094 
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6.2.4 Survey Results and Comments on Professionalism and Integrity 
Respondents were asked whether they would agree that BPK auditors perform 
professionally and act with integrity in auditing. Figure 6.4 (below) shows that most 
respondents had positive perceptions of auditors‘ professionalism and integrity. BPK‘s 
efforts of to provide the Code of Ethical Conductand better remuneration for auditors, 
induced a positive perception from respondents. Some positive statements on the 
professionalism and integrity of BPK auditors were recorded during the interview as 
follows:  
 “Now, BPK auditors have a better approach to auditees, are young, have better 
communication, and are friendly, which enhances their professionalism” 
(Interview A3, an auditee from the National Electricity Company). 
 “Now, BPK auditors are young, have a good educational background, in particular 
in accounting and finance, and perform with professionalism” (Interview A6, an 
auditee from the Ministry of Home Affair). 
 “All auditors that I know perform with professionalism; BPK’s official letter states 
that audit fees cover all the auditors’ costs except for accommodation” (Interview 
A4, an auditee from the National Oil Company). 
 “Auditors who work for BPK need legal protection and security assurance” 
(Interview B13, an auditor of  AKN I). 
These excerpts indicate that BPK auditors have many new and young auditors. They are 
well qualified, perform professionally, look fresh, and have a better approach and better 
communication with auditees. A remuneration system that provides better compensation for 
auditors becomes a motivation for qualified graduates to apply for positions with BPK. In 
addition, requirements for BPK to develop auditor skills and knowledge through training 
and further education induced them to perform well and more professionally. 
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Figure 6.4 Survey Results of ‘BPK Auditors Perform with Professionalism and Integrity’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007. 
One excerpt pointed out the importance of legal protection and security assurance 
for BPK auditors in conducting auditing. This was also stated by an auditor who works in a 
KAP
88
(Interview F4) and conducts audits on behalf of BPK. She argued as follows: 
Working as an auditor at BPK may not be as comfortable and safe as at KAP. This is 
because of too many pressures from auditees who lack accountability and there is no 
protection for auditors who maintain their integrity and professionalism in performing 
their audits. 
This statement indicates that auditors in the public sector need protection when uncovering 
audit findings and to perform with professionalism and integrity. Another KAP implied that 
she would feel worried about not maintaining her professionalism and integrity as an 
auditor if she worked at BPK, because of pressure from auditees and a lack of immunity for 
the auditors in maintaining their professionalism and integrity. Besides, informal norms and 
situational values from the public and other parties did not work well as informal protection 
for auditors and auditees. 
However, it would be too optimistic to assume that higher salaries will directly 
improve auditor professionalism and independence. From surveying whether BPK auditors 
had no integrity and lack of professionalism, 25 per cent of total respondents gave a 
‗neutral‘ response, and a ‗disagree‘ response was 10 per cent and 4 per cent respectively 
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 This is based on information from auditors who had moved from BPK to other public accountant‘s offices, 
and was via an interview conducted in Jakarta. 
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from the auditors and the auditees. Negative views from informants during interviews 
included the following: 
 “The lack of professionalism and integrity of BPK auditors showed in their 
behaviour” (Interview C1, a Member of Parliament from Commission I). 
 “In fact, some auditors had no integrity and were not performing with 
professionalism” (Interview A7, an auditee from Ministry of National Education). 
 “Some auditors have high integrity, some not” (Interview B22, an auditor of AKN 
IV). 
 “Small audit budget, reducing the integrity of auditors” (Interview B11, an auditor 
from AKN III). 
 “Not only have the quality and professionalism of auditors needed attention but 
also the integrity and professionalism of the BPK Members” (Interview B17, an 
auditor of AKN I). 
 “Some of BPK auditors were not professional, not competent, and had inadequate 
capacity to be a professional auditor” (Interview B10, BPK middle manager of 
Research and Development Division). 
 “Being professional means high lump-sum payment” (Interview B 25, BPK middle 
manager of Multiplying Report Sub-Division). 
 “The professionalism of BPK auditors was insufficient” (Interview A23, an auditee 
from Water Drinking regional-owned enterprises Sukabumi). 
 “Not all BPK auditors are performing professionally” (Interview B15, an auditorof 
AKN III). 
 “The quality of professional qualifications of BPK auditors is still far from those of 
Financial Development Supervisory Board (BPKP)’s auditors” (Interview B8, BPK 
middle manager from Human Resource Bureau). 
 “Not all auditors of BPK are qualified and competent” (Interview B6, an auditor 
from Organisation Bureau). 
 “Some auditors were not competent and had inadequate capacity to be a 
professional” (Interview B26, a BPK middle manager from Legal Affairs Bureau). 
 “Now, new auditors of BPK are good in theory and knowledge, however, they still 
lack of experience in auditing” (Interview A2, an auditee from West Java Province 
Government). 
These excerpts indicate that the respondents and informants thought that the attitude of 
BPK auditors revealed a lack of integrity and professionalism. These statements also 
strongly indicate that BPK auditors do not have enough proficiency and experience for 
public sector auditing. Low salaries for BPK auditors eroded their integrity. These 
comments also implied that BPK auditors had inadequate individual professional skills and 
knowledge bases.  
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For new BPK auditors, although they have obtained a good level of education, they 
are inexperienced in auditing the public sector. An auditee from the Ministry of Public 
Works (Interview A19) argued as follows: 
Although new auditors were good in terms of civil engineering theories and had 
enough confidence, they had no experience in auditing public works projects. They 
were more amazed at our explanations instead of asking questions to examine the 
projects. 
Whilst making this comment, this auditee was laughing and seemed to underestimate and 
look down at the ability of BPK auditors to find inefficiencies and a lack of accountability 
in public works projects. This means that BPK auditors, who are clever or good in terms of 
theory and knowledge concepts, still could not perform well in auditing because they had 
no ability to deal with auditees who knew their lack of experience. 
Moreover, an auditee from local government (16/09/2009) criticised the competence 
of auditors in understanding the problems facing local government agencies, as follows:  
BPK only described all the mistakes and problems, but they did not explain why these 
problems could happen, how we could solve the problems, what the effects of these 
problems are in the short, medium and long terms to give us a description of problem 
solving priorities.  
Although BPK auditors found fraud or inefficiency, their ability to explainthe causes and 
effects of the findings was criticised by auditees. Moreover, auditees found a lack of 
professionalism from auditors in providing the best solutions and recommendations to solve 
the problems, both in the short and long terms. 
6.2.5 Conclusion of BPK Integrity and Professionalism 
Before audit reform, BPK lacked integrity and professionalism and training and 
education did not effectively improve the skills and competence of auditors. Moreover, 
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BPK had few auditors with a background in accounting and had no code of ethics for its 
auditors. BPK had no clear audit manual, guidelines and technical guidance.  
Since reform, the requirement of BPK to maintain its integrity and to ensure the 
security and immunity of auditors and Members of BPK are stipulated clearly under the 
Law on BPK (2006). BPK also has the Code of Ethics (2007). Besides, BPK has 
implemented a remuneration system to provide fairer rewards for auditors who are more 
professional and perform better, and also to maintain auditors‘ professionalism in providing 
credible and objective reports. This study found that BPK has strongly attempted to 
improve their auditors‘ competence and professionalism by sending its auditors for training 
and education both inside and outside the country. All auditors are compulsorily required to 
develop their competence by completing at least 20 hours of a total 80 hours education and 
training package within a one to two year period.  
Besides positive responses regarding improvements in the integrity and 
professionalism of BPK, this study also revealed that the competencies and knowledge of 
auditors was still not as stakeholders‘ expected. For new auditors, a lack of experience in 
auditing public sector agencies resulted in their lack of ability to detect fraud and 
corruption. BPK auditors also still lack knowledge and experience beyond accounting and 
finance to examine the performance of public sector agencies and provide realistic audit 
recommendations.  
6.3 Auditing Resources of BPK 
As mandated by the 1945 Constitution, BPK is the only external audit institution in 
the Republic of Indonesia required to auditthe transparency and accountability of all public 
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sector entities. To meet this requirement, BPK needs audit resources, including budgeting, 
personnel, offices,and IT resources and systems.  
Figure 6.5 Survey results of ‘BPK has Sufficient Audit Resources’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007. 
Figure 6.5 (above) shows the survey results with regard to BPK having sufficient 
audit resources, and largely reveals positive responses. Overall, 49 per cent of auditors and 
auditees ‗agree‘ that BPK has sufficient audit resources. However, 33 per cent were 
‗neutral‘ and 14 per cent ‗disagreed‘, indicating dissatisfaction with the level of BPK 
resources. Both negative and positive comments on BPK audit resources were revealed in 
this study. 
With the support of data and information from documentation and interviews, the 
following sections examine in more detail the audit resources of BPK pre and post audit 
reform.  
6.3.1 Budget Resources 
Budget resources are the most essential resources to support the programs and 
activities of BPK as an independent and professional audit institution. They are needed to 
build new offices; recruit new qualified auditors; carry out training; provide scholarships, 
workshops and seminars; support the remuneration system; to improve the quality of audit 
research; and to procure goods and services and so forth. 
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However, before audit reform, BPK had inadequate budget from the Ministry of 
Finance. At the same time, the Financial Development Supervisory Board (BPKP), an 
internal audit institution, had a much higher budget allocation than BPK. Member IV of 
BPK (6 December 2006) explained how in the past the function of BPK as an external audit 
institution was ignored by the government. An internal audit institution, BPKP, had exactly 
the same duties and functions as BPK, however larger sums of money went to BPKP than 
to BPK (see Table 6.2 below). Due to a limited budget, BPK had not enough resources to 
audit all entities, lacked auditor quantity and quality, lacked modern stationery and so on. 
This indicates the efforts of the Executive to reduce BPK‘s position and functions. Budget 
resources are a key factor for BPK to perform its roles and functions to improve its 
independence, professionalism and integrity. An ex-auditor (24/11/2006)
89
 argued that the 
reasons he left BPK were to get a better financial compensation and a more promising 
career pathrather than one where promotion was based on seniority. Most important, 
however, was to escape the bureaucratic work culture. This statement indicates that the 
bureaucratic and promotion system based on seniority instead of work performance in BPK 
pushed qualified BPK auditors to work in the private sector rather than remain in the public 
sector. 
Since audit reform, especially from 2006 after the Law on BPK was issued, BPK‘s 
budget has increased significantly, this has had a significant impact on capacity of BPK to 
audit the public sector. In 2003, BPK audited only 50 per cent of all public sector entities 
due to its limited budget (Arif 2004: 14). In 2009, after increasing its budget to eight times 
higher than in 2003, BPK audited all public sector entities, except the tax office and SOEs. 
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 He is accountant who was graduated from US, highly skilled and leaved his position as a manager and auditor 
in BPK for better position in private sector. 
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According to Member II of BPK (14/02/2007), the increasing budget of BPK has mostly 
been allocated for: (i) improving the income of auditors and applying a revised 
remuneration system, (ii) recruiting new auditors and employees, (iii) improving BPK‘s 
telecommunications network, IT and the local area network (LAN) program and website, 
(iv) opening new representative offices, and (v) modernising and optimising equipment for 
audit support activities. 
Table 6.2 (below) shows that the budget allocated to BPK before audit reform was 
much smaller than after reform.  
Table 6-2 Annual Budget Allocation for BPK before (1993-2000) and after Audit Reform 
(2001-2009) 
Year Amount in Rupiahs (billion) Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from 
1. BEPEKA Statistics 1995/1996 (BPK RI 1996). 
2. BEPEKA Statistics 1996/1997 (BPK RI 1997). 
3. BPK RI Statistics 2001 (BPK RI 2002).  
4. BPK RI Statistics 2002 (BPK RI 2003). 
5. BPK RI Statistics 2003 (BPK RI 2004). 
6. BPK RI Statistics 2004 (BPK RI 2005b). 
7. BPK RI Statistics 2005 (BPK RI 2006b). 
8. BPK RI Statistics 2006 (BPK RI 2007b). 
9. Website of BPK (www.bpk.go.id, accessed on 17/08/2009). 
1993/1994 29.27  
1994/1995 33.30  
1995/1996 42.39 Before audit reform 
1996/1997 55.92  
1999/2000 93.09  
2000 81.01  
2001 116.44  
2002 153.96  
2003 199.91  
2004 238.33  
2005 329.36 After audit reform 
2006 690.23  
2007 1,337.85  
2008 1.490.84  
2009 1.725.48  
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Since the audit reform (2001), Parliament and government increased BPK‘s budget 
each year. From 2005, budget of BPK had increased more than five times higher from Rp. 
329.36 billion (in 2005) to Rp.1,725.48 billion (in 2009).This was after they 
foundsignificant improvement in BPK‘s performance auditing public finance, which was 
saving state expenditure and increasing state revenue. 
The budget resources of BPK come not only from the state budget, but also from 
loans and grants from other countries, and international donor organisations such as ADB, 
USAID and AusAID. The increased budget for BPK was intended to improve the quality of 
audit reports. Since the budget increases, BPK has had a greater role and more 
accountability in managing its budget. BPK has a strong commitment to improve its 
strategic plans for ensuring better performance (Ariyani 30
th
May 2005). In line with the 
increasing budget, BPK has improved its independence and autonomy to audit the 
accountability of the public sector in managing public resources (Ciantrini 2004:17-19).  
In addition, the organisation of BPK‘s Financial Bureau has expanded into three 
sections: (1) the budget and monitoring section that is responsible for budget planning and 
monitoring the implementation of budget, (2) the treasury section that is responsible for 
preparing policies for management and accountability of state finances and the financial 
statements for BPK, and (3) the accounting section that is responsible for administering 
accounting data and preparing financial statements.  
6.3.2 Human Resources 
This section describes BPK‘s organisational reform and the quantity and quality of 
human resources pre and post audit reform. 
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Organisational Reform 
Before audit reform, the Bureau for Personnel organised and managed BPK 
personnel. The role of this bureau was not complex for the following reasons: (i) BPK had 
very limited numbers of personnel, (ii) there was no clear development of a professional 
code of ethics for auditors,(iii) the criteria for recruitment was not as specific as needed, 
(iv) levels of appointment were based on seniority rather than on performance, and (v) BPK 
had only two types of auditors (trained and certified).  
In addition, the administration and management of BPK personnel was regulated by 
MENPAN and the State Personnel Board (BKN), exactly the same as the system applied 
for public service personnel administration
90
. This situation made it difficult for BPK to 
recruit qualified and professional accountants as auditors and to develop its personnel‘s 
qualifications. 
Since audit reform, each BPK auditor became an officer of Parliament rather than 
being an officer of government. Since 2007, the Personnel Bureau that has only liabilities in 
personnel administrative functions, has been replaced by the Human Resources Bureau 
(HRB) and with its strengthened functions it plays an important role in managing human 
resources as capital and an asset for BPK. The reform of human resource functions includes 
improvements in recruitment numbers and in the qualifications of auditors and staff to 
support BPK in conducting its functions for financial and performance audits. However, 
according to BPK auditors who joined the secondment program at the Australian National 
Audit Office (ANAO), BPK the organisation has not been divided according to auditors‘ 
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This is regulated by the Law Number 43 of the Year 1999 on Principles of Employment. However, the 
management of Indonesian civil service is still encountered many obstacles and problems, because the Law has 
not been run optimally and some civil service aspects are not regulated in detail.  
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specialisations in financial and performance audits such as is the case in ANAO (Interview 
F2, at Canberra). 
Since 2004, BPK‘s organisation has expanded with the opening of new 
representative offices in different provinces. The HRB has a special section for human 
resource planning and rotation. This section is responsible for planning and analysing the 
quantity and quality (competencies) needs of human resources in BPK for general and 
specific position qualifications. Excellent human resource planning can improve efficiency 
in recruitment new employees and development career in the future. As argued by Fearnley 
and Beattie (2001: 117-138), auditor rotation has significantly influenced the auditors‘ 
independence and development competencies. The section is now one of the most 
significant in BPK for its work conducting planning, recruitment, rotation, dismissal, 
position analysis and human resources information.  
Table 6-3 Number of Employees who Received Rewards and Punishments (2004-08) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Source: website of BPK (www.bpk.go.id. Accessed on 27/07/2009) 
Note: * Satya Lencana Wira Karya Award 
 
Since 2004, BPK began employing a reward and punishment system for its 
personnel in separate functional and structural positions, HRB has had a special section for 
evaluating and developing competition between staff and auditors and for managing 
functional positions (BPK RI 2007f). Table 6.3 (above) shows the numbers of BPK 
Rewards* 29 18 28 4 10 89 
Punishment 7 35 25 93 41 201 
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employees who received rewards, namely Satya Lencana Wira Karya
91
for their 
achievements and also those who received punishment (such as for auditors and staff who 
broke BPK rules and the Code of Ethics). The table indicates that evaluation was conducted 
by HRD. For implementing the remuneration system for the welfare and fairness of BPK 
personnel, there is a welfare section that is responsible for managing the remuneration 
system and providing consultation and health for BPK personnel.  
Quantity and Quality of Personnel 
An insufficient number of auditors was a key factor causing BPK to be ineffective 
in performing its audit functions. As mandated by the Law on State Finances (2003), BPK 
was required to implement auditing for financial statements of all public sector agencies by 
2007. However, until 2008, BPK still had insufficient auditors. In 2003, BPK had only 100 
audit teams from 2000 auditors in Jakarta and 500 auditors at seven regional offices, which 
covered only thirty per cent of all auditees (Ciantrini 2004:17-19 and Arif 2004: 13-16). 
Meeting the increasing demand for qualified and professional auditors in the public sector 
agencies is crucial for managing and reporting state finances in Indonesia.  
By 2010, BPK still needed about 5000 auditors to meet the mandate of the 
Constitution (Supriyanto 2006b). This was based on the number of entities in 2007, which 
was about 719, including 86 central government entities, 466 regional government entities, 
and 161 SOEs. Member IV of BPK (Bisnis Indonesia 9
th
March 2006) described that to 
audit a single regional government entity; BPK needs four or five auditors, or more than 
5000 auditors to audit all public sector entities. However, in 2004, BPK only had 2851 
auditors. He also argued that if the IT infrastructure is developed in all regions, the required 
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 This award is from the government for BPK employees who perform well achievements and dedication. 
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number could be reduced to about 3000-4000 auditors. This means that the lack of regional 
government ability in managing and reporting public resources by applying modern 
technology and network systems resulted in the need for more auditors.  
Figure 6.6Number of BPK Employees for the Period 2000-2008 
 
Sources: Adapted from:  
1. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2003 (BPK RI 2004). 
2. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2004 (BPK RI 2005b). 
3. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2005 (BPK RI 2006b). 
4. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2006, (BPK RI 2007b). 
5. BPK website (www.bpk.go.id Accessed on 17/07/2009). 
 
Figure 6.6 (above) shows the total number of BPK personnel from 1998/99-2008 
and reveals yearly increases in the number of employees. According to the head of human 
resources of BPK (6/12/2006), in 2007 BPK recruited more than 1700 auditors, mainly for 
the representative offices, to fulfill its audit mandate. Compared to the number of 
employees before audit reform, the number of employees was increased by about 2600 
personnel by 2008. Member IV of BPK argued to a national newspaper that it was a 
priority for BPK to continue to recruit personnel to provide adequate auditors and 
administrators for new representative offices throughout Indonesia (Supriyanto 2006b).  
  
1782 1794 1869
2726 2851 2991
3498
4305 4382
Number of 
Employees
Year
98/99 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
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Table 6-4 Recruitment of New BPK Personnel for the Financial Year 2007-08 
No Faculty Department Recruitment 
Source: BPK Announcement Number: 01/S.Peng/X-X.3/12/2007 on Recruitment of Candidate Public 
Officials for Bachelor Degree at BPK, the financial year 2007/2008 (BPK RI 2007i). 
 
In addition, Table 6.4 (above) presents data on the recruitment of new personnel of 
BPK for the financial year 2007/08. The figures indicate that the priority was for auditors 
with a background in professional accountancy, in addition to other educational 
backgroundssuch as financial and human resources management, development studies, law, 
civil engineering and public relations.  
The purpose of BPK‘s recruitment is to meet its needs for auditing the finances and 
performance of public sector entities. To support its internal administration, BPK recruits 
personnel with backgrounds in literature, social and political science, psychology and law. 
The highest number of recruitment is still for auditors with an accounting education 
1 Economics  Accounting 272 
   Financial Management 25 
   Human Resources Management 5 
   Development Studies 5 
2 Law  Law Science 40 
3 Engineering  Civil Engineering 25 
   Industrial Engineering 10 
   Mining Engineering 5 
   Informatics Engineering/ 20 
   Computer Science  
5 Social and  Communications 20 
  Political Science  International Relations 2 
6 Agriculture  Agriculture 5 
7 Forestry  Forestry 10 
8 Psychology  Psychology 5 
9 Literature  Indonesian Literature 2 
   English Literature 4 
  
 French, German, Dutch and Russian 
Literature 
4 (1 for each 
literature) 
Total 
 
Recruitment as of  
Year 2007/2008  
469 
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background for financial auditing. Second is recruitment for employees with a law 
education background. According to the head of Legal Affairs Bureau (Interview B26), 
about 10 per cent of new personnel have a law background and this is due to the need to 
review and amend more than 24 laws and regulations that are still hampering the roles and 
functions of BPK. The data and information above indicate that BPK is still focused on 
financial auditing rather than performance auditing despite this also being mandated by the 
Constitution.  
The Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) allows it to employ auditors with the status of civil 
servant or non civil servant, giving it ―the authority to employ experts and/or auditors 
outside BPK who shall work for and on behalf of BPK‖. Therefore, BPK employed 
auditors from KAP for financial audits. KAP auditors are trained and certificated by BPK 
to meet the required standards and regulations. BPK auditors focused on developing 
performance audits to be implemented on public sector agencies and on strategic audit 
matters.  
In the case of BPK, the contracting out of financial audit services to auditors from 
KAP raised some criticism. One criticism was related to the high fees for KAP auditors, 
which are much higher than for BPK auditors and placed a burden on the BPK budget. 
Another criticism is related to the quality of KAP auditors who are not familiar with audit 
systems in the public sector and also with the bureaucratic culture, which can affect their 
audit opinion. As argued by Mulgan (1997: 106), ―Contracting out has the potential to 
reduce the extent of public accountability by transferring the provision of public services to 
Members of the private sector who are generally not subjected to the same accountability 
requirements as public officials‖. BPK auditors have direct accountability to the public 
through the Parliament, while KAP auditors do not.  
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In addition, Table 6.5 shows the responsibilities and functions of each BPK Member 
(excluded the Chairman and the Vice Chairman).  
Table 6-5 Fields of Duties and Function of Individual BPK Members, 2007 
BPK Members Fields of Duty and Function 
 
Source: Adapted from: 
Articles of the BPK RI Decree Number 28/K/I-VIII.3/5/2007 on Fields of Duty of the Chairman, Vice 
Chairman and Members of BPK RI, 24 May 2007, Jakarta (BPK RI 2007e).  
Articles of the BPK RI Decree Number 39/K/I-VIII.3/7/2007 on Organisation and Implementation 
Framework for BPK RI, 24 May 2007, Jakarta (BPK RI 2007d). 
 
Table 6.5 (above) presented additional to the numbers of Board Members of BPK 
from five to seven Members (excluding the Chairman and Vice Chairman). These 
additional numbers are due to the separating of the duties and functions of regional 
governments between the western and eastern regions. Moreover, in concern of public 
awareness about the imbalance between infrastructure development and environment 
arrangements, there is an additional Member of Board who is responsible for examining 
infrastructure, environment and natural resources 
 
Member I Politics, law, defense and security 
Member II Economics and national development planning 
Member III State institutions, people’s welfare, state secretary 
 State apparatus, research and technology 
Member IV Environment, natural resources, and infrastructure 
Member V Internal affairs, religious affairs, rehabilitation and reconstruction  
 board (BRR) of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Nias 
 
authorised development of industrial area Batam, regional finance and 
regional assets in the regional governments of Sumatera and Java (western 
regions) 
Member VI 
 
 
Health, controlling drugs and food, acceleration of development of backward 
regions, national education, regional finance of government and ROEs of Bali, 
Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua (eastern regions) 
Member VII State-owned  enterprises (SOEs)  
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6.3.3 Training and EducationCentre 
In 2002, the former Chairman of BPK argued that BPK should improve its auditor‘s 
training and education in accounting and auditing to improve their professional 
qualifications in financial auditing as mandated by Constitution (Auditor Magazine 
2002:12-15). BPK tried to improve the quality of auditors not only in financial and 
compliance audits, but also in performance, environment and other specific purpose audits. 
The Centre of Education and Training runs programs and trainings both locally and 
internationally for BPK auditors, technical staff, managers and prospective managers. 
Members of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) 
support the education and training that is carried out abroad. 
Currently, BPK has a centre for training and education in Kalibata (Jakarta) and 
three other education and training units. One is in Medan, North Sumatera (for auditors 
from the western part of Indonesia), Yogyakarta, Central Java (for auditors from the central 
region), and in Makassar, South Sulawesi (for auditors from the eastern part of Indonesia) 
(BPK RI 2007a). The regional training units hold courses to improve the quality and 
capacity of auditors at representative offices. For instance, the representative office of BPK 
in Medan held an in-service training course on the ‗Regional Financial Accounting System‘ 
on 16
th
23
rd
March 2007
92
 . The opening of three BPK education and training units in 
different parts of Indonesia was a strategic effort to facilitate auditors be more intensive in 
participating in education and training programs by placing the programs closer to their 
domicile.  
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http://medan.bpk.go.id/, accessed on 07/05/2007.  
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Table 6.6(below) shows the education programs for auditors and managers 
delivered by the training centres from 2004 to 2006. The data indicates the extensive 
expansion of education and training delivered by these centres in line with the increasing 
number of auditors as well as levels of manager as a result of opening new offices. 
Moreover, BPK also increased the numberof personnel pursuing formal education through 
post-graduate degrees and overseas short courses (non-degrees). 
Table 6-6 Number of Participants in BPK Training and Education (2004-06) 
Education/Training 2004 2005 2006 
Training of Managers 26 47 60 
Training of Auditors 445 497 1472 
Training of Technical Staff 2828 3444 1642 
Overseas Short Courses (Non-Degree) 28 49 10 
Formal Education for Post-Graduate Degrees 28 6 36 
Source: BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2006, pp. 46 and 49 (BPK RI 2007b) 
BPK has cooperated with Members of INTOSAI and ASOSAI to conduct a number 
of education and training programs on formulating policy, exchanging information, and 
experience cooperation. For example, auditors were sent, accompanied by supervisors from 
the UN, to audit in countries involved in conflict, such as Congo, Ethiopia, and Eritrea to 
gain new knowledge and experience through international practice. Other instances include 
an international auditor fellowship cooperation program held in the United States and a 
secondment programs undertaken with the Audit New Zealand Office (ANZO) for planning 
reporting and developing audit strategies
93
.Also, BPK and the Australian National Audit 
Office (ANAO), through the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and 
Development-Government Partnership Fund (AIPRD-GPF), engaged in a partnership 
framework concerning knowledge and information related to financial and performance 
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  BPK has sent approximately 30 auditors on this program according to a former participant who was spoken 
to in Canberra on 14
th
 July 2007. 
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audits, and contract management. From 25
th
-29
th
September 2006 a BPK delegation visited 
ANAO to examine a pilot study on contract management in Australia. In addition, from 
July 2007 to July 2009, six BPK auditors joined the ANAO secondment program on 
performance and financial audits (INTOSAI 2007b: 5). 
BPK also cooperated with USAID through the Financial Crime Prevention Project 
(FCPP) to develop an ‗investigative special unit‘ from 2006 to 2008, and the Swedish 
National Audit Office (SNAO) to help facilitating tutoring and monitoringfor auditing the 
Central Bank of Indonesia since 2007. BPK cooperated with ASEAN countries, particularly 
Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, for environmental auditing, including for cases 
on forest fires, avian flu, and shipping safety in the Malaka Straits. BPK cooperated with 
countries affected by tsunamis (such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, India, Bangladesh, 
Thailand, Malaysia) and donors (from the US, Netherlands, France, Germany, Japan the 
UN, the World Bank, and the International Red Cross) audited for the accountability in 
managing funds, and institutions (BPK January 2007: 20). Moreover the World Bank 
provides donations to BPK to carry out a Strengthening Investigative Audit Capacity 
(SIAC). 
BPK formed on Advisory Audit Board (AAB) with 10 SAIs from donor states 
(America, Australia, the Netherlands, Denmark, England, Japan, Norway, France, Sweden 
and the European Community) to assist BPK in auditing management and accountability of 
funds in emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and 
Nias. Regarding cooperation in auditing tsunami funding, BPK held an International 
Conference with the theme ‗Promoting Financial Accountability in Managing Funds 
Related to Tsunami Conflict and Other Disasters‘, in Jakarta, from25-27 April 2005. The 
participants agreed to emphasise the importance of ensuring that management of aid funds 
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would be more efficient, effective and economic (BPK RI 2007a: 24-25). The Chairman of 
BPK and the Chairman of SAI South Korea were appointed as the Vice Chairs of the 
INTOSAI tsunami taskforce (Hsing 2004:25-29). This appointment indicates international 
appreciation and trust in BPK‘s ability to handle the management and accountability of 
disaster funds. In 2006, BPK conducted audits of the management and channeling of relief 
funds to the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase (R2) and held ‗The 1st Meeting of The 
Advisory Board on Tsunami to Audit‘ from 24-25 April 2006. 
However, this study found criticisms from auditors on the lack of opportunity for 
BPK auditors to proceed to further education and to participate in training (15/3/2007). 
Auditees from public works department (20/08/2009) and regional government (21/3/2007) 
argued that the educational background of BPK auditors is limited to financial or 
accounting and that they lack knowledge beyond that, such as knowledge of engineering or 
public administration. These statements indicate that the growing number of auditees and 
the expanding scope of auditing from financial to performance mean those auditorsneed to 
improve their knowledge not only in accounting and finance, but also in a variety of 
educational backgrounds. This will enable auditors to better perform in auditing the 
different roles and functions of agencies in the public sector.  
However, this study found complaints from auditors about the quality of the training 
centre, as follows:  
 “Prior to audit, auditors have to attend in-house training, however, we found 
unqualified instructors” (Interview B19, an auditor of AKN II). 
 “BPK trainings were unqualified” (Interview B22, an auditor of AKN IV).  
 “Training materials that were given not applicable for the audit works” (Interview 
B11, an auditor of AKN III). 
These comments indicate dissatisfaction by auditors about the quality of the content, 
materials and trainers provided at the BPK centre of education and training. Ineffectiveness 
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of the education and training centre has significantly limited the development of skills and 
knowledge for BPK auditors.. 
6.3.4 Information Technology and Modern Office Equipment Resources 
Communication, IT and modern office equipment resources are key for influencing 
the quality and communication of audit information, including the formatting, and timely 
publication and distribution of information reports, which in turn can influence stakeholders 
in following up BPK audit reports.  
Before audit reform, BPK suffered from a lack of IT resources. Table 6.7 (below) 
shows the total number of BPK‘s computers, notebooks and laser printers in the period 
1994-2003. The data indicates that before reform, BPK had very limited quantities of 
modern equipment. From2002, the number of notebooks and scanners improved gradually, 
including the quantity of personal computers and laser jet printers, which were increased 
doubled since the audit reform.  
Moreover, during 2004-2006, after the expansion of BPK representative offices, the 
number of notebooks for every audit team, consisting of three to six auditors, increased 
significantly. Due to breakdown problems, the number of scanners in the central office and 
in the representative offices of Yogyakarta and Banjarmasin, decreased. This indicates that 
there was a lack of maintenance for office equipment at BPK. 
Besides, as show in Table 6.8 (below), some of the new representative offices are 
still not suitably equipped with computers, scanners, notebooks and a local area 
network.BPK has continued to improve IT resources in every representative office by 
providing modern equipment, and personal computers and notebooks in every office based 
on auditing needs.
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Table 6-7 Number of Computers, Notebooks and Printers at BPK Offices (1994-2003) 
Notes: RO = Representative Office; PC=Personal Computer; NB=Notebook; LJ=Laser Jet Printer; SC=Scanner; n/a = not available 
Sources: Adapted from 
1. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2003, pp. 66-84 (BPK RI 2004). 
2. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2002, pp. 70-84 (BPK RI 2003). 
3. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2001, pp. 62-73 (BPK RI 2002). 
4. BPK RI, BEPEKA Dalam Angka (BEPEKA Statistics) 1996/1997, pp. 81-91 (BPK RI 1997). 
5. BPK RI, BEPEKA Dalam Angka (BEPEKA Statistics) 1995/1996, pp.84-96 (BPK RI 1996). 
No  94/95 96/97 2000  2001  2002  2003 
  Offices  PC NB LJ PC NB LJ PC NB LJ PC NB LJ PC NB LJ SC PC NB LJ SC 
1 Central Office 125 0 43 231 0 60 247 0 91 233 0 66 487 n/a 121 n/a 495 320 127 NA 
2 Medan RO 6 0 1 21 4 6 36 3 7 43 6 4 47 9 6 n/a 51 19 19 3 
3 Palembang RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 2 6 2 2 17 10 6 n/a 46 23 19 3 
4 Yogyakarta RO 11 0 1 20 7 6 33 8 19 39 6 27 31 3 27 1 61 33 36 4 
5 Denpasar RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 5 7 2 5 20 10 10 1 38 22 15 3 
6 
Banjarmasin 
RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1 3 8 2 3 9 9 12 n/a 24 21 15 2 
7 Makasar RO 11 0 1 22 3 2 33 9 15 33 9 14 35 16 17 n/a 35 17 17 3 
  
The Total 
Number 153 0 46 294 14 74 370 24 142 369 27 121 646 57 199 2 750 455 248 18 
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Table 6-8 Number of Personal Computers, Notebooks, Printers and Scanners (2004-2006) 
No BPK Offices  2004 2005 2006 
  PC NB LJ SC PC NB LJ SC PC NB LJ SC 
1 Central Office 747 316 152 14 754 321 224 20 740 541 201 14 
2 Medan RO 51 24 19 3 58 34 19 3 64 38 22 3 
3 Palembang RO 44 36 37 3 31 46 42 3 53 60 58 4 
4 Jakarta RO 39 26 4 0 44 36 9 5 43 40 12 5 
5 Yogyakarta RO 78 47 46 4 85 52 46 4 73 47 31 1 
6 Denpasar RO 40 22 15 3 50 24 22 3 53 37 26 3 
7 Banjarmasin RO 27 16 24 3 38 21 31 8 28 16 31 1 
8 Makasar RO 39 20 20 3 71 43 23 3 46 37 31 3 
9 Jayapura RO 24 10 5 0 24 11 10 0 29 33 15 0 
10 Banda Aceh RO 0 0 0 0 10 20 1 0 15 25 1 0 
11 Pekanbaru RO 0 0 0 0 10 16 0 0 25 25 21 1 
12 Bandung RO 0 0 0 0 10 16 0 0 20 20 11 0 
13 Surabaya RO 0 0 0 0 10 16 0 0 20 20 12 0 
14 Pontianak RO 0 0 0 0 10 16 0 0 18 18 12 0 
15 Manado RO 0 0 0 0 10 16 10 0 18 21 9 0 
16 Samarinda RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 12 0 
17 Palangkaraya RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 12 0 
18 Kendari RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Total Numbers  1089 517 322 33 1215 688 437 49 1268 978 517 35 
Notes: RO = representative office of BPK; PC=Personal Computer; NB=Notebook; LJ=Laser Jet Printer; SC=Scanner 
Sources: Adapted from 
1. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2006, pp. 73-94 (BPK RI 2007b). 
2. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2005, pp. 73-83 (BPK RI 2006b). 
3. BPK RI, BPK RI Dalam Angka (BPK Statistics) 2004, pp. 63-74 (BPK RI 2005b).
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Due to its IT development, BPK opened a new Bureau of Information Technology 
in 2006 for managing its IT systems. The IT Bureau‘s roles include developing computer 
system applications and design program, and administering and maintaining the 
infrastructure of IT operations and other equipment. Moreover, the IT Bureau deals with 
the development of audit information systems, including improving hardware and software 
(such as: audit standards applications, applications for specific auditing, and applications 
for BPK administrative units).  
Member IV of BPK (Interview B2) mentioned that BPK has reduced the problem 
of late submission of financial statements from regional governmentsby providing on-line-
auditing system in 2008. This was done in cooperation with the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and begun with the provision of IT equipment to 171 regional governments. An 
auditee from SOE, the National Electricity Company (Interview A3) argued that 
communication systems and IT help auditors and auditees in providing more detailed and 
prompt data and information. The development of IT and modern equipment also helps 
auditors to provide better formats in their audit reports.  
6.3.5 Office Resources 
Although BPK‘s IT system has been developed and improved, Members of 
Parliament and auditors had criticisms. Some auditors (Interview B15, B17, and B22) 
found that the capacity of BPK‘s electronic communications network and LAN were slow, 
unstable and suffered from viruses. Two Members of Parliament (Interview C2 and C3) 
expressed their problem in opening the BPK website to see the audit reports and 
complained about the lack of computers and audit references at Parliament‘s Library. An 
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insufficient number of computers, poor access to the internet and few public sector audit 
books have impeded Members of Parliament in trying to oversee audit reports. 
Office accommodation is an essential resource for BPK as it influences the quality 
of audit reports in terms of the audit scope and the followup of audit reports. In the past, up 
to 2003, BPK had only one central office in Jakarta and six representative offices in 
Yogyakarta, Makasar (South Sulawesi), Medan (North Sumatera), Banjarmasin (South 
Kalimantan), Denpasar (Bali) and Palembang (South Sumatera).This situation resulted in a 
lack of audit scope. For example, Lampung representative office had to be audited by 
Palembang office. On the other side, an internal audit institution, BPKP, had a much 
bigger number of regional representative offices than did BPK
94
. Member II of BPK 
explained (14/02/2007) that the biggest impediments to BPK were Indonesia‘s geography 
and the infrastructure of transportation and communication needed to reach distant 
territories in the east of Indonesia, such as Papua and Maluku. Therefore, auditees of BPK 
were limited to central government and several provinces that could be reached by the 
representative offices. Most of the regional governments were audited by BPKP, which 
had the same function as BPK. As a result, regional government entities were more 
familiar with BPKP than BPK. 
Table 6.9 (below) presents data and information of the opening dates of BPK 
representative offices in every province. Each representative office of BPK has different 
number of local government audited entities. The data indicates the great improving of the 
                                                             
 
 
94 For instance, in 2003, in the regions, the number of representative office of BPKP was 25, 
with 5,104 BPKP officials, while BPK had only 7 representative offices with 955 BPK officials 
(BPK RI 2006). 
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progress numbers of BPK representative office from only six offices in 2001 to 33 offices 
in 2008.The highest number of auditees (local government and regional-owned 
enterprises) in BPK representative office is in Surabaya with 38, followed by Semarang 
with 35, and Medan and Bandung each with 26. The lowest are Mamuju and Yogjakarta 
BPK representative offices each with only five auditees. 
Table 6-9 Opening Dates of BPK Representative Offices (1950-2008) 
No Opening Dates Representative Office Province (33) Auditees (456) 
in 2007 
I 15/08/1950 Yogjakarta Yogyakarta 5 
II 17/01/1985 Makasar South Sulawesi 23 
III 28/08/1993 Medan North Sumatera 26 
IV 30/05/2000 Banjarmasin South Kalimantan 13 
V 21/09/2001 Denpasar Bali 9 
VI 28/09/2001 Palembang South Sumatera 15 
VII 11/04/2005 Jayapura East Papua 20 
VIII 27/09/2005 Jakarta DKI Jakarta 6 
IX 25/11/2005 Surabaya East Java 38 
X 05/12/2005 Menado North Sulawesi 13 
XI 09/12/2005 Pekanbaru Riau 11 
XII 20/01/2006 Banda Aceh NAD 23 
XIII 27/01/2006 Bandung West Java 26 
XIV 17/02/2006 Pontianak West Kalimantan 13 
XV 12/06/2006 Samarinda East Kalimantan 13 
XVI 10/08/2006 Palangkaraya Central Kalimantan 14 
XVII 15/11/2006 Kendari South East Sulawesi 12 
XVIII 09/03/2007 Bandarlampung Lampung 10 
XIX 30/04/2007 Ambon Maluku 8 
XX 10/05/2007 Manokwari West Papua 9 
XXI 24/05/2007 Ternate North Maluku 8 
XXII 31/07/2007 Kupang East Nusa Tenggara 19 
XXIII 27/08/2007 Jambi Jambi 10 
XXIV 26/10/2007 Padang West Sumatera 19 
XXV 16/11/2007 Palu Central Sulawesi 10 
XXVI 23/11/2007 Mataram West Nusa Tenggara 9 
XXVII 29/11/2007 Tanjungpinang Riau Archipelago 6 
XXVIII 14/12/2007 Gorontalo Gorontalo 6 
XXIX 2008 Bengkulu Bengkulu 9 
XXX 18/12/2008 Semarang Central Java 35 
XXXI 2008 Pangkal Pinang Bangka Belitung 7 
XXXII 2008 Serang Banten 6 
XXXIII 2008 Mamuju West Sulawesi 5 
Sources: Adapted from: 
1. Website of BPK: http://www.bpk.go.id/ (accessed from 14/03/2005 to 23/06/2009). 
2. BPK, 2007. The Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, BPK RI (2007a). 
3. BPS, Statistics Indonesia, List of Province/Regency/City, January 2007 (BPS 2007). 
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As mandated by Article 23G of the Constitution (2001) and the Law on BPK (GOI 
2006b), BPK should have a representative office in every province. Indonesia‘s geographic 
location, separate by oceans and seas
95
 requires BPK to provide an office in every province 
as mandated by the Constitution (2001). The representative offices are established by a 
BPK regulation, taking budget capacity into consideration.  
After audit reform, BPK opened 27 new representative offices from the west to the 
east of Indonesia. Table 6.9 shows that the number of BPK representative offices increased 
from six (in 2001) to 11 (in 2005). By the end of 2006the total was 17 (about 50 per cent 
of the number of provinces).In 2007, BPK opened a further 11 new representative 
officesfollowed by another five in 2008. The data indicates that BPK made a great effort in 
opening 33 representative offices to cover every province in Indonesia by 2008. In 2007, 
the Chairman of BPK said, ―Our target is that by the end of 2008, BPK will have 
representative offices in every province as stipulated by Amended 1945 Constitution 
(2001)‖ (Radar Lampung 10 March 2007). As the data shows, this target was successfully 
reached.  
It is more effective and efficient if BPK has a representative office in every 
province because auditors can gain a better understanding of their own local auditees, 
reduce costs, and have a longer time for auditing if the distance between an auditors‘ 
                                                             
 
 
95Indonesia is often referred to as the world's largest archipelago, with around 17,508 islands which 
span more than 5000 km (around 3,200 miles) Eastward from Sabang in Northern Sumatera to 
Merauke in Irian Jaya (http://www.indo.com/indonesia/archipelago.html). It had a population 
of about 235 million people based on the estimation from the US census bureau 2007 (the 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 2). 
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domicile and the auditees‘ offices is shorter. Therefore, opening the BPK representative 
offices has helped to provide more effective and efficient auditing of regional governments 
to encourage their transparency and accountability. Figure 6.7(below) illustrates 
Indonesia‘s geographical spread and the location of BPK representative offices throughout 
Indonesia. 
Figure 6.7 Representative Offices of BPK in 33 Provinces (2008) 
 
 
 
As the budget for opening representative offices was still not fully covered by the 
BPK budget, BPK also received loans and grants from other countries and international 
organisations, such as ADB, USAID, and AusAID. For instance, the opening of the BPK 
office in Aceh was mostly funded by ADB and USAID. Moreover, some BPK 
representative offices were opened by building loans from regional government. For 
example, the BPK office in Pekanbaru province is located in the former office of the 
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regional income agency
96
, while the BPK office in DKI Jakarta province is located at the 
former office of the Information Department
97
. However, where the BPK does not have its 
own office and is still hosted in a local government building, this results in BPK auditors 
lacking a strong position. 
6.3.6 Conclusion on BPK Resources 
Before audit reform, BPK had very limited resources, including budget, auditors, 
representative offices and training. Besides, the government and the bureaucracy 
controlled BPK‘s resources. As a result, the quality of findings, opinions and 
recommendations in BPK reports was deficient. 
Since 2004, BPK has managed to secure an impressive increase in the quantity of 
its resources. These achievements include the following: (i) budget allocation has 
improved significantly, (ii)the number of new auditors and other staff has increased by 
more than 1500, (iii) the number of Board Members has increased from seven to nine, (iv) 
it became compulsory for auditors to undergo 80 hours training, (v)the quantity and quality 
of BPK‘s training and education services have improved, (vi) modern equipment and IT 
has been added, and (vii) regional offices have been opened in every province. These facts 
indicate that since audit reform, BPK has gradually increased its resources to be more able 
to conduct its audit roles and functions effectively. 
                                                             
 
 
96
 Information from the website of Pekanbaru Representative Office (accessed on 10/05/2007): 
http://pekanbaru.bpk.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=37 
97
 Information from the website of DKI Jakarta Representative Office (10/05/07) 
http://jakarta.bpk.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=27 
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The analysis of factors influencing audit quality continues in Chapter Seven, 
particularly in relation to the capacity of BPK and auditees to act on audit information. An 
overall conclusion on the factors influencing of audit effectiveness/ineffectiveness in BPK 
is given at the end of Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter 7  
Factors Influencing Acting on Information 
in BPK Reports 
Chapter Seven continues on from Chapter Six in analysing the critical factors 
influencing the quality of audit information, in relation to the capacity of the Indonesian 
State Audit Board (BPK) and auditees to act on audit reports. The main factors are as 
follows: (i) political support from the Legislature in overseeing and reviewing audit 
reports, (ii) support from the Executive in following up on audit recommendations, (iii) 
law enforcement support where audit reports indicate criminality or corruption, and (iv) 
public and media support. The following sections provide analysis on each of these factors.  
7.1 Political Support from the Legislature 
This section examines the roles and functions of the central and local Legislature in 
acting on information in BPK reports as a factor influencing the quality of information.  
7.1.1 BPK Reports and Parliament Pre and Post Audit Reform 
Before audit reform, the original 1945 Constitution mandated BPK to report its 
findings to Parliament. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the previous chapter, during the New 
Order Erathe State Secretary Office checked BPK audit reports before they were submitted 
to Parliament. Moreover, there was no evidence that Members of Parliament followed up 
the information in BPK reports as there was no obligation and responsibility for any 
parties, including the Legislative and Executive, to act on BPK reports. At that time, the 
Golkar party held a majority of vote in Parliament, as the President was the headof the 
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advisory Members of the Golkar party, the most powerful party. The President appointed 
all his people, from the same party, in almost entire important position in public sector. 
This situation prevented the implementation of the checks and balances system. 
Since audit reform in 2001, the major tasks of the Members of Parliament have 
been to approve the government budget and oversee the performance and accountability of 
the government in managing public resources and providing good quality public services. 
BPK reports provide information to support the Members of Parliament in conducting their 
tasks to oversee the performance and accountability of the government. The Members of 
Parliament have the right to ask questions; request information; and express the views of 
officials from Executive bodies, and Judicative bodies, and Members of society to clarify 
the information in BPK reports and to review the performance of public sector agencies. 
To help review the BPK reports, Members of Parliament hire experts and advisers. BPK 
experts and staff of the Secretariat General of Parliament provide summaries of BPK 
reports to help Members of Parliament understand the reports and to act on the information 
by asking about the performance of government. 
7.1.2 Communication and Agreement between BPK and the Legislature 
The Members of the Legislative are the main stakeholders of BPK. The Legislature 
has the responsibility to hold the government accountable in using and managing the state 
budget and public resources. Article 23, Paragraph 1 of the third amendment of the1945 
Constitution (GOI 2006c: 58) and Chapter VIII about Finance and the Law on BPK (GOI 
2006), mandates Parliament to review BPK reports.  
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Figure 7.1 (below) illustrates the relationship of the functions of BPK as auditors 
and the functions of Parliament (both central and local level) as controllers in state 
finances. After BPK audits all the financial statements based on the BPK audit standards, 
BPK reports the audit results to central Parliament, the Senate (DPD) and regional 
Parliaments (DPRDs). Members of legislative institutions then review and oversee the 
performance and accountability of the agencies with supporting information from the 
opinions and recommendations in the BPK reports. They use this information as a basis for 
approving proposals from the agencies on their state/regional revenue and expenditure 
budget plans (budget function). After the public sector agencies receive the approved 
budget, they use it to develop their regions and to provide public services. All revenue and 
expenditure has to be accounted for and reported in the financial statements. 
The relationship between the bureaucracy, BPK and the Legislature (illustrated in 
Figure 7.1) indicates the essential roles and functions that BPK reports have in supporting 
the control and budget functions of the Legislature. 
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Figure 7.1Process of BPK and Parliament Functions for Public Accountability 
 
Source: Processed and adapted from BPK (BPK RI 2007a) 
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The Head of the Analysis and Budget Implementation for State and Regional 
Budget Bureau (Biro Analisa Anggaran and Pelaksanaan APBN and APBD) of the 
Secretariat General of Parliament (Interview D1),
98
 explained how Parliament acted on 
BPK reports: 
First of all, BPK audit reports were sent to a plenary session in the Parliament 
(DPR). After that, these reports were reviewed by a significant DPR Commission. 
For further analysis and review of these reports, DPR Members have been supported 
by the Parliament‘s Secretariat General. These services are information, analysis and 
advice in order to perform their duties. For this purpose, the Secretariat General of 
Parliament trained staff in the technical aspects of auditing and financial 
management. The staff of DPR secretariat is trained in ways to relate their technical 
and specialist expertise to the political needs of the Members of Parliament.  
This excerpt indicates that BPK audit reports are reviewed by Parliament with the 
assistance of experts from BPK and the Secretariat General of Parliament. BPK provides 
experts to the Secretariat General to help Parliament review the audit reports. Moreover, in 
2006, the Secretariat General of Parliament formed a new division called ‗BPK Reports 
and Senate Budget‘ to provide assistance to parliament in the process of reviewing audit 
reports. 
Because of the low follow-up of BPK reports, in 2006, BPK signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Legislative institutions at both central and 
local levels. This covered: (i) submitting audit reports and findings, (ii) monitoring follow-
up of the reports by the auditees, (iii) consultation and meetings with Members of 
Parliament and auditors, and (iv) provision of follow up and reporting after the meeting. 
The main objective of the agreement is to improve the effectiveness of acting on BPK 
                                                             
 
 
98
 The Bureau, formed in 2006, gives support to DPR Committees and Commissions to review and analyse 
BPK reports together with the Centre of Information Service Research (Pusat Pengkajian Pelayanan 
Informasi) and Commission staff. 
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reports and findings with support from Parliament. The coordination agreement between 
BPK and the Legislative (Central Parliament, Regional Parliament and Senate) is 
illustrated in Figure 7.2 (below).  
Figure 7.2 Coordination between BPK and the Legislative 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from  
1. MoU between BPK and Parliament, BPK RI, Jakarta (MoU 2006a). 
2. MoU between BPK and Regional Parliaments, BPK RI, Jakarta (MoU 2006b). 
3. MoU between BPK and Senate, BPK RI, Jakarta (MoU 2006c). 
 
The joint agreement between BPK and Parliament was signed in 2006 (MoU 
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and further information to Parliament regarding audit findings. Communication between 
BPK and the Members of the Legislature are conducted regularly to provide good 
interaction and correct information for the Members in overseeing and reviewing audit 
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For example, a consultation was held on 27
th 
February 2007
99
 to clarify the 
‗disclaimer opinion‘ from BPK on the financial statement of the central government 
(LKPP). It was attended by BPK Members and high officials and byMembers of the 
Parliament‘s budget committee. During the consultation time, the majority of the Members 
of Parliament asked for clarification on how they should take action against the central 
government to follow up the audit findings and recommendations. Example of questions 
asked by three different factions (PKS, PD, PDIP) were as follows: (i) two Members from 
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) asked, ―BPK, please give us advice on following up 
audit findings that need further investigative auditing‖ and ―How does the Parliament have 
to respond to the arrangement of the accountability Bill for implementation of state budget 
that has a disclaimer opinion from BPK?‖ (ii) a question from a Member of the 
Democratic Party (PD) faction: ―I need an explanation of the differences between financial 
statements that have been audited and not been audited‖, and (iii) the Indonesian 
Democratic Party Struggle (PDIP) faction asked ―What is your advice to improve state 
finance management?Where do we have to start from?Who are the human resources in the 
government who will conduct this state financial reform management?‖ 
These questions indicate the lack of understanding and knowledge of Members of 
Parliament about what should they do to with information and data presented in BPK 
reports. This means that the Members still need assistance to conduct their role in 
controlling government entities to fulfill their accountability duties to the public. The 
forum of consultation is strongly needed by the Members of Parliament to provide clear 
                                                             
 
 
99
The researcher participated in this consultation that was held the auditorium of BPK office, Jakarta.  
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information and suggestions from BPK in performing their duties. After the consultation, 
Member III of BPK (Angbintama III), proposed ―to insert one special paragraph in the Bill 
of accountability on the implementation of state budget 2005 to encourage the government 
to follow up the audit results of BPK in a certain period‖. Input from BPK becomes 
important information for the Members. Therefore, consultation and communication 
between BPK and Members of Parliament is very important for the effectiveness of audit 
reports in learning what action is required on BPK opinions and recommendations, and 
also for the Legislature to conduct its budget and control functions. 
BPK also signed a MoU with regional Parliaments (DPRDs) in 2006 (MoU 2006b). 
Some examples of signed agreements between BPK and DPRDs include:(i) BPK 
representative office of Yogyakarta with the regional Parliament of Central Java Province 
and its regencies, including Banyumas Regency and Banjarnegara Regency
100
, (ii) BPK 
representative office of Jakarta with the regional Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province
101
 
(Indo Pos 9
th
March 2006),(iii) BPK representative office of West Kalimantan Province 
with the West Kalimantan regional Parliament, in Pontianak (Pontianak Post 10
th
March 
2006), and (iv) BPK representative office of Lampung Province with Lampung regional 
Parliament in Bandar Lampung (Republika 23
rd
March 2006).  
Consultations were also conducted between BPK, Members of regional Parliaments 
DPRDs) and the Senate (DPD). For example, in September 2007a consultation was held 
                                                             
 
 
100
 Joint agreement was held in BPK representative office of Yogjakarta, Jalan HOS Cokroaminoto 52. This is 
based on the BPK RI Decree Number 12/SK/I-VIII.3/09/2005 about the decentralisation BPK RI to the head of 
BPK RI Representative Office to submit BPK‘s audit results reports on management and accountability of 
regional government state finances to the Regional Parliament. 
101
 Joint agreement was signed at DKI Jakarta regional parliament office; on 8
th
March 2006.The ceremony was 
attended by the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Chairman of BPK, the Governor of DKI Province, the Head 
and Members of DKI Jakarta regional representatives. 
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between BPK and Members of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta(DIY) Parliament to get 
information from the Members related to the benefits of information provided in BPK 
reports and to discuss special purpose audits that were requested as an audit priority (BPK 
RI 2007c).On 23
rd
January 2008, the Members of regional Parliaments paid a working visit 
to the Central BPK office to obtain information directly related to the followup of auditees 
on BPK reports that contained findings of irregularities, state and regional financial losses, 
and inefficiency (February 2008a). The Members gave attention to the constraints faced by 
BPK to conduct its roles and functions. On 25
th
September 2007, Members of Nganjuk 
Regency Parliament had a consultation with BPK related to issues with the election budget 
of the Regent (the head of Nganjuk Regency) (Warta BPK October 2007:5). 
Members of both central and regional Parliaments (Interview C1, C3, and C9) 
argued that they are consistently committed to holding the government accountable to the 
public. They also found that their relationships with BPK are important. BPK has 
conducted some specific purpose audits at the special request of Parliament, such as 
investigative audits for indications of corruption or irregularities, the mudflow disaster 
auditing at Sidoardjo, and auditing the electricity subsidies policy. A Member of 
Parliament (7/3/2007) argued that the Legislature will continue to strengthen the roles and 
functions of BPK, including budget allocation to support BPK‘s independence and 
professionalism.  
The Chairman of BPK stated to high officials of local government (Governor, 
Regent, Mayor, the heads of government agencies) and to Members of Lampung Province 
Parliament (9 March 2007) that BPK reports support the regional Parliament in carrying 
out their functions in budgeting and controlling government entities by monitoring and 
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encouraging government agencies to act on BPK reports and recommendations. BPK are 
open and transparent and willing to answer all questions posed to its Members and to 
explain any information in the reports that is not understood. The mutual support of BPK 
and the Members of Parliament can hold the government accountable in using state 
finances, managing public resources and providing satisfactory public services. 
Since the joint agreement was signed and consultations began, there has been a 
significant improvement in the followup of BPK reports and findings from the Members of 
the Legislature. One example is the Member‘s rejection of the 2007 financial statement 
produced by the DKI Jakarta government because of a gap of hundreds of millions of 
Rupiahs of state revenues from tax of vehicles. This was discovered after the Members of 
Parliament conducted surprise visits to the tax office (Investor Daily and Seputar 
Indonesia 5
th
March 2008). A second example was when Members of the Cianjur City 
Parliament questioned investigators about their follow up of BPK findings regarding 
irregularities in tax revenues (Republika 26
th
February 2007). A final example is the 
followup conducted by Parliament when it formed a team for budget control of the 
National Education Department, which has the highest budget allocation of all 
departments. BPK found ineffectiveness in its program implementation and irregularities 
in the procurement process of book and school equipment (Seputar Indonesia 
22
nd
February 2008). From 2001 until December 2007, BPK had found 1,254 cases (valued 
at Rp.286.28 million) which were only followed up about 71.77 per cent or 900 cases.  
Therefore, after BPK consultations with Members of Parliament there was 
significant progress on the follow up of BPK reports. However, this study revealed that 
Members of Parliament have not used BPK reports optimally for the budget control of the 
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Executive government. Since 2006, in response to the lack of Parliament Members‘ ability 
to understand and review BPK reports, the State Audit Reform Sector Development 
Project (STAR-SDP) has supported programs to improve the ability of the Members of 
Parliament to oversee the performance of the Executive through reviewing BPK reports 
(Interview F5)
102
. These programs help Paliament Members be aware of what sources of 
information they need to review BPK audit reports. In addition, STAR SDP provides other 
support services for the Parliament Secretariat to assist Parliament Members.  
BPK‘s Chairman has recommended a committee, called the Public Accountability 
Committee (PAC) or Panitia Akuntabilitas Public (PAP), to be formed for the Indonesian 
Parliament (Bisnis Indonesia 18 January 2008). This committee would be responsible to 
review BPK reports and to solve weaknesses in basic financial management and 
administration of state finances in government agencies. Similar public accounts 
committees are found in other countries. For example, in Australia there is the Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) that has the power to hold government 
officials to account in the Australian Parliament. It also monitors the followup of audit 
recommendations towards good public sector governance, helping to make government 
agencies and officials act in compliance with existing rules, to act efficiently and to 
achieve their purposes effectively in the use of public funds. 
However, the recommendation to form the PAC has not yet been approved. A 
Member of Parliament from the PKS faction, Nasir Zamil, stated in a national newspaper 
                                                             
 
 
102
 This is based on an interview with the deputy team leader of the Asian Development Bank, Program Loan 
Monitoring Unit State Audit Reform Sector Development Project (STAR-SDP) Loan, No. 2126-INO in 
Jakarta. 
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that the proposal to establish such a committee is still being examined (Kompas 
21
st
February 2008). He argued that the main problem is the lack of public accountability of 
government in public administration and in using public finances rather than the following 
up of BPK reports by the legislative. This opinion indicates that the Member feels 
confident that Parliament can perform its duties and functions to improve the fiscal 
transparency and accountability of government without assistance from PAC. In fact, in 
following up the weaknesses of the Indonesian state and regional financial administration, 
Members of Parliament could not perform well. Since the ReformationEra, Members of 
Parliament have had a budget committee to discuss state and regional government budgets. 
In addition, the Legislative has commissions that oversee the use of budgets and the 
performance of each department. However, without a PAC, for instance, Members of 
Parliament have not been able to check how a government agency acquires expenditure for 
its activities, including how much is sourced from state/local public budgets and how much 
from other resources. 
7.1.3 Survey Results and Comments on Political Support from the Legislature 
During the survey, respondents were asked their opinion about the support 
fromMembers of the Legislature for BPK reports. Figure 7.3 (below) presents the survey 
results and reveals that the responses varied considerably. 
Figure 7.3 Survey Results that ‘Members of Parliament Provide Political Support for the 
Roles and Functions of BPK’ 
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Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007 
 
Sixty-one percent of auditors and 73 per cent of auditees responded positively, but 
only 18 per cent the Members of Parliament ‗agreed‘. Respondents provided positive 
comments as follows: 
 “Now, the Members of Parliament have supported BPK audit reports and 
findings” (Interview B29). 
 “Approval for a draft of a new Law on BPK is one example of real political 
support from the Members” (Interview C5). 
 “We will support the important roles and functions of BPK for public 
accountability” (Interview C3). 
These comments indicate that the respondents found thatMembers of Parliament have 
supported the BPK reports. One example is that the Members of Parliament approved 
revolutionary managerial reforms of the public sector by approving the Law on BPK (GOI 
2006b) to strengthen the professionalism and integrity of auditing in the public sector. 
Besides, with support from Parliament, BPK has reformed its organisation, management, 
leaders and information technology. It has also recruited new qualified auditors and 
provided a representative office in every province. At the same time, BPK supports the 
role and function of the Members of Parliament in budgeting and controlling the 
government agencies to act accountably in improving their public service delivery and 
public administration.  
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Besides these positive responses, the survey also indicated neutral and negative 
responses. The Members of Parliament group responded with 73 per cent ‗neutral‘ and 9 
per cent ‗disagree‘. On the other hand, the auditors group responded with 29 percent 
‗neutral‘ and 10 per cent ‗disagree‘. In addition, the study revealed negative comments 
from Members of Parliament and BPK auditors as follows:  
 ‘”We could not support audit reports, because the information from BPK is still 
biased. May need further explanation from BPK or further investigation” 
(Interview C8, a Member of Parliament from Commission V) 
 “The Members of Parliament have not reviewed audit findings seriously” 
(Interview B11, an auditorof AKN III). 
 “There are still the lack integrity and commitment from the Members in 
providing political support to uncover and solve some cases of BPK findings and 
to improve performance of government” (Interview B22, an auditor of AKN IV). 
 “Difficult to support BPK audit reports without the ability of the auditees to 
reform the bureaucracy” (Interview C2, a Member of Parliament from 
Commission VII). 
The first three excerpts indicate the potential for Parliamentary oversight of the Executive 
to be jeopardised. The Members of Parliament doubted the professionalism and integrity of 
BPK auditors. On the other hand, BPK auditors foundthe Parliament‘s ability to review 
BPK reports weak in holding the Executive to account. A researcher from a research unit 
for ParliamentStudy (18/2/2007) argued that Members of Parliament have the budget 
committee to control the pre budget (budget planning) of government agencies, but that 
Members have not controlled the post budget. Besides, Parliament lacks budget analysis 
experts to support Members in asking questions and forcing the government to be 
accountable. Every year, BPK reports which publish to the Parliament and the public 
(through the BPK website) show the significant number of irregularities of public sector 
agencies. Moreover, the audit reports also found lack of financial performance of 
government agencies that show potential losses worth billions rupiah. The last excerpt 
indicates thatMembers of Parliamentare being defensive by concluding that the problem is 
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not due to the oversight of the Members, but due to the commitment of government to 
provide better performance and more satisfactory public services.  
7.1.4 Conclusion on Political Support from the Legislature 
To summarise, before audit reform, the Members of Parliament never followed up 
information in BPK reports. There was no obligation or responsibility for the Legislature 
to act on BPK reports. Parliament‘s Members were dominated by the Golkar Party, which 
of the Golkar‘s advisor was the President. As a result, the checks and balances system 
between the Legislature and the Executive did not effectively apply in the New Order Era. 
After audit reform, political support from Members of the Legislature (DPR, 
DPRDs and DPD) to follow up BPK audit reports has not run optimally, although BPK 
reports have significantly helpedMembers of the Legislature to conduct their control and 
budget functions. In 2006, a joint agreement between BPK and the Legislature was signed 
with the aim of improving follow up of BPK reports byMembersof the Legislature by 
communicating and consultation on BPK reports. BPK conducts these consultations with 
Members of the Legislature to explain the audit findings, including answering questions 
from the Members. Since then, through consultation forums, Members of Parliament 
(including regional Parliaments) and the senate have obtained guidance and clarifications 
from BPK to help them better understand the audit results and problems highlighted by the 
audit reports. Besides, consultations also provide guidance on procedures for government 
entities in following up audit reports and monitoring this. These efforts have led to positive 
responses from Members of DPR and DPRDs who are starting to review BPK reports 
more seriously and putting more pressure on the government to follow up audit findings 
and recommendations. The Members ask, remind, and pressure the government. As the 
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Members have the right to control the accountability of government and to approve state 
and regional government budgets, Parliament can push the government to follow up BPK‘s 
audit findings and recommendations in line with its responsibility to be accountable in 
public administration.  
This study found that the Members of the Legislature control the budget planning 
of the central and local government entities through budget committees. However, this has 
not run optimally because Members lack ability and also the support of experts in budget 
analysis. The control function of the Members of the Legislature as ex-ante oversight has 
not been yet fully extended to the post-budget actions of government entities. The 
recommendation to form a Public Accountability Committee (PAC) to control the financial 
performance of the Executive after implementation programs (post budget) has not been 
approved.  
7.2 Support from the Executive 
As mentioned previously, the central government and many regional governments 
had ‗disclaimer opinion‘ on their financial statements, which indicated their poor public 
accountability and management of state finances. Although the opinions from BPK can 
influence the decisions of investors whether or not to invest in Indonesia, the government 
has consistently ignored these opinions. The most severe restriction is that since 2004, the 
Directorate General of Taxation cannot be audited, although tax revenue is the largest state 
income in the state budget. The effectiveness of BPK audit reports is also influenced by the 
commitment of the public sector to follow up BPK‘s recommendations. The following 
section describes BPK‘s opinions and findings on public sector accountability and the 
perceptions and comments received during the survey and interviews. 
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7.2.1 BPK Opinion and Findings on Public Sector Accountability 
Brunori (2002: 1076-1077) argued that in a democratic society, accountability and 
transparency regarding the quality of a tax revenue system is essential for fiscal decisions 
and policy. Revrisor Baswir, an economist from the University of Gadjah Mada, estimated 
leakage in tax revenues at75 per cent (Investor Daily Indonesia 4
th
February 2005). He 
argued that before the state revenue from tax income is reported to government, 25 per 
cent of the real potential tax revenue was not paid or reported. For instance the target of tax 
revenue in 2009 was Rp.100 trillion (US$ 9.09 billion)
103
, although the real potential of tax 
revenue might be Rp.130 trillion (US$13.9 billion). Moreover, when the tax revenues 
came into government, leakage occurred again at25 per cent of the total income tax, 
because the tax administrators were not depositing the tax into the state treasury. In 
addition, 25 per cent of the total tax revenue was used with a lack of accountability to the 
public. However, until now, BPK could not access the data and information required to 
audit tax revenues. As a result, the opinion of BPK on the financial reports of central 
government for six years (2004-2009) was a ‗disclaimer‘ (no opinion), because BPK 
lacked enough information to provide an audit opinion. The Chairman of BPK argued that 
BPK will still provide a ‘disclaimer‘ opinion on government financial statements if BPK 
cannot audit and access the tax information (Harian Ekonomi Neraca 20
th
February 2008). 
According to the BPK Vice Chairman, in 2005, BPK had direct communication 
with the President just once. Although some letters had been sent to ask for direct 
communication and consultation with the President in regard to reforming state finance 
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management, there was no response. Based on a discussion between BPK and Parliament‘s 
budget committees
104
, BPK suggested some options to improve the state finance 
management of government institutions. Member I of BPK (Angbintama I) reported that 
BPK sent letters to the President regarding problems with the state finance management 
system and gave some options and suggestions on how to solve the problems. BPK 
suggested the Financial Development Supervisory Board (BPKP), which had sufficient 
and competent auditors, to give assistance in supporting the new state finance management 
system in central and local government agencies. In addition, Member of BPK III 
(Angbintama III) suggested improving the state finance management and accountability, 
starting from the Ministry of Finance to improve its own state financial management. 
Moreover, the tax office is not transparent and the state revenue system has just started to 
implement the single account system. Moreover, it is no secret to taxpayers that there is the 
potential for tax revenue leaks. 
According to Member of BPK III
105
, BPK findings indicate low commitment of the 
government to improve the state finances system. Moreover, weaknesses in state finance 
management and accountability are due to the ineffectiveness of budget reconciliation, and 
the lack of integration of the IT systemfor financial management with the government 
accounting system. Moreover, not all public sector agencies have implemented single 
treasury accounts as stipulated in the Law on State Treasury (2004) (Warta BPK June 
2007:2).  
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In this regard, the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indarwati, argued that difficulty 
of external examiners is caused by a lack of role of internal audit or the Internal Controller 
Unit (SPI) and the public administrators, who are still working to implement the new 
government accounting standardsaccounting standards (SAP 2005). This is the main 
reason why the financial reports of the departments (LKD), the Institutes (LKL), state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and regional-owned enterprises (ROEs) received a ‗disclaimer‘ 
opinion from BPK. Sri Mulyani argued that the full implementation of the new system of 
the SPI and SAP needs a long-term process and stated in Rakyat Merdeka newspaper 
(17
th
February 2007) as follows: 
BPK and government have the same understanding that improvement in state 
financial management will need many years of recovery, because it involves the 
system. So, it is impossible to find a direct solution, because we are still in the 
process of recuperation. The government law (PP) for SPI has not cleared and not 
been determined, because the government is still reforming the BPKP as the internal 
control of government. 
In addition, she promised to take seriously the need to provide clear steps and will not 
tolerate any government agencies, SOEs, and ROEs that are identified by BPK as 
practicing corruption and irregularities. Moreover, government agencies are still adapting 
to an accrual-based accounting system as required by the new government accounting 
standards (SAP 2005). The statement from the Ministry of Finance indicates that although 
the government works better by various policies and efforts to reform the public sector, 
there issignificant evidence there remains a lack of human resource capacity and overly 
bureaucratic systems in implementing the new state accounting, financial and auditing 
standards. 
The Minister of Finance continues to encourage government entities, including her 
Ministry, to submit financial statements and reports no more than 60 days after audit 
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findings are accepted. This is supported by the Minister of Finance Regulation Number 
16/PMK 05/2007 on planning arrangements for follow-up and monitoring the completion 
of follow-up (Seputar Indonesia 29
th
September 2007). The Member of BPK II 
(Angbintama II) complained about the inability of government to take significant 
professional steps to control obscure state accounts in government officials‘ accounts 
valued at trillions of Rupiahs that were found by BPK (Rakyat Merdeka 17
th
February 
2007). A 2005 case involving1,303 hidden bank accounts (of government officials) 
containing Rp.8.7 trillion of state money could be solved if the government has the 
courage to close these unauthorised accounts and uncover who the owners are. 
BPK reported the reluctance of the government in responding to the President 
about BPK audit results. After that, the President requested all government officials to 
follow up every BPK finding and recommendation. He also committed to monitoring 
government agencies to follow up audit findings. The Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, argued 
that all public officials would be investigated based on BPK audit results. However, it will 
be a long process to examine cases of irregularities in public administration and criminal 
cases (Media Indonesia, 2
nd
December 2006). An example of support from the Executive 
was their support regarding BPK findings that indicated irregularities in the Ministry of 
Health and the ‗mark-up‘ of health insurance funds for poor people. Another example was 
when the Executive asked WHO to give a cheap price for Avian flu vaccine for examining 
virus samples of H5N1 (Koran Tempo 21
st
February 2008).  
In 2007, from a total 76 of government agencies, 31 received a ‗disclaimer‘ 
opinion. 20 of 31 ‗disclaimer opinion‘s agencies, they had the highest state budget 
allocation. BPK found Rp.19.27 trillion of state assets in 19 departments that were not well 
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administered (Koran Tempo 11
th
April 2008). Although there were indications of leakage of 
around 30 per cent, BPK could not audit foreign aid funds (Kuncoro 13
th
December 2009). 
In 2008, the recording of all state and regional inventory and assets begun and was 
reported to the Ministry of Finance to avoid the loss and misuse of public sector assets. 
According to Member of BPK I (Angbintama I), the poor management of state assets that 
caused public sector assets to be unsafe, is also one of the reasons for a ‗disclaimer‘ 
opinion on central government financial statements (Kompas 11
th
April 2008). BPK also 
found fraud relating to many foreign grants in the form of goods, money or assets, because 
they were not reported to the government, in this case the Ministry of Finance (Kuncoro, 
13
th
December 2009).  
The President commented in Bisnis Indonesia (22
nd
February 2008) that ―Now, our 
state finance management is still under repair. In the future, we will have a better system to 
provide the right management of state finances‖. He also added that the government is 
preparing regulations to strengthen the role of BPKP as an internal audit institution of 
government (Bisnis Indonesia 22
nd
February 2008). In addition, collaborative solutions 
between BPK and government institutions were conducted to correct the financial 
statements of these institutions. For instance a discussion was held on 21
st
February 2008 to 
follow up the financial reports of the Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian National 
Army, which receiving the largest state/national budget and assets. From this meeting, 
BPK presented recommendations to provide better management and accountability for 
these institutions and expected an agreement that they would follow up BPK reports 
(Warta BPK February 2008b: 2). 
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The facts and information above indicate the government‘s lack seriousness in 
following up the findings and reports of BPK. The government has not yet fully 
implemented the new system of state and regional management finance. This resulted in 
many irregularities and indications of state losses in BPK findings. Moreover, BPK still 
cannot audit foreign aid or tax revenues. The following section explainsperceptions and 
comments on government support to BPK reports, based on the survey data and 
interviews. 
7.2.2 Survey Results and Comments on Support from the Executive 
Respondents comprising auditors and auditees were asked whether government 
provides support for improvements and changes in the public sector, after BPK reported its 
findings. Figure 7.4 (below) shows the survey results indicate positive responses from the 
auditees group on government support for BPK, with 57 per cent ‗agree‘ and 30 per cent 
‗strongly agree‘. From the auditors group, 48 per cent ‗agree‘.  
Figure 7.4 Survey Results on ‘Government Provides Support for BPK Results and 
Recommendations’ 
 
Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007. 
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 “Auditees have responded positively to BPK reports and have the commitment to 
make some corrections based on auditors’ recommendations” (Interview B17, an 
auditor of  AKN I). 
 “Under the new laws, audit recommendations from BPK help us to provide better 
management of state finances and improve the performance of organisations” 
(Interview A7, an auditee from the Ministry of Education). 
 “We have a commitment to support the roles and functions of BPK for better 
performance in the public sector” (Interview A22, an auditee from Bandung city) 
These quotes indicate that both auditors and auditees found BPK reports and 
recommendations important to help public sector agencies provide better public 
administration, performance and accountability.  
On the other hand, there were some negative and neutral responses during the 
survey. For the auditors‘ group, 48 per cent had a ‗neutral‘ response, 3 per cent ‗disagreed‘ 
and 1 per cent ‗strongly disagreed‘. For the auditees‘ group, 8 per cent responded ‗neutral‘ 
and 5 per cent responded ‗disagree‘. The survey results indicated that almost 50 per cent of 
the auditors group responded as being uncertain or doubtful about support from the 
government. During the interview, auditors and auditees commented as follows: 
 “To adapt to the reforms in the system of new state finance management in 
government institutions which is not transparent and disordered, needs longer 
time” (Interview A15, an auditee from Cianjur District). 
 “Lack of commitment from auditees to change their attitude and to reform 
financial administration” (Interview B15, an auditorof AKN III).  
The statements indicate that government did not perform transparently and accountably in 
managing state finances. Significant doubts from auditee and auditor about the ability of 
government to follow up audit reports and recommendations which can help the 
bureaucracy reform of financial public administration. 
To conclude, the Indonesian government has not fully implemented the new 
government accounting standards (SAP 2005) as the basis of providing government 
financial statements. The efforts of the government to reform state financial management 
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and auditing were noted by the number of positive responses in the survey. Since 2003, the 
government has reformed the state finance management system, starting from the Ministry 
of Finance and followed by all other departments. Data and survey results indicate that the 
government agencies found it hard to provide support for BPK‘s audit findings and reports 
in the short term. Since 2004, the central government has had a ‗disclaimer‘ opinion for its 
financial statement reports. This is because BPK cannot audit the tax revenue office or 
foreign loans well as the due to the poor management of state assets and lack of 
transparency and accountability by government agencies. However, the response from 
government and the support from the President to make changes and to reform public 
administration based on BPK reports and recommendation, were still low. Up until 2008, 
some government agencies still showed no significant change in their commitment and 
behavior to reform their organisations to perform better in public accountability. BPK 
seeks to hold consultations and discussions with government agencies to improve 
government support and to provide collaborative solutions for improving anticorruption 
programs, transparency and accountability, and to implement necessary reforms in public 
sector agencies. BPK encourages the leaders of institutions and agencies to improve the 
accountability of state finances in many ways. These include (i) improving their 
accounting and financial reporting systems and information technology system, (ii) 
regulating government accounts, (iii) providing inventory and valuation of assets and 
liabilities, (iv) improving quality assurance from internal auditors, and (v) improving 
human resources quality who contributed and worked for management finance both at 
central and local government. For example on 18
th
July 2008 (Kasnah, November-
December 2008: 40), BPK held discussions with all state institutions, including Members 
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of Parliament, the state secretary and the Central Bank, to obtain support for BPK findings 
and recommendations  
7.3 Law Enforcement Support from Authorised Investigators 
This section examines the essential factor of law enforcement support for effective 
audit reports. As mandated by Article 8 of the Law on BPK (2006), authorised 
investigators should follow up any BPK audit reports that indicate fraud, criminal 
irregularities and corruption. Authorised investigators include the Attorney General, the 
Police and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). In line with the national 
anticorruption program, since 2004 BPK has focused on audit work in the areas of 
corruption, collusion and nepotism. Recently, BPK has found increasingly reliable 
evidence of significant fraud and corruption as the result of investigative audits. There are 
many BPK reports and findings that indicate of corruption that have to be followed up by 
the authorised investigators.  
BPK found indications of corruption and criminality in several public sector 
agencies and which were published in local and national newspapers, magazines and 
television. BPK found false and fictitious documentation and transactions to claim money 
for budget activities that were never carried out. These fictitious activities included 
workshops, consulting services, procurement of goods and business travel. BPK reported 
Rp. 3.85 billion (US$420,000)
106
 or about 20 per cent of total government expenditurewere 
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fraudulent (INTOSAI 2006a:10). The investigative audit reports were sent to DPR and the 
office of the Attorney General for further action on September 2005. 
BPK also found central government entities showing a discrepancy of Rp.257 
trillion. These include: (i) the Ministry of Transportation with a discrepancy of Rp.751 
million from a total audit valued at Rp.2.51 trillion, (ii) the Ministry of Finance with a 
discrepancy of Rp.51 trillion with a total audit valued at Rp.207 trillion, (iii) Gelora Bung 
Karno with a discrepancy of Rp.40 million, and (iv) the Supreme Court with a discrepancy 
of Rp.464 million from a total audit valued at Rp.502 million.  
Two other findings in the audit report of semester II of 2005indicatedcorruption 
involving Rp.201.5 million. The first case regarded the implementation of the Provincial 
Health Project II (PHP II) in the Health Department in Jakarta and involved a loss valued 
at Rp.1.75 million. The second case regarded the audit results of the President‘s Secretariat 
found that the Board of Management Complex Kemayoran and Sport Arena of Bung 
Karno had a total loss valued at Rp.199.75 million.  
The Chairman of BPK (Hudiono 17
th
May 2006) stated that BPK had reported two 
cases indicating corruption to a value of Rp.201.5 billion to the Attorney General‘s Office 
for further investigation, namely: a Health Ministry Project with potential state losses of 
Rp.1.75 billion, and the State Secretariat‘s management with a value of Rp.199.75 billion-
worth of state assets at the Gelora Bung Karno Sports Stadium and the Kemayoran 
Complex.These were reported to the Attorney General to be followed up and published in 
the media, but have not been followed up. 
Chairman of BPK also explained (Sam 2006)that in the past, all areas of the Bung 
Karno Sport Arena were allocated for the development of public sports facilities. However, 
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in reality, some of them were reallocated and re-functioned as commercial areas belonging 
to the families of high state officials, for instance, the location of Plaza Senayan Building, 
Hotel Hilton and Hotel Mulia. He also explained another case regarding the land of 
Kemayoran Airport that in the past belonged to private owners, who sold the land to 
investors at a low price. Land was sold cheaply by the owner, because the owner thought 
the land will be used for public purpose (that is for public sport area and training). 
However, the investors transferred the land to another party to be used for commercial 
purposes, such as the location for the Palazo Apartments and Mitra Keluarga Kemayoran 
Hospital.  
Moreover, from December 2004 to December 2008, there were 21 cases of BPK 
reports and findings indicating criminality to the value of Rp.20.22 trillion (Auditor 
Magazine 2008: 30), that were reported to the Police of the Republic Indonesia (POLRI). 
Notwithstanding, audit reports that indicated corruption and criminality and were 
published in media outlets, have not been followed up by investigators or law enforcers. 
BPK reported the reluctance of the government in responding to BPK audit results to the 
President. The President asked the Police and the Attorney General to examine audit 
reports on state agencies that indicated criminal activities (Media Indonesia 2 December 
2006). But according to the judgment of someMembers of Parliament and other observers, 
law enforcement officials respond poorly to the BPK audit findings that indicate criminal 
activities or fraud. 
The Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Saleh argued 
that law enforcers found obstacles in following up evidence from BPK reports on cases of 
corruption(Saleh 2007: 8). Although BPK reports found indications of corruption, there 
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were different perceptions among law enforcers about whether or not the cases actually 
involved corruption or not. The Attorney General(Saleh 2007: 8)argued that in analysing 
corruption cases, criminal irregularitiesand state finance losses, having the same 
perceptions is important to uncover corruption cases, round up corruptors and apply 
criminal sanctions. This means that although BPK reported findings indicating corruption 
to law enforcers and the public, these findings were not enough to lead to any 
prosecutions. Further investigations from law enforcement were not conducted effectively, 
because the cases of corruption were still debatable. 
7.3.1 Mechanisms and Findings Indicating Corruption 
Due to the low followup by law enforcers on BPK reports indicating criminality 
and corruption, BPK provided new mechanisms to improve this situation. The first new 
mechanism was the signing of a joint agreement between BPK and KPK concerning 
cooperation and efforts to prevent and eradicate corruption (KPK and BPK RI 2006)
107
. 
The agreement covers the coordination of information exchange, personnel assistance, 
education and training, and further investigation. The Chairman of BPK explained 
(Eksekutif January 2007:18-23) that BPK only report to the KPK findings that indicate 
fraud and corruption as preliminary evidence. KPK has to follow up the reports by 
conducting further investigations to prove whether the corruption exists or not.  
Article 3 of this agreement focuses on the exchange of information between KPK 
and BPK in relation to the duty and authority of each party. BPK reports audit findings and 
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information that is required by KPK to investigate or handle any cases that indicate 
corruption. On the other hand, BPK can obtain information from KPK in regard to any 
complaints or information from the public indicating corruption, and other information 
required by BPK to conduct an investigative audit. All confidential information to or from 
BPK and KPK must be given in writing and is signed by the respective heads of BPK and 
KPK. 
The second new mechanism was an agreement signed between BPK and the Centre 
for Reporting and Analysis of Financial Transactions (PPATK) to more effectively prevent 
and eradicate criminality related to money laundering (PPATK and BPK RI 2006). The 
purposes of this agreement between BPK and PPATK are to exchange of data and 
information, to assist in promoting system against criminality related to money laundering, 
and to provide trainings and education
108
. For the transfer of information, both parties 
agreed that BPK could provide to PPATK information in audit reports that indicates 
money laundering. On the other hand, PPATK provides information to BPK in regard to 
abuses of authority and contempt of regulations related to money laundering. Although 
cooperation among BPK, KPK and PPATK has occurred before, the joint agreements 
show that further efforts are being undertaken to prevent money laundering and to 
strengthen more effective cooperation. 
The third new mechanism was a joint agreement signed in 2006 between the 
Attorney General and the police (Kep-019/A/JA/03/2006) to improve the effectiveness of 
coordination to eradicate corruption (Saleh 2007: 16). However, this cooperation has not 
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run effectively due to different perceptions between the laws enforcers regarding the 
definition of state finances. The Attorney General (Saleh 2007: 4) indicated this as follows:  
The detailed information on the definition of state finances and state loss are stated in 
two administrative laws, the Law on State Finances and the Law on BPK. For 
criminal activities, the definition of state finances which are relevant to corruption 
shall be based on general provision of Law on Corruption (No. 31/1999). The 
definition of state finances mentioned in State Finance and BPK Laws is more 
detailed compared to Law on Corruption that is more general. Yet, Law on State 
Finance is in the range of administrative law. If it is related to a criminal case, law 
enforcers use the definition of state finances based on the Law on Corruption. In 
criminal cases, the principle of lex specialis derogat lex generalis (the specific laws 
overrule the general laws) prevails. Consequently, in handling the case of corruption, 
the definition of state finances is based on the specific and special definition 
mentioned in Law on Corruption.  
This statement means that the definition of state finances stipulated by the Law on State 
Finances (GOI 2003b) and the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b) provides the scope of public 
finance administration. Considering that state finance has close links with criminal cases of 
corruption, the definition of state finances is based on the Law Number 31 of 1999 on 
Eradication of Criminal Corruption is: 
All government property in any forms, separated or not separated, including all the 
state property and all the rights and the responsibilities because they are, (1) under 
the authority, management and responsibilities of state institution officials, at both 
central and local levels (2) under the authority, management and responsibilities of 
SOEs/ROEs, foundations, law boards and enterprises that involve state capital or 
companies that involve capital from a third party based on the agreement with the 
state. 
The Attorney General has argued for a different perception or definition of state finances 
in SOEs, which is still under discussion (as stated earlier in Section 5.1.1). 
The fourth new mechanism is an agreement between BPK and the Attorney 
Generalmade on 25 July 2007 (Kejaksaan Agung and BPK RI 2007) to support the 
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effectiveness of BPK reports that indicate a criminal matter
109
. The agreement
110
 covers 
coordination between BPK and the Attorney General for the submission of BPK‘s audit 
results to the Attorney General‘s office, law enforcement on BPKaudit findings that 
indicate corruption, and their cooperation in education and training.  
The joint agreement between BPK and the law enforcers in this example is with the 
Attorney Ge neral as depicted in Figure 7.5 (below), which shows the coordination in 
following up BPK reports that indicate criminality. BPK submits these audit findings to the 
law enforcers, including the Attorney General. If the preliminary audit findings from BPK 
provide sufficient evidence, the Attorney General has to follow up that case by undertaking 
further investigation. On the other hand, if the preliminary evidence is insufficient, the 
Attorney General can ask BPK to audit further in order to obtain the required evidence. 
After BPK audit findings are submitted to the Attorney General, the results of the 
investigators have to be reported within two months. The agreement also includes the 
provision of BPK experts or auditors to the Attorney General and vice versa. Appointed 
officials must propose their requirements in writing. For assistance from BPK auditors in 
calculating state finance losses, Article 7 of the joint agreement stipulates that not more 
than two months after accepting the requirement for state finance loss calculation, the 
result of this calculation must be presented to the Attorney General. Moreover, BPK and 
the Attorney General conduct joint education and training for BPK auditors and Attorney 
Generalofficials on the requirements for investigative audits. 
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Figure 7.5 Coordination between BPK and the Attorney General Indicating Corruption 
 
 
Source: Adapted from the joint agreement between BPK and the Attorney General , 25thJuly 2007, 
Jakarta (MOU Kejaksaan Agung and BPK RI 2007). 
 
To implement this joint agreement, as stipulated in Article 10, BPK and the 
Attorney General respectively appoint and place at least two coordinators, one in the 
central office of BPK or the Attorney General and the other in a representative office of 
BPK or the Attorney General.  
The head of Parliament
111
 emphasised the significant role and functions of law 
enforcers and BPK for eradicating corruption.  Further investigation and handling of the 
corruption cases are the commitment of law enforcers. Since the agreement, support from 
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the Attorney General in following up BPK reports has improved. For example, in 2006, the 
Attorney General followed up four cases of BPK findings that indicated corruption to a 
value of Rp.85,11 billion and US$4.23 million
112
 (equal to Rp.38 billion) on SOEs and 
state institutions (Bisnis Indonesia 1
st
December 2006). Moreover, KPK and the Attorney 
General are following up the BLBI case seriously (Pelita 9
th
January 2008; Seputar 
Indonesia 9
th
January 2008).  
7.3.2 Survey Results and Comments on Support from Authorised Investigators 
The survey results indicate various opinion from auditors and auditees on the 
support of authorised investigators for BPK reports that indicated corruption and fraud. 
Figure 7.6 (below) shows that the majority of respondents were ‗neutral‘. Moreover, 
similar perceptions were presented by both auditors and auditees, only a few responded 
‗strongly agree‘ and ‗strongly disagree‘ and similar percentages responded ‗agree‘ 
(auditors 23 per cent and auditees 22 per cent). The results imply that the support from 
authorised investigators remained low. 
Figure 7.6 Survey Results of ‘Authorised Investigators Support the Audit Findings of BPK 
Indicating Corruption and Fraud’ 
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Source: Fieldwork survey from 5thNovember 2006 to 25thMarch 2007 
 
Auditors and Members of Parliament expressed their opinions on the importance of 
support to BPK reports from authorised investigators as follows: 
 “Follow-up of fraud indications is really dependent on the Police and Attorney 
General and KPK” (Interview B23, an auditor of AKN V). 
 “Audit reports from BPK are not final reports. If there are findings that indicate 
fraud or corruption, these reports need to be followed up by Police or the 
Attorney General or KPK for a further investigation” (Interview C6, a Member of 
Parliament from Commission IX of PAN faction). 
 “Ineffectiveness of government auditing is because of the low commitment of law 
enforcers to follow up this audit result. The institutions of law enforcers 
themselves have to be improved” (Interview C12, a Member of Parliament from 
Commission II of PKS faction).113 
These excerpts indicate that auditors have no authority to take action or follow up for 
auditees who have criminal indications based on audit findings. The sanction from auditors 
is substantially limited to shaming auditees through the publication of their audit reports.  
A Member of Parliament from Commission V stated (Suara Pembaharuan 
16
th
May 2006) as follows:  
Law enforcers, such as the Police and the Attorney General should use BPK audit 
findings as preliminary evidence to solve some irregularities in SOEs and 
government entities, by requesting BPK to do an audit investigation.  
Although this statement indicates that BPK reports are important for the Police and the 
Attorney General as evidence for further investigation,law enforcers and investigators did 
not take BPK findings seriously. 
Some negative responses were also recorded in the survey results. Of the total 
respondents, 60 per cent were ‗neutral‘, 13 per cent ‗disagreed‘ and 1 per cent ‗strongly 
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disagreed‘. The negative views from auditors and Members of Parliament indicate a lack 
of willingness of authorised investigators to follow up audit findings. The following 
statements reflect their criticisms: 
 “Police, the Attorney General and KPK have not followed up audit reports 
optimally”(auditors). 
 “Many audit findings or audit reports had not been followed up by the Police and 
the Attorney General”(Members of Parliament). 
These excerpts imply that the Attorney General and the Police were not concerned with 
following up BPK‘s audit findings. Two Members of Parliament from the National 
Mandate Party (PAN) faction made the following criticisms (Rakyat Merdeka 18
th
May 
2006):  
BPK‘s audit reports found state losses to a value of Rp.40 trillion, but only Rp.10 
billion was returned to state revenues. This indicates that no serious efforts to 
eradicate corruption were made.  
And on the lack of followup by law enforcers: 
Law enforcers were not objective in their work. Police caught many suspected 
people that were under investigation. But strangely, people engaged in criminal 
activities which clearly caused trillions of state losses were still free and still could 
be negotiated with, for instance, fraud of BLBI which lost trillions of state funds but 
were still free and untouchable. It is obviously not fair. 
These statements identify a lack of effort from law enforcers in following up on audit 
findings. One of the Members of Parliament indicated that money returned from those state 
losses was only 0.025 per cent of the total value and criticised the lack of law enforcement 
for auditees who perpetrated fraud on state finances.  
An auditee who pointed out the misuse of BPK audit findings by investigators 
commented as follows: 
I strongly agree if there is any suspicions of fraud, audit findings have to be followed 
up for further investigation by the Police, Attorney General or BPK. However, in 
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some cases, there was deliberate bullying by investigators or Police where fraud was 
suggested. This situation sometimes caused further fraud. 
Supported this view is a statement made by a researcher from Parliament, who said, ‗In 
some cases, evidence from BPK‘s audit findings has been used by law enforcers as a tool 
to pressure the corrupted audited entities‖114.  
In addition, a Member of Parliament from Commission IX criticised the lack of 
coordination between BPK and law enforcers and was cited in a national newspaper 
(Rakyat Merdeka18 May 2006), as follows: 
Lack of coordination between BPK and law enforces has resulted on making no 
sense of cases. For example, BPK had not yet reported its findings, but the Police 
had considered irregularities. On the contrary, BPK reported fraud that should be 
followed up, but the Police did not do.  
In a keynote address in 2007, the head of Parliament
115
concurred with the above view as 
follows:  
For audit findings that indicate corruption, BPK reported and submitted to KPK, the 
Attorney General and Police. Therefore, the role of BPK in eradicating corruption is 
significant. Nevertheless, its role is limited to auditing and then stops. After that, the 
BPK findings will depend on the commitment of law enforcers to follow up the 
findings.  
This statement implied a lack of coordination between BPK and law enforcers. They work 
separately and independently. Although BPK had provided audit reports, law enforcers did 
not use the reports aspreliminary data for further investigations.  
To summarise, the survey results and data in this study indicate a lack of support 
from authorised investigators for audit findings that have indications of corruption and 
                                                             
 
 
114
 This is based on interview with a researcher at Secretariat General of Parliament during fieldwork on 4
th
 
January 2007. 
115
 Keynote Speech of the Spokesperson of Parliament, H.R. Agung Laksono, at the One Day Seminar of 
Public Sector Auditing, on 9
th
 January 2007, Jakarta Convention Centre, Jakarta. 
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fraud. To improve investigator follow-up of such audit findings, four mechanisms were 
introduced.These are: (1) a joint agreement between BPK and KPK to prevent and 
eliminate corruption, (2) a joint agreement between BPK and PPATK, related to data for 
preventing and eradicating corruption, (3) strengthened coordination between the Attorney 
General and police of the Republic of Indonesia, and (iv) a joint agreement between BPK 
and the Attorney General to support more effective law enforcement. Since the 
implementation of these mechanisms, there have been significant changes in support by 
authorised investigators for BPK audit findings indicating criminal activities. 
7.4 Public and Media Support 
Prior to audit reform, BPK reports were not made public as they were designated as 
state confidential documents. The media had no freedom to disclose news that could 
threaten Indonesia‘s political stability. This resulted in little information for the public on 
the roles and functions of BPK in auditing public sector to support bureaucratic reform.  
As democracy has emerged in Indonesia, the public is demanding accountability 
and transparency in the administrative system. Since the Reformation Era, the public and 
media have freedom to access information on public sector agencies to ensure their 
accountability. BPK reports are published to provide the public with information on the 
transparency, performance and accountability of the government and all agencies that use 
public finances.  
7.4.1 Media and the Public to Disseminate BPK Reports 
Since audit reform, the public and media have had significant roles and functions in 
securing the effectiveness of information in BPK reports. The media is a tool for BPK to 
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disseminate its work and for the public to criticise the government and urge it to provide 
better performance based on the recommendations provided by auditors. Within the spirit 
of transparency, the public and media have access to data and information in the 
Indonesian public sector and can participate in controlling government policies, decisions, 
performance and in providing transparency and accountability in public administration.  
The audit findings and reports revealing inefficiency, poor public administration 
and corruption can result in protests and demonstrations against the lack of government 
accountability. This means that the public and media significantly participate in controlling 
the quality and accountability of public administration and the quality of information in 
BPK reports. Besides, the participation and responses of the Indonesian people to the 
information in BPK reports related to the malpractice by government officials, influence 
significantly influence the effectiveness of follow up on audit reports.  
The public plays a critical role in demanding accountability by the government and 
Legislature. However, in the case of Indonesia, Satriyo et.al(2003:32-34) argued that the 
public had insufficient understanding of the meaning of accountability and lacked 
information of possible benefits of audit reports to their lives as their right to 
accountability. This resulted from the weaknesses of civil society in promoting public 
accountability by participating in controlling the performance of state and public sector 
agencies, including BPK. A 2002 study by LP3ES (Economic and Social Research, 
Education and Information Agency) found that only 53 per cent of the public in 10 big 
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cities
116
 of Indonesia recognised BPK from television and only 7 per cent from school 
(LP3ES 2002). In 2004, another study indicated a significant increase in public knowledge 
about BPK; 85 per cent of the public knew about BPK‘s roles and functions from print 
media, radio, television and school (LP3ES 2004: 13-18). However, published BPK 
reports were not evenly distributed throughout the small villages and districts regions 
where had little access to the media (ADB 2004a). The results indicate that the media plays 
a significant role in informing the public about the roles and functions of BPK in auditing 
public funds and resources.  
Moreover, the ADB (2004a:52) pointed out, ―Public sector accountability is 
constrained by a weak capacity of oversight institutions and lack of awareness of the 
public on the role of government institutions, such as the audit institutions‖. This meant 
that the lack of transparency in the government environment as well as in the Legislature 
created a lack of understanding of civil society and the public to defend their right on the 
government accountability . 
Since 2005, BPK has had programs to increase public understanding of the state 
audit system and functions and to enhance public capability in controlling and demanding 
transparency and performance of the government in managing public resources. The 
programcollaborates with the media at both local and national levels and involves 
television, radio, community, the leaders of religious groups (such as Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadyah), academia, professionals, International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI), Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (ASOSAI), IAI 
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Mataram. 
291 
(Indonesian Accountant Association), Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) and 
Transparency International, and the bureaucracy (national and local levels). For example, 
BPK has a public education campaign program with two main purposes, namely: (1) to 
build good governance, accountability and a transparent environment of government 
expenditure, and (2) to provide a strong auditing function by the involvement of civil 
society. Thus, the public education campaign aims to provide understanding for the public 
on how Indonesian state finances or public money is spent, and what the benefits are for 
the public. This program is very useful for the public, because before reform, the 
government were very secretive about public finances.  
BPK‘s efforts have increased the public‘s cynicism and demands relating to the 
performance and accountability of politicians and bureaucrats. For instance, as a result of 
the refusal by Supreme Court to be audited by BPK in the case of obtaining court fees, a 
protest involving theatrical action was mounted in front of the Supreme Court building, 
organised by NGOs including the Indonesia Legal Resources Centre, the Indonesian Law 
Aid Institution and ICW (Kompas 26
th
April 2008). News headlines of print media have 
focused on findings of BPK. For examples: (1) the case of BLBI, corruption, irregularities 
in central and local governments;(2) auditees‘ financial statements which were not based 
on the government accounting standard, non-compliance with laws and regulations; and 
(3) conflict between BPK and Supreme Court. All these BPK findings had provided 
positive responses from the public for BPK. Indraswati and Desilia (2008: 47-48) 
emphasised the media‘s publication of BPK‘s roles, functions, and findings in providing 
government transparency and accountability.  
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7.5 Conclusion on Factors Influencing Public Sector Auditing in Indonesia 
This study has examined factors influencing the reporting of audit information and 
factors influencing acting on audit information in reports.  
The independence and autonomy of an audit institution is the most important factor 
influencing the effectiveness of information in public sector audit reports. This includes for 
the quality of the information (in particular, credibility and objectivity), the content and 
communication of information, and the capacity to act on information in audit reports (in 
particular, realistic recommendations). However, before audit reform in 2001, BPK was 
under the control of government. The Chairman and Members of BPK were appointed by 
the President and had a close relationship with the government. The role of BPK as an 
external audit institution failed because auditors were neither independent nor professional. 
This influenced the objectivity and credibility of BPK audit reports.  
The auditors‘ professional ethics were dominated by a bureaucratic culture and 
regulations. Budget resources came from the state budget and were determined by the 
Ministry of Finance. The personnel of BPK were public servants who complied with the 
regulations of MENPAN and the State Personnel Board (BKN), the same requirements as 
for public servant personnel administration. Moreover, BPK‘s budget resources were 
derived from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) through the state budget (APBN) and that 
impacted on other resources (including personnel, offices and other facilities). In addition, 
another internal audit institution, BPKP, which had the same function as BPK in carrying 
out post-auditing, had a much higher budget than BPK. In contrast, BPK had insufficient 
budget and resources to conduct audits for public agencies. As a result, BPK could not 
provide good incomes for its auditors or develop their professionalism through training and 
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education. BPK had no modern equipment, was underfunded and employed under-
qualified staff. Moreover, BPK auditors had no legal protection or security assurance when 
uncovering audit findings and this increased their lack of integrity and professionalism. 
This situation significantly influenced the quality of auditing.  
There has been a significant change in BPK independence and resources since audit 
reform. BPK has maintained its independence in order to obtain trust from stakeholders 
about its auditing. Survey results on the independence and autonomy of BPK in managing 
its resources indicate positive perceptions from auditors and auditees. However, these 
perceptions may not be fully reliable as some negative views were revealed during the 
interviews to mitigate the optimistic survey results.  
After audit reform, the independence of BPK in managing its budgeting and 
personnel resources has significantly changed. Although BPK personnel are public 
servants, BPK has more flexibility to manage its human and budget resources. BPK‘s 
budget and human resources have increased gradually based on the needs of organisation. 
The budget is mostly allocated for auditor remuneration, recruitment of new personnel, 
improvement of IT and modern equipment, and opening new representative offices. In 
short, all the budget allocation is used to support the roles and functions of BPK to audit 
the entire state finances of Indonesia. For public accountability of its financial and 
performance, BPK had been reviewed by independent peer-review since 2007.  
BPK helps the Members of Parliament rather than becoming public servants under 
the government. BPK resources are based on its needs which are separated from the 
government budget and approved by Parliament. Furthermore, new processes for 
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appointing and electing BPK‘s Members, Vice Chairman and Chairman have addressed 
the issue of independence of BPK‘s leadership. 
The professionalism and integrity of auditors and Members of BPK are an essential 
factor influencing the effectiveness of information in BPK reports. This study found that 
before audit reform, BPK had very limited budget and resources to develop its auditors‘ 
skills, competencies and education. Moreover, low incentives and salaries significantly 
reduced the professionalism and integrity of auditors. The programs and materials from the 
training and education centre did not provide significant benefits for BPK auditors to 
improve their skills and competency. In addition, there was lack of opportunity for auditors 
to pursue further formal education and training both inside and outside Indonesia. 
Since audit reform, there have been significant changes that are improving the 
quality and professionalism of BPK auditors. They have greater opportunities to develop 
their skills and education both locally and abroad. BPK has taken advantage of 
international and national cooperation to provide education and training programs to 
improve professional qualifications through audit trainings, workshops and seminars. 
Besides the education and training centre in Jakarta, BPK also opened education and 
training units in Medan (North Sumatera) for auditors from the western part of Indonesia, 
Yogyakarta (Central Java) for auditors from the central region, and Makassar (South 
Sulawesi) for auditors from the eastern region.BPK has also gradually increased the 
salaries and rewards for its Members, auditors, managers and staff. Since reform, the 
remuneration system has employed a reward and punishment system for BPK personnel. 
BPK also has established aCode of Ethics and formed the Honorary Board of Code of 
Ethics to monitor the performance of its Members and auditors.  These efforts have 
295 
gradually improved the professionalism and integrity of auditors and provide optimism for 
future improvement. 
Before reform, BPK had an inadequate number of personnel. Since reform, in line 
with the Constitution mandate stipulating that BPK has to audit all public sector agencies, 
BPK has increased the total number of its personnel by more than 2513. However, BPK 
still lacks the required number of auditors and staff with accounting, finance and other 
academic backgrounds to conduct financial and performance audits for all public sector 
agencies. To meet its needs, BPK employs auditors from Public Accountant Office (KAP) 
who have been trained and have received the BPK certificate to conduct financial audits on 
behalf of BPK. Therefore, BPK auditors can concentrate more on conducting performance 
and investigation audits.  
Before reform, BPK had very little modern equipment and had no information 
technology resources. Since audit reform, the roles and functions of BPK have improved 
significantly and IT resources and modern equipment has been increased to better support 
the audit work. BPK now has a Local Area Networking (LAN), the internet and many 
more computers, notebooks, laser jet printers, scanners and computer applications. 
However, as a result of additional personnel and offices, it seems that IT resources are still 
not satisfactory, especially for the representative offices. 
Before the audit reform, BPK had only one central office and six representative 
offices. Following the mandate from the amended Constitution to provide a representative 
office in every province, by 2008 BPK had opened 27 new representative offices (22 of 
these during 2005-2007). Thus, in terms of location, BPK is much closer to auditees. The 
new representative offices influence the quality of BPK reports, because auditors can be 
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more engaged with the culture of local governments and ROE, have more understanding of 
local public administrative problems, can provide better audit recommendations and have 
more time to audit. In addition, auditors can save on traveling time and have fewer 
expenses for traveling as auditees and auditors live in the same province.  
Before audit reform, BPK reports were never responded to by the Legislature. 
During the Reformation Era, the study found a lack of Parliamentary Members who 
responded to BPK opinions and recommendations seriously. The study found that 
Members of the Legislature had limited interest and understanding of the content in BPK 
reports. To solve this problem, effective communication and joint agreement has been 
made between BPK and the Members of the Legislature. The increasing number and 
quality of consultations, discussions and meetings between these two institutions have 
significantly improved responses from the Members in reviewing BPK reports. Better 
communication has provided open and clear explanations and information related to audit 
opinions and recommendations provided by BPK. The findings and opinions from BPK 
assist the Members to conduct their own functions in controlling the accountability of state 
finances and in approving the budget plans of the government. BPK helps Members of 
Parliaments at both the central and local levels in reviewing and overseeing audit reports if 
they find the reports unclear. The joint agreement also helps Members of regional 
Parliament to obtain information about the BPK opinion on the financial accountability 
and performance of regional governments.  
Since public demand for the accountability of the Executive in managing resources 
has increased, information in BPK reports needs to be followed up by public sector 
agencies. Data indicates low support from government agencies for following up the 
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information in BPK reports and audit recommendations for improving public 
administration. Auditees argued that BPK‘s recommendations are difficult to implement 
and the rapid changes of administrative laws related to finances, accounting and auditing 
are hard to follow. The auditees found difficulties in implementingnew Government 
Accounting Standards (2005). Government has made some effort to help agencies to adapt 
more quickly to the financial management changes. However, the limited number of 
qualified human resources and limited commitment of the heads of local government to 
follow up BPK reports have impeded the improvement of public administration. BPK has 
conducted consultations and meetings with government institutions to provide 
collaborative solutions for providing better financial management and accountability in the 
public sector.  
The study found that the information in BPK reports and audit findings with 
indication of criminality, frauds and corruption, are lack of supports from authorised 
investigators (the Attorney General, the Corruption Eradication Commission or KPK, and 
the Police). As there had been a lack of follow up of BPK reports that indicated fraud and 
corruption, BPK and authorised investigators signed joint agreementsto ensure more 
effective coordination and communication for the follow up of BPK reports. These joint 
agreements include cooperating in joint legal areas of education and training: from the 
Attorney General to BPK auditors, and otherwise, education and training related to state 
finance auditing from BPK to the personnel of Attorney General. 
 Moreover, BPK and the Centre for Reporting and Analysis of Financial 
Transactions (PPATK) signed an agreement for cooperation (1) to exchange of data and 
information, (2) to assist in promoting system against criminality related to money 
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laundering, and (3) to provide trainings and education.These agreements have all had a 
positive influence in providing better follow-up of BPK audit findings by the Attorney 
General, the KPK and the Police.  
Since audit reform, the public and media have played important roles in influencing 
the effectiveness of information in BPK reports. Since 2006, BPK has conducted public 
awareness programs for disseminating information about its roles and functions to provide 
better management and transparency on state finances and public money (Natanegara and 
Leong 9
th
June 2006). This has been achieved through collaboration with the media. BPK 
also has cooperation with public service advertising on commercial television and radio, 
community and religious groups, academia,NGOs, and the bureaucracy. Moreover, BPK 
has held national public education campaigns to educate the public and to promote public 
participation in public sector auditing. This study revealed that since reform, the media 
have been enthusiastic to draw public attention to audit report findings. As a result, the 
public has started to become aware about the importance of public sector auditing as 
means of saving public finances from inefficiency, ineffectiveness, fraud, money 
laundering and corruption.  
Table 7.1 (below) summarises the reforms of the factors that influence the quality 
of information in BPK audit reports and shows that significant improvements have 
occurred since audit reform.  
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Table 7-1 Summary of Reforms in Factors Influencing Information in BPK Reports 
No Factors Sub Factors Reforms 
1. Independence Leaders The election of Board Members is based on a proposal from BPK and elected by the 
Members of Parliament, while the Chairman is appointed from and by Board 
Members. 
  Budget and 
personnel 
Flexibility for BPK to manage its financial and human resources. 
Budget resources are separated from the annual state budget and are approved 
directly by Parliament. 
BPK’s financial reports are audited by the independent Public Accountant Office 
(KAP).  
  The quality of 
auditing 
Reviewed and audited by an SAI of INTOSAI Member. 
2 Integrity and 
professionalism 
 Providing the Code of Ethics for the Board of Members and auditors of BPK. 
Forming the Honorary Board of Code of Ethics to monitor the implementation of 
the Code. 
Developing the functional positions for auditors that are separated from structural 
positions. 
Applying a remuneration system for auditors, managers, and staff to improve their 
performance. 
3. Audit resources  Budget 
resources 
Budget resources based on BPK needs to audit all public sector agencies and to 
fulfil the demands of the legislative. 
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Table 7.1 (cont) 
No Factors Sub Factors Descriptions 
 Audit resources Human resources Increasing number and quality of BPK personnel from different educational 
backgrounds. 
Two additional Members of the Board taking it to nine (since 2007). 
Providing training and education for representative offices in Medan and in 
Makassar.  
Developing cooperation with other SAIs in education, training, workshops and 
conferences for auditors, managers and staff. 
Creating more opportunities for auditors and staff to pursue their formal 
education and to improve skills and knowledge inside and outside the country. 
  Communications and IT Significant improvement in number of computers, laptops and other modern 
equipment. 
Developing an electronic communication network and website to publish audit 
reports.  
  Office  Having a representative office in every province and opening 27 new 
representative offices within 3-years (2005-2007). 
4 Political, 
government and 
law enforcement 
support 
Government support Providing a new government accounting standards(2005) with accruals-based 
accounting system to provide financial statements. 
Strengthening the function of internal audit institutions in managing state 
finances.  
  Political support to review 
audit reports 
A joint agreement between BPK and Parliament, at both central and regional 
levels. 
  Law enforcement support 
to reduce corruption 
Joint agreements between BPK and KPK, PPATK and the Attorney General. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This thesis has analysed the effectiveness of Indonesia Supreme Audit Institution 
(ISAI), BPK, by examining the quality of its performance against a number of criteria for 
effective auditing (Chapters 4&5) and explaining this performance in terms of various 
factors that influence the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of auditing (Chapters 6&7). 
Rather than attempting an overall summary of all the findings, this conclusion seeks to 
highlight some of the main features of the analysis, with particular emphasis on those 
aspects where clear differences have emerged in the practice of auditing between the pre- 
and post-reform periods. The chapter then briefly lists a number of recommendations that 
arise out of the research, before suggesting areas for further research. 
The following sections describe the conclusion of the study, which consist of two 
parts. The first part is the conclusion of the Indonesian public sector auditing before and 
after audit reform. Then, the second part explains factors that influence public sector 
auditing in Indonesia. 
8.1 Conclusion of the Indonesian Public Sector Auditing (BPK) Before and After 
Audit Reform 
The following sections are the conclusion of the content, information, 
communication of and acting on BPK audit report information. 
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8.1.1 Content of BPK Audit Report Information 
There are significant changes in the BPK scope of auditing before and after audit 
reform. Before reform, BPK had a very limited scope of auditing as indicated by the 
following three examples. Firstly, the internal audit institution, BPKP (Financial and 
Development Supervisory Board) under the Executive, had a much larger number of 
auditees from State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Regional Owned Enterprises (ROEs), and 
government agencies at both the local and central level. BPK had far fewer auditees than 
BPKP and only audited the central government, but not regional governments. Secondly, 
BPK only focused on financial and compliance auditing limited only to the expenditure 
from the state budget (APBN). Thirdly, BPK was prohibited from auditing the ‗gold 
mining state‘, such as the Central Bank of Indonesia, the National Airline Company (PT. 
Garuda Indonesia Airways), the National Oil Company (PT. Pertamina), state-owned 
banks, ROEs, and other SOEs.  
Since audit reform, BPK has had an expanded mandate from the Constitution and 
the Law on State Finances (2003), the Law on Audit (2004), and the Law on BPK (2006). 
Its scope of auditing now includes all state finances (both central and local governments, 
SOEs, ROEs, the Central Bank of Indonesia, public services agencies and other agencies 
using statemoney. Additionally, it has a broader scope of audit that covers three types of 
audits (financial, performance and specific purposes audits). Moreover, BPK has been 
confirmed as the only external audit institution for all public sector agencies in Indonesia, 
while BPKP is the internal auditor. As a result, the number of BPK auditees has increased 
dramatically. 
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In terms of access for reliability of audit evidence, before audit reform BPK had no 
power to seek, search and seize documents and other related items for auditing. In short, 
BPK had insufficient access to relevant information and data from auditees. After audit 
reform, BPK gained the authority to access any data and information for auditing purposes. 
Moreover, under the new Law on BPK (2006), sanctions apply for auditors, officials and 
Members of BPK who misuse their power in accessing data and information. However, the 
Law on Taxation, SOEs and Supreme Court prevents BPK from accessing tax revenue 
data, and SOE and Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) revenues. This situation indicates a 
lack of transparency and accountability of government agencies. 
Before audit reform, BPK could not examine the accountability of government in 
managing public resources. There was no transparency, objectivity and credibility of audit 
reports. Audit reports were tailored to suit the government‘s interests and had to be 
checked and sorted by the State Secretary Office (Kantor Sekretariat Negara-Sekneg) in 
order to prevent the instability of national security. Conversely, since reform, the Law on 
BPK (2006) and BPK audit standards (2007) has provided basic rules and standards for 
reporting audit findings objectively and credibly. The quality of information and 
performance of BPK audit reports are reviewed by the Auditor General of New Zealand in 
2004 and the Netherlands Court of Audit in 2009. However, the study found that auditors 
who were pressuredby auditees (for example the Policy Department and the Ministry of 
National Army to not publish audit findings for national stability reasons) found a lack of 
protection from BPK to help them perform objectively. 
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8.1.2 Communication of and Acting on Audit Report Information 
BPK reports in the past were difficult to understand because of too many technical 
financial, accounting and auditing terms. These were difficult to understand for 
stakeholders with no knowledge or background in finance and accounting. Since audit 
reform, BPK has provided guidelines for auditors to provide clear and understandable 
reports for stakeholders. This is described under the new BPK state finance standards 
(2007). Moreover, BPK provides summary reports that stakeholders find easier to read, not 
least because they contain a glossary of technical terms.  
In terms of the audit report format, before reform, BPK audit reports were difficult 
to read, were too complicated, were long and were poorly formatted. Since audit reform, 
BPK reports are presented more simply and precisely in a user-friendly way with an 
elegant layout, pictures, diagrams and charts. This has ensured many stakeholders are more 
interested to read BPK reports.  
Before audit reform, information in BPK reports was out of date because the 
reports were too late for sending to Parliament (as this was just a formality and BPK was 
only a ‗rubber stamp‘ for the government). Furthermore, the Indonesian government was 
very closed and BPK reports were not made public as the reports were included in state 
confidential documents. There was no transparency. As a result, the media had no freedom 
to disclose information. In addition, the public had a limited understanding about the 
importance of the roles and functions of BPK in examining the accountability of 
government and the performance of public sector agencies in using public funds and other 
resources.  
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Since audit reform, audit reports are issued and published on time, are printed and 
also presented electronically on the BPK website. New laws have required auditees to 
submit their reports to BPK and auditors to submit the audit reports to Parliament on time. 
The publication of audit findings has raised the participation of the public in controlling 
the performance and openness of government agencies. However, the study also found the 
misuse of published audit reports by the media or opponent parties in regard to sensitive 
cases such as those involving corruption. 
In terms of realistic audit opinions and recommendations, this study found that 
before audit reform, there was no audit opinion from BPK because auditees did not 
provide financial reports. Besides, there was no standard for providing realistic audit 
recommendations. Since audit reform this situation changed; all auditees were required to 
provide financial reports that include reports on budget revenues and expenditure, balance 
statements, cash flows, and notes to the financial statements. As mandated by the 
Constitution and regulations, BPK audits all state agencies and provides opinions for their 
financial reports and recommendations for better performance in public administration, 
management and results. However, the study revealed that BPK auditors still lack the 
ability to provide constructive and realistic recommendations as a part of their expertise 
and professionalism. 
Evidence indicates that the follow up of BPK audit reports is still low. Before audit 
reform, there was no obligation for auditees to follow up BPK audit findings or 
recommendations. The Parliament never followed up BPK reports that did not indicate 
corruption, fraud or misuse of public funds (the reports had been previously screened by 
the government). Since audit reform, the follow up of BPK audit findings and 
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recommendations is mandated by an amendment to the Constitution (2001), the Law on 
Audit (2004) and the Law on BPK (2006). Members of Parliament are the main 
stakeholders of BPK, and are mandated to follow up audit reports as part of their function 
to oversee the performance and accountability of government. Follow up of audit 
recommendations and findings are very important for providing better performance in 
public administration and management. BPK communicates with auditees and Members of 
Parliament (at both central and regional levels) to discuss and explain BPK 
recommendations and findings that have to be followed up. Additionally, BPK signed joint 
agreements with the Parliament and regional Parliaments. Moreover, BPK monitors and 
reports on the follow up to Parliament. As BPK has no power to give sanctions or to 
prosecute auditees who do not follow up audit reports, BPK also signed joint agreements 
with authorised investigators including the Police, the Attorney General and the Corruption 
Eradication Commission. 
8.2 Conclusion of Factors Influencing Indonesian Public Sector Auditing 
 
8.2.1 Independence and Autonomy of BPK 
Before audit reform, there was a lack of checks and balances in state finances and 
policies. Indonesia was under the control of an authoritarian government, which meant that 
public sector auditing could not be performed independently. Evidence that public sector 
auditing lacked independence includes the following:(i) the Constitutional mandate that 
BPK was an independent audit institution was not respected by state leaders, (ii) BPKP, 
which was under the government, had exactly the same functions as BPK, the external 
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auditors, (iii) BPK‘s budget was under the power of the government (the Ministry of 
Finance), (v) there was no independence in the appointment and dismissal of BPK Board 
Members (BPK leaders were appointed by the President), and (vi) BPK had no authority to 
organise its personnel.  
In contrast, after audit reform the independence of BPK has been bolstered by the 
following: (i)a clear Constitutional mandate that BPK is the only external audit institution 
in the Republic of Indonesia which independent from the Executive to improve the 
transparency and accountability of the public sector; (ii) clear differentiation of the 
functions of BPKP (as a part of government) and BPK (as an independent body), with no 
rivalry between the internal and external audit institutions; (iii) an independent budget for 
BPK(separate from the state budget); (iv) a new system for appointing Board Members, 
including the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Parliament now makes the appointments, 
which has resulted in more independence and autonomy of BPK leaders; (v) clear 
regulations to maintain the independence of BPK auditors and personnel; and (vi) BPK has 
greater authority to organise its human resources without being subject to the strict rules 
administered by MENPAN (Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reforms).  
8.2.2 Integrity and Professionalism of BPK Members and Auditors 
Before reform, BPK Members and auditors lacked integrity and professionalism, 
because BPK had no formal regulations to protect their personnel‘s immunity and security. 
It was difficult for BPK auditors to maintain their integrity when they had low incomes, 
audited high-risk cases and accepted financial support from auditees. Moreover, BPK had 
no formal rules in the form of a Code of Ethics.BPK also lacked high quality education 
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and training centers and resources to improve the capacity and skills of its auditors and 
other personnel. 
Since audit reform in 2001, BPK has gradually strengthened its professionalism 
and the integrity of its Board Members and auditors. The provision of professional training 
has been one of the most important factors for providing higher quality audits. BPK has 
also established a Code of Ethics for maintaining auditor integrity and professionalism and 
its implementation has been supervised by the Honorary Members of Code of Ethics Board 
made up of audit professionals and academics. Based on the Law on BPK (GOI 2006b), 
BPK also provides immunity and security to its auditors to avoid pressure and intimidation 
practices (such as from heads of regional government or from the army). In addition, since 
BPK has implemented a performance-based remuneration system with incentives for 
promoting or sanctioning its auditors and staff, auditors are not allowed to accept any 
money, facilities, tickets and accommodation from auditees. This new system is intended 
to reduce bribery. 
Moreover, BPK has improved its cooperation with other Member countries of 
INTOSAI and ASOSAI to conduct training sessions, symposiums, seminars and 
workshops to improve auditors‘ skills and knowledge. In addition, BPK has developed the 
functional capacity of professional auditors who must complete a minimum 20 hours of the 
80 hours education within a 1-2 year period. Therefore, BPK continues to pay attention to 
improving its auditors‘ knowledge, skills and welfare in an effort to improve their 
professionalism and integrity in conducting audits for public sector agencies. 
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8.2.3 Auditing Resources of BPK 
Since audit reform, Indonesian public sector auditing has experienced major 
changes. This has partly been as a result of external pressures, such as media, reviewers, 
the general public and auditees, but also from internal pressure to reform the organisation 
to fulfill its new mandates. To cope with these pressures, BPK has improved its resources 
such as budget, personnel/human resources, representative offices, modern equipment, 
computers, laptops, printers, scanners and so forth. It has also redesigned, restructured, and 
right-sized its organisation based on needs.  
In term of budget resources, in the past BPK had a very limited budget. It was 
funded from the State Annual Budget (APBN) that was determined by the Executive, in 
this case the Ministry of Finance. As an external audit institution for the public sector, 
BPK had exactly the same duties and functions as BPKP. However, BPKP had larger sums 
of money and resources. BPK had fewer auditees than BPKP. BPKP conducted post-
auditing for public sector agencies that had higher material assets, such as State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) and state banks. As a result, large companies owned by the state were 
audited by BPKP, including the National Oil Company (Pertamina), the Central Bank of 
Indonesia (the Bank of Indonesia), the National Airline Company (Garuda Indonesia 
Airways), the National Bank of Indonesia 1946 (BNI 46), the logistics agency (BULOG)..  
Since audit reform, based on the new Law on BPK (2006), the process of 
determining BPK‘s budget and the auditing of this budget is regulated by the Law on BPK 
(2006). BPK‘s budget is determined separately from the state budget with a special 
allocation from the government based on BPK‘s proposal (audit needs). BPK proposes its 
budget directly to the Parliament. After the Parliament and the Ministry of Finance 
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determine the budget estimation for BPK, the budget is approved by Parliament. The data 
and information from the study indicate a significantly increasing budget allocation for 
BPK. It has been supplemented by numerous grants and loans from international 
organisations such as ADB, AusAID and USAID. BPK‘s financial accountability is 
audited annually by an independent Public Accountant Office (KAP). BPK‘s increased 
budget has significantly strengthened its audit resources, enabling it to give better 
compensation and welfare to its employees. 
Before audit reform, the Chairmen of BPK had no power to manage their own 
organisation as all BPK personnel operated under the rules of the Ministry of 
Empowerment State Apparatus (MENPAN) and the State of Personnel Board (BKN). This 
included for their salary and rules, as was the case for public servants from other 
government institutions. BPK had no flexibility in personnel management. Moreover, BPK 
had a limited number of professional personnel as the professional quality of auditors and 
personnel grew very slowly due to limited opportunities to improve employee capacity. 
BPK auditors had no professional organisation for public sector auditors with backgrounds 
from outside accounting. In terms of personnel planning and career development, BPK 
employed a strong bureaucratic culture, where promotion and appointment were based on 
seniority rather than performance.  
After audit reform, requirements of the Law on BPK (2006) and audit standards 
(2007) changed the management of BPK‘s human resources. The Human Resources 
Bureau of BPK has significantly improved the number (more than 2500) and qualifications 
of personnel. Although there has been a significant increase in human resources, the 
number and quality of auditors and employees are still not met the needs of BPK. The 
311 
bureau also expanded its services and assessment to auditors and staff as capital and assets 
of BPK. Moreover, the Code of Ethics for BPK Members and auditors implements rewards 
and punishment and BPK appointments are now based on performance instead of 
seniority.  
For the time being, to meet the needs of auditors to audit the financial reports of a 
large number of government agencies, BPK has been outsourcing auditors from the Public 
Accountant Office.Very poor transparency and capacity on the part of auditees to 
implement the new government accounting standards also makes the auditing job of BPK 
longer and more difficult. However, this outsourcing cannot continue for too long as the 
fees for KAP auditors are much higher than for auditors from BPK and are burdening the 
BPK budget. Moreover, in terms of accountability, BPK auditors have direct 
accountability to the public, while KAP auditors do not.  
In terms of resources for performance auditing, BPK keep improve auditors‘ 
capacity in performance auditing through trainings and education both inside and outside 
Indonesia. As well as increasing the number of auditors from different educational 
backgrounds, including economics;engineering;social and political science; law; 
management; agriculture; forestry;and literature; for conducting performance audit.  
In order to improve BPK auditor capacity, training and education have become a 
key factor for BPK to meet the needs of its stakeholders to provide objective, reliable and 
credible information in audit reports. Before audit reform, BPK‘s training and education 
development centre of BPK had the following issues: (i) it was not managed effectively 
and professionally,(ii) it lacked qualified trainers and had poor facilities,(iii) there was no 
evaluation of training programs, (iv) it provided limited opportunities for BPK auditors 
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and staff to pursue their education and develop their skills and professionalism, (v) there 
was only one training and education centre at Kalibata, Jakarta, and (vi) it did not 
undertake a clear training needs analysis for auditors. 
After reform, BPK has shown a strong commitment to improve the quality of 
auditors through better quality training and professional development. BPK improves 
numbers and quality of training and education through development cooperation with other 
SAIs for education, training, workshops and seminars programs. Besides, BPK has been 
supported through funding and other aid from international organisations.BPK now also 
provides continual professional development and education opportunities for auditors and 
other staff. Compulsory training for auditors includes at least 20 hours of 80 hours 
education within a 1-2 year period. Besides the centre for training and education in 
Kalibata (Jakarta), BPK has opened three additional centres in Medan (North Sumatera) 
for auditors from the western part of Indonesia, Yogjakarta (Central Java) for auditors 
from the central region, and Makassar (South Sulawesi) for auditors from the eastern part 
of Indonesia. This is an appropriate development to accelerate improvements in the quality 
of BPK auditors.  
The quality of information in BPK audit reports is influenced by the standard of 
communication resources, including equipment and information technology. Before audit 
reform, BPK suffered from a lack of IT resources and modern equipment and had neither 
an electronic communications network nor website. Since audit reform, BPK made the 
following improvements:(i) established an electronic communications network and Local 
Area Networking (LAN) to transfer and report data and information quickly and 
accurately; (ii) created a website on which to publish audit reports; (iii) increased the 
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amount of modern equipment such as computers, laser printers, color printers and scanners 
enabling the production of more interesting and timely reports that are formatted well; 
and(iv) improved audit information systems and applications to support BPK roles and 
functions. BPK also opened an Information Technology bureau.  
Prior to audit reform, BPK had only one central office in Jakarta and six 
representative offices while BPKP had representative offices in every province. However, 
since the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 2001, BPK has been mandated to 
provide an office in every province. BPK opened 27 new representative offices in 
Indonesia during2006 to 2008via budget loans and grants or by using regional government 
buildings. Opening representative offices has helped BPK auditors to understand better the 
character of local auditees and has reduced travel costs. This situation has had a positive 
influence on the quality of auditing in terms of reporting objective and credible 
information and providing constructive recommendations. 
One task of Parliament is to oversee the performance and accountability of the 
government and to approve the government budget. Before reform, there was no evidence 
that Members of Parliament followed up the information from BPK reports. The majority 
of Members of Parliament came from the Golkar Party, as the President was the head of 
advisory of the Golkar party in the New Order Era. Since Indonesia became a democratic 
country, political support from Members of Parliament has become essential for the 
effectiveness of BPK reports. However, this study found a lack of understanding on the 
content of audit reports by Members of Parliament resulting in the inability of Parliament 
to act on the information in the BPK reports. To support their main tasks and functions and 
to improve their effectiveness in carrying out their functions overseeing and reviewing 
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audit reports, the Secretariat General of Parliament has assisted BPK with trained staff and 
experts. Moreover, the Secretariat General provides library, a special division of ‗BPK 
audit reports and senate budget‘; and researchers to help the Members to review the BPK 
audit reports.  
Moreover, BPK took the initiative to sign a joint agreement between with 
Parliament to help the Members of Parliament at both central and local levels in reviewing 
and overseeing the performance and accountability of public sector agencies. Since then, 
BPK has held many consultations with the Members of Parliament to clarify information 
in BPK reports. BPK has also given explanations of what actions the Members of 
Parliament should take to Government. These efforts from BPK and the Secretariat 
General have provided positive results and given the Members greater self-confidence to 
review BPK reports and pressure the government to perform well and accountably. 
However, Members of Parliament have still not achieved what the public and BPK 
expected.  
From 2004 to 2009, BPK gave a ‗disclaimer‘ opinion to all of the financial reports 
of the central government and to nearly half of those from regional government. This 
indicates poor government accountability and transparency. The public suspects ‗leakages‘ 
have occurred in tax revenues at both central and local tax offices. However, BPK has 
been unable to audit tax revenues, the largest item of income in the state finances. This 
situation has contributed to a lack of trust from foreign and domestic investors and a 
reluctance to pay tax on the part of the public. Evidence that the government has lacked 
accountability was shown by the large amounts of foreign debt that could not be accounted 
for. The Minister of Finance made many attempts to reform state financial management, 
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however, the bureaucracy lacked capacity and many government leaders lacked 
commitment to implement the necessary policies and regulations.  
There is evidence that public sector agencies have supported BPK audit findings 
and recommendations regarding making changes and improvements to their public 
administration. They recognise the importance of BPK audits for improving their 
performance, however, many public agencies remain unresponsive and lack commitment 
to act on BPK recommendations. For instance, public agencies have been unwilling to 
comply with regulations from the Ministry of Finance aimed at improving the state finance 
system, as indicated by the lack of integration of IT application systems for financial 
management in the government sector, and the slowness of government in adapting to the 
accrual-based accounting system. BPK sent letters directly to the President on this matter, 
but received no response. Through discussions, BPK has tried to raise the awareness of 
leaders of the public sector agencies about the importance of acting on BPK reports as a 
means to reform public administration. 
For audit reports that indicate corruption and criminality, BPK relies on support 
from investigators such as the police, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and 
the General Attorney. This study found that BPK reported many indications of criminality 
in the administration of government institutions. For example, in 2006, BPK reported 
about 20 percent of total expenditure in public sector used fictitious documentation and 
transactions to claim money valued at US$420,000 (Rp. 3.99 billion)
117
. It reported many 
discrepancies and indications of corruption in both central and local government entities. 
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However, the followup of audit findings that indicate criminality was still very low (less 
than 50 percent) despite these findings involvingRp.20.22 trillion between 2004-
2008.Despite being reported to the police, most of these cases were never followed up.  
In order to encourage investigators to act on BPK findings that indicate criminality 
and corruption, BPK signed agreements withthe Corruption Eradication Commisssion 
(KPK), the Centre for Reporting and Analysis of Financial Transaction (PPATK), the 
Attorney General and the police. The agreements have resulted in better coordination 
between BPK and investigators and also between investigators themselves, and have also 
increased follow up. However, despite these improvements, public expectations have not 
been met and much more needs to be done to alleviate corruption in Indonesia. 
BPK understands the important role of the media in informing the public about the 
roles and functions of BPK and improving the public accountability of the Indonesian 
government. BPK collaborates with the media in publishing BPK findings to the public 
and in improving public understanding of state audit functions. As a result, news about 
BPK reports especially relating to fraud, corruption and inefficiency often makes the 
headlines of national and local newspapers and provides interesting topics for discussion 
on radio and television.  
In addition, the participation of the media has influenced public understanding 
about the quality of BPK reports. The public has increased its demands for objectivity, 
credible data, independence, integrity and professionalism on the part of BPK. Therefore, 
the public influences not only the accountability of the government in managing public 
funds and other state resources, but also the quality of BPK reports in providing objective 
and credible information and findings.  
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Based on the above descriptions, Appendix C provides a summary table comparing 
BPK before and after audit reform.  
8.3 Recommendations 
Based on this comprehensive study of the effectiveness of public sector auditing in 
Indonesia, some recommendations are suggested to make BPK a more excellent and 
reputable audit institution. Although some effort has been made and some reforms have 
been achieved, BPK still needs to improve its weaknesses and to be aware of threats from 
the external environment. The recommendations are divided into six aspects namely: (1) 
legal basis, (2) institutional, (3) training process, (4) effectiveness of audit reports, (5) 
human resources, and (6) Information Technology. 
8.3.1 Legal Basis Aspects 
 To strengthen the role and functions of the ethics board and Inspectorate 
unit of BPK (see 6.2.1). 
 To implement audit law and audit standards effectively with law 
enforcement and sanctions for any BPK Members and auditors Memberwho 
do not comply with regulations, such as accepting bribes or other 
gratification from auditees (see 6.1.3).  
 To keep proposing judicial reviews of the tax and State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) Laws that impede BPK from auditing national tax revenues and 
SOEs (see 4.1.2. and 4.2.2.). 
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8.3.2 Institutional and Resources Aspects 
 To communicate effectively between BPK, Parliament and government 
about the importance of accessing data and information for auditing tax 
revenues, Supreme Court revenues, and SOEs, as mandated by the 
Constitution (see 7.1.2. and 7.2.1.). 
 To protect auditors who uncover sensitive cases (such as fraud, corruption 
and other irregularities) from external pressures, to maintain their audit 
independence and the quality of audit reports (see 6.1.3. and 6.2.3). 
 To build networking with public sector auditors‘ professional association, 
public policy and public administration groups to develop auditor expertise 
in measuring organisational performance (see 5.4.2. and 6.2.3.).  
 To create stronger commitment and integrity of BPK MemberMembers in 
providing objective and credible information in audit reports through 
training and education that focus on psychomotor and cognitive targets, 
such as revitalisation, integrity and anti-corruption ethics training programs 
(see 4.3.2. and 6.3.3).  
 To improve the quality of audit resources in all new BPK representative 
offices, mainly for IT that allows auditors to (i) access data and information 
relating to the activities of the audit office and public sector regulations and 
documents, (ii) to share information between auditors and other interest 
groups, (iii) to get faster and cheaper communication with other SAIs, and 
(iv) to help auditors detect fraud and toconduct audits of disasters (see 
6.3.4. and 6.3.5.). 
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8.3.3 Effectiveness of Audit Reports Aspects 
 To pay more attention to performance auditing for assessing the results, 
outputs, benefits and impacts of public sector organisations in the short, 
medium and long terms to improve the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of state programs (see 4.2.1.). 
 To assist Members of Parliament to understand BPK audit reports to better 
perform their duties and functions to hold public agencies accountable to 
the public (see 7.1.2. and 7.1.3.).  
 To focus on the follow up of audit reports, with providing concrete and 
constructive recommendations, clearer and more understandable analysis 
that takes into account the needs of stakeholders (see 5.4.2).  
 To provide more effectivemonitoring and controlling in the implementation 
of the followup to audit reports (see 5.4.3). 
8.3.4 Human ResourceDevelopment Aspects 
 To allow more opportunities for graduate auditors to pursue formal and 
professional education and trainings inside and outside the country to 
develop their knowledge and skills, especially to improve BPK capacity to 
conductperformance auditing and to comply with audit standards. 
Moreover, professional development of auditors through an e-learning 
strategy opens for the future learning environment in BPK (see 6.3.2, 6.3.3, 
and 6.3.4.). 
 To improve communication building capacity of auditors with stakeholders, 
both orally and written. Effective communication can improve 
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understanding of BPK audit findings and reports which also reducing 
misunderstanding between auditors and auditees (see 5.1.2. and 5.2.2.).  
 To improve the credibility of information in audit reports in providing an 
objective report for gaining greater support and trust from auditees, users 
and other stakeholders (see 4.3.2.).   
 To improve the knowledge and understanding of auditors in information 
technology for providing timelier audit reports (see 5.3.2.). 
 To provide better recommendations for auditees by improving 
understanding on the problems faced by the bureaucracy, public 
administration and management. Especially for performance auditing which 
each auditee has different performance indicators in accordance with the 
type of public services provided (see 5.4.2. and 5.4.3.). 
 To rotate BPK auditors for different auditees to reduce the possibility of 
cooperative negotiation or negotiation impasses between auditors and 
auditees (see 6.1.3.).  
 To provide a wider variety of multidisciplinary skills, besides accounting 
and management, for conducting performance auditing (see 6.2.4.). 
 To develop the curriculum, teaching methods, trainers and training facilities 
based on a training needs analysis (see 6.3.3.).  
8.4 Further Research 
This research has opened the gates to public sector auditing in exploring the 
effectiveness of public sector in Indonesia in depth. It has shown that the study of 
government auditing in Indonesia is challenging, in particular if it is linked with the 
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realities of audited entities, Members of Parliaments and resources of BPK at local levels. 
Many areas, which could not be given proper attention by this study, are recommended for 
further research.These areas follow:  
 to explore more empirical work of actual impact and outcomes of 
performance auditing in the Indonesian public sector in different groups of 
entities, such as regional governments, central government (departments 
and non departments), and state and regionally owned enterprises;  
 to evaluate the implementation of law enforcement and criminal sanctions 
for auditors and auditees to ensure compliance with existing laws and 
regulations in Indonesia;  
 to examine how the implementation of performance auditing will influence 
the effectiveness and efficiency of public sector bodies in general and will 
lead to good governance in the Republic of Indonesia;  
Nevertheless, there will be challenges in putting these recommendations into 
practice. For example, it would be difficult to reform the police, the Attorney General and 
government institutions generally. Moreover, assessing the quality of public policy and 
management related to the roles and functions of auditing and politics would be quite 
challenging because it is more complex. However, for Indonesia to be seen as a modern, 
forward-looking nation, and one that is seriously addressing the problems of corruption, 
collusion and nepotism, these challenges are well worth facing. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaires 
 
Survey Questionnaires of the Public Sector Audit Reports in Indonesia  
Part 1: Information Sheet 
 
 
Part 2: Information on Respondent 
Q1. Position  
 
Q2. Work Place  
Part 3: List of Questions 
The questionnare below relates to your opinion on the quality of information in BPK audit 
reports and factors influencing effectiveness or ineffectivenss of the reports, based on your 
experiences as auditor, auditee,or Member of Parliament. There are five (5) choices from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. 
If you have further comments to provide more information of your opinion, please fill in the 
comments box. 
 
Q1    Septiana Dwiputrianti is a PhD student in Policy and Governance Program of the Crawford 
School of Economics and Government (ANU). She has an academic background in economics 
and has been employed as a senior lecturer at School of Administration, the National Institute 
of Public Administration (STIA-LAN) Bandung (West Java). Her research is about the qualitfy of 
information in BPK reportsin promoting transparency and accountability in the Indonesian 
public sector agencies. Her study also compares the differences of period before and after the 
audit reform. This research aims to understand the effectiveness of BPKand to throw light on 
the factors influencing effectiveness or ineffectiveness of external auditing in Indonesia. If you 
need more information about this research, please see this website: 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/students/showphd.php?id=25&surname=Dwiputrianti 
 
    If you would like more information about this research, please contact: 
Septiana Dwiputrianti 
The Crawford School of Economics and Government 
The Australian National University (ANU), Canberra, Australia 
Tel: 61-2-6125 1300 
Fax: 61-2- 6125 5570 
Email: septiana.dwiputrianti@anu.edu.au. 
 
   If you have any concern about this research that you do not wish to discuss with Septiana, you 
can contact: 
Policy and Governance Program 
J.G Crawford Building, Building #13,  
The Crawford School of Economics and Government, ANU 
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia 
Tel: +61 2 6125 4705 
Fax: +61 2 6125 5570 
Email: crawford-programs@anu.edu.au 
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Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Q3. Information in BPK 
reports provides 
clear audit scopes 
and objectives  
     
 Comments 
       
Q4. Information in audit 
reports is supported 
by strong evidence. 
     
 Comments 
 
Q5. Information in BPK 
reports is objective 
(using appropriate 
audit technique and 
professional 
judgment). 
     
 Comments 
 
Q6. Information in BPK 
reports is credible 
(trusted by 
stakeholders) 
 
 
    
 Comments 
 
Q7. Information in BPK 
reports is clear and 
understandable. 
     
 Comments 
 
Q8. Format of BPK 
reports is precise 
and informative. 
     
 Comments 
 
Q9. BPK results are 
reported timely.  
     
 Comments  
 
 
Q10. BPK reports are 
published. 
     
 Comments 
 
 
 
Q11. BPK auditors 
provide realistic 
recommendations. 
     
 Comments 
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Q12. BPK reports are 
followed up. 
 
     
 Comments 
 
 
Q13. BPK auditors are 
professionalis and 
have integrity.  
     
 Comments 
 
 
Q14. BPK has sufficient 
audit resources 
     
 Comments 
 
 
Q15. Government 
agencies followed-
up BPK reports and 
recommendations. 
     
 Comments 
 
 
Q16. Members of 
Parliament 
reviewed BPK 
reports. 
     
 Comments 
 
Q17.  Authorised 
investigators 
followed up BPK 
findings with 
indication of 
corruption and 
fraud. 
     
 Comments 
 
Q.18 Public and media 
support supporting 
BPK functions.  
     
 Comments 
 
 
Part 4: Consent form  
If you agree to participate in the interview, please give your contact details as the consent 
form. 
1. Office Address 
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2. Phone (home) 
 
 
3.  Phone (office) 
 
 
4.  Mobile  
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
List 
Interview 
Number Group of Interviewee Position 
 
Date 
A.  Auditees  
 
A1 Local Head of West Java Province High Official 
28/02/2007 
A2 West Java Province government  Middle Official 
24/09/2009 
A3 National Electricity Company (PLN) Middle Official 
19/02/2007 
A4 National Oil Company (Pertamina) Middle Official 
20/02/2007 
A5 
Ministry of Home Affair-Inspectorate 
General  Middle Official 
14/02/2007 
A6 Ministry of Education Inspectorate General  Middle Official 
04/01/2007 
A7 Ministry of Education Inspectorate General  Internal auditors 
04/02/2007 
A8 Ministry of Finance Inspectorate General  Middle Official 
10/01/2007 
A9 and A10 
Planning and Organisation Division of the 
Ministry of Finance Inspectorate General  
Middle 
manager/official 
08/03/2007 (A9) 
12/01/2007 (A10) 
A11 Local government of Cianjur District Internal auditors 
20/03/2007 
A12 
Secretary of Financial Management Reform 
Committee of the Ministry of Finance Middle Official 
11/01/2007 
A13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Middle Official 
18/1/2007 
A14 National Development Planning Board  Project Manager 
5/12/2006 
A15 Local government of Cianjur District Internal auditors 
19/03/2007 
A16 Ministry of Finance Consultant 
19/12/2006 
A17 
Centre Education and Training for 
Apparatus Finance Section 
19/3/2007 
A18 Mandiri Bank 
Auditee-Finance 
section 
11/12/2006 
A19 Department of Public Works 
Research and 
Development Centre 
20/08/2009 
A20 Local government of Bandung city Finance Section 
19/03/2007 
A21 Local government of Bandung city Finance Section 
21/03/2007 
A22 Local government of Bandung city Finance Section 
22/03/2007 
A23 
Water Drinking Regional Enterprise 
(PDAM) Sukabumi 
Auditee - high 
manager/official 
28/02/2007 
A24 Local government of Cianjur District Internal auditors 
19/03/2007 
20/03/2007 
A25 Local government of Jambi Province Middle Official 
16/09/2009 
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List 
Interview 
Number Group of Interviewee Position 
 
Date 
B 
The Audit Board of the Republic Indonesia 
(BPK)  
 
B1 Member II of BPK High Official 
21/03/2007 
B2 Member IV of BPK  High Official 
6/12/2006 
B3 Public Relation and Public Service Division A Senior Official 
08/12/2006 
B4 Internal Controller of BPK Middle Official 
11/02/2007 
B5 Public Relation and Public Service Division  Middle Official 
06/12/2006 
B6 Organisation Bureau Middle Official 
4/12/2006 
B7 Public Services Sub Unit Middle Official 
22/11/2006 
B8 Human Resource Bureau Middle Official 
6/12/2006 
B9 Public Relation and Public Service Division  Middle Official 
08/12/2006 
B10 Research and Development Division High Official 
14/03/2010 
B11 State Finance III (AKN III) Middle Official 
14/03/2007 
B12 State Finance I (AKN I) Middle Official 
06/08/2007 
B13 State Finance I (AKN I) Auditor 
06/08/2007 
B14 Ministry of National Education Internal Auditor 
13/02/2007 
B15 State Finance III (AKN III) Auditor 
14/03/2007 
B16 State Finance II (AKN II) Auditor 
15/03/2007 
B17 State Finance I (AKN I) Auditor 
15/03/2007. 
B18 State Finance I (AKN I) Auditor 
06/08/2007 
B19 State Finance II (AKN II) Auditor 
14/03/2007. 
B20 State Finance III (AKN III) Auditor 
15/03/2007. 
B21 State Finance IV (AKN IV) Auditor 
06/08/2007 
B22 State Finance IV (AKN IV) Auditor 
15/03/2007. 
B23 State Finance V (AKN V) Auditor 
13/03/2007 
B24 State Finance V (AKN V) Auditor  
06/08/2007 
B25 Mutiplying Report Sub-Division Middle Official 
14/01/2007 
B26 Legal Affairs Bureau Middle Official 
9/1/2007 
B27 Publication Sub-Division  Middle Official 
8/12/2006 
B28 Training and Education Centre  Trainer 
4/01/2007 
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List 
Interview 
Number Group of Interviewee Position 
 
Date 
C. Parliament / Regional Parliaments  
 
C1 Commission II of PAN faction 
Member of 
Parliament 
25/01/2007 
C2 Commission VII of PAN faction 
Member of 
Parliament 
5/3/2007 
C3 Commission VI of PAN faction 
Member of 
Parliament 
5/3/2007 
C4 Commission I of Golkar faction 
Member of 
Parliament 
19/2/2007 
C5 Commission I of PAN faction 
Member of 
Parliament 
7/2/2007 
C6 Commission XI of PAN faction 
Member of 
Parliament 
09/1/2007 
C7   
 
C8 Commission V of PKB faction 
Member of 
Parliament 
1/12/2006 
C9 Kuningan regional Parliament 
Member of Regional 
Parliament 
4/2/2007 
C10 West Java Province regional Parliament 
Member of Regional 
Parliament 
26/1/2007 
C11   
 
C12 Commission III of PKS faction 
Member of 
Parliament 
 
D General Secretariat of Parliament   
 
D1  
Teh analysis and Budget Implementation for 
State and Regional Budget Bureau Head  
26/11/2006 
D2 
BPK Audit Reports and Senate Budget Sub 
Division  Head 
29/11/2006 
D3 
Budgeting and Auditing and 
Implementation of State Budget Bureau  Staff 
23/11/2006 
D4 Research Unit for Parliament Study Researcher 
18/2/2007 
E. Academics  
 
E1 Public Administration School Lecturer 
6/3/2007 
E2 Padjadjaran University Lecturer 
5/2/2007 
F Others  
 
F1 
B-Trust – A Non-Government Organisation 
(NGO) Researcher 
6/3/2007 
F2 
The secondment program at Australian 
National Audit Office (ANAO), Canberra 
Participation from 
BPK 
24/8/2007 
F3 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) Middle manager 
18/7/2007 
F4 Ex-auditor of BPK Private accountant 
24/11/2006 
F5 ADB Loan Monitoring Unit STAR SDP Deputy Team Leader  
04/03/2007 
359 
List 
Interview 
Number Group of Interviewee Position 
 
Date 
F6 General Secretariat of Parliament Researcher 
15/3/2007 
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Appendix C: Comparison of BPK Before and After the Audit Reform 
No 
 
Auditing Aspects Before Audit Reform 
(1945-2000) 
After Audit Reform 
(2001-2009) 
1. Scope BPK had very limited scope of auditing: 
BPKP had a large number of auditees (SOEs, central 
and local governments), compared with BPK (only 
auditing the central government). 
Focused only on financial and compliance auditing, 
that was limited to the expenditure of the state budget 
(APBN). 
BPK prohibited from auditing the ‘gold mining state’, 
such as the Bank of Indonesia, the National Airline 
Company, the National Oil Company, State-owned 
Bank, and SOEs.  
Much larger scope of auditing: 
Mandated to audit all state finances, including all central and 
local governments. 
Not only financial auditing, but also performance auditing 
and specific purposes auditing. 
2. Data and information as 
evidence 
Had no power to seek, search and seize documents 
and other related items for auditing. 
Had insufficient access to relevant information and 
data from public sector agencies 
Clear authority to access any data and information from 
auditees.  
Sanctions applied for auditors, officials, and Members of BPK 
who misuse audit data and information. 
3. Objectivity and Credibility 
of audit information 
BPK could not examine the accountability of 
government in managing public resources. 
No transparency, objectivity and credibility of audit 
reports.  
Audit reports were tailored to suit the government’s 
‘interests and had to be checked and sorted by the 
State Secretary Office in order to prevent instability of 
national security. 
The Law on BPK (2006) and BPK audit standards (2007) 
gives basic rules and standards for reporting audit findings 
objectively and credibly.  
The quality of information and and performance of BPK audit 
reports are reviewed by another SAI. 
 
4. Understandable 
Information 
Reports were difficult to understand, due to too many 
technical financial, accounting and auditing terms. 
Reports provide summaries, making them easier to read. 
Reports provid explanation/glossary of some technical terms. 
5. Precise and Informative 
Formatting 
Audit reports were difficult to read, being too 
complicated, long, with poor format,  
Simple and precise reports. 
Interesting and user-friendly report format with elegant lay 
out, pictures, and charts. 
6. Timely Reporting Out-of- date audit information. 
Reports were too late for sending to Parliament (just 
for formality, as BPK was only a ‘rubber stamp’ for the 
Reports issued on time as mandated by Laws. 
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No 
 
Auditing Aspects Before Audit Reform 
(1945-2000) 
After Audit Reform 
(2001-2009) 
government).  
7. Publication of Audit Reports Reports were never published; resulting in there was 
no control from the public. 
Reports are published both in printed form and electronically 
in BPK website.  
Published reports help the public to participate in controlling 
government performance and accountability. 
8. Realistic audit opinion and 
recommendations 
Could not provide audit opinion as auditees did not 
provide financial reports. 
No standard for providing realistic audit 
recommendations. 
 
All auditees are compulsory to provide financial reports that 
include reports of: budget revenues and expenditure; balance 
statement; cash flow; and notes to financial statement. 
Follow up of audit reports of BPK has been mandated by 
Constitution and the Law on Audit (2004) and the Law on 
BPK (2006). 
9. Follow-up on Audit Reports There was no follow-up of BPK audit reports by 
government as auditees had no obligation to follow up 
audit findings and recommendations. 
Members of Parliament did not follow up audit 
reports as submission of BPK reports was only 
formality. 
Audit reports did not indicate corruption/fraud as the 
reports had been sorted by government. 
 
Follow up of BPK audit reports is mandated by the Law on 
Audit. 
Members of Parliament have a major task to oversee the 
performance and accountability of the government. 
Many findings indicate corruption and frauds that must be 
followed up by KPK, Attorney General or Police. 
Follow up of BPK recommendations are very important to 
providing better performance in public administration, 
management and results.  
10. Independence  Absence of checks and balances in state finances and 
policies. 
Under control of authoritarian government and could 
not perform independently. 
The mandate of Constitution that BPK was an 
independent audit institution was not respected by 
the state leaders of the Republic of Indonesia. 
BPKP (under the government) had exactly the same 
function with BPK as external auditors.  
BPK budget under the power of government (the 
Ministry of Finance). 
No independence in the election, appointment and 
dismissal of the Board Members. BPK leaders were 
appointment by the President.  
Bolstered by the mandate of Constitution as an independent 
SAI in Indonesia. BPK has a major function in improving the 
transparency and accountability of public sector. 
Clear difference of function between BPKP (a part of 
government) and BPK (independent body), no rivalry. 
Budget is independent from the government. 
New appointment system of the Board of Members, including 
the Chairman and Vice Chairman. BPK leaders have more 
independence and autonomy and are appointed by 
Parliament. 
Clear regulations to maintain the independence of auditors 
and personnel of BPK. 
BPK has authority to organize its human resources 
management and is no more subject to strict rules 
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No 
 
Auditing Aspects Before Audit Reform 
(1945-2000) 
After Audit Reform 
(2001-2009) 
Had no authority to organize its personnel. administered by MENPAN. 
 
11.  Integrity and 
Professionalism 
Lack of integrity and professionalism as BPK Members 
and auditors had no formal regulation of immunity, 
legal protection and security assurance. 
No formal rule in the form of a Code of Ethics for BPK 
personnel and auditors.  
Difficult to maintain auditors’ integrity and 
professionalism, as auditors received very low income 
with high-risk audits, and accepted financial support 
from auditees.  
Not enough resources to improve the capacity and 
skills of BPK auditors and personnel. 
Integrity and professionalism of BPK has been improved 
significantly, with skilled auditors and professional training.. 
New Code of Ethics with detailed rules for maintaining the 
auditors’ integrity and professionalism implemented and 
supervised by the Honorary Members of Code of Ethics 
Board.  
Auditors not allowed accepting any money, facilities, tickets 
and accommodation from auditees. 
 
7. Budget Resources A very limited budget, funded from State Annual 
Budget (APBN) which was determined by government 
(the Ministry of Finance). 
BPKP had exactly the same duties and functions as 
BPKP but BPKP had large sums of money and facilities 
compared with BPK.  
BPK strongly influenced by government to restrict its 
capacity to examine the accountability of government. 
 
Process of determining BPK budget and auditing the budget is 
regulated by the Law on BPK (2006). 
BPK’s budget determined separately from the state budget 
with special allocated from the government after getting 
approval from Parliament based on BPK proposal (audit 
needs). 
Budget resources added from many grants and loans of 
international organization, such as: ADB, AusAid, and USAID.  
Financial accountability of BPK is audited by an independent 
Public Accountant Office (KAP) annually.  
Better compensation for employees (structural, auditors and 
staff). 
8. Personnel/Human 
Resources  
The Chairmen of BPK had no power to manage their 
own organization, as all personnel of BPK were under 
the rules of the Ministry of Empowerment State 
Apparatus (MENPAN) and the State Personnel Board 
(BKN), including their salary and rules, such as other 
public servant of government institutions, with no 
flexibility in personnel management.  
Limited number of professional personnel as the 
professional quality of auditors and personnel grew 
The requirement of the Law on BPK (2006) and audit 
standards (2007) have changed the management of BPK 
human resources. 
The Human Resources Bureau manages BPK auditors and 
employees as capital and assets of organization 
Significant improvement of recruitments numbers and 
qualification of personnel.  
Availability of the Code of Ethics for auditors and BPK 
Members. 
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Auditing Aspects Before Audit Reform 
(1945-2000) 
After Audit Reform 
(2001-2009) 
very slowly with limited opportunity to improve 
employees’ capacity. 
No professional organization for public sector 
auditors with background from outside accounting. 
Lack of integrity as there was no clear auditor’s code 
of ethics; and auditors accepted facilities and 
inducements from auditees. 
No clear personnel planning and criteria development, 
with strong bureaucratic culture, where promotion 
and appointment were based on seniority, instead of 
performance. 
Implementation of rewards and punishment. 
Appointment based on performance, instead of seniority. 
BPK auditors are officers of Parliament and assist the role 
and functions its Members. 
Much greater opportunity to improve auditors’ and 
employees’ capacity through several human resources 
capacity building programs in BPK. 
 
9.  Training and Education 
Centre 
Training and education development centres were not 
managed effectively and professionally, having with 
qualified trainers and poor facilities. 
No evaluation after training programs. 
Auditors lacked of motivation to participate in 
training programs. 
Limited opportunities for BPK auditors and staff to 
pursue their education and develop their skills and 
professionalism. 
Only one training and education centre at Kalibata, 
Jakarta. 
No clear training needs analysis for auditors. 
 
Continuous professional development of audit skills 
The numbers and quality of training and education improved 
through development cooperation with other SAIs for 
education, training, workshops and seminar programs. 
Improvement of support from international organization 
funding and aid. 
Opening wider opportunities for auditors and staff to pursue 
their education. 
Two other trainings and education centres at Medan 
(western part of Indonesia) and at Makassar (eastern part of 
Indonesia). 
Compulsory training for developing capacity for functional 
auditors, at least 20 hours of 80 hours education within 1-2 
years period.  
10. Modern Equipment  No Information Technology (IT) Bureau 
Suffered fromlack of IT resources and modern 
equipment. 
No electronic communication network and website 
New Bureau of Information Technology opened 
M modern equipment, audit information systems and 
applications developed to support BPK roles and functions. 
Improved capacity of electronic communication and Local 
Area Network (LAN). 
 
 
